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APPENDIX 1
ABSTRACT
This qualitative research study examines moral responsiveness and thinking in a mixed 
gender class o f primary school children over a period o f four and a half years. It sets out 
to track development in children’s moral awareness, looking at gains and losses from 
middle to late childhood, and focusing on cognitive skills, notions of moral rectitude, 
and interpersonal relationships and friendship.
The first part o f the study is designed to offer a theoretical background to inform 
interpretation o f the data in the second part. It examines major issues in morality and 
moral education in the context of significant recent debates across several disciplines, 
including developmental psychology, philosophy, sociology and education; it also 
offers a theoretical perspective on children’s ability to think together about morality in a 
community of enquiry and on related issues of pedagogy.
Through interpretation of transcripts, the second part o f the study analyses the 
children’s thinking, in response to a wide range o f content, on issues o f justice, 
freedom and responsibility, rights and duties, inclusiveness, and friendship. Gender 
differences, most notably the reticence of girls to express themselves in a mixed gender 
group after about age ten, are also examined.
The study demonstrates how, through participation in a community of ethical enquiry 
such as Thinking Time -  Philosophy with Children, children become more thoughtful 
and develop respect and responsiveness to others as well as other traits of character that 
are central to democratic citizenship.
vi
GENERAL IN TR O D U C TIO N
1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1 In troduction
Parties shall assure to the child who is capable o f forming his or her own views 
the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views 
of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of 
the child (Article 12, UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989).
This thesis is an enquiry into what might broadly be called children’s moral 
development as enacted within an educational setting. More specifically, it is an in- 
depth study o f a mixed gender class of primary school children over a four and a half 
year period, focusing on a sequence of structured discussions by them of a range of 
moral topics concerning issues of justice, freedom and responsibility, rights and duties, 
inclusiveness and friendship. The primary focus is on the children’s thinking about 
these issues, particularly as this is shaped by the interactive process within which it 
occurs. Accordingly, it examines the children’s moral concepts and the thinking skills 
they deploy in developing them as well as the judgements they make, and the kind of 
reasoning that supports these judgements. It also analyses the dynamics o f dialogue in 
the group, the patterns o f responsiveness among the children, how they influence and 
are influenced by one another in the development of their thinking. It is concerned too 
with affective issues, with the development of disposition and sensibility and the 
emergence o f “moral selfhood” as this can be gleaned from the voices that are given 
expression in the group discussions. While the thesis is not a full-scale longitudinal 
study, nor exclusively a study of gender issues in moral education, nonetheless it takes 
advantage of the fact that the data were gathered in a mixed gender class over several 
years o f  primary schooling to identify and discuss some important issues concerning the 
development of moral thinking as well as some salient differences between boys and 
girls.
The thesis comprises two main parts. Part I establishes a theoretical context for the 
case study analysis that is conducted in Part II. It explores a wide range of significant 
and influential writing on moral development and education in childhood, on children’s 
moral thinking, and the social and interactive contexts o f their construction o f meaning 
and value. It looks at key landmark studies on these issues, and tracking significant
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debates about them across a range of disciplines -  including psychology, philosophy, 
sociology, and educational studies -  it attempts to establish an overall sense of the 
contemporary state of these debates. Part II of the study is devoted to an interpretative 
analysis o f the data gathered for the case study, which consists o f forty-seven transcripts 
of structured discussions by a class group over a period o f four and a half years of 
fieldwork. Further specification of the nature of the fieldwork and of the methodological 
rubrics that governed the analysis of data is offered in section 1.4 below. The purpose of 
Part I is to enable this analysis to be carried out in the light o f salient research and 
scholarship and, beyond the necessary considerations o f methodological rigour, to 
provide a substantive theoretical context that can inform the particular interpretative 
work of Part II.
In the rest o f this introduction I will outline
(i) the generative context of the study
(ii) its overall purpose
(iii) the key methodological issues involved in the qualitative analysis of data in 
Part II
(iv) a brief overview of the content and sequence of the study, chapter by 
chapter.
1.2 G e n e ra tiv e  c o n te x t o f  th e  s tu d y
A lot has been said and written about a decline -  or alleged decline -  in morality in 
post-modern Ireland. Blame has been attributed to radical change in family structure, 
increasing marital breakdown and a general erosion o f “family values” . This has been 
related to a general slackening of discipline often traced back to cultural changes, whose 
first stirrings became evident in the 1960s. The media paints apocalyptic scenarios, 
evoking an atmosphere of great uncertainty caused by a shifting o f moral parameters 
and especially by a marked decline in religious practice and belief and a much 
diminished role and influence for the church(es). This is accompanied by a widespread 
sense that standards in politics and in business have slipped abysmally -  a sense 
fostered by a spate of revelations in a succession o f official tribunals about widespread 
corruption o f government ministers, county councillors, civil servants, local officials, 
captains o f industry, and not least the police. In relation to young people, this sense of 
moral alarm tends to focus on high incidences o f  substance abuse including binge
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drinking and drug-taking, and to highlight as a special concern increasing rates of 
suicide, especially among young males. Such issues have been dramatised and often 
sensationalised in the media but they have also become increasingly the focus of 
concern for parents and educators.
Much of this concern has an indigenous ring but it also reflects wider concerns in 
western societies where many see the values of individualism, consumerism, and the 
market unravelling social ties and undermining the moral basis o f communities. In 
many urban environments in Ireland and in other advanced industrialised societies there 
is supposed to be a diminished sense of belonging or identity with widespread alienation 
and social fragmentation. Ireland has also begun to experience unprecedented change in 
making the transition from a society where large-scale emigration has been the norm to 
a society with significant immigration annually; it is increasingly becoming a multi­
ethnic society, obliged to accommodate difference and redefine Irishness.
Mindful of these various changes and reactions they have provoked in the media and 
among parents and educators, I became more curious about children’s own thoughts and 
feelings about morality as it arose in their experience or impinged on their lives. In my 
experience in engaging with primary school children both as main-stream class teacher 
and special educational needs teacher over many years, I had occasion to observe some 
of their different ways of thinking and reasoning in school situations, e.g. their frequent 
assertions of “that’s not fair” and “you shouldn’t do that” ; and this had aroused my 
interest in how they judge right and wrong and what shapes their moral outlooks. This 
led me to study moral thinking in two groups o f children (an older and a younger group) 
for the degree o f Master of Education (Russell, 2000). As a primary school teacher with 
access to children and enjoying their parents’ confidence, 1 was in a privileged position 
to immerse myself in the children’s world with a view to researching their thinking. 
Having completed this research, I was more aware of its inherent interest and value and 
at the same time acutely conscious of how much more work could be done in this area. I 
was encouraged too by a significant change o f attitude towards children at official level 
in Ireland, influenced by the kind of thinking enshrined in the UN Convention on the 
Rights o f the Child, cited at the beginning of this introduction and issuing in the 
publication o f The National Children’s Strategy Our children -  Their Lives 
(Government o f Ireland, 2000), This document marked a decisive shift away from any 
idea that children’s views were undeserving of serious attention or that they were 
incapable of reasoning or unfit for meaningful civic participation. It insisted that
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“children’s voice” and “agency” were to be respected and promoted, that they were to 
be consulted on all matters affecting them and that they had both a capacity and a right 
to contribute actively to shaping their society and environment. The whole ethos of this 
important document, then, provided a supportive backdrop when I decided to analyse 
the thinking o f my younger group over the following four years until they were at the 
end of the primary school cycle (which in Ireland is at an average age o f twelve). This 
entailed following the same group of children through to their next school and liaising 
with parents, Principal and Board of Management with a view to securing permission 
and approval for further research.
Apart from these wider considerations concerning culture and policy, another more 
particular aspect o f the context out of which this study emerges should be noted here. 
This concerns my engagement for over a decade in the classroom practice of “Thinking 
Time” or “Philosophy with Children”, This practice, partially inspired by though not 
modelled on the Philosophy for Children programme developed by Matthew Lipman 
and his associates, and now widely disseminated internationally, has been developed by 
a group o f  teachers and teacher educators in Ireland. Beginning in 1989, this practice 
has been adopted in a number of Irish primary schools, with support from principals and 
boards of management and actively encouraged by some school inspectors. It has been 
disseminated through in-service courses and Master of Education modules and the 
Association of Teachers of Philosophy with Children has been founded under whose 
auspices ongoing development and research has been promoted with financial support 
from the Department of Education and Science; a specialist journal Arista  has been 
founded.
A  Thinking Time session is a class discussion on a topic of interest to the children, 
often selected by them, and conducted in a circle with the teacher participating as 
facilitator and stimulator of good discussion. It thus becomes a community o f  enquiry or 
community o f  persons-in-relation, speakers and hearers, who communicate with each 
other under conditions of equality and reciprocity and with a willingness on the part of 
the participants to reconstruct what they hear from one another and to submit their 
views to the self-correcting process of further enquiry. According to Lipman & Sharp 
(1994), such a community presupposes as core values, care for one another as persons, 
and respect for each other’s views. In the setting of Thinking Time, children have an 
opportunity to reflect on important issues, to encounter, understand and respect different 
views, and to reconsider and perhaps alter their own opinions in light o f the beliefs and
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experiences shared with them by others. What I especially experienced from my 
ongoing engagement in Thinking Time was a new greatly sensitised capacity to listen to 
children and through this listening an increased appreciation o f and fascination by their 
thinking on a wide range of issues. This experience led me to see Thinking Time as a 
fruitful laboratory, so to speak, in which more focused research in children’s thinking 
could be conducted, and increasingly it was their moral thinking that interested me. I 
also became aware of what seemed a significant advantage that research conducted in 
this setting might have over much of the most influential research in what might be 
called “the dominant paradigm” on children’s moral development. While there has been 
much research into children’s moral thinking, as mediated in one-to-one interview 
formats where they respond to adult questioning, most notably by Piaget (1932), 
Kohlbeig (1981) and Gilligan (1982), not many studies have focused on children’s 
deliberations in dialogical settings and the changes in their thinking engendered by 
participation in such a setting. Accordingly, I felt that in Thinking Time I had not only a 
feasible medium for research but also in some respects, a more fruitful one for accessing 
the more dynamic and creative aspects of children’s thinking, its construction within 
social settings o f peers, and perhaps its expression in more “authentic voices” than 
might be captured through the more standard asymmetrical interview format.
1.3 P u rp o se  o f  the  s tu d y
The purpose o f this study is to investigate moral awareness in a mixed gender class of 
primary school children as facilitated by a dedicated process o f group discussion over a 
period of four and a half years. The study does not aim to test any detailed, pre­
formulated hypothesis; it sets out, rather, to generate a large data-base of transcripts of 
an extended sequence of such discussions and then to reconstruct inductively from these 
data what they tell us about the moral thinking and responsiveness o f these children 
over that period. While primarily inductive in nature, the study did o f course have a 
determining focus of interest and some shaping questions — which were themselves a 
function both o f my previous practical experience and my reading of related theoretical 
literature. At the outset of the study my interest was in morally salient aspects of 
children’s experience in a broad sense and my questions concerned such basic issues as: 
How do children form their views on moral matters? What for them is a moral matter 
and what makes it count as such? What shapes their moral outlooks -  and how, and how
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much, do they themselves do this shaping through more or less autonomous processes 
o f thinking and reasoning? What role is played by their views -  and the thinking and 
reasoning supporting these views — in influencing their actions and behaviour and 
shaping their characters? How might this role be affected by factors that are not purely 
cognitive, such as emotion, habit and motivation? It was questions o f this degree of 
generality that first prompted the study. In addition, I was interested in tracking 
development in the children with regard to the substance of these questions (while 
remaining open to the possibility that this ‘development’ might in some respects entail 
losses as well as gains). While I was interested in the thinking of individual children, 
my primary focus was on how this thinking influenced and was influenced by the 
thinking of other children in the whole group. One of my primary interests, in fact, was 
to examine the potency of the particular format of discussion that I was using with the 
children (Thinking Time -  Philosophy with Children) as a medium of moral education -  
in terms of its effectiveness in enhancing children’s moral thinking, enabling them to 
become more thoughtful, respectful and responsive to others, and fostering traits of 
character that are central to democratic citizenship.
To generate data that would help me to pursue these broad interests and questions, I 
engaged in a series of discussions with these children within the setting of Thinking 
Time. Over the course of these discussions (forty seven in all) I introduced many topics 
dealing with issues, for example, of justice, freedom, rights and responsibilities, 
property claims and friendship. There was no specific blue-print for selecting topics, 
many of which emerged in response either to the children’s attention or enthusiasm (or 
lack thereof) in the preceding session(s) or to contemporary events with moral import, 
often dramatised in the media, that clearly sparked their interest. My major purpose in 
the study then was to offer an illuminating interpretation o f the data gathered during an 
extended period of field-work that was guided by an overall pattern o f interest while at 
the same time, within this overall pattern, remaining open to a considerable degree of 
improvisation.
With the data assembled and subjected to a preliminary reading, I was in a position to 
specify more clearly defined aims for the study -  or to clarify the lines along which the 
interpretation should run, by indicating more precisely the aspects o f children’s moral 
awareness that it was intended to illuminate. The study aims, then, to develop an 
account o f the children’s moral awareness in three distinct though related respects: a) 
the cognitive skill and sensitivity involved in the formation o f their views -  their
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growing ability to deduce, infer, generalise, justify, make apt distinctions, reflect on the 
evidence or arguments underpinning their moral judgements, take the perspective of the 
other and, in particular, allow this perspective to challenge and possibly transform their 
own; b) the content of their notions of moral rightness and goodness, and the 
relationship of this to heightened moral sensibility, dispositions to act rightly or well, 
and overall development as a moral self; and c) their understanding of the claims of 
personal relationship and especially of friendship and, in this respect, their sense of 
relevant differences between boys and girls.
These aims are pursued through two complementary phases o f the investigation: an 
interpretative analysis of the data constituted by transcripts o f the discussions with the 
children and, as a prelude, an examination of existing scholarship and debate -  across a 
range of disciplines, including developmental psychology, philosophy, sociology and 
education -  on core issues in moral education (and indeed morality itself), children’s 
ability to think collaboratively in a community of enquiry, related issues of pedagogy, 
and gender differences in middle and late childhood. This latter examination comprises 
the first part o f the study and is intended to provide a theoretical background to inform 
and situate the in-depth and detailed interpretation o f the accumulated transcripts 
presented in the second part of the study.
1.4 M e th o d o lo g y
1.4.1 Researching the theoretical background
In this research I was concerned to build a theoretical context for the kind of study of 
moral thinking in children that follows in Part II. This entailed a study o f recent 
research into children’s moral development, children’s cognitive processes, the social 
construction o f  thought, the use of narrative as a medium and trigger for moral 
reflection, the moral self as a largely narrative construct, virtue and moral disposition, 
and the role o f gender in moral orientation and development. In examining major issues 
in moral education I am inevitably drawn into debates within contemporary philosophy 
about the nature o f morality itself. Indeed the enquiry does not manage to avoid political 
philosophy and, in particular, the ways in which morality is differently conceived within 
a liberal perspective, emphasising freedom and rights, and a communitarian one 
emphasising communal responsibilities, civic virtues, and solidarity within a civil 
society with a strong premium on trust and civic friendship. Most central to Part I
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however, is the very influential body of work in cognitive developmental psychology, 
pioneered by Jean Piaget, extended significantly in the field by Lawrence Kohlberg, and 
later contested by Carol Gilligan.
Piaget’s (1932) work has had an enormous impact on twentieth century pedagogy 
but it is his moral stage theory that is of interest here. Kohlberg (1981), who further 
refined Piaget’s moral stage theory, has been the most influential and controversial 
figure in moral education since the 1960s. His emphasis is not on the content of 
morality but rather the form or structure o f moral reasoning, and this has tended to be 
the primary focus o f developmental moral education. Gilligan (1982), a central figure in 
the care versus justice debate, has been a major influence in questioning the dominance 
of cognitivist approaches to moral development in recent times. Lipman’s (1988, 1991) 
writings also have a special importance in Part I o f my study because of his pioneering 
work in Philosophy for Children, which helped to foster dialogue and reflective thinking 
and to turn the classroom into a community o f enquiry. Lipm an’s emphasis on dialogue 
is supported by Vygotsky’s theory of the social construction o f the self. The writings of 
these and other authors will be the object of attention and analysis in Part I. They are 
chosen because they address the central issues at stake in the thesis and because of their 
influence in recent debates about these issues as well as in practical approaches to moral 
education and classroom pedagogy. More specifically however, they are selected 
because the perspectives which they open up — and not least their diverging and 
conflicting emphases -  are intended to inform the different kind o f interpretative work 
carried out in Part II. That latter work is essentially a hermeneutical exercise; in 
Gadamerian terms one might say that Part I helps to form the “pre-cognitions” that are 
brought to it. One might also advert to a “hermeneutical circle” here. It is not only that 
Part I is intended to develop a more sensitive and critical eye for Part II. It is also the 
case that Part II can help to vivify as well as to confirm or challenge the readings of Part 
I.
1.4.2 Nature o f qualitative enquiry
In analysing the data on classroom practice I chose qualitative research methods for the 
following reasons. First, they are best suited to this type o f enquiry because they allow 
for interpretation of human thoughts and feelings (as expressed in the transcripts of 
recorded dialogues with the children). As a primary school teacher I was interested in
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understanding how children thought and felt, what shaped their understandings, how 
they formed their views, and how they used language to express those views and 
negotiate complex dilemmas. All this could best be captured through approaches geared 
to interpretation rather than proof. Therefore the philosophical underpinnings of this 
kind of research are different from those of quantitative research. Data were gathered in 
the natural setting which in this case was the classroom; I as researcher became the 
human instrument, and data analysis was inductive. The study might be characterised as 
illuminative in that its aim was to focus on meanings, understandings and perspectives 
operative in children’s utterances -  and in the whole conversations of which they were 
parts -  and to provide an account that rendered them more intelligible by grasping 
patterns o f coherence or divergence or by rendering more explicit and systematic what 
might otherwise have remained implicit and fragmentary. The children were revealing 
themselves through their words and my task was to capture the interrelatedness of these 
revelations in their complexity and diversity, and to do interpretative justice to the 
richness o f meaning contained in their words.
1.4.3 Research design and sample
The group chosen for this study consisted o f a mixed gender class o f 29 pupils aged 
between seven and eight years in the fourth year in primary school (2nd class). They 
were o f average ability and not deemed by the teaching community to be in any way 
exceptional. I began recording their dialogues in October 1998 and continued (with 
gaps) until May 2003. There were some changes in the composition o f the sample in 
that within two years of the commencement of field-work four pupils had left and five 
others had joined the group. The new members who joined the class came from various 
schools in the neighbourhood and were unfamiliar with the practice o f  Thinking Time -  
Philosophy with Children. A core group o f 25 participated from beginning to end of the 
study. The children were in a mixed-gender school in a middle-class urban area. In the 
first year o f the study they were in my own Junior School which has twenty teachers on 
the staff. They then entered the Senior School, also a mixed-gender school in the same 
area with twenty teachers on staff. For the final two years o f the study, the group 
comprised 14 girls and 16 boys.
In conducting the study I used the Constant Comparative Method o f Glasser & 
Strauss (1967), later expanded by Lincoln & Guba (1985) to analyse the transcripts o f
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recorded dialogues in the community o f enquiry. An emergent research design best 
suited my purposes as it meant ongoing data analysis where significant understandings 
could emerge in the process. I began with an initial focus o f enquiry and refined my 
focus as I proceeded with data collection and analysis.
1.4.4 Generating data: the pedagogical setting
As explained earlier the practice which provided the data for this study was Thinking 
Time — Philosophy with Children and I shall provide here a somewhat fuller account of 
what this practice entails. It was first introduced to Ireland in the late 1980s through the 
collaborative work of Philomena Donnelly and Joseph Dunne. The wider movement, 
Philosophy for Children, was begun by Matthew Lipman in the late 1960s. Lipman’s 
model envisages a high degree of intervention by the teacher and the use of particular 
texts. A narrative form of the philosophical text is considered the most appropriate way 
of bringing philosophy to children. Children do not study the canonical philosophers but 
take the first steps in becoming philosophers themselves. Later they are introduced to 
the rudiments o f formal and informal logic as an aid in strengthening their reasoning 
powers. Lipman’s (1988) basic contention is that if  we want children to become 
reflective adults we must encourage them to become reflective children.
The Irish model, popularly known as Thinking Time (Donnelly 1994), uses the 
community o f enquiry in a somewhat different way from that o f Lipman. The Socratic 
dialogue format is kept but there is less direct intervention by the teacher and more 
scope for open-ended discussion by the children and consequently greater access for the 
researcher to oral expressions of their thinking. The teacher is free to choose texts such 
as stories and poems which are used at the beginning of the session to stimulate and 
focus discussion, and the children can have an input here too, either in the choice of 
story, poem or the key question to be discussed. The change in name from the American 
one Philosophy fo r  Children to Philosophy with Children, is intended to emphasise the 
larger and less structured role given to children in this model.
Wonder is the driving force in children’s philosophical thinking and is something 
that conventional pedagogy has perhaps been reluctant to harness. Aristotle contends 
that philosophy begins in wonder {Metaphysics 982bl2). Echoing this also Gareth 
Matthews suggests that children’s puzzlement has a freshness and inventiveness that 
contrasts with the staleness that often accompanies maturity and suggests that teachers
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and parents fail to recognise the moments of pure reflection in children’s thinking 
(Matthews, 1984, p. 52). In the practice of Thinking Time one has ample opportunity to 
tune into and harness the children’s sense of wonder -  it takes only willingness and 
enthusiasm to conduct the practice on a regular basis and an ability to become more 
perceptive and skilful in doing so.
In my school Thinking Time sessions are conducted on a weekly basis with 
discussions lasting from twenty minutes with young children to forty-five minutes or 
more with older children. The children sit in a circle and the teacher joins them in the 
role of facilitator and participant observer. The circle arrangement is preferred because 
it allows all the participants to have eye contact with one another, and since a circle has 
neither a beginning nor an end, everyone is o f equal rank, including the teacher once he 
or she joins the circle. The role of the teacher, however, is not a passive one. While still 
retaining authority he or she encourages the children to take the initiative and express 
themselves freely and is at all times conscious that interventions on his or her part 
should aim to raise their thinking to a higher and more reflective level.
The theme for discussion is usually chosen one to four days beforehand so that the 
children have time for reflection. The first speaker volunteers and when finished 
speaking tips the person sitting next to him or her in the circle; that person has the 
choice o f speaking or remaining silent and passing the tip. This ensures minimum 
interruption and allows the dialogue to flow. Each child is encouraged to participate. 
One is free to remain silent if one so wishes, not least because the classroom community 
must be able to accommodate those for whom overt participation is painful or 
frightening. The ground rules, always on display on a poster and alluded to at the outset, 
ensure that everyone understands that one must listen to others, respect others, and say 
what one believes to be true. The aim is to give children the opportunity to develop the 
thinking and reflective capacities necessary in making judgements, and the purpose of 
enquiry as a collaborative search for truth is emphasised. The teacher’s input as 
facilitator cannot be decided beforehand because to a large extent he or she has to 
follow the enquiry where it leads. There is more teacher intervention in the earlier 
sessions but one can withdraw more and more as the children take charge, eventually 
participating as one o f the group and only speaking when one gets the “tip” .
Thinking Time -  Philosophy with Children differs in its agenda from Circle Time 
which enjoys a degree of popularity in Irish schools. In contrast to the latter, it moves 
beyond the domain of feelings and wants to concentrate on thinking and reflective
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capacities. It is not that these feelings or emotions or personal desires are excluded from 
the process; it is rather that they are validly included when they are relevant -  as they 
often are -  to clarification by the children of concepts and arguments about moral issues 
that have general significance beyond their particular feeling states. The participants not 
only extend their understanding of the thinking of others in the group but also reflect on 
their own thought processes. How successfully the children attempt this can be judged 
from the dialogues that furnish the data for Part II of this study.
1.4.5 Data collection
I explained the focus of my enquiry and elicited the support o f the Principals, class 
teachers and parents of the children involved in the research in both Junior and Senior 
schools. To gather data for the study I conducted sessions once-weekly in the 
classroom. Thus Thinking Time served as both a pedagogical practice and a research 
laboratory. The teachers in the school were familiar with the practice o f Thinking Time 
since my colleague, Philomena Donnelly, had already set it up in the school where it 
had been running since the late 1980s. The school regarded it as an innovative practice 
that could form a normal part of school work insofar as it was consistent with the 
curriculum aims of furthering higher order cognitive processes. To explain the thinking 
behind the practice of elementary school philosophy I sent a journal article by Matthew 
Lipman (1974) to all parents o f the children in my chosen class. Since most of the 
parents already knew me as a teacher o f long-standing in the school and some of their 
children had come to me for learning support in either English or Mathematics, it was 
not difficult to gain their trust and support. I also sought and received permission from 
parents to videotape some of the sessions, assuring them that the anonymity of their 
child would be protected and that video material would only ever be used for 
educational purposes.
A wide range of issues that provoke puzzlement were discussed in the Thinking 
Time sessions such as the origins of the universe, the existence of aliens, where dreams 
come from, and the kind of world it would be if  there were no books, no television etc. 
For the purpose of this research I confined my focus to topics of moral salience. These 
included justice in its many forms, equality and the race issue, rights and duties, 
freedom and responsibility, honesty and truthfulness, goodness, beauty and friendship. 
A discussion on the virtues implied a corresponding exploration of the vices with the
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emphasis on the justification for distinguishing between both. Although I had a general 
idea of the main roads the research might take, it was not a straight pathway. In terms of 
content, discussed in sequence from week to week, different events and circumstances 
took it sideways and along unplanned pathways. The engagement of the children was 
cruciaL, whether it was with a story or poem, a political event or an experience to which 
they could relate.
In order to encourage reflective thinking, sometimes I used stories or poems; at other 
times I chose media issues. As far as possible I located the story, poem or event within 
the children’s own experience thus enabling them to identify with it and to empathise 
with the characters involved. This is in keeping with Kieran Egan’s (1988, p. 124) view 
that engaging children in the binary opposites of good and evil, beauty and ugliness 
through story provides an opportunity for self-reflection through interaction with others. 
The right kind story or poem proved very rewarding as trigger material. Stories with 
characters involved in situations that embodied moral dilemmas helped to direct 
children to core moral issues embedded in the stories. I used many of Philip Cam’s 
(1997) stories in this research because they were concerned with fundamental moral 
issues such as how we come by a knowledge of right and wrong and who should decide 
what is right and what is not. Mindful that the children were greatly helped by a 
narrative context in engaging with abstract concepts, I chose poems and stories in 
consultation with the children themselves who more often than not wanted an input into 
the choice of question to be discussed as they got more familiar and confident with the 
format. Most themes were introduced in story form and ended with a question that the 
children discussed in a session which lasted for thirty minutes at age eight and for about 
forty-five minutes at age twelve.
My first few sessions o f Thinking Time with the children were a process of getting to 
know each other. This was both important and necessary, since I was at this time 
involved in learning support, specialising in language development and reading 
difficulties in the school, and was not their class teacher. M y only regular contact with 
them was through my regular weekly visits to them — visits during which the class 
teacher exempted herself. While the children discussed a topic I recorded the dialogue 
on a tape-recorder and since the children were wary o f it at first, I assured them that it 
had one purpose only, to record all their utterances. In time, rather than being an 
intimidating presence, the tape-recorder came to symbolise the importance of their
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conversations. Usually when the discussion got underway, and they were accustomed to 
the practice, they seemed to ignore the tape-recorder.
Transcribing the audio-tapes was a laborious task, involving long hours deciphering 
conversation, which occasionally seemed inaudible. I showed the children the 
transcripts from the outset to explain the presence o f the tape-recorder. I was asked each 
week of that first year for the transcript which was kept in the classroom and read avidly 
by many. This surprised me as I had not expected them to find the transcript of great 
interest. I enlarged the print for ease of reading and many searched eagerly to find their 
own contributions to the conversation. In this first year I recorded twenty sessions in all, 
covering a variety of issues.
After an absence o f a year and a half I continued dialogue sessions with them when
ththey were now in 4 class in the Senior School, aged nine to ten. O f the original group 
of twenty-nine, four had left and five new children from other schools had joined the 
class. The class teacher left the room as I entered, having put the children sitting in the 
circle ready to begin. Initially in the four sessions that followed I was aware of a 
regression, less willingness to listen to others, ridicule o f  an opposed view, and less 
focused thinking which necessitated a lot of intervention on my part. The ground rules, 
respect for others and deference towards difference in particular, had to be emphasised 
once more as friction between certain individuals was obvious and they attempted to 
settle scores in the group.
I noted in my journal (which I kept from the outset) my doubts about continuing with 
this group and whether they would be suitable for the kind o f research I had in mind. 
For a while I considered taking a different group o f children. W ith grave reservations, I 
decided to try for another few sessions as they had seemed so promising when they 
were younger. By the time we came to the fifth session after resumption of contact, I 
noticed that the group had begun to bond better and to build on each other’s 
contributions, adding their own. Taking the perspective o f the other and justifying their 
reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with another marked a turning point. I noticed that 
trust was beginning to characterise the discussions more; rather than being wary they 
seemed to trust me and each other more. Only when this trust was established could 
they become comfortable with entertaining the possibility o f letting go o f their own 
positions and modifying their points of view in the light of the reflections of others.
A smooth and easy passage could not be guaranteed. Concentration in the group was 
affected by frequent interruptions from outside in spite o f the “Do not disturb” sign on
14
the door. People occasionally came in on errands or to seek a group whose turn it was to 
attend Learning Support. Fund-raising activities such as cake sales often caused them to 
become over-excited, frequently checking their watches to get out quickly and spend 
money. On wet days, if  they were unable to go outside, there was a lot of pent up energy 
and their concentration suffered, but the Thinking Time sessions continued nonetheless. 
Concentration was always better if the sessions were held in the forenoon.
For the final two years of the study the children had a class teacher who had done 
educational research and who was very interested in philosophical enquiry. I agreed that 
she could participate in the group and she greatly enriched the process by her 
contributions. At first she found it difficult to abandon her role o f offering long 
comments and imparting information. It was a different -  and initially quite difficult -  
experience for her to refrain from direct teaching and instead stimulate reflective 
thinking, saying as little as possible. I welcomed her interest and contributions because 
it was an extra support in scaffolding the pupils’ arguments, stimulating them and 
questioning with a view to extending their thinking. From time to time she was able to 
tell me how the influence of Thinking Time sometimes transferred to other areas of 
activity inside or outside the classroom. I also began to depend on her to get the children 
to read aloud in class beforehand the required story or poem which was to be the trigger 
material for our next enquiry session. Some o f these stories were quite long and 
sometimes took a half an hour to read. Each child would get a copy of the story or poem 
to take home and could reflect on it in the meantime.
To improve the children’s own critical thinking skills in the final year of the study I 
showed them a video recording I had made of my previous research group (Russell, 
2000). The discussion in question concerned Kohlberg’s Heinz dilemma: Should Heinz 
steal the drug that would save his wife’s life, breaking the law in the process? I asked 
them to critique it, giving them certain guidelines. My aim here was to put them in a 
position to talk about criteria for good discussion thus enabling them to become more 
critical and gain a meta-perspective on the process. It was interesting to note that they 
took issue with the children in the video for the times they did not justify their reasons, 
for going off track, for not challenging each other enough and repeating another’s 
argument without building on it. Ironically this was something which they themselves 
frequently did. They were interested to see how this other group dealt with a similar 
issue and, despite their criticisms, on the whole considered them to be better speakers 
than themselves.
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As "time went on the children became more and more able to discuss in depth, 
exposing themselves but not compromising without what they saw as sufficient reason 
for doing so. What came up was nearly always unpredictable if  we followed the enquiry 
where it led. As it was inherently open-ended, there was always the risk of material 
coming up that might be deemed unsuitable. In that eventuality I did not have a specific 
contingency plan. As a teacher one deals with issues as they arise every day in the 
classroom and trusts that one’s judgement is the right one in the particular circumstance. 
In the final two years, with the class teacher present in the group having knowledge of 
the SPHE programme (Social Personal and Health Education) and what was age- 
appropriate, I felt more secure in the group. In all I recorded 47 sessions of Thinking 
Time.
These transcripts form the data of the research. I engaged more intensively with the 
group at certain periods and hence they are unevenly spread throughout the study 
period. They consist of 19 transcripts from 2nd class, one from 3 rd class, seven from the 
4th class, 16 from 5th class and four from 6th class (See table 1 below).
Class Age Group T ran sc rip t N um ber
2nd class 7-8 years transcripts 1-19
3 rd class 8-9 years transcript 20
4th class 9-10 years transcripts 21-26
5th class 10-11 years transcripts 27-43
6 th class 11-12 years transcripts 44-47
Table 1. Class level, age group, transcripts o f  dialogues
I have numbered all the transcripts so that in looking at the data, the higher the 
transcript number, the later the dialogue took place in the fieldwork. For example, tr47 
represents the final dialogue session, conducted in 6th class when the children were 
eleven to twelve years old. In addition to the transcripts, I continually wrote memos 
recording passing observations and reflections and kept an ongoing journal to note 
mood, atmosphere, non-verbal behaviour and anything that seemed relevant to the 
study, not captured in the recordings. Family break-up, parental illness and depression 
impacted on some children’s behaviour and participation and was important to note, as
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will be evident later. This recording of my audit trail was to prove very valuable when 
it came to writing the final report.
1.4.6 Data analysis procedures
In the Constant Comparative Method of Glaser and Strauss (1967) one adopts a 
radically different way of thinking about data from that of the quantitative researcher. A 
non-mathematical procedure with different underpinnings and approach, it is more 
flexible and less pre-planned and controlled. One listens to what the children say and 
how they say it, and one stays alert for how they are interpreting what is said. In this 
study it involved sorting through the data to find categories o f meaning and to arrive at 
significant themes and patterns. My aim was to identify those themes that stood alone 
and those that formed salient relationships and patterns.
What was important in the study could not be predetermined but evolved from the 
categories o f meaning that I derived inductively from the data. In this derivation there 
was a subjective element in that I had to make interpretive judgements about what was 
really significant and meaningful. These judgements had to be carefully considered 
because my task was to make explicit what was implicit, capturing the children’s 
experience in context. In finding meaning in what was there, I was bringing as much 
hermeneutical skill to the task as possible, translating what I had at hand and bringing a 
kind o f educated mind to it that the children did not have. The emphasis in this type of 
research is on “illumination and extrapolation rather than causal determination, 
prediction and generalisation”, the latter being the hallmarks o f quantitative research 
(Quinn Patton, 1990, p. 424).
In transcribing the audio-tapes I adhered to the children’s exact words without editing 
them. As these verbatim  transcripts form the primary data o f  the research I examined 
various methods for organising them. A computer software package called N6 (Nudist 
6) seemed at first an attractive option. It could help with sorting and coding, and with 
arranging and synthesising ideas, but on closer inspection, managing the software with 
its complex system of coding seemed more daunting and time-consuming than anything 
done manually with scissors and paste. My data were not large-scale enough to warrant 
the use of this kind of computer software. There did not seem to be great benefit to it 
and in the end I chose to rely on a manual method and the hermeneutical finesse that it 
required. Cumbersome though it was, I felt more secure with the hands-on method and 
the direct engagement with and more personal control over the data that it afforded.
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From the beginning of data collection I made comments in the margins of the 
transcripts, looking at what was there and giving it a name or label. Informal records of 
my thinking or memos helped provide direction and to sort out ideas. I identified the 
broadest categories of meaning first. Tree structures helped to identify categories and 
subcategories. The next task was to refine these categories and subcategories, keeping 
conceptually related categories together. Overlapping ideas were combined and the 
relationships and patterns across categories explored, using the look-and-feel-alike 
criteria (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). When I identified a broad category I gave it a number 
and pasted it into my file. For example when I identified friendship and interpersonal 
relationships, I combed through all 47 transcripts and cut out every utterance that 
pertained to this category. I usually cut the whole piece o f conversation, including the 
child’s name. This was important for later study o f gender issues. Each piece had to be 
coded as I cut it out, the number of the transcript and the page number for easy 
reference and each piece was colour-coded to denote the class level of the child at the 
time of this particular utterance: green for 2nd class, brown for 3rd, blue for 4th, red for 
5th and purple for 6th. Often categories overlapped, hence the need for more than one 
copy for cutting. I put memos and colour-coded material into a binder making sure that 
the material was easily retrievable for sorting and cross-referencing. The refining o f 
categories continued until all sources had been exhausted and the categories seemed 
saturated. When the categories are saturated we have, according to Strauss & Corbin 
(1998, p. 121), the foundation and beginning structure for theory building.
The many broad categories could be grouped under three overarching categories: 
cognitive processes, notions of moral rectitude, and interpersonal relations and 
friendship. These categories had several sub-categories and concerned how the children 
think, the content or the what of their thinking, and the group dynamic or patterns o f 
participation and relationships within the group, as is indicated by the presence of the 
third category here. I coded for group process also, noting movement and change, how 
interaction in the group evolved and changed over time. Then a comprehensive picture 
began to emerge, a portrayal of the thinking of the participants in the study.
Adjustments and changes were made to the original objectives as the research 
progressed, responding to the new realities of the situation. In analysing, I was 
interpreting, illuminating, giving a new vision of the experiences embodied in the data. 
In hermeneutical analysis, the insightfulness and previous relevant experiences of the 
analyst are primary, and they in turn are rooted in tacit knowledge that is deeply internal
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(Polanyi, 1983). While this is unavoidable -  and calls for the kinds o f checks adverted 
to in the next section below -  in writing up the analysis, I have, where applicable, 
located the findings in the larger body of knowledge, referring back to the theoretical 
literature explored in Part I that is background to the practice in order to make linkages 
or to contextualise interpretation offered, and by reference to more publicly accredited 
and authoritative work in the field, to provide general parameters for the analysis.
1.4.7 Provision for trustworthiness and limitations o f study
Lincoln & Guba (1985) use the term trustworthiness, to connote the believability or 
credibility of a researcher’s findings. The trustworthiness o f the findings is tied directly 
to the trustworthiness of the evaluator who collects and analyses the data and 
trustworthiness here, as I have already stressed, is not just a matter o f meticulous care 
and reliability in all the more straightforward aspects o f the tasks, such as recording and 
transcribing, but also interpretative flair, imaginative resourcefulness and informed 
judgement in the more contestable and hazardous aspects o f interpretation and analysis. 
Being mindful of this I have provided details of my audit trail, and my taped recordings 
and transcripts are available for scrutiny or for verification o f my findings. More 
immediately, I have tried to ensure that when presenting particular interpretations I do 
so with constant reference to direct quotations from the transcripts so that the reader has 
a better opportunity to detect arbitrary or ungrounded interpretations and to monitor the 
fit between an interpretation and its evidential basis in transcripts. Moreover, the 
outcomes of the research were presented to the class teacher who had participated in the 
discussions and cooperated in the study. Her corroboration o f the findings helps to 
triangulate them and add to the cogency of the study. At completion o f fieldwork the 
parents were shown two videotaped presentations o f the children participating in 
Thinking Time, one which took place toward the beginning o f  the study and the other at 
the end and their views and comments were elicited. I received very positive feedback 
from parents who were impressed with the level o f discussion and the impact that 
participation in a community of ethical enquiry could have on their children. They 
expressed an interest in seeing what a video presentation o f the same group discussing 
the same topic four years hence would produce. This of course by no means supports 
detailed interpretations offered in the study; however it does provide some confirmation 
with regard to the credibility of the overall format within which it was conducted.
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The ultimate test of the trustworthiness of a qualitative study, according to Mischler
(1990), is whether one has enough faith in the findings to act upon them. It is 
encouraging that many teachers in my school have taken up the practice of Thinking 
Time or expressed a strong interest in doing so but, with respect to this study, “acting on 
findings” would o f course entail more specific commitments than this. What these 
commitments might be is an issue to which I shall return in the final chapter.
The findings of this qualitative research study must be considered in relation to its 
limitations. The sample is a small one and reflects the views o f children in a particular 
class in an urban middle class suburb. The sample was not random. There was a 
convenience factor; I chose this class because of the age group and the willingness of 
the class teacher to facilitate me in conducting my study over a long period. Because of 
these factors one has to be wary of generalisation. Although I strove to divest myself of 
power, my role as teacher in the group could possibly impact on some children’s 
willingness to be truly honest and open. My presence and that of the class teacher in the 
group could impact on the children’s opinions, influencing them to produce the views 
that they thought would meet with our approval. In response to this misgiving, I can 
only say that, apart from the observer effect that goes with any such study and indeed 
the inhibitions from almost any social situation, I was not aware of it as being an issue. 
Rather, there was much evidence to the contrary. The children seemed open and un­
contrived -  frequently with me and with the class teacher.
Common concerns centre round the subjectivity o f the evaluator. Qualitative studies 
are inevitably subjective because the findings reflect the impressions and opinions of 
the researcher. However it is the quality of the observations that matter. The issue is 
about researcher credibility, about fairness and balance, generating multiple 
perspectives rather than claims to absolute truth. Rather than generalise from the 
findings, in this kind of research one extrapolates from them. Extrapolation persuades 
rather than proves and aspires to be credible rather than certain. Quinn Patton (1990, p. 
490) suggests that the findings in a qualitative research study can be persuasive in that 
they provide information about a particular setting that is useful and can inform action. 
Whether this study achieves this kind o f persuasiveness is a matter which can more 
profitably be discussed in the final chapter.
1.5 Outline of study
This thesis has eight chapters in all. Following this introduction, which comprises 
chapter one, there are two main parts in the study. Part I outlines the theoretical 
background both to the practice and to the interpretation o f  data generated through it 
while Part II provides this interpretation of those data. The study is completed by a 
concluding chapter.
1.5.1 Part I Building a theoretical context
Part I examines the theoretical background to the study and contains three 
complementary chapters. Chapter two gives an account o f recent debate about moral 
development, outlining the dominant figures and influences, based largely in 
psychology. Here I outline the developmental approach to moral education, pioneered 
by Piaget who charted children’s moral development in two cognitive stages, the amoral 
egocentric and the autonomous stage and Kohlberg who refined Piaget’s stage theory, 
adding four more stages.
I then look at the criticisms of cognitive developmental theories of moral 
development, most notably by Gilligan who claimed that they represented an over­
emphasis on principle-based justice at the expense o f emotions such as care and 
compassion. Next I examine different approaches to moral development which go 
beyond the cognitivist approach and also differ from the care perspective. These include 
Blum’s moral responsiveness theory and various positions developed by Flanagan and 
others. The Traditional Character Education movement, with a fundamentally different 
approach to that o f the cognitive developmentalists, is also considered as are efforts 
since the 1980s to integrate the different perspectives and combine the core aspects of 
Kohlbergian structuralism with character education.
Chapter three advances the account by moving it deeper into the realms of 
philosophical ethics. It examines approaches, traceable back to Plato and Aristotle, that 
go beyond a morality of principle or duty to consider the good life as a life o f virtue, 
communally, dialogically, and narratively constructed (in for example, Murdoch, 
MacIntyre, Taylor, and Noddings). It also looks at different ways o f construing the 
relationship between ethics and politics, with their different entailments for the 
relationship between moral and civic education.
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Moving closer to pedagogical issues and classroom practice, chapter four looks at 
various theories of children’s ability to think collaboratively about morality in a 
community o f enquiry. ' It considers the arguments of Lipman and Matthews for a 
greater recognition of children’s capacity to develop reasonably, especially through 
open-ended Socratic discussion. It also examines the wider social constructivist -  and 
especially Vygotskian -  influence on the theoretical conceptualisation of a community 
of enquiry and on related theories of the role of story in the development of moral 
imagination. Finally, it considers some research on the relationship between gender and 
moral orientation in children.
1.5.2 Part II Classroom practice: a qualitative analysis
Informed by the extensive theoretical discussion in Part I, Part II moves to interpretation 
and analysis of the textual data, generated of the children’s discussion of moral topics. 
Chapter five focuses on thinking processes and cognitive styles as the children move 
through the continuum from middle to late childhood and early adolescence. The gains 
-  and losses -  inherent in the development o f thinking are examined as is the role of the 
teacher, in stimulating reflection and thoughtfulness, and the scaffolding of the less able 
by the more able pupils in the group. This chapter also focuses on ways in which 
children confront biases and stereotyping in their thinking especially in responding to 
reflections by other children. Finally, it looks at issues o f group dynamics including 
different levels o f participation and some gender differences.
Chapter six extends the discussion, examining children’s apprehensions and 
judgements in relation to core moral concepts. It analyses various notions of right and 
wrong and focuses more explicitly on a range o f substantive moral issues: truth-telling, 
theft, friendship, duty and moral obligation, a broad spectrum of rights -  human rights, 
children’s rights and animal rights -  and responsibilities to others, to the environment, 
and to all who share the planet with us. In examining notions o f freedom, duty and 
moral obligation, the issue of choice comes up: Who is making our choices? How do 
we know what is right? Similarly, examining the notion o f fairness and equal treatment 
raises issues o f racism; in this chapter we see children looking at racism in themselves 
and the challenges posed to them by the values of inclusion.
Chapter seven explores the children’s views on friendship and what they consider to 
be the important qualities of a friend. Similarities and differences in boys’ and girls’
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conceptions of friendship are examined -  as are the significantly changed levels of 
participation in the group by boys and girls in the final two years o f the study. Girls’ 
and boys’ views of each other and girls’ perception of the effect on them of interaction 
with boys in a mixed gender class Eire analysed as is the girls’ greater reticence after age 
ten (the subject of much recent research).
1.5.3 Conclusion
Chapter eight, which concludes the study, looks at the significant findings that have 
emerged in the analysis of Part II, setting them in the context o f the existing research 
and debates in moral philosophy and education, considered in Part I. Central issues in 
these debates are again examined and discussed in light of the findings. The significance 
o f the Thinking Time community of enquiry forum in deepening moral reasoning and 
understanding, in developing moral sensibilities and in enabling children to have a voice 
on issues that concern them, is also considered. The chapter concludes with discussion 
o f implications o f the study for pedagogical practice in Irish primary schools, for the 
development o f policy on citizenship and civic education, and for future research.
1.5.4 Appendix
The Appendix contains a complete list o f the topics discussed in each o f the forty-seven 
sessions. It also contains a sample of transcripts o f children’s dialogues, recorded at 
different stages during the course of the study.
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PA R T I - BUILDING A THEORETICAL CONTEXT
2 THE CURRENT DEBATE: AN OVERVIEW
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will look at some of the most significant discussions on moral 
development, exploring the arguments of the last few decades, beginning with Piaget 
and linking back to Kant. This will entail examining a great deal o f the most important 
recent work on moral development and education and exploring the different strands of 
thought from the impartialist perspective o f Kant, Piaget and Kohlberg with universal 
principles predominating, to the particularist position o f Gilligan, which takes account 
o f the particulars o f a situation. I will look at Gilligan’s (1982) studies o f women’s 
moral thinking that change the definition of the moral domain and focus on the 
difference between a care and a justice orientation. The different positions that have 
been taken subsequently by other theorists will be looked at and approaches to moral 
education examined. There is disagreement as to what essentially morality is and what 
the most effective approaches to moral development are. The traditional character 
education position emphasises direct teaching o f societal values and habituation in the 
virtues, while the cognitive developmental approach aims at stimulating principled 
moral reasoning. I will be showing that Kohlberg’s (1981) major contribution is in 
emphasising the importance of understanding moral development in educating children. 
Building on the work of Piaget, Kohlberg’s theory focuses on moral decision-making 
and developmental growth. It is essentially a theory o f justice reasoning, influenced by 
Durkheim’s vision to create a moral society in the classroom. Recent developments 
attempt to stress the commonalities of the different positions to integrate the cognitive 
development approach with the traditional character education approach (Berkowitz, 
1998; Likona, 1983).
2.2 Moral stage theory of Jean Piaget
Recent research on moral development stems primarily from the cognitive theories of 
Jean Piaget. Not much research into children’s thinking took place before him and 
moral development was not his main concern. His research consisted mainly o f studies 
with school-going children and their beliefs about right and wrong and involved verbal
24
responses to a standard interview or set of questions. Moral judgment and not moral 
behaviour was his focus. Children’s feelings and emotions did not form part of his 
interest. These investigations led Piaget to conclude that children’s morality throws 
light on adult morality and that all morality consists in a system of rules and 
consciousness of rules. Observing children playing the game o f marbles and how they 
applied the rules of the game led Piaget to believe that morality can be considered a 
developmental process. He believed that the child would progress from the study of the 
rules of games to the analysis of moral realities imposed on him by the adult (Piaget, 
1932, p. 96).
Piaget’s impartialist view of morality was in the Kantian tradition with morality 
being seen as a set of rules governing inter-personal relations. These rules engender 
duties and obligations. For Kant (1959), rational acceptance was sufficient to motivate 
conformity to morality. This conception of morality, focusing on rights, duties and 
obligations was consistent with the Enlightenment view that right action will follow if 
one recognises the moral principle. The essential role o f relations in moral development 
was stressed, as left to himself the individual remains egocentric and only develops 
through contact with the judgment of others. Only children’s reasoning and judgement 
mattered. Psychologists and sociologists are agreed on the influence of peer 
relationships in the moral development o f the child. It is through peer interaction that 
autonomy develops. For Kant what counted for morality were the agent’s intention and 
whether the act was performed from a sense of rightness. Feelings and emotions do not 
count if  we are to see clearly the rights and wrongs in a situation. Emotions, according 
to Kant, are directed toward particular persons in particular circumstances and therefore 
lack the generality and universality that are essential to rational morality.
The central thread of Piaget’s theory was that the child makes a series o f conceptual 
adjustments to reality which constitutes stages o f moral development, these being 
closely in parallel with cognitive development. Piaget explored children’s responses to 
moral judgement through the use of stories and constructed his theories about the stages 
o f moral development from these findings. He found from such responses that moral 
development consisted of two distinct stages, the heteronomous stage and the co­
operation and autonomy stage.
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2.2.1 The heteronomous stage
In the heteronomous stage of moral thinking authority is supreme and there is a belief 
that moral codes are dictated by others, that they are non-rational and morality is seen as 
obedience to a given authority. This is also the egocentric stage where the child takes 
only his own view and that of authority into account and is not yet aware that the view 
o f others may differ from his own. This stage o f moral reasoning is marked by strict 
adherence to rules and duties and obedience to authority. His subjective perspective is 
the only one that matters and he is unable as yet to take the perspective of others into 
account.
For Piaget rules only begin with a consciousness o f obligation and the child obeys a 
rule given by someone whom he respects. Rules for the child o f seven are completely 
sacred and non-negotiable. This is the stage of moral realism, which in essence means 
regarding duty and the value attaching to it as self-subsistent and independent of the 
mind. The law must be obeyed regardless of the circumstances in which the individual 
may find himself. The rule is a given and is external to the mind and the good is defined 
by obedience (Piaget, 1932, p. 36). The outcome o f an action is o f more significance 
than the agent’s intentions. Piaget was concerned with how the sense of justice 
develops, hence much of his analysis was concerned with children’s ideas about 
punishments. Moral realism is also associated with the young child’s belief in 
“immanent justice” (p. 260); this is that wrong-doing will be punished. The younger the 
child the stronger will be his belief in the rightness and universality o f expiatory 
punishment. The young child feels powerless with all authority resting with adults. 
Heteronomous moral thinking is in essence a morality of duty where duty is determined 
by the relevant authority figure. Right is the will o f the adult and wrong is to have a will 
of one’s own (p. 193). This phase is also referred to as the morality of constraint, the 
child obeying the rules or commands given him by the adult. Up until the age or seven 
or eight, the child finds great difficulty in sticking to the truth and distorts reality 
without intending to deceive anyone. According to Piaget, he distorts reality according 
to his desires and his romancing.
Development in moral thinking then entails moving from the egocentric stage where 
focus is on the self to a focus that considers other points o f view and the interests of 
others. Piaget further refined his stages through observing how children put mles into 
practice and for him the essence of all morality is to be sought in the respect which the 
individual acquires for these rules (Piaget, 1932, p. 5). The earliest stage was the motor
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phase where the very young child handles the marble and plays outside of the system of 
rules. Next is the egocentric stage, also outside rules where the child is playing by 
himself with little consideration of others. At age seven or eight is the stage of incipient 
cooperation where the child learns to adapt or submit to the wishes of others and 
participates in the negotiation of rules. The final stage at eleven or twelve marks the 
consciousness of rules arrived at by mutual agreement.
2.2.2 The co-operation and autonomy stage
Piaget’s second stage is one of cooperation and autonomy. In cooperation with others 
the child’s egocentrism yields. He is confronted by the point of view of others and 
compares it with his own (Piaget, 1932, p. 187). From the age of eight, belief in 
immanent justice diminishes and the constraint of the adult gives way to cooperation. 
The social influence is now more apparent. The rules are negotiated and become 
accepted by mutual agreement. The influence o f peers is now seen in the constitution of 
rules. Rules are not absolute but can be changed if it is agreed that they should be. 
Tradition is not the deciding factor; rather it is mutual agreement and reciprocity. An 
ability to differentiate emerges. In the autonomous stage the individual reasons as to 
whether an action is right or wrong and comes to see fairness in moral actions as taking 
account o f  the agent’s intentions. This is also the stage where the child can take into 
account the perspective o f others to inform his or her own thinking.
A necessary condition of autonomy appears to be mutual respect. Whereas a rule for 
the child o f  seven is sacred and untouchable, only mutual acceptance makes it valid for 
the child o f twelve. Where the child previously attributed moral perfection to his 
parents, after the age o f seven he can face the fact that this is not necessarily so. The 
child no longer merely obeys the commands given him by the adult but obeys the rule 
itself. Children’s reactions to each other in reciprocal relationships promote the sense of 
equality. W hat is just is no longer that which is commanded by the adult and a stage 
which Piaget terms equalitarianism begins to emerge. It is characterised by a more 
subtle conception of justice or equity which takes into account the particular needs of 
the individual. Expiatory punishment is gradually replaced by punishment by 
reciprocity as solidarity and the desire for equality among children is on the increase. 
Cheating at games is punished by exclusion for a period o f time. As the child gets older 
the greater is the degree of reciprocity. Whereas in the young child what is wrong is
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what contravenes the command of the adult, in the child o f  eight that link begins to 
weaken as he increasingly gains autonomy. He begins to have a concept of the inherent 
rightness of an action. Moral action is sought for its own sake, independently of reward 
or punishment (Piaget, 1932, p. 315). Only through cooperation and mutual respect can 
the influence o f the adult diminish and autonomy begin to develop.
The older child at eleven to twelve, as he approaches adolescence begins to consider 
himself in many ways as equal with the adult. With the reciprocal exchange of ideas the 
child comes to embrace a more refined form of justice concerned with equity and love. 
Forgiveness takes precedence over revenge. A true sense o f morality accords greater 
importance to rules which transcend the individual and which are arrived at by 
consensus within the group. Relations o f constraint which characterised the adult-child 
relationship, give way to relations of cooperation. There is what Piaget termed “a 
coming into consciousness” (Piaget, 1932, p. 408), a conscious realisation which the 
individual is not capable of achieving by himself. He becomes aware of himself and the 
functioning o f his own mind, of what belongs essentially to him before understanding 
others. His views are questioned and he must defend his position. Left to himself, the 
child remains egocentric but through social interaction he becomes conscious of his 
own and the perspective of others. He is forced to question his own thinking. Through 
contact with the judgements and evaluations of others egocentrism gradually yields. For 
Piaget moral development resulted in mutual resolutions which all considered fair. An 
autonomous view of morality viewed as fairness leads to more consistent behaviour 
than that held by children at the heteronomous stage. Durkheim (1925) believed that 
social interaction was crucial to moral development and it was the attachment to the 
group which fostered the moral sense of the child. Piaget disputed this; participation in a 
group was not sufficient. He contended that it was through their struggles to arrive at 
fair solutions that the individual defined his morality.
Piaget contended that cooperation alone leads to autonomy because the very process 
of socialisation suppresses “moral realism” (“the tendency which the child has to regard 
duty and the value attaching to it as self-subsistent and independent of the 
mind...regardless of the circumstances...” p. 106). The child now comes to an 
interiorization of rules. His morality is now more them obedience out of a sense of duty. 
The concrete-operational child is limited in his thinking to the facts as he sees them but 
for the adolescent all possibilities in a situation are considered. His thought is 
hypothetico-deductive. He has at his disposal a large number o f cognitive operations
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and can attack a problem from more than one perspective. This is what Piaget calls 
formal thought (Piaget, 1932, p. 201). The child now becomes capable of directing 
thoughts not just toward people but at abstract ideals. He can analyse a situation and 
arrive at a conclusion and at this stage often loses touch with reality. The evidence is 
that not all adolescents are capable of formal operations, and many adults in non- 
westem countries are not. They depend for their development on a particular experience 
and cognitive development. According to Piaget, development results in the acquisition 
o f  general cognitive structures which make possible meaningful learning. Only when 
his cognitive structure is sufficiently prepared for it is the child able to profit from and 
assimilate new experience (p. 219). For Piaget, learning cannot explain development. 
Instead development explains learning. The child does not just react to his environment 
but is an active agent in his own development, (p. 221). Piaget was aware of the 
problems o f confusing moral development with intellectual development. Right answers 
to questions about moral conduct did not necessarily follow through to moral action 
(Piaget, 1932, p. 116).
Piaget’s studies involved mainly boys. From observing how they adhered to or 
defined rules in the game of marbles, he concluded that the legal sense is far less 
developed in young girls than in boys. Although fairness, defined as the keeping of the 
rules of the game, figured largely for the younger boys, the girls saw fairness in terms of 
sharing. They were more tolerant and more easily reconciled to innovations and far less 
concerned with legal elaborations. They were more inclined to manage conflict by 
making exceptions to the rules or ignoring them entirely. Piaget suggests that girls 
regarded a rule as good as long as the game repaid it. G irls’ play was less receptive to 
formal principles o f authority, personal relationships taking precedence over principles 
o f rights and duties (Piaget, 1932, p. 96).
2.2.3 Critics o f Piaget’s theory
Piaget views development as moving toward objectivity and truth and away from 
subjectivity and egocentrism. Some of his assumptions on the intellectual processes of 
children are open to dispute. Lipman (1994, p. 221) contends that the language of 
children and that of adults are much more similar than Piaget is willing to concede. 
There are losses as well as gains, impoverishments as well as riches on the path from 
childhood to adulthood. Piaget’s general technique for charting intellectual development
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is to map stages of progressive mastering of a concept and then to show that most 
children o f a certain age will be at the same stage. Matthews (1994, p. 222) queries 
whether one can reasonably suppose that a child will make well-marked progress in the 
handling of genuine philosophical questions. Matthews sees Piaget as condescending 
with regard to the philosophical musings of children. His criteria are based on a 
multiplicity of results and on the comparison of individual reactions (Piaget, 1951, p. 7). 
Piaget is looking for the same pattern of response in all children. He ignores the 
atypical or deviant response which is more likely to be philosophically interesting, and 
eliminates it on methodological grounds. Matthews argues that Piaget’s attention is 
focused on a narrow set of logico-mathematical operations and that he tends to ignore 
children’s fantasy. Puzzlement is ruled out in a world where there is much to learn but 
nothing to puzzle over (Matthews, 1980, p. 54). The sauvage response is discarded as 
“mere romancing” and the question posed again to obtain a realistic answer that would 
expose the appropriate developmental stage. In Piaget’s charting o f the growth in 
intelligence romance and fantasy are regarded as contaminants. Children can not think 
philosophically because their thinking is unguided by the constraint of logic and 
experience. Piaget has a low estimate of rationality in young children; the deficiency in 
their thinking is something to be corrected at a later stage. Development, according to 
Piaget, entails overcoming the cognitive deficits o f childhood. Matthews contends that 
children’s ability to think philosophically occurs quite independently o f the capacities 
cognitive scientists are interested in (Matthews, 1994, p. 36).
Egan queries whether it is more important to future development, to be able to 
conserve liquid quantity or an intellectual life “brimming with knights, dragons, witches 
and star warriors” (Egan, 1988, p. 25). Representing the developmental process as the 
accumulation o f intellectual capacities to be developed focuses attention on what young 
children lack. Piaget’s scheme focuses on the acquisition o f forms o f thought, logico- 
mathematical structures characteristic of literate cultures, with a gradual scale of 
achievement to adulthood. Egan argues that if  we were to focus on the thinking 
techniques o f oral peoples, we would get a different developmental picture. Imaginative 
thinking or Mythic Understanding, according to Egan, peaks very early in western 
children’s lives and then in many cases, begins to decline after about age seven.
The essence of the Piagetian model is that people’s behaviour can be explained in 
terms o f psychological structures of mind which are invariant across cultures. Thus the 
individual mind develops through individual construction of outside reality but
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influenced by relations with others. According to Meadows (1993), this idea is 
challenged by Vygotskian theory. Instead of being individualistic, cognitive abilities are 
formed in part by social phenomena and are created by interaction with the social 
environment. Piaget also considered the social environment crucial to the development 
of autonomy but the emphasis is different. What is important in social interaction is the 
disagreement between peers on matters o f judgment, the consequent disequilibrium 
leading the individual to reflection and cognitive advance. The Piagetian thinker creates 
his own individual concepts, derived from his own experience of the logico- 
mathematical and physical worlds.
Vygotsky, on the other hand, emphasised the primacy o f the social world in cognitive 
development. Ideas and skills are learned socially from more competent partners. The 
role played by language in Vygotsky’s account is crucial to cognitive development. He 
differed from Piaget on the part played by egocentric speech in the child’s development. 
Far from being a failure to communicate, the child who talks to himself or herself is 
regulating and planning mental activities. Egocentric speech becomes inner speech for 
solving problems with the self. It is self-regulation through language and later develops 
through social interaction into mature verbal thought. Through the mediation of 
language, the child comes to internalise what he perceives (Meadows, 1993, p. 246). 
For Piaget, development leads learning. This causal-linear model of development is 
rejected by Vygotsky. He claims that development is not ahead of learning. Rather the 
two form a unity (Newman & Holzman, 1993). In Piaget there is a lag of learning 
behind development. Piaget’s stage theory reflects the ideology o f individualism, with 
the relation between the person and the social world conceived as the individual 
standing apart from and interacting with a social environment. Development in thinking, 
according to Vygotsky, is not from the individual to the socialised but from the social to 
the individual.
The Piagetian account of cognitive development has been queried in recent years. It is 
now widely acknowledged that human cognitive growth is not very stage-like. 
According to Schweder, Mahapatra, & Miller (1987), no single cognitive stage can 
adequately characterise a person’s cognitive functioning. Current research no longer 
supports the hypothesis of a major qualitative shift from pre-operational to concrete- 
operational thought (Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983; Schweder et al, 1987). Piaget’s 
contention that morality of constraint or what is forbidden, is experienced through 
interaction with an adult, while morality of cooperation is experienced through
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interaction with peers, is questionable. Observations on discussions about what is 
allowed and what is forbidden -  the morality of constraint -  show that argument takes 
place both with the sibling and with the mother; “the morality o f cooperation can be 
experienced with either mother or sibling or both” (Dunn, 1987, p. 109).
The constructivist approach to learning, that children have their own ways of 
thinking, mediated by the influence of others, owes much to the insights of Piaget. It is 
now widely accepted that learning results from the complex interaction between child, 
adult and the social world.
2.3 Moral stage theory of Lawrence Kohlberg
Piaget’s theory o f moral reasoning was taken up by Kohlberg who extended the theory 
through empirical research and conceptual studies. His initial intention was to replicate 
Piaget’s (1932) findings with regard to moral judgment stages but he went beyond the 
ages researched by Piaget, studying children into adolescence and following them 
through into early adulthood. In doing so, Kohlberg (1978) went beyond Piaget’s two 
stage process and created a six stage process. In the pre-conventional stages (1 and 2) 
moral thinkers behave appropriately from fear of punishment or in the hope of a reward. 
In stage 1 it is the physical consequences of an action that determine whether it is good 
or bad. In stage 2, called the instrumental-relativist orientation, an action is right if  it 
satisfies one’s own needs and sometimes the needs of others. One follows the rules only 
when it is to one’s advantage. What is right is relative at the pre-conventional level of 
reasoning.
In the conventional stages (3 and 4) one recognises the demands and rules o f one’s 
own culture and shapes one’s behaviour accordingly. People have a basic understanding 
of conventional morality and reason with an understanding that upholds societal 
conventions. In stage 3, the interpersonal concordance or good boy -  nice girl 
orientation, good behaviour is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by 
them. Intention is taken into consideration in good behaviour. One earns approval by 
being nice (Kohlberg, 1978). What is right is determined by the expectations o f  persons 
close to oneself. Mutual relationships define what is good. The perspective is that of the 
local community or family. A generalised social order is not yet a consideration. Stage 4 
is the law and order orientation. There is respect for authority, fixed rules and 
maintaining social order for its own sake. Right behaviour consists in doing one’s duty.
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In the post-conventional stages (5 and 6), also called the autonomous or principled 
level, one moves beyond the detailed rules of a particular culture and one invokes a 
universal principle of justice. At this post-conventional level moral values have a 
validity beyond one’s social group or local authority. In stage 5, the social contract or 
legalistic orientation, right action is concerned with general individual rights and 
standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. 
There is an emphasis on the legal point of view but also on the possibility of changing 
the law if  rational considerations demand it. In stage 6, for which Kohlberg has no 
empirical evidence, the universal-ethical-principle orientation, right is defined by the 
decision o f conscience, in accord with self-chosen ethical principles. There is an 
awareness o f the universal principle of justice, o f reciprocity and equality of human 
rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons as ends in 
themselves and not solely as means to achieving other values. Stage 6 is the highest and 
most adequate stage o f moral thinking, the one that resolves all moral problems and 
conflicts (“From Is to Ought”, Kohlberg, 1971a, pp. 164-165).
Kohlberg’s critics claim his theory does not explain all o f  moral development but is 
only concerned with an aspect of it, justice reasoning, a fact which Kohlberg readily 
conceded in his redefinition of his theory (1984, 1985). At some stage Kohlberg 
considered adding another stage calling it stage 7 because psychological mechanisms 
could not wholly account for moral development and that a value stance is necessary 
allowing religion to play some part. This stage has been mainly discounted by theorists 
because they do not consider it relevant or that it does not add to his stage theory 
(Petrovich 1985, p. 85). Stage 7 points toward a religious or holistic orientation in 
answer to questions that could not be satisfactorily explained by reference to reasoning 
such as “Why be moral?” Some of his subjects’ responses were o f a religious nature, 
mentioning God as a reason for action (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 20). Under Kohlberg’s 
scoring system such responses had to be regarded as immature and discounted. 
Kohlberg had an ambiguous attitude to religion and did not consider it had an important 
role to play in moral development. He saw its role as developing religious beliefs and 
sentiments and not moral character (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 301).
The six stages, describing the development o f moral judgment from childhood to 
adulthood are based empirically on a study of eighty-four boys whose development 
Kohlberg had followed for a period of over twenty years. The stages are identified not 
by content -  the views expressed -  but by form which is the justification of reasons
33
given by the agent to defend a moral judgment. Kohlberg contends that the higher 
stages of moral development are qualitatively better than the lower stages, and are more 
differentiated and integrated because at the higher levels the individual comes to a more 
satisfactory resolution of problems. The later stages are higher and better because they 
are more adequate cognitively and therefore morally more adequate. New ideas and new 
experiences imposed on the individual force him to develop more sophisticated ways of 
handling his moral environment and function at a higher level o f  moral reasoning. It is 
the cognitive conflict and its resolution that causes the shift in thinking and the move 
from one stage to another in a particular order (Locke, 1985, p. 28). Kohlberg claims 
that the moral adequacy of his higher stages is backed up by empirical research and this 
claim to moral adequacy plays a central role in his conception o f moral education.
The argument that Kohlberg puts forward in defence o f the claim to moral adequacy 
of the higher stages has never been subjected to serious scrutiny (Siegel, 1985, p. 65). 
His claim that one stage builds upon another is also contentious. Tomlinson (1985, p. 
119) found in his research that respondents were capable o f  using different stage 
arguments across various answers and they would also use different stages in a 
connected way within the same response. For instance they might use a stage 5 
argument in defence of Heinz stealing the drug because o f everyone’s right to life and 
then add a stage 2 argument thinking that in any case the druggist would make more 
money if  he priced his drug at a more realistic level. In Kohlberg’s reckoning a student 
does not have a sense of fairness unless he can reason at stage 5 or 6 in resolving a 
moral dilemma. There is evidence of various levels o f moral thinking in children as 
young as four years of age (Williams N. & S., 1970). Matthews contends that the 
Kohlbergian response focused on only one of the several dimensions of moral 
development, the adjudication of moral conflicts and ignores all the rest (Matthews, 
1994, p. 65). According to Matthews a very young child can have a strong sense of 
fairness and have an empathic response to suffering and injustice. Wilson contends that 
Kohlberg’s findings tell us nothing about children’s understanding. He has merely 
shown the reasons children give in certain dilemmas to judge a course o f action, reasons 
which are most salient in the regime which controls them at a particular age/stage 
(Wilson, 1985, p. 230).
Kohlberg, in the rationalist tradition of Kant, emphasised the intellectual and 
cognitive aspects of morality. In this he has his critics for his over-emphasis on the 
rational side to the neglect of the emotional. Emotions such as compassion do not merit
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treatment in Kohlberg’s account of moral reasoning. Emotions are assumed to be 
irrational and in conflict with the cognitive core of moral development. He believed that 
the morally good person is the one who reasons and acts on the basis of justice and 
fairness. An alternative approach, Rich suggests, might be to recognise the cognitive 
core of the emotions in relation to moral development (Rich 1985, p. 211).
Kohlberg’s (1981) claim for universal application o f his stage theory is 
controversial. With its strong western bias and emphasis on rational thinking it is not 
widely acceptable outside of western culture. Since moral values vary from culture to 
culture, an invariant sequence in moral judgment is a controversial claim. Many non- 
westem societies do not have the stimulation required to reach the higher stages. He 
himself found that moral stage development tends to be arrested at lower stages in less 
developed village cultures; Kohlberg could find no higher than stage 4 in Turkey 
whereas in highly developed urban societies moral development proceeds to the highest 
stages, at least in some individuals (Kohlberg 1981, p. 234). Having backed off from 
some claims about the nature and adequacy of Stage 6, Kohlberg later reduced the 
number o f stages to five, making stage 6 an advanced form of stage 5 (Kohlberg, Levine 
& Hewer, 1983, p. 60; Kohlberg, 1985, p. 512).
Opportunities for Socratic dialogue are not equal across the world’s population of 
children. Moral thinking seems to be culture-specific. Schweder et al (1987, p. 35) 
contend that the child, through communication with others has not just a conceptual 
inheritance. Emerging moral consciousness is a product o f social practices. For 
example, the thinking of Indian and American children is much like the thinking of 
adults in their respective cultures. According to Schweder et al, Western cultures, where 
individualism is the norm, will see freedom, justice and rights as the principled moral 
standards and guilt as a major moral emotion. Children reason and reflect and have 
their own modes of thinking but the concepts they reason with may not be totally their 
own (p. 75). In other cultures where the group is primary, respect for social rules will 
be the primary moral standards and the fear of the disfavour o f others will be the 
primary emotion.
Schweder et al (1987) are critical of Kohlberg’s aspiration to a universal morality and 
his assumption that the highest stage is characterized by autonomy. He sees the content 
o f morality as supplied by the norms o f the culture in question, with no higher moral 
appeal possible or necessary. Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview may fail to do 
justice to a subject’s actual competence in moral reasoning because they may be
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responding to dilemmas which do not reflect their predominant values. There is a 
difficulty in non-westem countries in getting scorable responses from those whose 
conception o f justice itself is more collectivist (Vine, 1985, p. 443). Kohlberg (1971a) 
termed the difference in moral judgment of traditional societies compared with modern 
western societies as one of adequacy in moral judgment. This could be seen as violating 
the norms o f inter-cultural respect (Edwards, 1985, p. 419).
2.3.1 From moral development to moral education
Kohlberg has dominated the field of moral education since the late 1960s. So far I have
concentrated on his account o f moral development but his research extended to moral 
education and that is what I will deal with here. His research findings led him to reject 
the practices o f the traditional character education movement which claimed to have 
Aristotelian philosophy at the core of its thinking. Kohlberg believed a better approach 
could be devised, linked to his theory of moral development; the way a person organises 
their thoughts and understanding of the virtues enables them to make a moral choice. 
Development in the Kohlberg model would not be judged by acquiring more knowledge 
but would rather consist of a sequence of qualitative changes in the way an individual
thinks (Nucci, 2002). His stage theory, charting the growth of moral judgment
competence in six stages has had, in spite of criticism, dominant influence until recent 
times. He contended that classroom discussion of the moral dilemma, guided by 
developmental teaching led to a higher level of moral reasoning. Kohlberg’s aim was to 
explore moral judgment change by applying developmental principles to a programme 
o f moral education.
The Kohlberg-Blatt (1975) approach consisted o f one-hour teacher-guided discussion 
per week for the duration of twelve weeks, stimulating the next step of development and 
presenting modes of thought one step above the child’s own. Socratic discussion helped 
the students to clarify not only their own values but also to defend their beliefs as to 
why one answer was better than another. The children were tested at the outset to 
ascertain their level of moral reasoning and at the end of twelve weeks each child was 
given a test in the form of the Moral Judgment Interview and then classified into a stage 
of moral development depending on his or her responses. The approach defines the aim 
of moral education as the stimulation of the next step o f development rather than 
indoctrination into the fixed conventions of the society. Development is not only
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stimulated by exposure to the next level o f thought but also by the experience of conflict 
in trying to resolve problematic situations (Blatt & Kohlberg, p. 130). The essential 
rationale was to expose the children to cognitive conflict about moral reasoning and an 
awareness of other points of view and exposure to judgments one stage above their own.
The optimal age for moral dilemma discussion was considered to be between ages 10 
and 16. Kohlberg claims that the results indicate that an educational programme 
incorporating such methods was able to speed up natural developmental trends in moral 
development. Passive exposure to the next stage up would not have the same effect. 
Kohlberg envisioned an active role for the teacher as leader o f focused moral 
discussion. He would not allow for the teacher taking a lesser role, claiming that his 
moral dilemma discussion (led by the teacher with specific guidelines to expose the 
child to a higher level of moral thought) led to more change than is found in either free 
unstructured discussions or in didactic forms o f moral education (Blatt & Kohlberg, 
1975, p. 153).
There is a degree o f support for the moral dilemma discussion as a method for 
fostering moral development in adolescents. Methods like value indoctrination and 
moral behaviour drills have been found to be less effective (Lind, 1996a). However it is 
questionable whether moral dilemma discussion is complete in itself and whether real 
life situations rather than hypothetical situations are not a better starting point for 
stimulating moral reasoning in children. A criticism of Kohlberg’s theory is that it 
seems to favour those who can verbalise their reasons for preferring one course of 
action over another and takes no account o f tacit or implicit knowledge (Schweder et al, 
1987). It is doubtful whether a person’s verbalisation of a moral judgment is enough to 
classify him or her as being at a particular stage o f moral development.
Research by Berkowitz (1982) and Berkowitz & Gibbs (1983) into the effectiveness 
of moral discussion in the classroom raises some doubts about the finer points of 
Kohlberg’s method in favour of more interactional patterns. Kohlberg claims that 
advances in moral judgment are aided by teacher statements one stage above the moral 
reasoning level o f the children (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975). According to Nucci (1987), 
not only are such statements difficult to generate and therefore rare in classroom 
discussions, including those conducted by trained experts, but they seem far less 
relevant to changes in moral reasoning than statements by peers. The research by 
Berkowitz and his colleagues suggests that teachers serve less as instruments for direct 
intervention than as agents for the facilitation of peer discussion. Berkowitz and his
37
associates identified forms of student statements, which they called transacts that are 
related to moral development. In a transact the listener makes an effort to integrate the 
speaker’s statements into his own framework before making a response. Listener 
behaviour was not considered a positive contribution to moral discussion where the 
listener either engages in monologue or restates the speaker’s argument. The best results 
were obtained when the problems selected for discussion generated the most 
disagreement. However, researchers are not unanimous on this. These methods could be 
considered more effective with older children.
Damon and Killen (1982) cautioned against the use of conflict situations with young 
children. They found that social conflict tended to retard rather than promote change in 
children under eight years of age. For young children the best contexts for development 
were situations where they could resolve problems through conciliation and 
cooperation. Younnis (1980, p. 81) found that moral development in young children 
occurs through co-construction rather than through argumentation or passive 
withdrawal.
2.3.2 The judgment-action debate
Kohlberg’s critics claim he adheres too rigidly to the Piagetian model with its excessive 
focus on justice reasoning which does not adequately describe moral development. He 
is criticised for being more concerned with moral reasoning than with behaviour and 
being loathe to recognise that right thinking might not translate into right action (Gates, 
1985, p. 299). According to Kohlberg, one finds out what a person’s principles are, not 
by studying how he or she actually behaves but by analysing and interpreting his or her 
verbal responses to hypothetical dilemmas. He saw merit in moral dilemma discussions 
because he believed that moral judgment influences action. The higher the stage of 
reasoning, the more likely one is to reason in terms of principles rather than rules and to 
act in accordance with one’s moral judgments. Moral judgments are about the right and 
good of action (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 301). Yet, this explanation fails to explain why many 
individuals at the lower stages act consistently (Clark Power, 1997). Although one’s 
principles can give an indication o f how one is likely to act there is no guarantee that 
one will follow through on intention.
The issue here concerns the gap between judgement and action or what in traditional 
discussion, going back to Aristotle, has been referred to as akrasia or weakness o f will
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(Book 7 o f NE). Kohlberg’s theory is open to challenge due to the gap or “weakness of 
will” between judgments and action. Reasons for action o f a justifying kind do not 
always provide us with reasons for action of a motivating kind. There is more to moral 
behaviour than conformity to rules. Discussion of hypothetical dilemmas lack direct 
emotional experience of a situation which is necessary if  one is participating as a moral 
agent (Straughan, 1985, p. 101). Kohlberg’s argument is that moral reasoning is a better 
test to predict moral action. Each higher stage is more predictive o f moral action, 
impelling one from I  ought to I will. He is less concerned with moral action than with 
moral choice and the cognitive dispositions that inform it.
Kohlberg (1984) took the notion of responsibility into consideration in his later 
deliberations on the judgment-action question. He now acknowledged that moral action 
requires two kinds of judgment: a deontic judgment about the rightness or wrongness of 
a particular course of action and an aretaic or responsibility judgment about whether one 
should follow through. He described a moral principle as a rule of choosing and also a 
rule o f action. Blasi (1980, 1983) speculates that the bridge from judgment to action is 
through responsibility. The individual’s will to action is aroused when one is obligated 
to act and the impetus to act one way or another depends to some degree on the kind of 
person one thinks one is and wishes to become. He contended that individuals are more 
likely to feel responsible to act morally if  moral concerns are crucial for their self- 
definition. Kohlberg (1984, 1985) and his Harvard colleagues revised their research 
definition from the study o f moral development to its more restricted form, the study of 
moral judgment as embodied in judgments of justice. Moral development is concerned 
with all aspects o f human action but the development o f justice reasoning was 
Kohlberg’s central focus; he later came to recognise that the rational discussion 
approach should be part of a broader approach involving students in the moral and 
social function o f schools. Durkheim’s vision o f creating a moral society in the 
classroom appealed to him (Power, Higgins and Kohlberg, 1989b).
2.3.3 The Just Community approach
Although the ability to reason logically is a necessary condition for morality, it is not 
sufficient. Moral development results from an increasing ability to perceive social 
reality and to integrate social experience. Kohlberg recognised from early on that 
although moral dilemma discussions were crucial to moral development, moral
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education needed to include experiences for students to act as moral agents within a 
community. The year 1978 marked a change in emphasis for Kohlberg’s moral 
education programme. He revised his theory to account more adequately for experience 
and better explain the school’s role in moral education. His earlier experience of 
education in the Kibbutz led him to believe that an effective school must impact on 
students’ actions and not just their reasoning. The Just Community approach to moral 
education evolved out of experimental secondary school programmes, and functioned as 
schools within schools. Kohlberg saw this approach as a more effective way of 
stimulating principled moral reasoning. The Just Community schools aimed at 
developing the basic elements of morality as Durkheim described and were in keeping 
with the Aristotelian process of habituation in the virtues. In the Just Community 
schools Kohlberg encouraged the practice of democratic decision-making, fostering a 
sense o f community. The focus of moral education became the group rather than the 
individual and real-life dilemmas rather than hypothetical ones were at the centre of 
discussion. As a result of his Just Community experiments Kohlberg later entertained a 
far more sympathetic approach to the teaching o f virtue (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 2-3). 
Cognitive developmental researchers are now beginning to examine the development of 
virtues within a cognitive developmental framework (Clark Power, 1997).
Kohlberg developed the Just Community schools approach with the intention of 
offering students the opportunity to participate in democratic community. The primary 
purpose o f this approach was not just to enhance moral reasoning but to affect students’ 
actions. The key institution in this approach is the community meeting where the group 
meets to draw up rules and policies that concern the members and particularly to define 
policy in response to particular disciplinary problems (Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg, 
1989a). The stress was on collective responsibility and in two o f the Just Community 
programmes stealing virtually ended when members decided that the community would 
make restitution for thefts. While researchers acknowledged that the moral dilemma 
discussion was o f great significance to teachers, the latter did not continue to use this 
approach in the classroom when the researchers had left. Kohlberg wryly observed that 
although the operation was successful the patient died. Teachers cited pressure to follow 
a curriculum and irrelevance as reasons. The evidence would suggest that teachers do 
not see the goals and methods of Kohlbergian moral education as essential or 
compatible with their lives as teachers (Leming, 1985, p. 252). The Just Community 
approach has been used largely in alternative school settings and primarily with
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alienated or disruptive youth. Most mainstream schools would not consider it because it 
would entail a revolution in the thinking of teachers concerning the function of the 
school and a challenge to administrators concerning structural reorganisation (Leming, 
1985, p. 253).
Other theorists differ with Kohlberg in his claim to a single comprehensive moral 
theory. The domain theory of Elliot Turiel (1983) and his colleagues differentiates 
morality from matters of social convention. A distinction is drawn between the child’s 
developing concepts of morality and social convention. Conventions are arbitrary and 
are concerned with actions which are neither inherently right nor wrong whereas the 
moral domain is not arbitrary. The moral domain is concerned with issues of justice, 
human welfare and rights, and stems from factors intrinsic to action such as 
consequences that could harm others (Nucci, 1989, p. 184). In contrast to Kohlberg, 
Turiel claims that morality and convention are distinct parallel frameworks, needing to 
be approached differently in practice. Values education, he argues, should not be 
reduced solely to concerns o f moral development. Cultural tolerance and understanding 
would necessitate a respect for convention, rather than that it be treated as a subset of 
morality as in Kohlberg’s theory. Domain theory aims at the development o f both the 
student’s moral reasoning and concepts o f social convention. Kohlberg’s response is 
that the moral domain cannot be as neatly delineated as Turiel and Nucci suggest. The 
development o f communal norms to take the place o f conventional norms entails a kind 
of moralizing. So also can conventional norms be moralized by making them communal 
(Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989a).
2.4 The Particularist Position
2.4.1 The care versus justice debate
Kohlberg’s critics reacted to the fundamental assumptions o f his impartialist view, 
objecting to it on the grounds that it does not take enough account o f the moral virtues. 
They argue that virtues such as kindness, compassion and courage have as much 
significance as do qualities of justice, duty and adherence to moral principles. Gilligan 
(1982) contends that Kohlberg’s conception of adulthood is out of balance, favouring 
the separateness of the individual self over connection to others. Stage theory, having as 
its basis the universal principle of justice and the capacity for autonomous thinking, is 
associated with masculinity. The research instrument, the Moral Judgment interview is,
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she argues, biased against females, with males reasoning from a predominantly justice 
position and females employing predominantly care reasoning. In favouring the 
separateness o f the individual over connectedness with others, it does not encompass 
women’s ways of thinking (Gilligan, 1982, p. 17). Gilligan’s claim is that the 
interdependence o f love and care are not taken account of and that the justice motivation 
does not concern itself with particular persons or particular needs. Kohlberg’s response 
to this is that considerations of particularity such as care and beneficence are aspects of 
morality in which justice is central (Kohlberg, 1984, pp. 231-232).
Gilligan offered a morality of care, based on listening to wom en’s experiences, in the 
place o f Kohlberg’s justice theory. In her view, the morality o f  caring and responsibility 
is premised on non-violence, while justice morality is based on equality. 
Interconnectedness is central to morality of care and is associated more with girls 
because o f their early identification with their mothers. The morality of justice on the 
other hand is associated with the interactions of autonomous individuals. Masculine 
identity entails early separation from the mother. Gilligan contends that this separation 
makes boys more aware of difference in power relations between themselves and the 
adult and hence they tend to have more concerns over inequalities. Masculinity is 
defined through separation while femininity is defined through attachment. Male gender 
identity is threatened by intimacy while female gender identity is threatened by 
separation (Gilligan, 1982, p. 8).
While many would disagree with Gilligan’s core theory she has highlighted the 
importance o f care in moral reasoning and its omission from Kohlberg’s theory. 
Gilligan’s conception of moral development centres round the understanding of 
responsibility and relationships. Her claim is that women are systematically 
underestimated by Kohlberg’s system because of their different construction of the 
moral problem. Kohlberg’s highest stages of moral reasoning centre round a reflective 
understanding o f human rights. The morality of rights with its emphasis on separation 
rather than on connection, differs from the morality o f responsibility, according to 
Gilligan. Her claim is that women order human experience according to different 
priorities and have a more contextual mode o f judgment (Gilligan, 1982, p. 19). In the 
Heinz dilemma, two eleven-year-old children see two different moral problems. Jake 
sees the conflict as between life and property whereas Amy sees a fracture in human 
relationship. Gilligan (1982; Brown & Gilligan, 1992) sees the justice theory as failing 
to take account of women’s experience and is concerned by women losing their voices
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and the mysterious disappearance of the female self in adolescence. In early 
adolescence girls can become disconnected from what they are feeling and experience a 
loss o f  authentic relationship (Brown & Gilligan, 1992, p. 169). Empathy and 
compassion are at the centre of women’s judgments and, according to Brown and 
Gilligan, their concern is more with the real than with the hypothetical dilemma; women 
have a different way of constituting the self and a different idea o f what is moral. Since 
Kohlbeig’s research is derived mainly from a study o f masculine moral reasoning, 
failure o f development is seen as divergence from the masculine standard.
In Kohlberg’s scoring system the thinking o f women is often classified with that of 
children, the results being sex-biased against a moral orientation based on care. Gilligan 
stresses the necessity for defining criteria that encompass the categories of women’s 
thought and the inclusion o f the feminine voice in any developmental theory (Gilligan, 
1982, p. 105). Since women’s voices have been heard through a filter that renders them 
incoherent it was difficult for men to understand women. For her there is a dissonance 
between established psychological theory and women’s experience:
The disparity between women’s experience and the representation o f human 
development, noted throughout the psychological literature, has generally been 
seen to signify a problem in women’s development. Instead, the failure o f  women 
to fit existing models of human growth may point to a problem in the 
representation, a limitation in the conception o f the human condition, an omission 
of certain truths about life (Gilligan, 1982, p. 2).
Gilligan speaks about a different voice that is identified not by gender but by theme, a 
different way of constituting the self and morality, a theme that is different from 
Kohlberg’s justice theme even though her research evidence reveals a stronger link with 
women than with men. The different voice and its association with women, Gilligan 
(1982, p. 2) claims, are confirmed by empirical observation and it is primarily through 
women’s voices that she traces its development. Theories o f moral development have 
tended to overlook the implications of attachment relationships and she rejects 
Kohlberg’s implication that the care ethic can be reduced to an aspect o f morality 
conceived as justice (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987, p. 295).
Gilligan’s interest lay in the way people defined moral problems and her research 
methods centred on first-person accounts of moral conflict in real-life situations. Her 
findings led her to conclude that the justice and care orientations organise thinking 
about moral problems in different ways. Boys and men, although they introduce
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considerations of care, tend to define and resolve moral problems within the justice 
framework. The focus on care in moral reasoning is a characteristically female 
phenomenon, although not characteristic of all women. Kohlberg’s psychology was 
defined by male perceptions about what is of value and does not incorporate women’s 
way of knowing. Concern for particular situations rather than abstract principles is 
characteristic of the morality of women and, according to Gilligan, constitutes a 
superior moral orientation (in Braebeck, 1993). What Kohlberg measures are cognitive 
judgments rather than decisions that effect action in real life situations. Gilligan’s aim, 
according to Braebeck (p. 48), was to interpret the difference in the two perspectives 
and rather than rejecting Kohlberg’s theory, she sought to supplement it with one 
grounded in responsiveness to others and with concern for particular moral situations.
2.4.2 Response to Gilligan
Kohlberg finally admitted that Gilligan’s challenge was more cogent than he had at first 
conceded. He acknowledged that the emphasis on justice in his work did not fully 
reflect all that is recognised as being part of the moral domain (Kohlberg, Levine & 
Hewer, 1983). Although he conceded that his theory is not comprehensive, he continued 
to promote a restricted conception of morality and called for an understanding of his 
theory as a rational reconstruction of justice reasoning (Kohlberg, Levine & Hewer, 
1983, p. 19).
Braebeck (1993) calls for an enlarged conception of morality that integrates justice 
and care. There are many who think that notions of justice and care overlap more than 
Gilligan admits, and that morally adequate care involves considerations o f justice. 
Mature reasoning about moral issues, Friedman argues, incorporates considerations of 
justice and care (Friedman, 1993, p. 264). Friedman questions the moral adequacy of 
either orientation dissociated from the other. She calls for a non-gendered, non­
dichotomised moral framework incorporating all moral concerns; commitments to 
particular persons and to rules and principles are not mutually exclusive.
The Kohlberg scale was constructed to capture responses to a limited class of moral 
problems. Walker (1984) found no statistically significant gender differences in analysis 
responses measured on this scale. He refutes Gilligan’s claims o f sex bias in 
Kohlberg’s theory and concludes that there is little evidence to support her claim that 
stage 3 is modal for women and stage 4 for men. Gilligan further maintains that the fact
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that the main protagonists in Kohlberg’s dilemmas were male could be a factor in 
females not identifying with them. She is willing to concede that there are no gender 
differences in justice reasoning tests, but since justice reasoning is only one part of 
morality, Kohlberg’s findings do not address the issue o f gender difference in moral 
reasoning (Gilligan 1986c, p. 328). One may wonder whether the small size of 
Gilligan’s sample could be considered adequate to justify her characterisations. Eight 
males and eight females of different ages do not constitute a sufficient number to draw a 
general conclusion about all males and females. The samples drawn from classes in 
moral development at Harvard University would not be representative of students in 
general.
Flanagan (1991) criticizes Gilligan’s binary conception o f morality which does not 
take account of the diversity of moral personalities. There are a variety of good moral 
personalities, far more than the two postulated by Gilligan. Every problem can be 
construed from either a care or justice orientation. There is a need to listen to voices 
other than primarily white middle-class women. Her claim is that the justice orientation 
dominates moral thinking in developmental research and that dominance is gender 
linked. According to Flanagan (1991, p. 200), most people use both orientations some 
of the time when discussing moral problems. The type or content o f moral problem can 
influence the choice of solution and is a far greater predictor o f orientation used than is 
gender. The standard Kohlbergian dilemmas, such as the Heinz dilemma, generate the 
highest number o f justice responses in both sexes. Walker, Devries & Trevethan (1987) 
found that neither males nor females consistently focused from the perspective o f a 
single orientation to anything like the degree Gilligan claims. The contention o f Walker 
et al is that more personal dilemmas are likely to elicit a care response, and impersonal 
ones a  justice or rights response. Most people use a mix o f orientations depending on 
the context.
Education may have a greater role to play than gender in moral judgment. The care 
ethic seems to be dominant in societies where girls have a nurturing role. Damon (1990, 
p. 90) sees a gender difference in children’s approach to morality and he attributes this 
to the different ways in which boys and girls are treated when they are young. Social 
experience is, he claims, the crucial factor. Gender difference in moral orientation can, 
according to Damon, disappear if  circumstances change. This contention is at variance 
with Gilligan’s (1982) claim for developmental differences between the sexes. Different
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ways in which separation and connection are experienced would, according to Gilligan, 
mean a different self-concept and a different voice in defining it (See 2.4.1 above).
2.4.3 The broader picture: the particularist view
The upshot of the previous discussion is that one cannot reduce morality to care and 
impartiality. What about virtues, not wholly accounted for under either framework such 
as honesty, courage and compassion? The impartialist view does not address the 
question o f character or the role of the group in the wider community. Thinking of 
morality in terms of frameworks or orientations is only part o f the story (Blum, 1994). 
There is little sense in Gilligan that care and justice could overlap. Hers is a binary 
conception o f moraliy with no recognition of any other concrete possibilities entertained 
(Blum, 1994, p. 241). Blum attributes importance to group moral identity as having a 
moral dimension or voice distinct from both justice and care. Care morality, according 
to Blum is not limited to women. The impartialist view is concerned only with justice 
reasoning but morality is broader than this. Blum argues that morally significant group 
identities, such as those of gender, ethnicity or institutional identification provide moral 
orientations and forms of understanding that are distinct from both individual and 
universal principles o f justice.
The purely cognitive is not sufficient because it does not ensure the altruistic concern 
for the other. We need to get beyond the over-cognitive approach and consider attitudes, 
sentiments and emotions. Kohlberg saw no such need. For him justice was sufficient 
because it encompassed all other virtues. Moral responsiveness to others is mediated by 
adherence to principle, He saw justice as a prerequisite for care because there must be 
conditions o f social justice if personal virtues associated with both justice and care are 
to flourish. In his 6th stage Kohlberg (1981, p. 356) claims the integration of justice and 
care forms a single moral principle. His contention is that the two orientations converge 
at the highest point because the principle of “persons as ends” is common to both.
According to MacIntyre (1981) values or virtues are not grounded in universal 
principles but in particular circumstances. He sees the whole o f morality in terms of 
virtues grounded in the practice and way of life of particular communities. Hume (1751, 
1957) contended that moral judgment ultimately depends on empathy and that the moral 
judgments we make about others may be guided by empathy. His claim was that 
empathy provided the ultimate basis for the moral judgments we make about others.
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This view is echoed by Hoffman (1994, p. 164) who has long suggested a link between 
empathy, moral principles and judgment. The arousal o f empathy should activate moral 
principles and thus directly or indirectly have an effect on moral judgment and 
reasoning. Hoffman recommends a moral education curriculum that stresses the 
common humanity of all people and encourages empathy for those outside or on the 
margins o f the group. Empathic socialization begins in early childhood (Hoffman,
1982b) but it is not until late childhood or early adolescence that children are able to 
comprehend the meaning of moral principles. Then they can be receptive to principles 
of caring, equality and justice. People are, according to Hoffman, disposed to select 
from the moral principles available in society those that fit their empathic dispositions.
Flanagan questions whether one could teach children about fairness if one did not 
first teach them about kindness and sensitivity to the interests o f others. These virtues 
support each other because “instruction in both sensitivity and compassion and 
principles of fairness, turn taking and sharing occur in large part together” (Flanagan, 
1991, p. 226). Kohlberg overemphasises justice and fairness and underestimates many 
goods which play important roles in the moral lives o f most individuals. According to 
Flanagan, morality is mischaracterized when it is treated as a unitary subject matter 
requiring a unitary set of problem-solving skills. Noddings considers a focus on moral 
reasoning to be misplaced and considers that moral knowledge is insufficient for moral 
behaviour. She reckons that the ethic o f care should be the primary focus of moral 
education because of its emphasis on motivation, skills and attitudes required to sustain 
caring relations (Noddings, 1992, p. 21). Ultimately, it is not a question of choice 
between care and justice. The best promise for a satisfactory conception of moral 
maturity would, according to Carr & Steutal (1999, p. 181) be an approach in which 
care, justice and other virtues within the idea of community are emphasised.
Taylor (1989, 1991) describes a moral outlook guided by commitments to integrity, 
to perfection and to liberation which cannot be assimilated into Kohlberg’s or Gilligan’s 
theories. Traits such as courage and moderation do not have any very clear links to 
either orientation. He decries the narrowness o f an obligation-focused philosophy, 
concerned with what one ought to do rather than what it is good to be or what it is good 
to love. Ethics involves more than what we are obliged to do. It also involves what it is 
good to be. What is good to be is clarified by becoming more aware of what is noble or 
admirable about the human potential (Taylor, 1996, p. 12). In the neo-Kantian 
philosophy of Kohlberg, Taylor takes issue with the exaltation of justice-benevolence
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over issues of fulfilment and the good life. This view is also echoed by Murdoch (1970) 
who sees the dichotomy as the primacy of instrumental reason versus responding to 
something beyond the self -  the transcendence of the good. (This issue raised lightly 
here will be returned to in more depth in the next chapter).
2.5 Traditional character education movement
The area of moral education is bedevilled by a variety of terms that have come into 
usage. The terms different countries use for moral education can lead to confusion, 
particularly in Great Britain and the United States. The most widely used are values 
education, character education, and moral education. For many others it is citizenship 
education or civic education. In some cases there is overlap; in others basic differences 
in philosophical approaches underlie them. There are fundamental differences in the 
philosophical approaches of different schools of thought on how future good citizens 
are to be raised and educated (Bennet, 1992; Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972; Piaget, 1965; 
Wynne & Ryan, 1993). The traditional character education movement is among 
Kohlberg’s most vocal critics. Prominent in this movement is William Bennet (1993) 
whose best known work is The Book o f  Virtues, a collection o f classical moral stories 
for children. Bennet criticizes those who would educate children to judge and evaluate 
moral matters critically. His stories incorporate societal values and foster traits of 
character which are traditionally valued by society. Virtues are transmitted through 
good example and discipline and the stories are a central part o f this approach to moral 
education. The traditional character education approach is fundamentally opposed to 
the cognitive developmental one. Kohlberg (1981, p. 2) referred to it as the “bag of 
virtues” school o f thought, embracing the idea of habituation without taking due 
account of the reflection which characterises it in the Aristotelian sense. According to 
the traditional approach, virtues such as honesty, truthfulness, strength, kindness etc., 
are the basis of moral behaviour. The teacher teaches the virtues by example and direct 
teaching. In this approach the incorporation of societal values are central to character 
development and character education. It sees children as self-centred, needing formation 
and needing to reach out beyond themselves (Nucci, 1989).
Bennet (in Power, Higgins & Kohlberg, 1989b) considers the work of Kohlberg as 
mis-education because of the emphasis on children’s choices, decisions, deliberations
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and judgments. He has criticized educators for “intellectualising moral values” and 
suggests that they develop virtues through habituation. In response to this charge 
Kohlberg contends that Aristotle never lost sight o f the cognitive dimension of moral 
education, even as he distinguished habituation from teaching (Power, Higgins & 
Kohlberg, 1989b, p. 142). Bennet’s approach stresses the teaching of content 
emphasising traditional values and virtues whereas for Kohlberg, content is but a means 
to an end. Each accuses the other of relativistic views. According to Nucci (2001), the 
debate is mainly between the idea that the acquisition o f  morality involves an 
acceptance o f societal standards and norms and the idea that it involves the development 
of ways o f thinking about right and wrong or good and bad. It is also Nucci’s view that 
unlike the character education approach, the strength of Kohlberg’s (1981) approach lies 
in its basis in developmental research and in its substantive definitions and analysis of 
moral development.
Power, Higgins & Kohlberg (1989b, p. 126) contend that B ennef s proposals appear 
weak in comparison to the Just Community approach which sees character development 
through participation in a democratic community. While Bennet sees behaviour shaped 
through authority and discipline, Kohlberg promotes moral reasoning and responsibility 
through the experience of participation in democratic structures. The traditional 
character education model relies more on external controls and standards (Wynne & 
Ryan, 1993) while the Kohlbergian Just Community model tends to focus on 
cooperative democratic methods that empower students (Power et al, 1989b). The 
traditionalists criticize moral development approaches based on moral developmental 
research for failing to emphasize the role of habit, direct instruction and authority in the 
formation of character. This criticism is not entirely justified. Developmental moral 
educators have over time, and in light of the Just Community experience, come to 
recognise the importance or promoting responsibility and not simply reasoning. 
Cognitive developmental researchers have begun to examine the development o f virtues 
within a cognitive developmental framework. Kohlberg, in his later research, had a far 
more sympathetic view o f the Aristotelian approach to the teaching of virtue as a result 
o f his Just Community experiments (Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 2-3). He saw virtues as 
patterns or habits of action accompanied by requisite reasons and feelings (Clark Power, 
1997). The Just Community approach could be called an apprenticeship model of 
character education. Aristotle’s conception o f character and virtue includes the
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cognitive component, phronesis or practical wisdom, as well as the behavioural 
component, habit. The habituation process includes an emphasis on students’ reasoning, 
judgment and emotions. The community itself motivates moral responsibility, 
contributing to character development.
Bennet (1992), Etzioni (1993) and Kirkpatrick (1992) are critical of contemporary 
American culture because of its focus on individualism and over emphasis on rights and 
too little attention to collective norms and traditions. Nucci (2001, p. 74), viewing the 
debate as a balance between what is personal as opposed to societal, contends that 
morality and personal freedom are interdependent rather than oppositional features of 
human development. Lakoff (1996) sees the character education movement of Bennet 
and his associates as having a conservative political agenda, with family values and 
fatherhood central to conservative politics. He refers to it as the Strict Father Model in 
which children build character and self-reliance by respect and obedience to their 
parents. In contrast to this Lakoff depicts the liberal approach, the Nurturant Parent 
Model in which the obedience of children comes not from fear o f punishment but out of 
love and respect for their parents and their community. Children’s questioning is seen as 
positive (Lakoff, 1996, p. 34). Lakoff argues that the traditional moral values of Bennet 
are the values o f  Strict Father Morality or political conservatism. He farther contends 
that the Traditional Character Education approach is not supported by any modem 
research on child development. The Book o f Virtues, he claims, omits nurturance, 
tolerance o f deviants, open-mindedness, self-questioning and contains no section on 
modem moral issues, such as rights of minorities or the protection of consumers and the 
environment. Promoting discussion among children, according to Lakoff, prompts them 
to think for themselves rather than merely obeying authority. The Nurturant Parent 
Model promotes independent thinking by engaging children in dialogue. They will 
become socially responsible by openly discussing reasons for what they are being told 
to do and how their actions will affect other people (Lakoff, 1996, p. 357).
2.5.1 Integration of different perspectives
Berko witz (1998) suggests that asking which theory is right is asking the wrong 
question. It is not simply a choice between a single right theory and a set of wrong ones. 
Rather, the question should be how best to explain and influence moral growth, given 
all the available knowledge and theoretical perspectives. The challenge, according to
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Berkowitz, is to sift through what each approach has to offer, find the commonalities 
and adjudicate between the discrepancies. This would seem a better approach than the 
outright rejection of seemingly opposing theories. Likona (1983, 1991) advocates 
integrating Kohlbergian structuralism with character education. There are efforts at 
integration and one of the most notable of these is the Child Development Project which 
began in San Ramon, California (Watson, Solomon, Battistich, Schaps & Solomon, 
1989) but has now moved to Oakland. This project (CDP) has a theoretical perspective 
that overlaps in part with the traditional and the cognitive-developmental perspectives. 
Like the Just Community schools this programme has opportunities for children to 
develop the capacity for moral reasoning and includes experiences which help them to 
take the perspectives of others, valuing people equally and respecting individual 
difference. At the same time it incorporates instruction, role-modelling and habituation, 
thus blending the central aspects of both traditional and developmental approaches. The 
teaching of values is stressed but unlike the indoctrination approach, teaching is in the 
cognitive-developmental manner, helping children to analyse and evaluate critically. 
There is a belief that children can be intrinsically motivated to value the social norms of 
the group without promise of a reward or fear of punishment. The CDP school of 
thought aims at the development of an internalised commitment to a pro-social moral 
code (Watson et al, 1989, p. 87).
Both the Just Community and the CDP approaches stress the importance of adults 
guiding children in developing moral values but there are differences in emphases. The 
cognitive-developmental approach focuses on the importance of adults promoting 
autonomy and justice in children, while the CDP in addition stresses the importance of 
adult caring. The two approaches differ also on the role o f  peer interaction. For 
cognitive-developmentalists such interaction is crucial to the development of 
autonomous morality. For the CDP on the other hand, while peer interaction plays a 
significant role, adult-child interaction assumes primary importance, at least for young 
children. Although the CDP has had positive outcomes and the future looks promising, 
Watson and his colleagues (1989) considered that much was still unknown about its 
effectiveness in character education, A recent study by Battistich, Schaps, Watson, 
Solomon & Lewis (2000) of CDP effectiveness reported success in drug prevention and 
a reduction in behaviour problems, violence and substance use. Schaps (2005), one of 
the founding members, claims that results of evaluations o f CDP indicate that students’ 
interpersonal classroom behaviour, problem-solving skills, and commitment to certain
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democratic values were enhanced. He further claims that findings indicate achievement 
of a self-other balance, and that positive effects on self-esteem and conflict resolution 
were found two years after pupils had left their elementary school.
2.6 Conclusion
Recent research on moral development owes much to Piaget’s analysis of children’s 
thinking and understanding. Piaget’s constructivist approach to learning, emphasising 
the importance of social interaction in cognitive development, was a forerunner of 
today’s concept of child-centred learning. In recent years the impartialist conception of 
Kant, Piaget and Kohlberg which characterizes justice morality over several decades has 
been challenged by particularist positions. Rational acceptance is no longer considered 
sufficient to motivate moral action. That there is one unitary moral point of view rooted 
in impartial universal principles guiding the moral agent is disputed most notably by the 
care theory o f Gilligan, Blum’s theory o f moral responsiveness, and Hoffman’s 
contention that emotions and sentiments are the basis o f morality. Kohlberg’s initial 
theory o f moral development underwent change in the 1980s, becoming refined to a 
theory o f justice reasoning in moral decision-making. It is not essentially a theory of 
moral character but it is a theory of how people make mature moral judgements. The 
Just Community schools were an attempt to see justice reasoning in action in 
democratic communities.
Debate in recent times about what theory is best has seen opposing theories with 
fundamentally different approaches to moral education. Traditional character education 
proponents such as Wynne (1986) argue that the emphasis in moral education should be 
on influencing moral behaviour and not states o f mind. They are opposed to the 
cognitive developmental approach of Kohlberg and see the fostering o f reasoning, 
autonomous choice and decision making as essentially erroneous in a theory of moral 
education (Bennet, 1980a, p. 30). According to Turiel (1989), such a vision of moral 
education sees the examined life as corrupting (p. 177). Attempts at consensus in recent 
years (Berkowitz, 1998; Likona, 1983) have seen some agreement about the importance 
of integration. Most experts now favour a variety o f approaches to character 
development. The Child Development Project in California (Watson et a l, 1989) goes 
some way in bridging the gap between traditional character education and cognitive 
structuralism, combining the core aspects of the both approaches.
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3 ISSUES IN MORAL EDUCATION
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will identify the significant issues in moral education, what a theory of 
moral education has to take account of and what is crucial in an adequate theory. Some 
very basic philosophical issues are implicit in the debate on moral education. Different 
protagonists are in some way rehearsing positions that are not just relevant to education 
but to morality itself. The main philosophical theories o f morality that could currently 
influence moral education are Kantian liberalism, virtue ethics and mainstream 
communitarianism, and the ethics of care. Liberal theories, with which cognitive- 
developmental approaches have been mainly associated, encourage the development of 
the capacities o f  moral reasoning and the intellectual aspects o f moral understanding. 
Rational autonomy and principles of obligation, deriving largely from Kant are stressed. 
The primacy accorded to moral reasoning in the Kantian approaches is challenged both 
by virtue ethicists -  who see the child’s environment -  community, schools, parents -  as 
central to inculcating good character through the habitual practice o f the virtues -  and 
by ethicists o f care who emphasise emotional development, within the context of 
interpersonal relations, and who locate the self in networks where one is a giver or 
receiver o f care. The ethic of care has been given impetus by certain recent strands of 
feminist theory. Virtue ethics, associated with contemporary communitarianism and 
rooted, in the Aristotelian tradition, emphasises character education approaches and 
focus mainly on behaviour shaping and Raining.
Advances in psychology of moral development (Kohlberg, 1981) meant that the 
substantive content o f moral education became less important than the processes of 
moral decision-making. The Kohlbergian model, unique in the 1970s with its freedom 
from the restrictions of community values and its emphasis on justice reasoning, and 
occupying centre-stage for most of two decades, no longer dominates the moral 
education domain. Moral education now seems to involve more than making choices 
and there is widespread recognition o f the need for reflection on the nature of moral 
virtues. Character education has come back in favour and from the perspective of virtue 
ethics some theorists think it has much to commend it (Noddings & Slote, 2003). Some 
modem character educators see the value o f the role o f reason in Kohlberg’s model but
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reject the theory as a whole because of its perceived lack o f  moral content (Likona, 
1991).
3.2 The moral self
Different approaches tend to disagree on the basic nature o f the moral person and such 
disagreement at the level of different goals for moral formation leads to different 
emphases with regard to methods. What characterises a good child? Is the good child 
docile and obedient or inquisitive and challenging? Berkowitz contends that 
understanding the nature of the moral person involves going beyond Kohlberg’s 
education for moral reasoning and educating for the other components that make up the 
moral person such as emotion and behaviour. One requires moral emotions such as guilt 
and compassion in addition to moral reasoning to decide what is right or wrong in a 
given situation. One’s moral identity, a self-reflective and evaluative sense of the self, 
gives one a sense of being a morally adequate person (Berkowitz, 1997, p. 8). The most 
effective models of character education are, according to Berkowitz, those that 
recognize the complexity of human moral nature and attempt to be multi-faceted in their 
approaches. Moving beyond the cognitive developmental paradigm means seeking more 
adequate ways o f understanding what it means to be a moral self.
A person’s moral judgements do not determine the place that morality occupies in that 
person’s life. Moral behaviour depends on something beyond the moral beliefs in and of 
themselves. It depends in part on the importance of moral concerns to an individual’s 
sense o f self as a person (Colby & Damon, 1993 p. 152). Blasi stresses the role of 
biography in self-understanding and moral conduct. Moral responsibility must be 
integrated in one’s identity or sense of self. One’s actions need to be consistent with 
one’s sense of self and since moral identity plays a central role, self-consistency is the 
basic motivational spring of moral action (Blasi, 1993, p. 99).
3.2.1 Moral motivation
Why be moral? Reason alone cannot address this question. Morality relates to what a 
person really is, to the very essence of the individual. Making moral choices is guided 
by a different principle than that of mere judgement. According to Nisan (1993, p. 262) 
it is generally after making a judgement as to the morality o f an act that one feels it is
54
necessary to make a moral choice, He contends that moral judgement alone does not 
require much of the self; moral maturity needs the capacity to make complex 
judgements and  to take appropriate action. Kohlberg himself maintained that there is a 
higher degree of consistency between moral judgement and moral action as the level of 
moral judgement increases. For Kant, rational acceptability is sufficient to motivate 
conformity to right action. However, helping children to act as moral agents is not just a 
matter o f helping them to make moral judgements and to know right from wrong. 
Having all the relevant information is no guarantee of right action. The crucial factor, 
according to Straughan, is motivation: “Teaching children to be moral then must be a 
matter o f teaching them to want to be moral” (Straughan, 1988, p. 111). The feeling 
component o f morality is of the utmost importance whereby they will have greater 
concern for the welfare o f others. Straughan contends that religious education can be 
important here because of its emphasis on all humans as brothers and as children of 
God. He sees the justification of one’s beliefs as important because one is clearer about 
one’s commitments when one can rationally justify one’s beliefs and this kind of clarity 
is crucial in being a moral agent (p. 123).
Concern for the welfare of others, the feeling part o f relationships, makes people 
aware of obligations and responsibilities and helps them to regulate actions in ways that 
are consistent. According to Keller & Edelstein, affective bonding in relationships plays 
a crucial role in the development of the moral self. In early adolescence this sharing of 
emotions and intimate bonding is critical for the development o f a sense of self. 
Experience o f affective bonding can become a strong motivational force in decision­
making and conflict resolution between friends (Keller & Edelstein, 1993, p. 315).
3.2.2 The affective and emotive basis of ethics
Peters (1973) contends that the real tension is between the demands of reason and the 
particularist promptings of compassion. A more Humean account of the moral life can 
be given in which the virtue of justice can play a central role but where there is a place 
for the natural virtues “stemming from the sentiment o f  humanity” (Peters, 1973, p. 27). 
The narrow rationalism of most neo-Kantian theories, concentrating on the form of 
moral life in which rules are central, results in the neglect o f the affective and emotive 
basis o f ethics. In a similar vein, Benhabib (1992, p. 50) contends that these theories do 
not take account o f the embedded, finite aspects of human beings and are blind to the
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significance of emotional and character development. We are not rational by virtue of 
birth but acquire it through social experiences and identity formation. In the current 
understanding, the autonomous person is one who asserts independence but moral 
autonomy could also be understood as growth and change, sustained by a network of 
relationships. Benhabib further claims that ethical rationalism since the eighteenth 
century has promoted a form of moral blindness with respect to the moral experience 
claims o f women and children. The communicative ethics of Habermas (1990), in 
claiming that judgements o f justice constitute the hard core o f moral theory, is for her, 
an example o f ethical rationalism, privileging moral judgement to the neglect of moral 
emotions and character. The standpoint o f the “generalised other” predominates in such 
universalist moral theory. The “generalised other” (Mead, 1934), the community or 
social group which gives the individual his or her unity of self, demands that we see 
every individual as a rational being entitled to the same rights and duties as ourselves. 
Emphasis on this demand tends to occlude the “concrete” other, the individual who has 
concrete needs, desires and feelings. The standpoint o f the “concrete other” requires that 
we regard every individual with a concrete history, identity and emotional make-up. We 
seek to understand the other’s motivations and confirm our common humanity and 
individuality. Benhabib contends that the restriction o f the moral domain to questions of 
justice and the ideas of moral autonomy, as well as leading to “epistemological 
blindness toward the concrete other” has also resulted in the “privatisation of women’s 
experience” (Benhabib, 1992, p. 164).
It is argued that women’s relationships and women’s ways of knowing are not taken 
account of in cognitivist moral theories such as Habermas’s theory o f the ideal speech 
situation in which arguments are traded back and forth. Harding questions the 
privileged role of argument as a way of vindicating truth and moral claims. 
Assertiveness in speaking is overestimated while listening is undervalued. The goal is 
agreement rather than understanding. It marginalizes many who are subjective in their 
knowing and their thinking. In contrast she asserts that the knower uses empathy in 
communicating with others, which culminates in “constructed knowing” (Harding, 
1996, p. 93). Dominant ideals of moral autonomy and its privileged definition of the 
moral sphere have marginalized and continue to silence women’s voices, a fact also 
attested to by Gilligan & Brown (1992). Gilligan (1982) calls for the expansion of the 
definition o f the moral domain, to question the ideals o f the autonomous self in light of 
the experiences of women and children and to concede that a universalist moral theory
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must heed the voice of the excluded. Gilligan claims that because women and their 
experiences were excluded from mainstream developmental theories in psychology, the 
models and hypotheses which have emerged can not claim to be either universal or 
neutral. Universalist moral theory must hear the story of the excluded, the different 
voice. Hannah Arendt (1958) maintains that we are embedded within a web of 
relationships. I am part of others’ stories and they are a part o f  mine. A coherent sense 
of self and identity depends on how one integrates these stories into one’s life history.
3.2.3 The moral self as a construct
The moral self is the result of socialisation experiences as well as o f rational thinking. 
This social construction of the self is based on recognition o f the self as agent in 
interaction with significant others. In this interaction w ith others we learn the 
consequences o f  our actions on others, receiving their approval or disapproval. I learn to 
understand m yself in relation to others from the positive affirmation or otherwise I 
receive. Others become the mirror through which I come to know myself; I grow in 
interaction with them. Insofar as I wish to be part o f relationships, I must regulate my 
actions in accordance with given standards. Through perspective-taking and empathic 
feelings the self comes to emotionally share the world o f others, to become part of that 
world (Keller & Edelstein 1993, p. 313). Moral feelings are tied to an image of myself 
that I want to maintain. Moral ideals motivate me to moral action. I have a sense of 
myself as a moral agent and I experience obligations and responsibilities as personally 
binding. Moral sense is tied up with my sense of self as a person. If I have established 
consistency between my judgements and my actions I will see obligations as personally 
binding and strong affective bonding will strengthen moral motivation. Through 
emotional bonding with a peer, a sense of self is established. Therefore a secure self is a 
connected self. Close identification with friends plays a very strong role in adolescents’ 
evaluation o f action and responsibilities, a friend’s need being a spur to action. This is 
usually a reciprocal relationship. Keller and Edelstein (1986, 1990) consider the 
development o f friendship bonds as the decisive experience for building up moral 
motivation.
Valuing the self and valuing others are connected. Past experiences affect our self- 
evaluation. When the basic needs of the self are not met in childhood, an individual is 
likely to develop a defensive self. According to Staub (1993), the way a person’s
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identity is constructed has direct implications for morality, affecting disposition for 
moral thoughts, feelings and actions. While the role o f others is integral to the 
constitution o f moral selfhood, still, embeddedness in the group can be an inhibiting 
factor. People have greater capacity for moral thought, feeling and action when they can 
psychologically separate themselves from the group and so can critically evaluate the 
meaning and consequences of their group’s behaviour (Staub, p. 347). Self-awareness 
influences the choices we make. The autonomous self is capable of connection, whereas 
people with disconnected selves cut themselves off from others. Experiencing unity 
therefore requires a secure and connected self and a consciousness of common humanity 
with others. Our concept of selfhood is derived from the unity o f a narrative which links 
us to those around us from birth. In a word, narrative structure is at the core of the 
formation of the self.
3.2.4 The narrative view of self
The unity o f a human life is according to MacIntyre (1981, p. 203), the unity of a 
narrative quest. He contends that in diminishing the cultural place of narrative e.g. in 
sociobistorical, biographical, intellectual and religious tradition, we have encouraged 
the disconnection o f the narrative from life. One’s traditions and inherited roles are the 
“givens” of one’s life. It is because we all live out narratives in our lives that we 
understand our own lives and the actions o f others. Each o f us, according to MacIntyre 
(1981, p. 199), “being a main character in his own drama plays subordinate parts in the 
drama of others, and each drama intersects with the others” . Disconnected from its 
roles, the self loses something o f the social relationships in which Aristotelian virtues 
function. The self becomes invisible and life consists o f  a series of unconnected 
episodes with no scope for the exercise of dispositions. The “unity of virtue in 
someone’s life is intelligible only as a characteristic o f a unitary life, a life that can be 
conceived and evaluated as a whole” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 191).
A sense o f self is, according to Dunne, mediated by significant others and internalised 
by the child. Who we are and who we become is shaped in part by our history. We 
make sense o f our lives through the stories that shape it. The self becomes identified 
with its loves. Self-understanding is always an understanding o f one’s relatedness to 
others and to the good (Dunne, 1995, p. 151). One becomes identified with the story one 
tells and it thus influences actions and becomes self-constitutive. In the telling one
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becomes accountable to others, connected to them and part o f an intricate tapestry of 
cultural and interpersonal relations.
Noddings (1984, p. 4) maintains that the foundation of ethical caring is our memory of 
caring and our longing for goodness, rather than our moral reasoning capacity. This 
view differs from the cognitive developmentalist one as to the central importance of 
story and dialogue in human development, especially as they pertain to one’s sense of 
self. Her contention is that the individual in mainstream developmental psychology is a 
private self, set apart from other selves, focused on his or her own development, 
essentially unmediated by the other. This theory does not take account o f the coherence 
of the self, grounded in its narrative structure. I am the teller and receiver of stories 
through which I discover connections between myself and others. I come to know more 
deeply the meaning of my own cultural and historical narrative. It thus enables me to 
empathise with others. Our sense of self is, according to Witherall (1991, p. 85), 
influenced by our connection with others within our social sphere, our sharing mutual 
predicaments and possibilities; we are defined by the cultural context that shapes us, the 
collective norms of the society into which we were bom. The prejudices and values of 
that society, evolving over time, form part of the package o f our inheritance and become 
ingrained in our consciousness.
It is through narrative that we represent and give meaning to our life’s experiences. 
Tappan & Brown (1991, p. 176) stress the relationship between narrative, moral 
development and moral education. They advocate a narrative approach to moral 
education whereby children and adolescents are encouraged to tell their own moral 
stories. This is a way of translating knowing into telling and hence placing them in the 
context of the ongoing narratives of their lives. In the telling o f the story we endow a 
certain sequence o f events with moral meaning:
[Moral stories] represent the complex and complicated interrelationship between 
the cognitive, affective, and conative dimensions o f lived moral experience. As 
such, they again illustrate the ways in which narrative serves to give meaning to 
lived experiences of moral conflict and choice (Tappan & Brown, 1991, p. 179).
In telling my own moral story, I am both author and actor in my own drama. In 
recounting, I am telling my version of the story, which may or may not correspond to 
the actual facts o f the case but I am claiming moral authority from my own perspective. 
How we articulate our stories influences how we think, feel and act. A narrative
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approach to moral education affords students the opportunity to tell their own moral 
stories, to reflect on their own experience from their own moral perspective. This will 
lead to an increased sense of authority and authorization on behalf o f that perspective 
but also an increased sense of responsibility for action. Tappan & Brown advocate this 
approach, not entirely on its own, but in conjunction with other compatible approaches. 
They contend that it plays a valuable role in helping students to authorise their own 
moral choices and to have their voices and moral perspective shared with others.
The importance of the shared narrative in helping to establish connection, is also 
stressed by Belenky (1996) and her associates who see it as especially central to 
women’s psychological development and learning. They speak about a voice of 
“connected knowing”, a sharing of the self and other, a “felt relation between knower 
and known” (Belenky, pp. 102-103). The emphasis is on the nourishment of greater 
inclusiveness, change and growth over time. One of the functions o f narrative Bruner 
(1986, p. 69) contends, is to hold cognition, emotion and action together, and thereby to 
give meaning to human experience through the representation of such a unity. The 
moral agent, in the Aristotelian sense is not a solitary individual, a being for himself 
pursuing his own freedom, as Sartre portrays him, but a member of inter-related 
communities who is involved in a common life.
3.3 Virtue and moral disposition
3.3.1 Ari stotle ’ s account
An adequate account of moral development depends on a reasonably developed 
conception o f morality. Morality as Aristotle conceives it is concerned with the human 
good. It is concerned with well-being and happiness, promoting the conditions in which 
human beings act well and live good lives. Some think we are made good by nature, 
others by habituation, and others by teaching (NE 10, 9: 1179b20f). Aristotle rejected 
Plato’s quest for a universal or eternal conception of the good, divorced from the 
specific human situation. He contended that the good for human beings has to be 
worked out in relation to goods that are achievable by human activity or in terms of 
goals at which human beings are able to aim (Crittenden, 1990, p. 105). Reason on its 
own initiates no changes. The central idea in Aristotle’s account o f moral maturity is 
that the good life is lived according to a complex set o f excellences or virtues, certain
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dispositions for acting and feeling, exercised in choice and responsibility. Aristotle 
places virtue and the cultivation of moral disposition at the centre of morality. One is 
habituated into right action and for this to happen, other people are indispensable. It is 
in and through dealings with others that a person can become virtuous and for Aristotle, 
virtue is its own reward in the sense that it is the essential constituent o f happiness.
The virtues are primarily moral virtues or virtues of character, under the guidance of 
certain qualities o f mind, especially the intellectual virtue o f practical wisdom or 
phronesis. Aristotelian phronesis, often translated as prudence, is according to Dunne 
(1993), a habit o f attentiveness that enables one to profit from past experience, thus 
enriching our present through the insights gained. The just person does good actions for 
their own sake. Being virtuous requires practical knowledge, for it is knowledge that 
directs action. Knowledge is gained through experience and experience enhances 
knowledge (Dunne, 1993, pp. 276-280). There can however be an inconsistency 
between knowledge and conduct. According to Socrates, to know the good is to do it. 
Aristotle maintained that this contradicts the facts. Knowing what is right does not in 
itself make a person prudent. One must be disposed to do it. Moral weakness akrasia 
can occur only in someone whose grasp of the particular premise is weakened. He 
knows but does not follow his convictions (Dunne, 1993). The licentious person has no 
such conflict because he does not care and is not committed to the pursuit of the good, 
but to his own pleasures (NE 1145a 15-34). Ultimately it is the practice o f virtuous acts 
that constitutes good character because the good man or woman is disposed to following 
through on what he or she believes to be right action and is committed to the ideal o f the 
good.
The moral virtues extolled by Aristotle are essentially courage, self-control, 
generosity, a spirit of goodwill and cooperativeness, truthfulness, justice, and a capacity 
for love and friendship. These virtues or moral excellences are the constitutive elements 
of the good life. Eudaimonia or happiness depends on other things as well, on the sort 
o f society one lives in and having a degree of luck in matters beyond one’s control. The 
good life consists in living according to reason in contrast to living dominated by one’s 
passions or appetites. It is the irrational passions that Aristotle has in mind here. The 
morally mature person is the one who loves and hates in the right way, who experiences 
pleasure and pain rightly. The virtues are concerned also with actions and passions, and 
achieving moral excellence is a matter of being emotionally affected in the right ways. 
Intelligent choice of action involves both knowledge and desire; one’s emotional
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response to a situation is guided by practical wisdom (NE 1113a; 1139a23; b4-5). 
Practical wisdom enables one to ascertain what is good for oneself and the members of 
one’s community and what is best in particular situations (Crittenden, 1990, p. 109).
The young child’s capacity for deliberation and rational choice is undeveloped and 
the child is incapable of achieving virtue by itself but Aristotle stresses the need for 
habituation as a prerequisite for instruction and understanding in morality (NE 1, 3 1095 
a 2-4). The child’s progress toward a position where he or she can stand back apart from 
personal desires and evaluate them is, according to MacIntyre (1999, p. 88), an 
“extended initiation into the habits which are the virtues”. Moral understanding is found 
in what a person loves and through habituation the child comes to love what is noble 
and develop a deeper understanding. The crucial question for modem day educators is 
in sifting through conflicting theories and deciding which theory or theories of moral 
development offer the most promise.
3.3.2 The virtue ethics approach
Aristotle’s account of ethics and of ethical formation has assumed particular importance 
as the background to and inspiration for the contemporary approach, already referred to 
in virtue ethics. The virtue approach to moral education has as its goal, the 
encouragement o f virtues and their constituents (Carr & Steutal, 1999). While it stands 
in significant contrast to Kantian approaches, it has much in common with the 
approaches to moral education of the ethic o f care (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984) and 
character education (Likona, 1996). The virtue approach focuses on the development of 
the virtues and the promotion of admirable traits o f character. It accords more 
significance to agents and their character, rather than on the rightness or wrongness of 
actions or kinds o f actions. It stresses the primacy of good character over right conduct 
and what we are obliged to do. Accordingly it sees the essential concern of moral 
education as habituation in the virtues, how we are to live virtuous lives and not just 
with mastery of cognitive processes. Virtue theories see the foundations o f virtue as 
lying not only in rational agency but also in habit, emotion and sentiment (Blum, 1994, 
p. 169).
Within the virtue ethic approach values are appreciated for their own sake, and the 
crucial aim o f moral education is to show how life can be enriched by the possession 
and exercise o f qualities such as honesty, temperance, courage, justice and charity (Carr
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& Steutal, p. 245). Basic moral training especially in the early years is stressed, but 
critical appreciation of moral reasons is also encouraged. One must be able to provide 
good reasons for choosing one course of action over another. Motivational factors must 
enter into any real appreciation of principles. On this view there is an internal relation 
between moral reason and moral motivation. No one could claim to have fully grasped a 
moral reason or to have acquired the relevant moral virtue who is not inclined to pursue 
what that reason enjoins. The cultivation of affect is crucial to the development of moral 
dispositions. Aristotelian virtue requires the refinement o f  certain human capacities in 
the interests of self and others. For example, consciousness o f  the dignity of the self and 
an awareness o f how one’s actions impinge on others would call for the virtue o f 
temperance (NE 1104al 1-32).
The emphasis on the internal relation between reason and emotion is connected with 
other features of the virtue approach to ethics. The modelling o f conduct, through the 
example of others or moral exemplars, is a key factor for virtue ethics. In the 
development of moral sensibilities, virtue adherents agree on the importance of 
narrative and the potential of literary heritage and story; virtue ethicists stress the 
importance of narrative in general for the formation o f  personal and cultural moral 
identity.
A characteristic of an ethics of virtue is that aretaic concepts and judgements are 
treated as basic or primary. When we judge actions in aretaic terms we always do so 
because of the motives, dispositions or traits of character the agent manifests. An ethics 
of virtue, according to Slote (1992, pp. 89-93), puts a greater emphasis on the ethical 
assessment of agents and traits than it puts on the evaluation o f actions. Virtue ethicists 
do not lay claim to founding an original theory. Rather their claim is that their theory 
reflects a basically correct view of the nature of the moral life.
There is however some criticism of the virtue ethics approach to moral education even 
from those who espouse it (Steutal, 1997, p. 396). In order to reach a clearer 
understanding o f the harmonisation of reason, affect and behaviour in virtuous conduct, 
Steutal maintains that further research and more conceptual work on the psychology of 
virtue is necessary. The relationship between moral habituation and the development of 
autonomous moral judgement needs to be made clear. Theories o f moral education 
ought to translate into appropriate moral educational strategies if  the furtherance o f 
virtuous conduct is to be the ultimate aim. For me as a classroom teacher, a moral 
education class or discussion according to the Blatt-KohJberg (1975) or Lind (2001)
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approach has definite guidelines and 1 know what to expect at different age levels. It is 
not so with a virtue ethics approach. I am not aware o f any research that has been done 
to guide classroom practice outside of some broad outline of the philosophy itself. What 
is good conduct like and how can we make ourselves better? These are the questions 
that are ultimately important to moral educators and moral philosophers.
3.3.3 Love o f the Good
The revival o f Aristotelian insights through virtue ethics has been one significant 
counter thrust to the way in which the idea of goodness and o f virtue has been largely 
superseded in western moral philosophy by the idea of rightness. Another notable 
rejoinder to this super-cession is to be found in the work o f Iris Murdoch. Murdoch 
points to a void in recent British moral philosophy. In her view there is a need for “a 
moral philosophy in which the concept of love, so rarely mentioned now by 
philosophers, can once again be made central” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 238). What is the 
good person like? Can we make ourselves morally better? These are questions Murdoch 
thinks the philosopher should try to answer. She suggests that what is needed is a 
reorientation which will provide an energy of a different kind from a different source. 
Love is what ultimately inspires people. We should be aiming at goodness more than 
freedom or right action. Right action should provide the starting point o f reflection and 
not its conclusion; the aim o f morality cannot be simply action (p. 357). One needs 
some conception o f the human soul, and o f a transcendent reality to which it is in some 
form related. The task of morals must be the purification and reorientation o f the soul. 
Good is non-representable and indefinable. Ordinary human love is striking evidence of 
a transcendence of good. For Murdoch, to see the reality o f another person is a work of 
love, justice and pity. Love necessitates the suppression of the self as “the fat relentless 
ego” and giving attention to what is pure and good (Murdoch, 1998, p. 342).
In developing this line of thought, Murdoch quite explicitly involves Plato and is 
also much influenced by a recent Platonist, the French philosopher, Simone Weil. Plato 
stressed the connections between goodness, truth and love. For him, the True and the 
Good are aspects of the one object of the same person. Weil (1951, p. 126) speaks of 
purity o f  thought and action, putting others’ needs before one’s own, seeing it as “the 
central good for every man is the free disposal of h im self’ in the service o f others. If we 
could really see someone in their full humanity, we could not treat them unjustly. Weil
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urges valuing truth for its own sake, a commitment to truth and a love of truth or rather 
the spirit of truth in love. This view is echoed by Gaita (2000) who refers to love of 
truth as a spiritual love, the discursive capacities o f the mind in service to a love of 
truth. The sense o f life as a gift and the love of the beauty o f the world is, according to 
Gaita, nourishment of the soul. He maintains that part o f our intellectual and cultural 
tradition should include spiritual possibilities, the capacity to awaken in people a sense 
of goodness: “The deepest values of the life of the mind can not be taught. They can 
only be shown....only to those who have eyes to see” (Gaita, p. 230). Like Weil, Gaita 
sees Truth as a need of the soul.
Similar sentiments are expressed by Peters who contends that love of truth can 
transform all activities, and like religion it can enlarge the context in which these 
activities are placed, “enabling one to understand the facts o f  a more mundane level of 
experience in a new light, as one is moved by awe at certain aspects of the world” 
(Peters, 1973, p. 113).
3.3.4 Concern for the other
Love o f the Good is translated into moral living mainly in the form of concern for 
others. I have touched on concern for others in a previous section (3.2.4) but here I will 
deal with the problem of individualism getting in the way o f concern for others. Modern 
search for authenticity can result in narcissistic self-fulfilment; western emphasis on 
individualism has resulted in a loss of concern for others and a sense of responsibility 
for one’s neighbour. True self-fulfilment requires moral demands beyond the self in 
some form. It is by transcending the self that we become self-actualised. For Taylor
(1991) real authenticity has to include the discovery o f our own original way o f being 
and must be inwardly directed. One cannot do this in isolation but through dialogue in 
relationship with others. This view is echoed in Levinas’ (In Vetlesen, 1997, p. 157) call 
for unselfish concern for the other. For Levinas, morality begins and ends in the human 
dyad, the I-Thou relationship, in the unselfish concern for the other without thought of 
reciprocity. Its essence is in being open to the other, allowing the other to unfold. For 
Levinas, the other appears as Face, as a revelation. To welcome the other is to surrender 
the *T”, to put in question my freedom. Instead o f stealing my freedom from me, the 
other gives it meaning in presenting it with a task. It is the other, qua destitute, weak 
and frail that commands me. I am thrown into the domain o f the moral, committed to
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bearing responsibility for the fate of the other without being concerned with his concern 
for me. Morality, rather than being an option, is a predicament (Vetlesen, 1997, p. 153). 
This is so because our lives are intertwined and in this interdependence, we have 
responsibility for each other.
This sort of Levinasian view is also developed by Martin Buber. In Levinas’s work 
there is a strong Jewish strain of thought -  the sense of solidarity with others and a 
sense o f responsibility for the down-trodden -  and in Buber this also comes across. 
Buber (1961) maintains that the basic movement of the life o f  dialogue is a turning 
towards the other, a soul connection. To recognise the other in his particular existence is 
to plunge into “silent unity”; it is a dialogue between /  and Thou. The person who is no 
longer concerned nor assumes responsibility for the other with his whole being, 
becomes sterile in soul and “a sterile soul ceases to be a soul” . Buber’s thesis rests on a 
belief in God. Man adrift, alone in an alien universe, needs to hear the “wing-beat of the 
spirit above the abyss”, and the role of the educator in helping to bring him back to his 
own unity, will help to put him back again face to face with God (Buber, 1961, p. 47).
Morality is inseparable from the ways in which people are valued and experience one 
another. People become who they are through the ways in which they participate in 
society. Acting morally presupposes an understanding of the self and o f the other, but 
understanding is not enough. There has to be moral sentiment, a concern for the needs 
o f the other as well as a strong inner conviction to meet those needs. Concern for the 
other requires not only the sublimation of the self but a transformation in the ways in 
which mutual interdependence and participation in society is understood. The way 
forward, according to Williamson, is in nurturing the primal moral sense o f people 
combined with the development of communication so that people are enabled to make 
choices and feel valued. That is the only way of “avoiding all the pitfalls o f moral 
relativism” (Williamson, 1997, p. 99).
These views are echoed by Bauman (1993), a prominent analyst of post-modern life­
style and much indebted to Levinas. Post-modern life strategies tend to render human 
relations fragmentary and discontinuous and create a distance between the individual 
and the other, leading to lack of engagement with the other or sense o f commitment to 
his or her welfare. Morality has to find new grounding. Human beings, he contends, are 
neither fundamentally good nor bad; they are ambivalent but capable o f acting morally 
towards one another. We are ineluctably moral beings. I am challenged with 
responsibility for the other and responsibility for the other is shot through with
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ambivalence. Moral life is a life of continuous uncertainty. To act morally is to face up 
to that incurable ambivalence. This being-for the other, the tearing off of masks until 
“the naked defenceless face shows itself’ is described as a work o f love. Bauman 
further reminds us that taking responsibility for the other means not considering the 
other as a specimen, or species or category but as a unique dignified human being 
(Bauman, 1993, p. 60).
The kind of moral virtues and their developmental precursors such as sympathy, 
compassion, kindness, and generosity which were important in consideration for the 
other, were given little consideration in moral developmental theories. Blum (1994, p. 
175) stresses the need for compassion or responsiveness to another’s condition. 
Compassion, according to Blum, is not a simple feeling state but a complex emotional 
attitude towards another involving active regard for his good and a view o f him as a 
fellow human being with emotional responses akin to one’s own. Responsiveness could 
be called an altruistic virtue, involving concern for the good of the other and a 
disposition to perform beneficent actions. Responsiveness is towards the other’s 
condition, rather than towards some particular emotion or feeling. It involves some kind 
initiative and not merely a passive response and thus involves both cognitive and 
affective dimensions (Blum, 1994, p. 188).
3.3.5 Moral exemplars
Another facet o f morality, often neglected in cognitive developmental theories, has 
received attention in some recent works -  how to understand conspicuously good 
persons o f outstanding virtue who can act as moral exemplars. The relevance of this to 
moral education is obvious. Positive identification with an inspiring model contributes 
to building moral values into students’ identities, their conceptions of who they are and 
who they want to be. In a study of morally exceptional adults Colby & Damon (1992) 
found that the integration of self and morality was central in the commitment of moral 
exemplars to the common good. They contend that moral behaviour depends on 
something beyond moral beliefs, per se. It depends on how and to what extent the 
individuals’ moral concerns are important to their sense o f themselves as people. 
Similar findings were reported by Hart & Fegley (1995) who found associations 
between personal definition and prosocial conduct. They studied the moral identities of
a group of inner city adolescents who exhibited a high degree o f care for others and 
community service voluntarism.
Other research on moral exemplars by Blum confirms that moral exemplars hold 
worthy ideals and attempt consciously to live up to them. Emulating exemplars, those 
displaying moral excellence and moral heroism, can be a force for one’s moral growth 
and can affect one’s values and mode of life in suggesting particular directions one 
might take in one’s own moral improvement (Blum, 1994, p. 96). Our discussion of 
moral exemplars is concerned with love o f the Good and M urdoch’s discussion of the 
Good is also relevant to our present discussion of moral exemplars.
Murdoch (1972) characterises moral excellence in terms o f seeing the right 
relationship and the priority between different human values. Although we cannot all be 
moral exemplars, she contends that we can all be better than we are. There are some 
virtues that we could come to possess in greater degree than we do now. A genuine 
sense of morality enables us to see virtue as the only thing o f  worth. Murdoch suggests 
that moral goodness is properly regarded as the central value in human life and when 
the soul is turned toward good the highest part of the soul is enlivened. Questions such 
as “What is the good man like? Can we make ourselves morally better?” should be the 
central preoccupations of moral philosophy (Murdoch, 1972, p. 52). Life is not the 
whole story. Commenting on this aspect o f Murdoch’s work, Taylor speaks of entering 
the forest, the point beyond, something which matters beyond life, being called on to a 
change o f identity. “One enters the forest through the full-hearted love of some good 
beyond life” (Taylor, 1996, p. 26).
As already noted (in 3.3.3 above) the notion of the articulation o f the good has been 
relatively neglected in Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy. Theories o f justice-benevolence 
take precedence over virtues of fulfilment and the good life. Taylor suggests that we 
help to clarify what it is good to be by getting clearer on just what is noble or admirable 
about human potential. Some of our articulations not only help us to defme better what 
we want to be and do. They also move us. We are moved by human powers. 
Articulating a constitutive good can inspire and move us to want to be and do it. 
Exemplary people and actions, whether in real life or in story, have the power to inspire 
us to live more meaningful and purposeful lives. There are of course different kinds of 
moral excellences. According to Blum, one need not necessarily be an idealist but in 
responding to a situation one can discover depths o f character which can impel one 
towards exceptional behaviour. An example was Oscar Schindler who responded to a
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particular situation of the war and showed outstanding courage in sheltering substantial 
numbers o f Jewish workers by employing them in his munitions factory, thereby saving 
them from certain death in Auschwitz. Schindler’s wife declared after his death that 
Oscar c'was fortunate that in the short fierce era between 1939 and 1945 he had met 
people who summoned forth his deepest talent” (Keneally in Blum, 1994, p. 94). 
Perhaps that is what we need, something to reach towards and inspire us, some purpose 
that engages us deeply.
3.3.6 Contemporary culture: inhospitable ground for a rich morality?
In the preceding section I have been attempting to bring out those aspects of the moral 
life that receive scant attention when the primacy if not exclusive focus is on obligation- 
centred. morality. In Taylor’s nice image what I have been trying to do is to draw 
attention to the ethical persons dwelling in the field and forest and not only in “the 
corral” (Taylor, 1996, p. 5). However, while Taylor may be right there is much in 
contemporary culture which conspires against these wider and richer aspects of morality 
receiving their proper due. Morality, as restricted to the domain o f justice, the “corral”, 
what it is right to do, has been for long the subject o f contention. Other questions 
beyond the moral beg attention: How am I going to live my life? What kind of life is 
worth living? What constitutes a rich and meaningful life? (Taylor, 1989). Visions of 
the good life get blurred in a culture which prizes autonomy over connection to others. 
Modem culture, on the one hand has diversified our moral sources, giving exceptional 
value to equality, rights and freedom and commitment to universal justice and well­
being. On the other, according to Taylor, the atomistic focus on individual goals, 
dominant in our culture, dissolves communities and divides us from each other. The 
changes in modem life, decline in the practice of religion, secularisation, 
industrialisation, technology, mobility have resulted in a cultural mutation in which our 
sense o f  identity has become blurred and our horizons fractured. Taylor sees 
instrumental society with its utilitarian values as threatening to empty life o f its 
richness, depth and meaning; the individual, disconnected from community, enters a 
series of mobile, changing, revocable situations, relating to others through partial roles 
(Taylor, 1989, p. 502).
Taylor’s Sources o f  the Self was undertaken as a work o f retrieval, to uncover buried 
goods, to emphasise the need for the recognition o f some intrinsically valuable purpose
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in life beyond the utilitarian, to point away from the kind o f emptiness and shallowness 
that distinguishes the fragmented individual and point him towards the fulfilment of his 
expressive potential, to authenticity. This view is echoed by many. Galston points to a 
shallowness in modem liberal societies and contends that the greatest threat to children 
is “not that they will believe something too deeply but that they will believe nothing 
very deeply at all” (Galston, 1989, p. 101).
An obligation-centred morality emphasises right at the expense o f the good and has 
resulted in a narrowness in moral philosophy. Our identity is what allows us to define 
what is important to us and what is not. A society o f  self-fulfillers, whose allegiances 
are revocable, cannot identify strongly enough with the community. Taylor’s 
exploration of modern identity seeks the identification of citizens with their public 
institutions and political way of life. Morality, like every other aspect of our lives has 
to be formed co-operatively. Co-operation does not displace each individual’s own 
struggle. It supplements it. Midgley (1997, p. 31) contends that our obsession with 
protecting individual freedom has tended to isolate each person in an “unbreathable 
moral vacuum in a way that paralyses action”. Western culture extols individualism 
making personal freedom a central ideal and this has resulted in a neglect of the social 
aspect of morality and consequently an increase in irresponsibility and crime. There is 
room for some kind of teaching to help people respect the feelings o f others, argues 
Midgley, because people no longer know what they ought to do. Moral attitudes need to 
be caught or absorbed in the community. This raises the question as to what kind of 
education and what kind of community can best nurture the virtues of cooperation and 
responsibility.
3.4 What kind of moral education?
3.4,1 A liberal or non-liberal account?
An adequate theory of moral education has to take account o f  how best to assist people 
in pursuing a life that has meaning and purpose, which in Aristotelian terms means a 
fulfilling life lived according to the practice of the virtues. The cultivation of certain 
dispositions that assist in character development and good relationships with others 
could be considered as one of the basic aims of moral education. Discipline and 
training, even if  worthwhile goals in themselves, are nonetheless insufficient for
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m o ra lity . L ib e ra l educationalists, fo r w hom  no tions o f  ju s tic e , fa irness and in d iv id u a l 
r igh ts  p la y  a cen tra l ro le , see the developm ent o f  personal au tono m y as the p rinc ipa l 
a im  o f  m ora l education, w h ich  in  essence means g iv in g  peop le  the ra tio n a l resources to 
decide fo r them selves h o w  they should liv e  th e ir live s  (K o h lb e rg , 1981, 1984).
T he  lib e ra l v is io n  o f  m ora l education has been the ob jec t o f  considerab le c ritic ism  
how ever. Sandel (1982, p. 79), fo r example, c la im s tha t i t  is f la w e d  and its aspira tion 
incom p le te  and contends that neu tra lity  is im poss ib le  in  tha t w e  can never escape the 
e ffects o f  ou r co n d itio n in g . W e have a llegiances tha t go beyond  ob liga tions  and 
enduring  attachm ents and com m itm ents w h ich , taken  toge ther, p a r tly  de fine  the person I 
am. The lib e ra l concep tion  o f  m ora lity , indebted to  K a n t fo r  m uch  o f  its  ph ilosoph ica l 
founda tion , w ith  its  emphasis on in d iv id u a l r igh ts  and freedom s, has accord ing to  Carr 
(1999 ), n o th in g  to  say about the qua lity  o f  one ’ s va lue  preferences. F o r C arr m ora l 
de libe ra tion , as construed b y  libera l theo ry , is s im p ly  the  soc ia l d im ension  o f  
en ligh tened se lf-in te rest. Y oung  people need som eth ing m ore  than  the p u rsu it o f  
in d iv id u a lis t ic  personal fu lf ilm e n t. A r is to te lia n  va lues w ere  no t seen as sub jective  
preferences b u t as p r in c ip le d  d ispositions roo ted  in  estab lished practices, conducive to 
hum an f lo u r is h in g . The cruc ia l issue fo r m o ra l education, acco rd ing  to  C arr, is w hether 
young  peop le  are educa tiona lly  better served b y  a lib e ra l o r n o n -lib e ra l conception  o f  
m ora l educa tion . H e argues fo r  a restatement o r a re v iv a l o f  an eth ics o f  aspira tion, 
som eth ing  a k in  to  the C hris tian  ideal, w h ic h  w o u ld  seem to  o ffe r  a m ore p ro m is in g  
fo u n d a tio n  fo r  a p rog ram m e o f  m ora l education, lead ing  to  the  p rope r apprec ia tion  and 
a cq u is itio n  b y  p u p ils  o f  tru ly  fu lf i l l in g  m ora l va lues (C arr, 1999, p. 40).
In  M a c In ty re ’ s account the proper con tex t fo r  c u lt iv a t io n  o f  the v irtues  is  the 
co m m u n ity  fro m  w hence the narrative o f  ou r lives  begins. H e  contends that since w e 
have encouraged the d isconnection  o f  na rra tive  fro m  li fe  w e  no longe r kn o w  w ho  w e 
are and th is  la ck  o f  se lf-know ledge  is part o f  ou r pred icam ent: “ T he  s e lf has to  f in d  its 
id e n tity  in  and th rough  its  m embership in  com m un itie s , such as those o f  the fa m ily , 
ne ighbourhood , the  c ity  and the tribe ”  (M a c In ty re , 1981, p. 205). M a c In ty re  attem pts to  
exp la in  the w h o le  o f  m o ra lity  in  terms o f  v irtues  grounded in  the  practices and w ay  o f  
l ife  o f  p a rticu la r com m un ities . I t  is w ith in  the  cons truc tion  o f  lo ca l fo rm s  o f  co m m u n ity  
th a t c iw ility  and in te lle c tu a l and m ora l l ife  can be sustained. In  na rra tive  u n ity  I  f in d  m y  
concept o f  se lfhood . The A ris to te lia n  m ora l agent is n o th in g  w ith o u t others but fin d s  h is 
id e n tity  as a m em ber o f  in ter-re la ted com m un ities . In v o lv e m e n t in  the com m on l i fe  o f  
the fa m ily , the  househo ld  and the state characterised c itize n sh ip . The  search fo r  the
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Good, fo r  the  U n ive rsa l, consists in  l iv in g  the k in d  o f  l i fe  tha t is the exercise o f  the 
v irtues. M a c In ty re  sees the virtues as susta in ing re la tionsh ips  to  the  past, to  the fu ture  as 
w e ll as to  the  present; v irtue  and se lf-know ledge are fo r  the  independent practica l 
reasoner the essentia l constituents o f  fu ll hum an f lo u r is h in g  (M a c In ty re , 1999, p. 105).
V ir tu e  e th ics, as va rious ly  espoused b y  theorists such as C arr o r M a c In ty re , is by  and 
large co m m itte d  to  some fo rm  o f  com m unita rian ism . A  s im ila r  case is made by  B lu m  
(1994, p. 169) w h o  argues that the ties between c o m m u n ity  and v ir tu e  m ay be m ore 
s ig n ifica n t than  m o ra l theory has taken in to  account. H e  contends tha t com m un ities  can 
shape ou r sense o f  w ha t we fee l m o ra lly  d raw n to  do. V ir tu e  is  n o t s im p ly  generated by 
pure unconnected autonomous in d iv id u a ls  but in  co m m un itie s  o f  sorts. The 
com m u n ita ria n  c r it ic is m  is tha t the autonom ous in d iv id u a l w o u ld  com e to  regard 
rece ived c u ltu ra l ties and responsib ilities as a m atter o f  cho ice . H e  or she cou ld  feel free 
to accept o r re jec t them . Sandel (1996, p. 12) suggests tha t the unencum bered s e lf w i l l  
no t fee l o b liga te d  to  fu l f i l  ends that he has n o t chosen, ends de fined  by  iden tities  as 
members o f  fa m ilie s , cultures or trad itions.
For a ll the obv ious m erits o f  the com m un ita rian  p o s it io n  some serious questions 
about its  re levance to the contem porary w o r ld  need to  be faced. Such questions have 
been ra ised b y  W rin g e  (am ong others) w ho  po in ts  ou t tha t w e  shou ld  n o t be too  eager to 
conclude th a t m a te ria l change in  its e lf  constitu tes m o ra l dec line . W e no longer liv e  in  
s e lf-su ffic ie n t, se lf-con ta ined  com m unities, sm a ll enough fo r  m os t o f  those a ffec ting  
ou r live s  and a ffected  by  our actions to be know n . W rin g e  m a in ta ins  th a t i t  is  m ateria l 
change, p o p u la tio n  g row th  resu lting  in  greater m o b ility ,  advances in  techno logy  that 
have resu lted  in  changed w o rk  practices, and u rban isa tio n  w ith  its  increased 
o p p o rtu n itie s  fo r  m o b ility  and com m un ica tion  tha t have b ro u g h t about a d im in u tio n  o f  
c o m m u n ity  l i fe  and practice rather than s im p ly  m o ra l dec line  (W rin g e , 1998, p. 232).
W rin g e  argues tha t i f  the no tion  o f  deve lop ing  the v ir tu e s  is to  have a p lace in  m ora l 
educa tion  i t  m us t be in  ways tha t are bo th  cred ib le  and appropria te  to  o u r age ra the r than 
hankering  a fte r those o f  other ages and o ther tra d itio n s . T he  v irtu e s  m ust be acqu ired in  
a w ho le  le a rn ing  experience in v o lv in g  school, w o rk , yo u th  c lubs and churches. He 
suggests th a t in d iv id u a l counse lling  w o u ld  he lp  young  peop le  to  id e n tify  th e ir  pa rticu la r 
in c lin a tio n s  as w e ll as hav ing  discussion and m o ra l reason ing fo rm  pa rt o f  such a 
program m e. C oncentra ting  on a m o ra lity  tha t seeks to  curb  one’ s desires and to  ins is t on 
d o in g  w h a t pleases others rather than onese lf can, acco rd ing  to  W rin g e , pose prob lem s 
o f  m o tiv a tio n  fo r  young  people. He argues tha t the y o u n g  shou ld  be encouraged to  use
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th e ir  ow n  freedom  ac tive ly  and pos itive ly  because i t  is in  asserting onese lf and fin d in g  
one ’ s ow n path tha t one becomes em powered in  the m odem  w o r ld . A  m ora l education, 
w h ic h  emphasises the righ ts  o f  young people them selves a longs ide  those o f  others, 
w o u ld  be m ore reputable and m ore e ffective  than  one based on  the oppos itio n  between 
v ir tu e  and se lf-in te rest o r pleasure (W ringe, 1999, p. 287). Perhaps the real challenge 
here is  to  show  h o w  the emphasis on in d iv id u a l freedom  in  W rin g e ’ s account can be 
reconc iled  w ith  the emphasis on m ore com m una l and o b je c tive  standards in  the authors 
c ited  earlier. T h is  is a challenge to  w h ich  I  w i l l  re tu rn  in  Part I I  w hen  I  w i l l  be 
cons ide ring  in d iv id u a l em powerm ent o f  the  young  th rough  c o m m u n ity  in  the practice  o f  
T h in k in g  T im e  -  P h ilosophy w ith  C hildren.
F o r too  long  a tten tion  has been focused on  the school as the  crad le fo r  education and 
in cu lca tio n  in to  m ora l life . W ith o u t the support o f  the w id e r co m m u n ity  the school 
cannot fu n c tio n  e ffe c tive ly . W e need to  lo o k  at everyday practices. The a ffec tive  
env ironm en t is c ru c ia l fo r  m ora l developm ent. H a b itu a l m o ra l responses and th e ir 
in te g ra tio n  w ith  m ora l re fle c tio n  depend upon  soc ia lisa tion  w ith in  the fa m ily , the 
co m m u n ity , the peer group and the schools. D a m o n  &  C o lb y  a ttribu te  the increase in  
yo u th  v io lence  in  pa rt to the fragm enta tion  and p o la risa tio n  o f  m o ra l va lues tha t 
characterise our cu rren t s itua tion  and p o in t to  the need fo r  a  coherent m o ra l vo ice  tha t 
cuts th rough  the m o ra l p lu ra lism  o f  our d iverse society. T h is  w o u ld  im p ly  a certa in  
consensus on  core values in  the com m un ity . W h ile  com ple te  consensus in  u n lik e ly , they  
reckon  tha t there m ay s t i l l  be some core va lues tha t w e can a ll share. The schoo l can 
o n ly  be p a rt o f  the so lu tion . A l l  the in s titu tio n s  in  the c h ild ’ s l i fe  m ust p la y  a 
cons truc tive  ro le  in  h is o r her m ora l g row th  (D am on  &  C o lb y , 1996, p. 36).
3.4 .2 A  renew a l o f  c iv i l  society
In d iv id u a lis t legacies o f  E n ligh tenm ent th in k in g  have led to  the  decline  o f  c o m m u n ity  
as a w a y  o f  life . In d iv id u a l freedom  was pe rce ived  as b reak ing  the  b inds  o f  co m m u n ity  
and be ing  set free  fro m  the circum stances o f  one ’ s b irth . W e  seem to  have com e fu ll  
c irc le  n o w  and the idea o f  com m un ity  is be ing  re-eva luated. W h a t had once been 
perce ived  as a constra in t is now  a source o f  em pow erm ent. T he  d isconnection  fro m  
co m m u n ity , Baum an c la im s, has resulted in  a fragm ented  and d iscon tinuous l i fe  tha t 
prom otes the w a n in g  o f  m ora l impulses. B aum an contends tha t the p ro m o tio n  o f  a new  
and bad ly  needed eth ics fo r  the new  age can o n ly  be approached as a p o lit ic a l issue and
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task. C itizens need to be helped to recover the vo ices they have los t and make them 
again aud ib le , to  he lp  share respons ib ility  by ac tive ly  p a rta k in g  in  p o lit ic a l life . Post­
m odern pressures need to  be counteracted by  m ore au tono m y fo r  in d iv id u a l m ora l 
selves and m ore  v igo rous  sharing o f  co llec tive  respons ib ilitie s . In  short the  autonomous 
c itizen  needs to  be part o f  a fu lly -fle d g e d , se lf-re fle c tive  and se lf-co rrec ting  p o lit ic a l 
co m m u n ity  (Baum an, 1993, p. 287).
M a n y  theoris ts  c la im  tha t the  breakdown in  c o m m u n ity  va lues and ensuing a lienation  
fro m  one’ s roo ts  has resulted in  anomie fo r a great num ber o f  c itizens. The evidence is 
apathy tow ards dem ocra tic  pa rtic ipa tion  and a decline  in  the understand ing  and practice 
o f  c itizensh ip . W illia m s o n  (1997) contends tha t m o ra l unders tand ing  can o n ly  be 
developed and achieved th rough  an enriched no tio n  o f  c it ize n sh ip  w h ic h  embraces a ll 
the dom ains o f  fa m ily , education, w o rk  and co m m u n ity , in  w h ic h  people interact w ith  
one another. The  m ora l s e lf is  nurtured in  socia l con texts  and develops th rough liv in g  
w ith in  a socie ty. W here  bureaucratic organisation and the va lues o f  the m arke t place 
predom ina te , p o w e r is transferred to another im persona l agency, and m any citizens fee l 
a lienated and powerless. In  such circumstances m o ra l sen tim en t can atrophy in to  
in d iffe re n ce  o r apathy (W illia m so n , 1997, p. 103). T h is  v ie w  is also echoed by  Baum an 
(1993) w ho  speaks o f  a s h iftin g  o f  m ora l respons ib ilitie s  aw ay fro m  the s e lf tow ards 
faceless agencies, resu lting  in  d im in ished  sense o f  persona l re sp o n s ib ility .
The  w a y  fo rw a rd  accord ing  to  D unne (2002) is  in  a renew a l o f  c iv i l  society w here 
people com e together in  trus t and c iv ic  friendsh ip  and exerc ise  in it ia t iv e  in  the pu rsu it 
o f  com m on  in terests and goals. The p re va ilin g  k in d s  o f  kn o w le d g e  tha t p rom ote  a 
sk ille d  w o rk  fo rce  take precedence in  our schools ove r kn o w le d g e  tha t helps in  the fu l l  
flo u r is h in g  o f  the person. T h is  k ind  o f  ins trum enta l a ttitu d e  in  education -  the 
p ro m o tio n  o f  econom ic p rosperity  -  is u n lik e ly  to  p roduce  a fu lly - f le d g e d  se lf- 
actualised, co m m itte d  c itizen . I t  m ere ly results in  the subve rs ion  o f  the proper goods o f  
education. In  the c lassica l n o tio n  o f  c itizensh ip , acco rd ing  to  D unne , c iv ic  v ir tu e  m eant 
ca ring  about each o the r’ s good. C erta in  d ispos itions  o f  m in d  and character w ere  
requ ired , m ode ra ting  one ’ s desires and dealing ju s t ly  w ith  o thers. The p o lit ic a l system 
in  i ts e l f  encouraged c iv ic  v irtue . P reva iling  no tions  o f  r ig h ts  in  our so-ca lled  
dem ocracies p itc h  the in d iv id u a l against the state. O u r cu rren t no tions  o f  freedom  and 
e q u a lity  m ust in c lu d e  so lid a rity  i f  we are to  recover o u r sense o f  id e n tity  (D unne, 2002, 
p. 73).
74
A  renew al o f  c iv i l  society means w o rk in g  together tow ards  com m on  goals in  a 
va rie ty  o f  n e tw o rks  in  the society, fin d in g  em pow erm ent th ro u g h  co-operation  and 
concerted action . In  do ing  so, we learn the v irtues  o f  acknow ledged  dependency 
(M a c In ty re , 1989). M ac In ty re  contends tha t o n ly  w here the m a in  agencies are w o rk in g  
together to nu rtu re  a coherent set o f  m ora l and /o r re lig io u s  va lues can the  aims o f  m ora l 
education be rea lised. Is i t  rea lis tic  to a im  fo r  such coherence in  a lib e ra l democracy? 
A n d  w o u ld  i t  m ean some curta ilm ent o f  au tonom y?
C a llan  argues tha t an education tha t seeks to  cu rta il the deve lopm en t o f  autonom y 
so as to  p ro tec t the  g row th  o f  s im ple in te g rity , runs the  r is k  o f  be ing  se lf-de feating . I t  
co u ld  com e at a cost o f  close-m indedness, w h ic h  w o u ld  n o t be conducive  to real 
in te g rity  (C a lla n , 1997, pp. 66-67). Openness to d iv e rs ity  b y  its  ve ry  nature w i l l  en ta il 
some losses as w e ll  as gains. L ib e ra l p o lit ic s , accord ing  to  C a lla n , is o ften  depicted as 
devo id  o f  any d is tin c tive  eth ical ideal and the idea tha t v ir tu e  and libe ra lism  are 
in co m p a tib le  is  a v ie w  com m on in  m uch o f  co m m u n ita ria n  p o lit ic a l theory. C a llan  
defends a concep tio n  o f  p o lit ica l v irtu e  grounded in  the  idea l o f  free and equal 
c itizensh ip . H is  o u tlin e  o f  libe ra l pa trio tism  as part o f  a co n ce p tio n  o f  v irtu e , connects 
an understand ing  o f  ju s tice  w ith  the values o f  trust, c o m m u n ity  and generosity. The 
va lue  o f  au tono m y o r reasoned se lf-ru le  is, acco rd ing  to  C a llan , the key to  
understand ing  w h a t r ig h t ly  holds together lib e ra l and d em ocra tic  p rinc ip les . P o lit ica l 
educa tion  in  a lib e ra l dem ocracy w i l l  encourage c iv ic  p a rtic ip a tio n  and discourage 
a liena tion , respecting  the  m any d iffe re n t w ays o f  l i fe  th a t peop le  choose under free 
in s titu tio n s  and em brac ing  p o s itive ly  in  its  c iv ic  education  the  cha llenge o f  d ive rs ity . H e  
stresses the  need fo r  a m o ra lly  selective deference to  d iv e rs ity  in  h is  advocacy o f  
accom m odation  o f  reasonable p lu ra lism . A n  in te rp re ta tio n  o f  reasonable p lu ra lism  w i l l  
address the p ro b le m  o f  inc lus ion , in c lu d in g  a ll sources o f  d iv e rs ity  tha t deserve respect. 
T h is  raises the p ro b le m  o f  appropriate e xc lus ion  because in  any ju s t  socie ty one w i l l  
also have unreasonable p lu ra lism . A  com b ina tion  o f  e xc lu s io n  p lus  p o lit ic a l to le ra tion , 
tha t is to le ra tio n  o f  v iew po in ts  in  deep c o n flic t w ith  o u r o w n , is l ik e ly  to  feature in  the 
w ay  w e  deal w ith  unreasonable p lu ra lism  (C a llan , 1997, p. 23 ).
R a w l’ s (1973 ) p o lit ic a l libe ra lism  supports reasonable accom m odation  am ong 
con tend ing  v ie w s , n u rtu rin g  the d is tinc tive  v irtues  o f  lib e ra l coexistence. He argues tha t 
p rin c ip le s  o f  ju s t ic e  be constructed in  a w a y  tha t takes in to  accoun t the  va rie ty  o f  be lie fs  
and practices em braced by  reasonable c itizens. The  c ru c ia l que s tio n  then  is: H o w  are we 
to  respond to  the  prob lem s o f  p o lit ica l education under p lu ra lism ?  C a llan  contends tha t
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teach ing ch ild re n  and fu tu re  c itizens to use c r it ic a l reasoning and hav ing  them  c iv ic a lly  
engaged w h ile  rem a in ing  genuine ly c rit ica l is essentia l (C a llan , 1997, p. 115). In  a 
dem ocra tic  socie ty, ch ild ren  w i l l  be faced w ith  a b e w ild e rin g  v a r ie ty  o f  conclusions and 
choices, and be ing  able to deal w ith  that va rie ty  is centra l to  c iv ic  v irtu e . The tension, as 
C allan  sees it ,  is  between hav ing  to honour d iv e rs ity  and h a v in g  to  to le ra te  ways o f  l ife  
tha t c o n f lic t  w ith  one’ s own.
3.5 Conclusion
The m o ra l deve lopm ent o f  the ch ild  is a com p lex  issue engag ing c o n flic t in g  and 
ove rlapp in g  theories. M a n y  have argued tha t co g n itive  deve lopm en ta l theorists are 
p reoccup ied  w ith  co g n itive  processes to  the neg lec t o f  the v irtu e s  o ther than justice . 
There are perhaps some grounds fo r de fend ing  K o h lb e rg  here on  the basis o f  h is 
concern w ith  m o ra l behaviour and the h ig h  p r io r ity  accorded to  honesty, respons ib ility  
and c iv ic  fr ie n d sh ip  in  the Just C om m un ity  schools (P ow er et al 1989a). K oh lbe rg , 
how ever, w o u ld  n o t lay  c la im  to a v irtue  approach and in  theo ris ts  w ho  to o k  up and 
responded to  h is  w o rk  there is a sh ift in  em phasis fro m  c o g n it iv e  processes to  concern 
w ith  e m o tive  and a ffec tive  m o tiva tio n  o f  the m o ra l agent in  the la tte r pa rt o f  the 
tw e n tie th  cen tu ry . The in d iv id u a l concerned w ith  h is  o w n  w e lfa re  b u t whose 
deve lopm ent re flected  the in fluence  o f  others becam e the connected in d iv id u a l whose 
sense o f  s e lf and m ora l id e n tity  is carved ou t o f  a com m on  narra tive .
A  re tr ie va l o f  com m un ita rian  values, the  w h o le  co m m u n ity  in v o lv e d  in  a com m on 
goal in  p u rsu it o f  m ora l excellences is, accord ing  to  M a c In ty re  (1981 ), the  answer to the 
present anom ie , fragm enta tion  and loss o f  a sense o f  connec tio n  to  o u r true  selves and 
to  each other. V ir tu e  is a m atter o f  r ig h t a ffe c tive  nu rtu re  and good exam ple  in  one’ s 
p a rtic u la r c u ltu ra l environm ent. W e m ust recover our sense o f  p o lit ic a l connection  in  a 
renew a l o f  c iv i l  socie ty i f  we are to  f in d  o u r vo ice  in  co lle c tiv e  re sp o n s ib ility . One m ust 
be ready to  respond w ith  one’ s w ho le  l i fe  and f in d  the u n ity  o f  one ’ s be ing  in  its 
w illin g n e s s  to  accept re sp o n s ib ility  (B uber, 1961, p. 143). In  con trast to  M ac In ty re , 
advocates o f  a concept o f  righ ts  in  the educa tion  o f  the yo u n g  p lace  great emphasis on 
in d iv id u a l freedom  tha t respects the righ ts and w e lfa re  o f  o thers as w e ll as one’ s ow n 
and on an e n title m e n t to start l ife  as equals (W rin g e , 1999, pp. 292-293 ).
V ir tu e  theoris ts  see the re v iva l o f  v irtu e  eth ics as o ffe r in g  the best hope o f  a coherent 
m o ra l theo ry . I t  is, they c la im  (C arr &  S teuta l, 1999), c loser to  the  A r is to te lia n  no tio n  o f
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the in te g ra tio n  o f  m ora l hab it and m ora l re fle c tio n , the  ha rm on isa tio n  o f  reason, a ffect 
and behaviour in  v irtuous conduct. A r is to t le ’ s account o f  m o ra l educa tion  embraced 
in te lle c tu a l and m ora l v irtues, ne ither be ing com plete w ith o u t the  other. W h a t is la ck in g  
in  m ost ch ild re n  w ith o u t m ora l tra in ing , accord ing to  A r is to tle , is  an a ttachm ent to  w ha t 
is adm irab le , kalon (N E  1179b4-26). They w i l l  not deve lop  th is  th ro u g h  argum ent alone 
b u t p roper nu rtu re  w i l l  a llo w  them  to develop a taste fo r  w h a t is good and adm irab le  
and a devo tio n  to  i t  fo r  its  ow n  sake.
W ha t is m o ra l excellence and w hat goals are w o rth  pursu ing?  T a y lo r (1996 ) and 
M u rd o ch  (1972) p o in t tow ards a love  o f  the G ood, w ha t i t  is good to  be and no t ju s t to  
do. M o ra l p h ilo so p h y  and education need to  concern them selves w ith  the w h o le  o f  our 
m ode o f  l iv in g  and the q u a lity  o f  our re la tions w ith  the w o r ld  n o t ju s t the  n a rro w  co rra l 
o f  ob lig a tio n . R ecovery o f  the los t s e lf is inc reas ing ly  recogn ised in  the p u rsu it o f  
som eth ing beyond m ere secular m o ra lity , in  the a ttunem ent o f  the  s p ir it  to  beauty 
beyond life . “ G ood is an attem pt to  lo o k  aw ay fro m  s e lf to w a rd s  a d is tan t transcendent 
pe rfec tion , to  a source o f  uncontam inated energy, a source o f  new  and qu ite  undream t o f  
v ir tu e ”  (M u rd o ch , 1972, p. 99).
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4 ETHICAL ENQUIRY IN THE CLASSROOM
4.1 Introduction
In  th is  f in a l chapter o f  Part I  I  w i l l  be concerned w ith  co m p lem en tin g  the previous tw o  
chapters and lo o k in g  at issues related to m o ra lity  tha t w i l l  have an im p o rta n t bearing on 
the la te r analysis in  Part I I .  Th is chapter w i l l  go beyond  d iscussion on m ora l 
deve lopm ent and understanding o f  m o ra lity  and w i l l  p ro v id e  the theo re tica l background 
to  the c lassroom  setting. M y  c h ie f concern w i l l  be pedagog ica l issues and classroom  
practice  and the ro le  o f  the classroom co m m u n ity  o f  e th ica l e n q u iry  in  fos te ring  m ora l 
awareness. The question  o f  whether ch ild ren  can be reasonable and engage in  
ph ilo so p h ica l e n q u iry  w i l l  be considered. I  w i l l  be lo o k in g  a t the  c ru c ia l ro le  o f  d ia logue 
as an in te r-su b je c tive  process o f  reach ing  understand ing , m u tua l respect and 
cooperation , and the m erits  o f  ch ild ren  th in k in g  together ra the r than alone. Research has 
show n th a t the a ffe c tive  environm ent is  c ru c ia l fo r  m o ra l deve lopm en t in  so fa r as it  
determ ines the q u a lity  o f  re lationships peop le  w i l l  have. B e a ring  th is  in  m ind , I  w i l l  be 
ta k in g  in to  account the  ro le  that social experience p lays  in  h o w  ch ild re n  fo rm  th e ir 
v iew s and the k in d  o f  judgem ents they make. T h is  w i l l  e n ta il lo o k in g  at peer in fluence  
and the socia l in fluence s  o f  the w ide r environm ent.
The ro le  o f  s to ry  in  s tim u la ting  the m o ra l im a g in a tio n , educa ting  us in to  the v irtues  
and fo s te rin g  em pathy, w i l l  be considered. The teacher’ s ro le  in  engag ing ch ild re n  in  
c r it ic a l d iscussion, us ing  a s to ry  as trigger, lead ing  them  tow a rds  enqu iry  and tow ards 
autonom ous th o u g h t and action  in  a co m m u n ity  o f  e th ica l e nqu iry , w h ile  at the same 
tim e  sharing a u th o rity  w ith  partic ipants, w i l l  be exam ined. F in a lly , in  ana lys ing the 
data I  w i l l  be lo o k in g  at gender, an issue tha t has been theorised ; one’ s socia l experience 
is also the con tex t fo r  gender and m ora l o rien ta tion . I  w i l l  be e xa m in in g  various theories 
on the ro le  o f  gender in  m ora l developm ent and o r ie n ta tio n  fro m  m id d le  and late 
ch ildhoo d  to  ea rly  adolescence.
4.2 Development of reasonableness
4.2.1 A b i l i t y  to  engage in  ph ilosoph ica l enqu iry
Can ch ild re n  deve lop reasonableness and engage in  p h ilo so p h ica l enqu iry?  The debate 
centres on  h o w  one defines ph ilosophy; con fus ion  exists about w ha t is m eant b y  
p h ilosop hy , w he the r i t  is do ing  ph ilosophy as a sub ject o r p h ilo so p h is in g  tha t consists in  
asking na ive  b u t sometimes deep questions about m ean ing  and values in  life . H o w  do 
we gel ch ild re n  to  th in k  m ore deeply? Can ch ild ren  be reasonable? Can they engage in  
ph ilo so p h ica l enqu iry?  These questions have engaged some psycho log ists  and 
ph ilosophers. F o r K o h lb e rg  (1981) the best m ora l educa tion  lie s  in  the developm ent o f  
m ora l reason ing  th rough  m ora l d ilem m a d iscussion b u t p h ilo so p h ica l th in k in g  in  p re­
adolescents does no t fig u re  in  m ost cogn itive -deve lopm en ta l theories in c lu d in g  those o f  
P iaget and K o h lb e rg . They deemed early  adolescence to  be the o p tim u m  tim e  fo r 
readiness fo r  such a c tiv ity  w hen there w o u ld  be s u ffic ie n t in te lle c tu a l deve lopm ent and 
the c h ild  was capable o f  fo rm a l operational th in k in g , w h ic h  en ta ils  be ing  capable o f  
h yp o th e tica l reasoning, w e igh ing  poss ib ilitie s  and se lecting  fro m  a num ber o f  
a lternatives. S ince the app lica tion  o f  m ora l p rin c ip le s  to  s itua tions  and experiences is  a 
necessary e lem ent in  becom ing a m ora l agent, P iaget (1932 ) and K o h lb e rg  (1981) 
w o u ld  n o t envisage e th ica l enqu iry w ith  ch ild re n  be fo re  ro u g h ly  age ten as they w o u ld  
no t have an adequate com prehension o f  m o ra l p rin c ip le s . P iaget showed l i t t le  
understand ing  o f  and gave scant a ttention  to  the p h ilo so p h ica l a b ilit ie s  o f  younger 
ch ild ren , d ism iss ing  th e ir w onderm ent as m ere m usings. H aberm as’ s (1990) th e o ry  o f  
co m m u n ica tive  ac tion  o r discourse ethics v ie w e d  a rgum en ta tion  as p la y in g  a centra l 
ro le  in  the deve lopm ent o f  reasonableness, and l ik e  K o h lb e rg  he w o u ld  seem n o t to 
cons ider c h ild re n  before early  adolescence fo r  such engagem ent.
D esp ite  the a u th o rity  o f  these theorists fro m  the c o g n it iv is t (and b ro a d ly  K a n tia n ) 
tra d it io n  there  have been counter arguments fro m  in f lu e n tia l w rite rs  w ho  c la im  they 
underestim ate the  m ora l reasoning capacities o f  you n g  pre-adolescent ch ild ren . L ip m a n  
(1988, 1991) and M atthew s (1984, 1994) see no reason w h y  ch ild re n  shou ld  n o t beg in  
to engage in  p h ilo sop h ica l enqu iry  at a ve ry  ea rly  age; reasonableness is som eth ing  to 
be cu ltiva te d  and encouraged, and they consider th a t the  best w a y  is th rough  Socratic 
open-ended d iscussion. M atthew s (1984) contends tha t even though  the th in k in g  o f
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young  ch ild re n  d iffe rs  fro m  that o f  adults they ask s im ila r  questions as academic 
ph ilosophers at the beg inn ing  o f  the ir quest fo r  know ledge.
In  answ ering  the question as to w hether ch ild re n  can do p h ilo so p h y  w e need to lo o k  
at the aspects o f  c h ild re n ’ s experience tha t w e  p riv ilege . D o  w e  l im i t  i t  to  the age o f  the 
c h ild  o r P iagetian d e fin itio n s  o f  cogn itive  deve lopm ent w h ic h  p riv ile g e  log ico - 
m athem atica l deve lopm ent to  the neglect o f  the im a g ina tive  deve lopm ent o f  the c h ild ’ s 
m ind?  D o  w e assume th e ir th in k in g  is p r im it iv e  and in  need o f  be ing  developed tow ard 
the adu lt norm ? M o ra l developm ent, accord ing to  M a tthew s (1994, p. 65), takes place 
across d iffe re n t d im ensions bu t the dom inan t m ora l ph ilosophers  o f  our tim e  have 
tended to  concentrate on o n ly  one, ju s tic e  reasoning in  the  ad jud ica tion  o f  m ora l 
co n flic ts . M a tthew s refuses to accept ad u lt ph ilosop hy  as a c r ite r io n  fo r  ju d g in g  the 
p h ilo so p h ica l d im ens ion  o f  ch ild ren ’ s th in k in g . C h ild re n  are na tu ra l no t cu ltiva ted  
ph ilosophers and he suggests that adults w o u ld  be better ph ilosophers  i f  they had the 
na tu ra l w onde r o f  the ch ild .
F o r P iaget and K o h lb e rg  w hat counts as m o ra l fo r  yo u n g  ch ild re n  (the pre-m ora l 
stages) is dete rm ined by  others. P ritchard  w onders w he the r these are best characterised 
as stages o r as d iffe re n t w ays o f  reasoning ava ilab le  to  us, depend ing  on the con text o f  
judgem en t. H e  suggests re ta in ing  the stage n o tio n  bu t re v is in g  the expected ages o f  
c h ild re n  o ccu p y in g  them , thus acknow ledg ing  tha t som etim es ve ry  young ch ild ren  
em p loy  stage th ree  o r fo u r  reasoning ra ther than  o n ly  stage one o r tw o  (P ritchard , 1996, 
p. 128). In  K o h lb e rg ’ s theory one stage o f  deve lopm ent d isplaces the next one. 
M a tthew s disputes th is , c la im in g  that ch ild re n  deve lop a w o rk in g  understanding o f  
basic m o ra l concepts at a very early age and w h a t fo llo w s  is  an enlargem ent and 
re finem en t o f  these concepts rather than th e ir  d isp lacem ent. C h ild re n  and adults liv e  in  a 
w o r ld  o f  shared m ora l understanding and the m o ra l experiences o f  ch ild re n  and adults 
overlap  to  a la rge extent (M atthew s, 1994, pp. 65-66). K o h lb e rg ’ s stages w o u ld  seem 
n o t to  capture the nuances o f  c h ild re n ’ s re flec tions . A n  exc lus ive  focus on m ora l 
d ilem m as is l ik e ly  to leave ou t m uch o f  the depth  and richness in  the m o ra l th in k in g  o f  
ch ild ren .
M u rr is  (2000 ), a ph ilosopher w ho  has done m uch  w o rk  in  the  f ie ld  o f  P h ilosophy 
w ith  C h ild re n , contends tha t m any ph ilosophers ’ w o rk  is concerned w ith  the search fo r 
the  abso lu te  un ive rsa l m eaning o f  a p a rticu la r concept, independent o f  its  use in  
p a rticu la r c ircum stances (e.g. the P la ton ic  Form s). M a n y  ph ilosophers  (K itchene r, 1990, 
pp. 427 -428 ) s t i l l  see th is  as an ideal and i t  is used as an a rgum ent against ch ild ren
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doing p h ilo so p h y , suggesting tha t ch ild ren  can o n ly  do “ concrete p h ilo sop hy”  and no t 
“ abstract p h ilo so p h y ” . F ox advocates teaching th in k in g  sk ills , unbounded by w orries on 
the teacher’ s p a rt as to  w hether they were tru ly  p h ilosop h ica l o r no t. H e  argues against 
pu rsu ing  system atic  theore tica l th in k in g  w ith  younger c h ild re n  bu t is  in  favour o f  
general d iscussions w ith  ch ild ren  about ideas o r d o ing  p repara to ry  w o rk  on 
p h ilosop h ica l th in k in g . Instead o f  ca llin g  i t  ph ilosophy, he suggests tha t i t  is m ore 
co rrec t to describe i t  as m ov ing  towards be ing  able to  do ph ilosophy. D e fin in g  
ph ilosop hy  in  a m ore  libe ra l m anner as “ any and a ll sorts o f  w o n d e rin g  about the w o rld ”  
shou ld  be d is tingu ished  fro m  the k in d  o f  system atic the o re tica l th in k in g  in  w h ich  
academ ic ph ilosophers  ty p ic a lly  engage”  (Fox, 2001, p. 49).
E duca tiona l researchers have not accorded the im a g in a tive  s ide o f  the c h ild ’ s m ind  
due im portance  in  cogn itive  development. A cco rd in g  to  Egan (1988 , p. 29) ch ild ren  are 
capable o f  abstract th in k in g . He m ainta ins that p re -lite ra te  c h ild re n ’ s th in k in g  is not 
d e fic ie n t com pared w ith  that o f  adults and o lde r ch ild re n  as P iage t im p lie s . He calls the 
pe riod  o f  ch ild h o o d  up to  e igh t years o f  age the phase o f  m y th ic a l th in k in g . M y th ic  
understand ing  dom inates young ch ild ren ’ s th in k in g  and rem ains a constituen t o f  mature 
understand ing. I t  is no t the opposite o f  ra tiona l th in k in g  bu t is  a fo u n d a tio n  fo r  ra tiona l 
thought. In  fan tasy and im ag ina tion  the ch ild  engages e m o tio n a lly  w ith  abstractions 
w h ich  lie  beneath the fan tastic  content. O therw ise  they co u ld  n o t engage w ith  such 
abstract concepts as good and e v il, ju s t and un just, brave and co w a rd ly . W e  can assume, 
accord ing to  E gan (1988, p. 29) “ that they  com e to  schoo l k n o w in g  about pow er and 
w eakness...oppress ion , resentment, and revo lt, courage and fea r” . Such b in a ry  themes, 
he contends, are at the core o f  stories w h ich  enthra l c h ild re n  and are fo r  m any people an 
essential p a rt o f  th e ir  ch ildhood :
Such concepts enable them  to understand the basic s to ry  o f  R o b in  H ood  and the 
S h e r if f  o f  N o ttingha m , fo r  instance. C h ild re n  seem to  have d ire c t access to the 
m ean ing  o f  such stories th rough  those fundam en ta l abstract concepts learned from  
th e ir  d a ily  experience (Egan, 1988, p. 29).
A lth o u g h  E g a n ’ s ideas f i t  b road ly  w ith  w ha t I ’m  dea ling  w ith  here, he h im s e lf  (1997) 
reserves the te rm  philosophical fo r his fo u rth  leve l o f  understand ing , be long ing  rough ly  
to the post fifte e n -ye a r-o ld  pe riod  and reached b y  some no t a ll ch ild re n .
N e ith e r P la to  no r A r is to tle  w ou ld  have ch ild re n  engage in  m o ra l ph ilosoph ica l 
e nqu iry , seeing i t  as the preserve o f  m ature adults. P lato considered o n ly  educated 
adults capable o f  engaging in  ra tiona l argument. C h ild re n  w o u ld  n o t be able to  deal w ith
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argum ent and w o u ld  o n ly  demean it  b y  tea ring  and p u ll in g  i t  apart lik e  puppies 
(Republic, 539b and c). They were considered less ra tio n a l, capable o n ly  o f  pe rce iv ing  
th ings th ro u g h  the senses, confined to the Cave, the w o r ld  o f  appearances. O n ly  the 
adu lt ph ilosophe r can love  the tru th  and w an t to  k n o w  h o w  the  w o r ld  is  rather than how  
it  appears to  be. In  P la to ’ s account ch ild ren  cannot “ lo ve  the  tru th ”  and therefore can 
have o n ly  “ m ere b e lie fs ”  about the w o rld  (M u rr is , 2000 , p. 273). A cco rd in g  to 
A ris to tle , ch ild re n  are no t ready fo r  m ora l p h ilo so p h y  because th e y  are governed m ore 
by passions than b y  reason. Lack ing  the appropria te  experience  and w isd o m  to engage 
in  e th ica l re fle c tio n , young  ch ild ren  seem to respond m ore  to  fea r o f  pun ishm en t than  to 
appeal to  reason (N E  1095a2-a l3). A  recent author F la y , w h o  re lies  on A r is to tle  to 
m ake his case, m a in ta ins  that there is a tim e  w hen  the in d iv id u a l experiences a need to 
m ake sense o f  th ings  and to  deal w ith  the w o rld . L ik e  A r is to t le , he be lieves that there is 
an appropria te  tim e  fo r  engaging the young in  p h ilo s o p h ic a l e nqu iry . H e  c la im s that 
in v o lv in g  c h ild re n  in  e th ica l argum ent is dam ag ing  fo r  th e m  and argues fo r  the 
p ro te c tio n  o f  the  c h ild ’ s innocence, on ly  g iv in g  h im  the  to o ls  w hen  he is ready: “ To 
in troduce  e th ics be fo re  that w o rld  in e v ita b ly  shatters is  to  do v io lence  to  the 
deve lopm ent o f  the c h ild ”  (F lay, 1994, p. 153). The c h ild ’ s w o r ld , constitu ted  b y  the 
au th o rity  o f  adults is  fo r  the ch ild  a secure un p ro b le m a tic  w o r ld . T he  young , accord ing 
to  F lay , have to  f in d  id e n tity  th rough th e ir  o w n  search and a rm in g  them  w ith  ethics 
before they are ready risks fragm enting and a lie n a tin g  th e m . One has to  w a it fo r  the 
kairos o r  appropria te  tim e  when the young person experiences a “ fe lt  need”  and is ready 
to m ake sense o f  the w o r ld  (p. 155).
Ph ilosophers d if fe r  on w hat constitutes readiness. C h ild re n , encouraged to  engage in  
p h ilo so p h ica l enqu iry , can re flec t on th e ir  o w n  th in k in g  and engage in  m eta-d ia logue 
(R usse ll, 2002). I t  seems that tra in ing  in  p h ilo so p h ica l in q u iry  ra the r than  age is the 
d e c id ing  fac to r. F la y ’ s argum ent, echoing th a t o f  A r is to t le , is tha t ch ild re n  la ck  the 
necessary experience to engage in  eth ica l enqu iry . H e  seems n o t to  a llo w  fo r  the cu ltu ra l 
shaping o f  readiness. I  contend tha t ch ild ren  are capable o f  cons ide rab le  re fle c tio n  and 
th is  capac ity  o f  e n q u ir in g  together about issues w h ic h  p u zz le  them  cou ld  cons ide rab ly  
en rich  and g ive  m ean ing  to the ir experiences. L ip m a n  (1988 , p. 15) argues tha t ch ild re n  
are able at every  stage in  the ir g row th  to  engage in  p h ilo s o p h ic a l e n q u iry  and the ea rlie r 
they are g iven  the too ls  to  do so the better. D o in g  p h ilo s o p h y  is no t, acco rd ing  to  
L ip m a n , a m atte r o f  age bu t o f  a b ility  to  re fle c t sc ru p u lo u s ly  and courageously  on  w ha t 
one finds  im p o rta n t; no t to acknow ledge the c h ild ’ s capac ity  to  do th is  is based on
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condescending attitudes o f  adults rather than on  evidence. C h ild re n  are fro m  an early  
age capable o f  engaging in  ra tiona l dia logue, o f  g iv in g  reasons and o f  defend ing th e ir 
p o in t o f  v ie w  and ana lys ing arguments presented by  others as w e ll as by  themselves:
I f  w e  refuse to acknow ledge the ra tio n a lity  o f  ch ild re n , w e  cannot sa tis fa c to rily  
engage in  ph ilosoph ica l d ia logue w ith  them , because we cannot accept th e ir  
u tterances as reasons. I f  we cannot do p h ilo so p h y  w ith  ch ild ren , w e  deprive  th e ir 
educa tion  o f  the ve ry  com ponent tha t m ig h t m ake such education m ore 
m e a n in g fu l (L ipm an , 1988, p. 198).
L ip m a n  sees no argum ent against teaching ch ild re n  the techniques tha t are associated 
w ith  p h ilo sop hy , the beginnings o f  fo rm a l lo g ic , lead ing  them  tow ards p h ilo so p h y  and 
preparing  them  fo r  the larger discourses o f  dem ocra tic  socie ty. E ngag ing  ch ild re n  in  
co lla b o ra tive  d ia logue has, accord ing to M u rr is  (2000), im portance  fo r  in d iv id u a l 
co g n itive  and m ora l developm ent, p ro v id in g  oppo rtun ities  fo r  g ro w th  tha t fa r exceed 
any m o n o lo g ica l experience.
4 .2 .2  T he  d ia lo g ica l construction  o f  the s e lf
H aberm as (1990) saw the cu ltiva tio n  o f  reasonableness in  co lla b o ra tive  re fle c tio n  and 
argum enta tion  as p la y in g  a central ro le  in  m ora l deve lopm ent. M o ra lity  is thus v iew ed  
as be ing  concerned w ith  the g iv in g  o f  reasons and the a ttem pt to  persuade others o f  the 
rightness o f  one ’ s m ora l position . Habermas extended K o h lb e rg ’ s m ode l to  in c lu d e  the 
deve lopm ent o f  a capacity  to  enter in to  argum enta tion . U n lik e  the deve lopm ent o f  a 
capac ity  fo r  m ora l judgem ent, the deve lopm ent o f  a capac ity  fo r  argum enta tion  
incorpora tes the socia l capacity  fo r  entering in to  a rgum enta tion , as w e ll as the m ere 
co g n itive  capac ity  to  generate o r c r it ic ize  argum ents in  a fo rm a l sense (Y oung , 1992). 
L ik e  A r is to t le ’ s n o tio n  o f  hab itua tion  in  the v irtues , H aberm as advocates im m e rs io n  in  
the l i fe  w o r ld  th rough  socia l in te rac tion  and socia l d iscourse, in  a se tting  o f  
interdependence. H is  account m oves the n o tio n  o f  s e lf fro m  the m o n o lo g ica l account o f  
K a n t to th a t o f  a d ia log ica l self. A lso  re ferred to  as a theo ry  o f  com m un ica tive  ac tion , i t  
is a m eta -e th ica l theory  where partic ipan ts in  co lla b o ra tive  a rgum enta tion  advance the 
th in k in g  o f  the w ho le  group and thereby com e to  re fle c t on th e ir  o w n  th in k in g . H e 
c la im s  tha t o n ly  an in te r-sub jec tive  process o f  reach ing  understand ing  can produce an 
agreem ent tha t is re fle x ive  in  nature. I t  can g ive  the pa rtic ipan ts  the know ledg e  tha t they 
have c o lle c tiv e ly  becom e partners in  a rr iv in g  at im po rtan t conclusions.
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In  the coopera tive  process o f  argum enta tion, H aberm as argues tha t a k ind  o f  
d iscourse and rea l learn ing  takes place w h ich  cou ld  neve r occur in  a s tric tly  
m o n o lo g ica l fo rm  (1990, p. 68). He takes h is  account o f  the  deve lopm ent o f  ra tiona lity  
fro m  P iaget and K o h lbe rg  -  that developm ent enta ils  m o v in g  fro m  one stage o f  m oral 
reasoning to another, that the order o f  the stages is in va ria n t and tha t they p rov ide  a 
un iversa l basis fo r  eva luating  m ora l developm ent. Respect as a basic va lue in  m o ra lity  
is em phasised. In d iv id u a l interests and shared values need to  be c la r if ie d  co llabo ra tive ly  
and cannot be considered the preserve o f  the so lita ry  th inke r. A u to n o m y  in  Haberm as’ s 
account m ust be reconsidered as com m unica tive  au tonom y, w ith  partic ipan ts engaging 
e ffe c tiv e ly  in  c r it ic a l discourse.
H aberm as’ s stress on discourse w ith  the c e n tra lity  o f  reason emphasises the 
im portance  o f  in q u iry  and its  place in  com m un ity . H o w e ve r, the pre-requ is ite  o f  
consensual agreem ent leaves Haberm as’ s theory open to c r it ic is m  that i t  does not 
p ro v id e  a f u l l  account o f  m o ra lity  (Sprod, 2001, p. 80). A  basic assum ption in  
H aberm as’ s com m un ica tive  discourse is tha t a ll w h o  are ta k in g  part are a im ing  at 
consensus in  m atters concerned w ith  h o w  to  fm d  m o ra l righ tness. W h a t is r ig h t is that 
on w h ic h  a ll w o u ld  agree (Habermas, 1990, p. 68). T h a t c o u ld  pose d if f ic u lt ie s  when 
one has to  cons ide r d iffe re n t cu ltu ra l in te rp re ta tions  in  m o ra lly  charged situations. I t  
needs to  take  account o f  in d iv id u a l d iffe rences in  d ive rse  s ituations. Fem in ists 
(B enhab ib , 1992) and com m unitarians (M a c In ty re , 1981) accord  w ith  Haberm as’ s 
re cogn ition  o f  the  im portance o f  com m un ity  bu t advocate m o d ify in g  h is theory to take 
account o f  rea l and em bodied persons w ith  em phasis on  the  concrete rather than the 
generalised o ther. Haberm as concentrates instead on  com peten t abstract m ora l th inkers.
V ans ie leghem  (2005, p. 21) critic ises L ip m a n ’ s P h ilo so p h y  fo r  C h ild ren  fo r  its 
em phasis on  c r it ic a l th in k in g  and in te llec tua l deve lopm ent at the  expense o f  re la tionsh ip  
and search fo r  m eaning, a c r it ic is m  that is no t a ltoge ther v a lid . The same idea is echoed 
by  N o d d in g s  in  her c r it ic is m  o f  discourse ethics, because she considers tha t the  h ig h ly  
constra ined nature  o f  the conversation does no t m eet the needs o f  real people. She 
contends th a t i f  w e  are concerned w ith  m o v in g  fro m  ju d g e m e n t to  action, we m ust lo o k  
beyond com petence theories and consider an e th ic  o f  care. N o d d in g s  favours o rd in a ry  
conversa tion  w here  o u r partners in  conversation are m ore  im p o rta n t than the to p ic  itse lf: 
“ W hen  peop le  have lo v in g  regard fo r one another, th e y  can engage in  constructive  
c o n f lic t”  (N odd ings , 1994, p. 116). I  w o u ld  support th is  em phasis on the a ffe c tive  
d im ens ion  o f  teach ing  and learn ing, love  in  the c lassroom , the  teacher as genuine carer
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and I th in k  th is  aspect needs to be accorded greater im portance. H o w e ve r I  w ou ld  
d ispute her a ttr ib u tio n  o f  greater value to in te rlocu to rs  than to  the to p ic  in  question. 
C a lla n  contends tha t i f  the conversation is about som eth ing o f  m o ra l s ign ificance , one 
has to  appreciate the g ra v ity  o f  the s itua tion  and understand th a t one is not m ore 
im po rtan t than  the to p ic  o f  conversation. One is never m o re  im p o rta n t than the 
prob lem s o f  rac ism , or any o ther m atter o f  rea l m ora l w e ig h t tha t m ig h t arise in  
th o u g h tfu l d ia logue  (C allan , 1997, p. 204).
O u r concep tio n  o f  ourselves is bo th  revealed and shaped th ro u g h  re fle c tio n  w ith  
others. In  co llabo ra tive  d ia logue there is o p p o rtu n ity  fo r  increas ing  se lf-know ledge, 
increas ing  know ledg e  o f  the good and openness to  m o ra l fo rm a tio n . The s e lf and the 
good are co -d e fin in g , learn ing  about the s e lf as w e ll as the other. Just as the body needs 
to  f in d  its  bearings in  phys ica l space, the s e lf needs to f in d  its  bearings in  m ora l or 
sp ir itu a l space (T a y lo r 1989). In  B ube r’ s concep tion  o f  genu ine d ia logue  each o f  the 
pa rtic ipan ts  has in  m ind  the others in  th e ir  p a rticu la r beings and tu rns  to  them  w ith  the 
in te n tio n  o f  estab lish ing  a liv in g  m utua l re la tionsh ip  (B uber, 1961, p. 19). A re n d fs  
focus is no t on  ach iev ing  consensus in  co llabo ra tive  d ia logue  b u t on  understanding. In  
com ing  to  understand others th rough m utua l d ia logue , I  also understand m y s e lf  better. 
A s  I  m ake m y s e lf  p u b lic  I  fu rthe r understand w ho  I  am. I  understand m y life  story a 
l i t t le  m ore  than I  d id  before I  began the conversation . I  never k n o w  in  advance where a 
conversa tion  is  go ing  to  go. I  learn to  liv e  w ith  u n ce rta in ty  and am b igu ity . The 
d iscove ry  o f  m y s e lf  as a person is also the d isco ve ry  o f  o the r persons around m e in  a 
c o m m u n ity  o f  hearts and m inds (A rend t, 1958).
4.2.3 The soc ia l construction  o f  the s e lf
I t  is  w id e ly  accepted tha t the social env ironm en t in to  w h ic h  one is  b o m  and raised 
g rea tly  in fluence s  the k in d  o f  capacities and co g n itive  a b ilit ie s  one develops. In te rac tion  
w ith  the socia l w o r ld  is the crucia l factor. V y g o ts k y  (1981) contends tha t so c ia lly  based 
c o g n itio n  w i l l  be m ore advanced than co g n itio n  tha t is  separate fro m  the socia l w orld . 
W e m ay be able to achieve m ore in  coopera tion  w ith  another than w e  are capable o f  
alone. B ru n e r contends tha t sca ffo ld ing  o f  so c ia lly  m e a n in g fu l a c t iv ity  is the best w ay 
o f  h e lp in g  le a rn in g  (B runer, 1985, p. 25). C h ild re n  becom e m ore  com petent th inkers  
w hen  gu ided  b y  com petent adults w ho sca ffo ld  them  tow ards the  n e x t stage u n t i l  they 
can p e rfo rm  the task unaided. V yg o tsky  contends tha t the c h i ld ’ s o w n  ac tiv itie s , in  the
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course o f  deve lopm ent, are shaped by the cu ltu re  and b y  the reactions o f  other people. 
M o re  com p lex  cogn itive  fun c tio n in g  w i l l  be poss ib le  in  a d ia logue  between tw o  
in d iv id u a ls  than  is possib le fo r  those in d iv id u a ls  alone. V y g o ts k y  re fers to  the Zone o f  
P ro x im a l D eve lopm en t (ZP D ) as
the d istance between the actual developm enta l le ve l as de te rm ined  by  independent 
p ro b le m  so lv in g  and the leve l o f  po ten tia l deve lopm en t as determ ined through 
p ro b le m  so lv in g  under adu lt guidance o r in  co lla b o ra tio n  w ith  m ore  capable peers 
(V y g o ts k y , 1978a, p. 86).
The c h ild ’ s fu l l  po ten tia l is reached by the sca ffo ld in g  o r gu idance o f  an adu lt o r w ith  
m ore  com peten t peers. In  fu rthe ring  cogn itive  and lin g u is t ic  deve lopm en t the adu lt m ust 
p itc h  the c o m p le x ity  o f  the task at a level that is n o t too  fa r  beyond  the c h ild ’ s lin g u is tic  
a b ility .
In  V y g o ts k y ’ s theo ry  cogn itive  capacities develop w ith  the  g ro w th  o f  socia l speech 
and w ith  w h o le  experience. A n y  h igher m enta l fu n c tio n  was ex te rna l because i t  was 
socia l at some p o in t before becom ing an in te rna l m en ta l fu n c tio n in g . A n y  fu n c tio n  in  
the c h ild ’ s c u ltu ra l developm ent appears tw ice  o r on  tw o  planes. F irs t i t  appears on the 
socia l p lane, and then  on the psycho log ica l plane. F irs t i t  appears betw een people as an 
in te r-p sych o lo g ica l category and then w ith in  the c h ild  as an in tra -psycho log ica l 
category (M eadow s, 1993, p. 237). In te rna lisa tio n  is one o f  V y g o ts k y ’ s central 
concepts. The c h ild  th rough  observation and im ita t io n  in te rna lises  the cogn itive  sk ills  
o f  the cu ltu re  and, accord ing  to V yg o tsky , is shaped b y  the  cu ltu re  in  the course o f  
developm ent. The  c h ild  develops c o g n it iv e ly  th ro u g h  soc ia l experiences. W ith  the 
deve lopm ent o f  socia l in te raction  generalisa tion becom es poss ib le . The  c h ild  can re flec t 
on re a lity  in  a generalised way.
A t  the core o f  V y g o ts k y ’ s theory is the  n o tio n  o f  m e d ia tio n , the  use o f  m enta l too ls, o f  
w h ich  language is the m ost im portant, w h ic h  a llo w s  fo r  q u a lita tiv e  change in  the c h ild ’ s 
l ife . Language is the v ita l psycho log ica l to o l fo r  co m m u n ica tio n  and fo r  abstract 
re fle c tio n . V y g o ts k y  contended that i t  was coopera tion  and the  p o o lin g  o f  ideas tha t 
prom oted  change. P iaget (1965) be lieved that i t  was peer c o n f lic t  tha t caused the 
change. In  a sense bo th  positions are tenable, be ing  com p lem en ta ry  rather than 
co n trad ic to ry . The extent to w h ic h  peers p la y  a ro le  in  m o ra l deve lopm en t varies fro m  
theory to  theory . Some contem porary accounts (R u b in  et al, 1998; W ertsch, 1984)
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suggest tha t c o n flic t in g  ideas and d ifferences o f  o p in io n  a c tu a lly  e lic it  cooperation 
between partners.
C ogn itive -de ve lopm en ta l theorists have tended to focus on  the ro le  o f  peer 
re la tionsh ips in  m o ra l developm ent to  the neglect o f  the pa rt p layed  b y  parents. Piaget 
and K o h lb e rg  he ld  that peers were better able to  p rov ide  the appropria te  experiences 
tha t p rom ote  m o ra l developm ent but W a lke r and H enn ig  (1 9 9 9 ) argue that parents’ 
po ten tia l im pac t as agents in  the ir ch ild re n ’ s m ora l deve lopm en t has been overlooked. 
Th is  has been associated w ith  the preponderance tha t has been g iven  to  the cogn itive  
dom a in  to  the re la tive  neglect o f  the a ffective . W a lke r and H e n n ig  fo u n d  that a ffective 
factors are sa lien t in  m ora l socia lisa tion  in  a d d itio n  to  c o g n itiv e  ones. Parents’ 
in te rac tion  styles, ego fu n c tio n in g  and leve l o f  m o ra l reason ing , used in  discussion are 
p red ic tive  o f  c h ild re n ’ s subsequent m ora l reasoning deve lopm ent. The use o f  re a l- life  
d ilem m as, ra the r than an exclusive re liance on h yp o th e tica l ones m ay have m ore 
re levance to  the  c h ild ’ s ow n experience and m ay tap a ffe c tive  processes m ore 
p o w e rfu lly . T he  W a lk e r and H enn ig  study revealed tha t p a re n tin g  sty le  is in flu e n tia l in  
c h ild re n ’ s m o ra l developm ent, in  con trad ic tion  to the m in im a l ro le  accorded parents by 
cogn itive -de ve lopm en ta l theory. They found  tha t the p a ren ting  s ty le  m ost conducive to 
c h ild re n ’ s deve lopm ent invo lves supportive Socra tic  d ia logue  and K o h lbe rg ian  h igher- 
stage m o ra l reasoning. C h ild ren ’ s m ora l deve lopm ent w as ham pered b y  parental 
h o s tility  and c o n f lic t  and was fac ilita ted  b y  parental sup p o rt and encouragement. 
E ffe c tive  parents are m ore ch ild -centred and sca ffo ld  th e ir  c h ild ’ s developm ent by  
e lic it in g  the c h ild ’ s op in ion , d raw ing  out the c h ild ’ s reason ing  w ith  appropria te  p rob ing  
questions, and check ing  fo r understanding.
1 contend tha t a preoccupation w ith  m ora l c o g n itio n  is to o  lim it in g ;  a ffec tive  factors 
are im p o rta n t com ponents o f  e ffective  m ora l soc ia lisa tion . C o les (1986) c la im s that 
socia l experience is  the m a jo r determ inant o f  m o ra l deve lop m e n t and does no t see m uch 
b ene fit in  m o ra l ana lysis and re flec tion  i f  i t  does no t lead to  m o ra l action. H is  find ings  
ind ica te  tha t g ive n  favourab le  fa m ily  and ne ighbou rhood  circum stances, the ch ild  
becomes an in tense ly  m o ra l creature. R uby B ridges (The Moral Life o f Children), an 
A fr ic a n  A m e ric a n  ch ild , caught in  the struggle fo r  schoo l in te g ra tio n  in  the southern 
U n ite d  States, was able to demonstrate character in  ac tion  and a q u a lity  o f  m in d  and 
heart, d is p la y in g  courage in  the face o f  danger. A g e d  o n ly  s ix , she fitte d  in to  none o f  
K o h lb e rg ’ s stages o f  m ora l reasoning, and was to  in flu e n ce  C oles in  re v ie w in g  his 
ea rlie r c r ite r ia  fo r  eva lua ting  m ora l developm ent and in  f in a l ly  co n c lu d in g  tha t character
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and honesty are w ha t define the m oral dom a in  (C o les, 1986, p. 144). C o les ’ story 
emphasises the im portance o f  m ora l f ib re  and character in  fa m ily  upb ring in g , and 
character is im p o rta n t as v irtu e  ethicists show . H ow ever, I  am  g o in g  to  show  a d iffe re n t 
k in d  o f  emphasis w h ich  does not con trad ic t the cogency o f  w ha t Coles has to  say.
4.3 The community of ethical enquiry
4.3.1 V yg o tsk ia n  lea rn ing  and m eta -cogn ition
T he  co m m u n ity  o f  enqu iry  has a va luab le  ro le  in  fo s te rin g  co m m u n ica tio n  in  a m ixed - 
gender setting, w here ch ild ren  can hear the vo ice  o f  care as w e ll as tha t o f  ju s tice . The 
phrase community o f enquiry was o r ig in a lly  co ined  by  Pe irce  (1955) and was restric ted 
to  sc ie n tif ic  enqu iry . S ince Peirce, the phrase has been broadened to  inc lude  any k in d  o f  
enqu iry , conducted co llabo ra tive ly , w he the r s c ie n tif ic  o r  not. T he  n o tion  o f  a 
c o m m u n ity  o f  e nqu iry  presupposes some n o tio n  o f  tru th , some n o tio n  o f  the good. 
L ip m a n , w ho set up the m ovem ent P h ilosophy fo r  C h ild re n  in  the late 1960s, regards 
the co m m u n ity  o f  enqu iry  as the best fo rm a t fo r  c r it ic a l th in k in g  and fo r  creating  a 
soc ie ty  in  w h ic h  excellence flourishes (L ip m a n , 1991, p. 3). The goa l o f  p h ilo so p h ica l 
enqu iry  w ith  ch ild re n  transcends the th in k in g  o f  any one in d iv id u a l. I t  is  a co llabo ra tive  
e ffo r t w ith  the w ho le  group and th e ir  teacher e n q u ir in g  together. B e com ing  m ore 
reasonable is broader than  deductive lo g ic , though  L ip m a n  advocates teach ing the 
beg inn ings o f  fo rm a l lo g ic  at around 12 years o f  age. I t  in vo lve s  fu l l  capac ity  to  
im ag ine  and to  fee l, to  care fo r  one another as persons, and to  th in k  in  term s o f  we and 
no t ju s t / .
V yg o tsk ia n  lea rn ing  theo ry  can be c lo se ly  a llie d  w ith  the concept o f  the  co m m u n ity  
o f  enqu iry . C h ild re n  in  such a com m un ity  can beg in  to  engage in  the fo rm s o f  reasoning 
th a t are no t ye t ava ilab le  to them  in d iv id u a lly . A s  w e have a lready seen, pa rtic ipan ts  
sca ffo ld  each other, learn ing  fro m  each o ther and ques tion ing  th e ir ow n  th in k in g , 
enab ling  the less able pu p ils  to  enhance th e ir  com petency. W h ile  the students are 
d r iv in g  the in q u iry , m any competencies w i l l  be in te rna lised  re la tiv e ly  u n th in k in g ly . 
A n a lo g ic a l reasoning, an im po rtan t com petency, b rings  e x is tin g  kn ow ledg e  and s k ills  to  
bear on  new  in fo rm a tio n  and is central to  the processes o f  le a rn in g  and transfer. P iaget 
contended tha t pre-adolescent ch ild ren  w ere  no t capable o f  ana log ica l reasoning bu t tha t 
v ie w  is n o w  w id e ly  contested (M atthew s, 1984; G osw am i, 1991a).
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The teacher’ s ro le  in  sca ffo ld ing  the in q u iry  is m os t o ften  th a t o f  fa c ilita to r. A t  other 
tim es i t  is  d e v il ’ s advocate, using Socratic probes to  s tim u la te  re fle c tiv e  th in k in g , a ll the 
tim e  m o v in g  the students towards autonom y and em p o w e rin g  them  to th in k  fo r 
them selves. T hey leam  to d raw  appropriate inferences, c la r ify  th e ir  thoughts, define 
concepts and m ake va lue judgem ents. In  lis ten ing  re s p e c tfu lly  to  opposing  v iew s and 
values they can detach themselves from  a se lf-centred pe rspective  and try  to  im agine 
other v ie w p o in ts . In  le tting  go o f  the ir pos itions  in  o rde r to  lis te n  open ly , they fo llo w  
the e n qu iry  w here i t  leads. In teracting  on an equal fo o tin g  w ith  others w ho  have 
d iffe re n t v ie w s  helps them  to re flec t on th e ir  ow n  be lie fs  and values.
D e ve lo p in g  m eta -cogn itive  awareness in  th is  process he lps  ch ild re n  to  extend the ir 
th in k in g . The cen tra l learn ing  th rust is peer-correction , and -  th rough  th in k in g  about 
th in k in g  and re fle c tin g  on one’ s ow n know ledge  -  even m o re  im p o rta n tly , correcting 
oneself. D isagreem ent w ith  peers can be a source o f  m eta-co  g n itive  c o n flic t and 
consequently  o f  m e ta -cogn itive  advance. D ecen tring , be ing  ab le  to  take the perspective 
o f  the o ther, p lays  a v ita l ro le  in  th is process. I  becom e f in e ly  attuned to  w hat is 
re levan t, w ha t i t  is that you  need to  hear o r experience in  o rder to  share m y  op in ion , 
w he ther i t  be a question , an idea or an a ff irm a tio n  o f  o r cha llenge  to  y o u r v iew s.
Q u in n  sees the  value o f  th is  m e ta -re flec tive  process in  lea rn ing  the d iffe rence 
between q u a rre llin g  and arguing and h o w  to  argue and eva luate  w e ll. These s k ills  go 
some w a y  in  equ ipp ing  students to  resist undue pressure and in  cha lleng ing  the tab lo id  
cu ltu re  w ith  its  tendency to  deal in  conclusions ra the r than  in  e xa m in in g  ideas (Q u inn , 
1997, p. 83). O f  course i t  is no t on ly  externa l pressures such as these tha t need to be 
com bated b u t also peer-pressure w h ich  is in c reas ing ly  b e co m in g  a concern fo r  parents 
and teachers. O ne w a y  o f  dea ling  e ffe c tive ly  w ith  it, a cco rd in g  to  L ip m a n , is no t by  
engag ing in  fu t i le  e ffo rts  to  e lim ina te  i t  bu t b y  endeavouring  to  m ake i t  ra tiona l; and th is 
can be done b y  conve rting  the classroom  in to  a reason ing  co m m u n ity  (L ip m a n , 1988, p. 
76). K o h lb e rg  (1981) suggests that th is  sharing o f  d ive rse  m o ra l op in ions  and the 
experience o f  m o ra l c o n flic t encourages students in  the g roup  to  c la r ify  th e ir  ow n  m ora l 
stances and to  in tegra te  the op in ions o f  others in to  th e ir  o w n  m ora l be lie fs . In  a m ora l 
d ile m m a  d iscussion, e ffec tive  d ilem m as are those that fo rc e  the p u p ils  to  th in k  m ore 
deep ly  about m o ra l issues. A  d ilem m a dea ling  w ith  c o n f lic t  be tw een hum an life  and 
the la w  has trem endous po ten tia l because m ost peop le  be lieve  in  bo th  the im portance o f  
l i fe  and in  the in d iv id u a l’ s respons ib ility  to  the la w  in  a dem ocracy. M o ra l d ilem m a 
d iscussions w i l l  n o t o f  themselves solve behav iou r p rob lem s  in  ch ild re n , b u t the effects
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o f  m ean ing fu l d ia logues about righ ts and respons ib ilities  can ca rry  over in to  students’ 
lives outs ide  the classroom  (Scharf, M cC o y  &  Ross, 1979, p. 44 ).
4 .3 .2  E th ica l enqu iry  and education fo r dem ocracy
A  s ig n ifica n t o the r d im ension o f  discussion in  a co m m u n ity  o f  e n q u iry  is  education fo r  
dem ocracy, d ire c tly  re levant to w hat we have been d iscussing. The in te rac tive  process 
o f  the co m m u n ity  o f  enqu iry  is an ideal s itua tion  fo r  dem ocracy in  ac tion  and fo r  the 
p repara tion  o f  fu tu re  citizens. In  i t  they are encouraged to th in k  about socia l values, and 
to  becom e in vo lve d  in  the life  and concerns o f  th e ir co m m u n ity  and society. I t  is th is  
deve lopm ent o f  socia l in te lligence  and g ro w in g  sense o f  au tonom y, accord ing to F isher 
(1995 ), tha t challenges r ig id  th ink ing  and enables c h ild re n  to  becom e active and 
e ffe c tive  fu tu re  c itizens. They have an o p p o rtu n ity  to discuss va lues tha t w i l l  m otiva te  
them  to  m ake a d iffe rence  fo r  themselves and the com m un ity . I  have fo u n d  tha t some o f  
the  d ispos itions essential to  in te rcu ltu ra l re la tions  such as coopera tion , openness to 
u n fa m ilia r  ways and ideas, and respect fo r  c o n flic t in g  po in ts  o f  v ie w , are learned in  th is 
w ay. H ow ever, respecting and understanding the v ie w s  o f  another does no t m ean 
accord ing  them  u nqua lified  approval, a clearer understand ing  o f  the basis o f  
d isagreem ent b e ing  a desired outcome. A b ilit ie s  to com m un ica te , negotiate and to 
respect d iverse op in ions, deepen understanding o f  and s e n s it iv ity  to s im ila ritie s  and 
d iffe rences and are v ita l aspects o f  the k in d  o f  c iv ic  v ir tu e  requ ired  in  a dem ocratic  
socie ty. M c L a u g h lin  stresses the need fo r  the “ r ig h t k in d  o f  openness to d iv e rs ity ” ; 
dem ocra tic  m u tua l respect fo r  reasonable d iffe rences o f  m o ra l v ie w  requires m ore  than 
a g rudg ing  a ttitude  o f  “ liv e  and le t live ”  (M c L a u g h lin , 1995, pp. 249-250). He contends 
tha t c r it ic a l e xp lo ra tio n  by pup ils  should resu lt in  th e ir be ing  able to  m ake re fle c tive  and 
in fo rm e d  judgem en ts  and h o p e fu lly  decisions.
C am hy argues tha t th is  a b ility  to  deal w ith  c o n flic t and o p p o s itio n  and acqu ire  new  
perceptions enhances c h ild re n ’ s a b ility  to  th in k  c rea tive ly  w ith  a respect fo r  persons and 
personhood (C am hy, 1995, p. 119). In  the  se lf-co rrec ting  p rac tice  o f  the com m un ity  o f  
e nqu iry  ch ild re n  learn to connect th e ir present experiences w ith  w ha t has already 
happened in  th e ir  lives  and w hat they can expect to  happen. T hey  make judgem ents 
about re la tionsh ips  by  com paring th ings and d isce rn ing  s im ila r it ie s  and differences. 
T h is , acco rd ing  to  L ipm an , is  the con tex t fo r  h ighe r-o rde r o r com p lex  th in k in g , th in k in g  
tha t is  aware o f  its  ow n  assumptions as w e ll as be ing conscious o f  an onus to  g ive
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reasons in  support o f  conclusions (L ipm an, 1991, p. 23). I t  is the k in d  o f  th in k in g  that 
makes eva lua tions and d is tinc tions and that recognises the facto rs  tha t m ake fo r bias and 
pre jud ice . I t  helps to  counter ch ild ren ’s su b jec tiv ism  and to  a rm  them  w ith  the too ls fo r  
ana lys ing the s itua tions in  w h ich  they fin d  them selves and to  a rrive  at sound and 
re liab le  conc lus ions (L ip m a n  &  Sharp, 1994, p. 348).
G roup  so lid a rity  is  a feature o f  an established c o m m u n ity  o f  enqu iry . Successful 
p h ilo so p h ic  d ia logue prom otes interpersonal in s ig h t and connects us to  each other. In  
th in k in g  a loud I  am revea ling  w ho I  am as a person to  others in  the group. I become 
aware o f  o the rs ’ persona lities, values and biases and in  g e ttin g  to  k n o w  them  I  become 
m ore aware o f  m yse lf. A n  idea then, M orehouse (1990) suggests, is no longer the 
p riva te  possession o f  one person, rather i t  becomes co m m u n ity  p roperty , created by 
in d iv id u a ls  acting  together. In  the gradual e xp lo ra tion  o f  an idea in  a d iscussion a k ind  
o f  u n ity  emerges, though  a u n ity  that a llo w s  fo r  and is en riched b y  d iffe re n tia tio n  and 
d ive rs ity . The d ia logue  creates a com m un ity  ou t o f  in d iv id u a ls .
A n  im p o rta n t question , b r ie fly  adverted to  earlie r, concerns the  extent to w h ich  
p a rtic ip a tio n  in  a co m m u n ity  o f  e th ica l e n q u iry  leads to  m o ra l action. K n o w in g  the 
good m ay behove one to act accord ing ly bu t does i t  also enable one to do so? A ris to tle  
to o k  account o f  th is  in  h is analysis o f  akrasia o r  m o ra l weakness, k n o w in g  w hat i t  is 
good to  do, b u t fa il in g  nonetheless to  do i t  (N E 1 1 4 5 a l5 -3 4 ). C o u ld  one reason ve ry  
p la u s ib ly  and ye t no t be a m ora l person in  practice? Yes, one cou ld  because the m ora l 
strength and in te g r ity  tha t are the essence o f  character are n o t guaranteed b y  verbal 
reasoning. N everthe less, the a b ility  to reason ve rb a lly  ind ica tes  know ledge o f  the 
s itua tion  even i f  i t  is no t a su ffic ien t cond ition , as B uber (1 961 ) w ry ly  observes in  h is 
exam ple  o f  the best essay on ly in g  being w r itte n  b y  the w o rs t hab itua l lia r  in  the class. 
I f  one cons is ten tly  acts against one’ s know ledge  the p rice  to  be pa id  is some measure o f  
self-censure, and, unless one’ s m oral sens ib ilities  are a ltoge ther du lled , some a liena tion  
and u lt im a te ly  fragm enta tion . The emphasis on reasonableness in  the com m un ity  o f  
enqu iry , w ith  ch ild re n  lis ten ing  a c tive ly  and th in k in g  toge the r ra ther than alone, goes 
som e w a y  tow a rd  b r id g in g  the gap between judgem en t and action. Indeed, S p litte r &  
Sharp (1995, p. 7) w o u ld  no t describe someone as reasonable “ w ho  is able to fo rm u la te  
good judgem en ts , ye t cannot or consistently  does no t, p u t these judgem ents in to  
p rac tice ” .
F o r h a b itu a tio n  to  count as v irtue  it  requires ju d g e m e n t and tha t judgem en t can be 
b u ilt  th rough  engagem ent in  ph ilosoph ica l enqu iry . I t  is no t enough fo r  ch ild ren  to
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consider the  v irtues. Ph ilosoph is ing  alone is n o t su ff ic ie n t fo r  becom ing  virtuous. 
E th ic a l e nqu iry  m ust a im  at lin k in g  the conc lus ions o f  d iscussion to  the fo rm a tion  o f  
v irtu o u s  habits. O n ly  in  th is sense could the c o m m u n ity  o f  e n q u iry  be considered as part 
o f  h ab itua tion  in  the A ris to te lia n  sense. I t  is reasonable to  expect tha t the capacity fo r  
m ora l ju d g e m e n t can make a d ifference fo r  m ora l conduct. A  person ’ s understanding o f  
m ora l issues can g ive us some clues about h o w  the person w i l l  approach s im ila r 
p rob lem s as th e y  arise in  real life . Studies have show n tha t c h ild re n  show  a greater 
tendency to  share and cooperate w ith  one another as th e ir  m o ra l understanding 
develops. A c c o rd in g  to  Dam on, the c h ild ’ s soc ia l experience and soc ia l in fluences can 
tu rn  th is  m o ra l awareness in to  m ora l character (D am on , 1990, p. 50). Experience o f  
com m u n ica tive  discourse in  the com m un ity  o f  e n q u iry  can con tribu te  to the overa ll 
m ora l c lim a te  o f  respect and cooperation and as such is a moral practice in itself. 
L ip m a n  &  Sharp argue that m ora l education canno t be d ivo rce d  fro m  ph ilosoph ica l 
education. T he  cu ltiva tio n  o f  ch ild ren ’ s m o ra l d ispos ition s  and the im p rovem en t o f  the ir 
m ora l ju d g e m e n ts  should resu lt fro m  o u r p ro v o k in g  them  in  m any w ays, exerc is ing 
th e ir  pow ers o f  d isc rim in a tio n  and re fle c tio n  (L ip m a n  &  Sharp, 1994, p. 366). I t  im p lies  
a changed ro le  fo r  the teacher as that o f  fa c ilita to r  o f  good  d iscussion, he lp ing  the 
students to  re fle c t on and ju s t i fy  th e ir be lie fs.
4.3.3 The ro le  o f  the teacher
The teacher’ s ro le  in  L ip m a n ’ s m odel is tha t o f  ta len ted  questioner th rougho u t the 
d iscussion, s tim u la tin g  and p rovok ing  re fle c tive  th in k in g  in  a se tting  o f  em pathy and 
trust. T he  teacher is a lert no t on ly  to  w ha t is  be ing  said and h o w  the va rious m em bers o f  
the group in te rp re t i t  bu t he o r she m ust he lp  them  to  cha llenge each o the r’ s 
assum ptions. The teacher’ s ro le  is daun ting  in i t ia l ly  because he o r she requires 
cons iderab le  s k il l  in  dea ling  w ith  sensitive issues and needs to  exercise jud g e m e n t as to 
w ha t is  appropria te . I t  invo lves  the possession by the teacher o f  a fo rm  o f  pedagogic 
phronesis (H alstead &  M cL a u g h lin , 1999; M c L a u g h lin , 2000). P artly , the  a im  is to 
advance the d iscussion to  a h igher le ve l o f  genera lity . In  true  Socra tic  d ia logue the 
teacher is likened  to a g a d -fly , cha lleng ing  assum ptions and p ro v o k in g  though tfu lness 
in  a w o n d e rin g  ra ther than k n o w in g  w ay. The  teacher is also an e th ica l m ode l, a m ode l 
o f  in te g r ity  and o f  good discussion w ith  w h ic h  p u p ils  can id e n tify . L ip m a n  contends 
th a t it is  o n ly  b y  teachers show ing  the im portance , fo r  exam ple , o f  m a k in g  appropria te
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d is tinc tions  and c lass ifica tions  and by m an ifes ting  a love  fo r  such d is tinc tions  and 
c lass ifica tions  in  th e ir everyday behaviour that ch ild re n  lea rn  to  do like w ise  (L ipm an , 
1988, p. 100).
Part o f  the  purpose o f  a ph ilosoph ica l d iscussion, i f  i t  is to be deem ed successful, is a 
m ove in  the conversation  away fro m  the spec ific  and in  the d ire c tio n  o f  the general, and 
som etim es fro m  the general back to the spec ific , fro m  w h a t is  to  w h a t cou ld  be, and/or 
w ha t ough t to be. K o h lb e rg  (1981) saw the teacher’ s ro le  as s tim u la tin g  c o n flic t and 
g u id in g  students tow ards a reso lu tion  o f  the co n flic t. H is  c r ite r ia  fo r  success in  m ora l 
reasoning in  a m o ra l d ilem m a discussion w o u ld  be m ovem en t fro m  one stage to the 
nex t in  h is  s ix-stage sequence, w ith  the teacher a c tive ly  t ry in g  to  p rom o te  upw ard  stage 
change. Research on th is  (B e rko w itz , G ibbs &  B rough to n , 1980) fo u n d  that th is  was a 
d if f ic u lt  task fo r  the teacher in  an actual d iscussion. Peer statem ents w ere found  to have 
greater im pac t on  the group than the  inpu t o f  the teacher. In  m y  o w n  prac tice , the Ir ish  
m ode l, T h in k in g  T im e , uses the com m un ity  o f  in q u iry  in  a som ew ha t d iffe re n t w ay to 
that o f  L ip m a n  a lthough the u ltim a te  a im  is b road ly  s im ila r. There  is less d irect 
question ing  b y  the teacher and m ore  scope fo r open-ended d iscuss ion  (D o n n e lly , 1998; 
R usse ll, 2002). The ro le  o f  the teacher in  m o d e llin g  and s c a ffo ld in g  is s t i l l  ve ry  
im po rtan t bu t i t  is s ig n ifica n tly  m ediated th rough  its  in flu e n ce  on students w ho  then 
in fluence  each other. The goal is m ax im um  student-s tudent in te ra c tio n . C h ild re n  w i l l  
take note o f  w h a t th e ir peers th in k  and peer in flu e n ce  m atte rs  s ig n if ic a n tly  in  early 
adolescence (D am on  &  K ille n , 1982; D am on, 1990).
For e nqu iry  to  be successful, one needs to  have an in tu it iv e  fee l fo r  w h a t sort o f  
question  is  appropria te  to  each s itua tion  and w ha t stories, poem s o r o ther trigge rs  best 
m o tiva te  p h ilo so p h ica l th in k in g . One also learns w ith  experience  w hen  i t  is best to 
in tervene and w hen  n o t to. W ith  practice, the teacher gets a sense o f  progress in  the 
d iscussion, a sense o f  fo rw a rd  m ovem ent o r progress to w a rd s  a k in d  o f  consensus or 
understanding. One needs to be sensitive to the c h ild  in  the g roup  w ho  has n o t yet found 
a vo ice  b u t w h o  lis tens a tten tive ly  to the con tribu tion s  o f  others. There  is  some research 
evidence to  suggest tha t care fu l lis ten ing  is m ore  im p o rta n t than  speaking (Sprod,
1998). In  T h in k in g  T im e , u n like  the Haberm asian m ode l, consensus is no t the  u ltim ate  
a im , the process its e lf  be ing  the im portan t facto r. T o  do p h ilo s o p h y  w e ll,  M atthews 
suggests one m ust release the question ing  c h ild  in  on e se lf and be prepared to g ive  up 
adu lt p retensions to  know . C h ild ren  have a freshness and inven tiveness and a cu rios ity  
th a t is in  sharp contrast w ith  the staleness that a ll too  o fte n  is  taken  as a sign o f  m atu rity .
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Lea rn ing  to  puzz le  over som ething and to be com fo rtab le  w ith  na ive  questions is an 
im po rtan t part o f  do ing  ph ilosophy w e ll (M a tthew s, 1994, p. 13).
L in d ’ s (2001 ) m ora l d ilem m a discussion m ode l, w h ich  is  an updated version o f  the 
B la tt-K o h lb e rg  (1975) one, advises that the teacher shou ld  re fra in  fro m  g iv in g  an 
o p in io n  unless sp e c ifica lly  asked to  do so b y  the pup ils . The  a im  here is that the teacher 
w o u ld  con fine  h im /h e rs e lf to the role o f  m odera to r and no t in  any w a y  dom inate the 
d iscussion. M a in ta in in g  the ro le  o f  d idac tic  a u th o rity  as is  o fte n  exercised in  rou tine  
c lassroom  practice  cou ld  in h ib it  pup ils  i f  tha t same s itu a tio n  w ere  to  obta in  in  a 
c o m m u n ity  o f  in q u iry . Questions can be asked w hether the teacher should then m odel 
n e u tra lity . I  be lieve  he o r she should n o t because to  m ode l n e u tra lity  cou ld  convey the 
message tha t n e u tra lity  on m ora l issues is to  be condoned. There is a danger here o f  
m ora l ind iffe rence . Sprod argues that in  the c o m m u n ity  o f  in q u iry  the teacher can and 
ough t to  express v iew s. He considers a non-judgem enta l acceptance o f  certa in  extrem e 
pos itions  to  be in  its e lf  im m ora l. S till, a d ire c t in te rve n tio n  by  the teacher m ay m ilita te  
against s ig n if ic a n t learn ing  by  the pupils. One has to  guard against e th ica l re la tiv ism  
(Sprod, 2001, p. 178). I t  is the understanding tha t v ie w s  are n o t im m une  fro m  c r it ic is m  
-  w h ile  in  m any  cases they m ay also be reasonably defended against i t  -  tha t avoids 
e th ica l re la tiv ism . Open-m indedness in vo lve s  be ing  open to  h a v in g  one’ s v iew s 
cha llenged and be ing  disposed to  rev is ing  them  in  the l ig h t  o f  evidence and argum ent 
(H are &  M c L a u g h lin , 1998, p. 289).
T o  be tru ly  successfu l in  the ro le  o f  teacher w he the r i t  is as fa c ilita to r  in  a com m un ity  
o r leader in  any o the r aspect o f  education, one m ust be open w ho le -hea rted ly  to fu l l  
engagement. N odd ing s  contends that the capac ity  to  care is as m uch  a m ark  o f  
personhood as reason o r ra tiona lity . Lo ve  in  the  c lassroom  is a co m m itm e n t to the 
w ho le  experience and engagement w ith  the o ther as a “ T h o u ”  (N odd ings , 1992, p. 24). 
T h is  im p lie s  be ing  open to the d iffe ren t ways o f  k n o w in g  and fe e lin g , o f  co m b in in g  
love and in tu it io n  in  a ll approaches (N odd ings , 1984, p. 175). I t  im p lie s  be ing  fu l ly  
recep tive  to  the o the r in  a caring and com passionate w a y . I t  is w h a t S im one W e il ca lls 
attentiveness -  the  soul em pty ing  its e lf o f  a ll its  ow n  contents (w h a t M u rd o ch  refers to 
as “ the  fa t re lentless ego” ) in  order to  rece ive  in to  i ts e lf  the be ing  i t  is  lo o k in g  at, in  a ll 
its  tru th  (W e il,  1951, p. 115). W e challenge c h ild re n ’ s in te lle c tu a l and m ora l reasoning 
b u t never th e ir  in te g r ity  o r w orth . D ia lo g u e  can thus serve another purpose in  m ora l 
education , in  he lp in g  us connect w ith  each o ther and m a in ta in  ca ring  re la tions  and in s til 
in  each o ther a sense o f  our ow n w orth.
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4.4 The role of story and imagination
4.4.1 S to ry  and the m ora l im ag ina tion
One o f  the m ost p o w e rfu l ways o f  he lp ing  us to  engage e m o tio n a lly  w ith  others is 
th rough  story. S to ry  enables us to fee l w ith  others, to  see beyond  the actual to 
p o ss ib ilitie s  and to  m ake choices. In  us ing a story as tr ig g e r fo r  m o ra l discussion, the 
cho ice  o f  the  r ig h t k in d  o f  story is im portan t. I t  can be the ke y  th a t opens the door to 
w onder, to specu la tion  and to m ora l im ag ina tion . P h ilosoph y  beg ins in  w onder, in  the 
im ag ina tive  capacity  tha t appeals to  the poe tic  sense in  o u r nature. I t  begins in  the 
w hole-hearted love  o f  w isdom , accord ing to P lato and A ris to tle . A r is to t le  contends that 
a m an w ho  w onders th in ks  h im s e lf ignoran t and the purpose o f  ph ilosop h is ing  is to 
escape ignorance (D unne, 1998, p. 15). Can ch ild ren  be schoo led  w ith o u t los ing the ir 
sense o f  w onder?  School in  m any W estern societies has a u ti l i ta r ia n  focus, catering to 
the demands o f  the m arke t place w h ich  values p ro d u c tiv ity , to  the neg lect o f  a ffective  
and im a g in a tive  th in k in g . To redress the balance, as teachers w e  need to  take seriously 
and be a tten tive  to  the re flec tions o f  ch ild ren  and to  s tim u la te  the m o ra l im ag ina tion  
th rough the use o f  stories. Stories p o in t beyond the s e lf to  w o n d e r and to poss ib ilities . 
W e use o u r im a g in a tio n  “ no t to escape the w o r ld  b u t to  jo in  it ,  and th is  exhilarates us 
because o f  the d istance between our o rd ina ry  d u lle d  consciousness and our 
apprehension o f  the rea l”  (M u rdoch , 1970, p. 88). The s to ry  can enable new  w ays o f  
understanding and pe rce iv ing , fa c ilita tin g  im ag ina tive  p h ilo so p h ica l d ia logue. C h ild ren , 
in  id e n tify in g  w ith  the story characters, become conscious o f  them selves in  re la tion  to 
others and to  ideas and cu ltu re  o f  w h ic h  they are a part.
T h ro u g h o u t h is to ry , o ra l cultures th rough  the p o w e r o f  m y th  and im ag ina tion  
in terpreted hum an ac tion  and its  se tting  in  the cosmos. N a rra tiv e  s tructu re  is  at the  core 
o f  the fo rm a tio n  o f  the s e lf and w e  cannot underestim ate the  p ow er o f  m y th  and 
im ag ina tion  fo r  deepening our understanding o f  hum an re la tionsh ip s . M a n  “ in  his 
actions and p rac tice  as w e ll as in  h is  fic tio n s  is ” , accord ing  to  M a c In ty re , “ essentia lly  a 
s to ry -te llin g  a n im a l”  (M ac In ty re , 1981, p. 201). He argues tha t the a b il ity  to  fo llo w  
stories is connected w ith  the a b ility  to m ake sense o f  hum an experience because our 
lives  are them selves n a rra tive ly  structured and i t  is p r im a r ily  th ro u g h  narra tives that 
they are m ade in te llig ib le .
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T ra d it io n a lly , stories have played an im p o rta n t ro le  in  the m o ra l education o f  
ch ild re n , espec ia lly  in  regard to  portray ing  m ora l character, fo r  exam ple , the parables o f  
Jesus o r  the  fab les o f  Aesop. A m ong con tem pora ry  theoris ts  L ip m a n  (1988) and 
M a tthew s (1984 ) are the m ost w id e ly  know n  proponents o f  the p h ilo so p h ica l ab ilities  o f  
ch ild ren  and bo th  have w ritte n  stories to  illu s tra te  these a b ilit ie s  and to guide 
p rac titione rs  as to  the po ten tia l o f  the story. A  teacher needs to  have a w ide  va rie ty  o f  
stories th a t s tim u la te  the im ag ina tion  and engage the em otions. S tories have a va lue in  
educating us in to  the v irtues  because they can con tribu te  to  f le x ib i l i t y  in  th in k in g  and to 
a sense o f  to lerance and jus tice . Egan (1992) is em pha tic  tha t the cen tra l place o f  story 
in  educa tion  needs to  be restored. Young ch ild re n  liv e  in  an o ra l cu ltu re  and the stories 
tha t in terest them  deal in  abstract b inary opposites (a lready m en tioned ) such as bravery 
and cow ard ice , good and e v il, security and fear. W h a t c h ild re n  f in d  m ean ing fu l m ust be 
a rticu la ted  on  some p o w e rfu l abstraction. Egan contends tha t to  teach concrete content, 
u n tied  to  p o w e rfu l abstractions, is to starve the im a g in a tio n ; c h ild re n ’ s im ag ina tion  is 
engaged, n o t b y  focus ing  on the im m ediate w o r ld  around them , b u t b y  the m ost d is tant 
and exo tic .
In  E gan ’ s R om an tic  phase from  age e igh t to  fifte e n , w h a t fire s  ch ild re n ’ s 
im a g in a tio n  are the extremes and lim its  o f  hum an experience and the natura l w o rld . 
Th is  is m ore  characte ris tic  o f  m ale developm ent, w h ile  com passionate engagement and 
em pathy w ith  d is tin c t fo rm s o f  experience is  m ore  cha rac te ris tic  o f  fem a le  th in k in g . In  
th is  w a y  the  c h ild re n  m ake sense o f  th e ir surround ings. Id e n t ify in g  w ith  the hero ic , 
m o v in g  tow ards  w h a t one admires or w onders at o r regards w ith  awe and perhaps 
re v o ltin g  against adu lt conventions, marks th is  R o m a n tic  phase. I t  is a pe riod  also 
m arked b y  am biva lence , re vo ltin g  against the w o r ld  o f  the a d u lt w h ile  at the same tim e  
try in g  to  f in d  one ’ s p lace in  it. Egan suggests h u m a n iz in g  kn o w le d g e  and m ak ing  i t  
m ore m e a n in g fu l b y  engaging the fears, hopes and em otions o f  the  ch ild . He suggests 
ach iev ing  th is  b y  p resenting  lessons and un its  as good stories to  be to ld  rather than as 
b locks o f  kn ow ledg e  to  be sorted. The to o l w e  have fo r  dea ling  w ith  know ledge  and 
em otions toge the r is the story (Egan, 1992, p. 70). I  have fo u n d  th is  to  be the case in  m y 
m any years o f  experience w ith  the com m un ity  o f  enqu iry .
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4.4.2 S to ry  in  the com m un ity  o f  enquiry
The choice o f  s to ry  o r tr igge r te x t is cruc ia l no t o n ly  in  in f lu e n c in g  c r it ic a l and creative 
th in k in g  bu t in  engaging the p u p ils ’ interest and im a g in a tio n . I f  w e w an t ch ild ren  to 
becom e re fle c tiv e  adults, L ipm an  (1988) argues, w e  m ust encourage them  to be 
re fle c tive  ch ild re n . He decided that the best w ay  to  teach c h ild re n  to  th in k  was through 
stories. The f ic t io n a l models in  L ip m a n ’ s stories, fo r  exam ple , Harry Stotlemeier's 
Discovery, d e p ic t ch ild ren  as th in k in g  beings, capable o f  ra tio n a l and creative 
engagement. B y  means o f  f ic tio n a l m odels, L ip m a n  c la im s  i t  is possib le  to show 
ch ild re n  tha t th e y  them selves can th in k  m ore  reasonably and m ore  c re a tive ly  (L ipm an, 
1988, p. 187). Characters in  the stories discuss everyday p rob lem s concerned w ith  w hat 
w ords m ean and h o w  we use them  and also p h ilo so p h ica l to p ics  such as the nature o f  
th in k in g  and the  w ay the m in d  w orks. M a tthew s (1984 ) encourages ch ild re n  to  puzzle 
over o rd in a ry  happenings and events that they take fo r  granted. One such event is the 
resto ra tion  o f  the  o ld  ship Maria Magdalena. Is i t  s t i l l  the  o ld  sh ip  i f  85%  o f  its w ood  is 
restored? H o w  m uch  o f  the o rig in a l w ood needs to  be the re  be fo re  yo u  can ca ll i t  the o ld  
ship? (M a tthew s, 1984, p. 38). There is no easy so lu tio n  b u t m u ch  to  puzz le  over.
Socra tic  iro n y  characterises A rn o ld  LobeTs F rog  and T oad  stories, geared tow ards the 
c h ild  up  to  e ig h t years o ld. In  these stories the c h ild re n  are in v ite d  to  analyse an 
im p o rta n t concept. H o w  can they te ll i f  F rog  and T oad  are re a lly  brave? A re  they 
co w a rd ly  because th e y  ran away? O r w o u ld  they have been fo o lis h  to  stand b rave ly  and 
be eaten b y  the  snake? A r is to tle  d istinguishes betw een b ra ve ry  and foo lhard iness, a 
d is tin c tio n  tha t makes fear an in tegra l part o f  b ravery. In  these stories, ch ild re n  analyse 
ke y  m o ra l concepts and leam  to  appreciate d is tin c tions . F rog  and Toad th in k  o f  bravery 
in  te rm s o f  ph ys ica l courage. M o ra l courage, P ritch a rd  contends, is another k in d  o f  
bravery, and a d m itt in g  tha t one has made a serious m is take  som etim es requ ires as m uch 
courage as fa c in g  phys ica l dangers b rave ly  (P ritcha rd , 1996, p. 20).
G ood tr ig g e r texts represent a recognisable fra g m e n t o f  the  life -w o r ld  and fic tio n a l 
characters can express d issident v iews and in troduce  d iv e rs ity  in to  the com m un ity . 
C am ’ s (1997) Thinking Stories 3 focus on m ora l and soc ia l issues and are a va luab le  
gu ide to  teachers, concerned w ith  exp lo rin g  e th ica l issues. T he  stories ra ise questions 
and p rob lem s th a t have a ph ilosoph ica l tw is t. T hey  are o f  in te res t espec ia lly  to  p re ­
adolescent c h ild re n  g ro w in g  up in  an urban ne ighb ou rhood . The characters in  the 
narra tives m o d e l good enqu iry  and sometim es fa ll  fro m  reasonableness in  some w ay 
tha t leaves i t  open to the com m un ity  to  c r it ic iz e . M a n y  o f  ou r d iscussions in  the
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co m m u n ity  o f  e th ica l enqu iry  deal w ith  disagreem ents and uncerta in ties about w hat is 
r ig h t and w rong , h o w  w e come by  a know ledge o f  r ig h t and w ro n g  and w ho  is to decide 
w ha t is  r ig h t and w h a t is not. Joshua in  C am ’ s story The Fight says he doesn’ t  care w hat 
o ther people th in k  because he knows w hat he d id  was rig h t. H e tries  to  sustain h is ow n  
m o ra l j  udgem ent against w ha t he presumes are the assum ptions o f  h is parents and adu lt 
socie ty in  h is search fo r  a degree o f  m ora l autonom y. The stories concern ing issues o f  
freedom  and re sp o n s ib ility , ch ild re n ’ s righ ts , rac ia l and o ther in to le rance , e xp lo ring  the 
boundaries o f  acceptable behaviour, raise m any questions. T o  w ha t extent should 
socie ty decide w h a t is r ig h t and w rong and to  w ha t extent shou ld  tha t rest w ith  the 
in d iv id u a l?  B y  m a k in g  though t the subject o f  d iscussion c h ild re n ’ s a tten tion  is d raw n to 
th e ir o w n  th in k in g .
M y  experience w ith  the com m un ity  o f  e nqu iry  (R usse ll, 2002) suggests tha t the 
stories chosen need to  have a r ic h  narra tive  structure. They need to engage no t ju s t  the 
c r it ic a l aspect o f  th in k in g  but, as already m en tioned , the  em o tiona l aspect. K o h lb e rg ’ s 
d ilem m as tend to  d raw  on a narrow  p ic tu re  o f  m o ra l reason ing and lack  the deta iled 
o u tlin e  o f  character and context tha t is so r ic h  in  C am ’ s stories. W hen  the em otiona l 
aspects o f  the characters’ lives  are portrayed, the ch ild re n  in  the com m un ity  o f  in q u iry  
engage m ore w ith  the com m itted  aspects o f  th in k in g . A  r ic h  lite ra ry  te x t conta ins 
in v ita tio n s  to  enter the te x t im ag ina tive ly  and th rough  its  p o rtra ya l o f  a re a lis tic  l ife -  
w o r ld  w i l l  assist students in  in tegra ting  th e ir  m o ra l enqu iry  in to  th e ir liv e d  experience. 
Coles speaks o f  the  im m ed iacy  tha t a story can possess as i t  connects persuasive ly w ith  
hum an experience. S tories, w ith  th e ir ly r ic a l m ag ic  in s in u a tin g  its e lf  in to  our various 
separate lives , can o ffe r  us “ k insm en, k insw om en , com rades, advisers -  o ffe r  us o ther 
eyes w ith  w h ich  w e m ig h t m ake soundings”  (C oles, 1989, pp. 159-160).
A  s im ila r  p o in t is made by B. &  S. N o r fo lk  w h o  suggest in  Folk Tales for Character 
Development (a c o lle c tio n  o f  tales from  d iverse cu ltu res) th a t stories teach by a ttrac tion  
rather than  co m pu ls ion  and in v ite  rather than  im pose. They see the s to ry -te lle r ’ s ro le  as 
p ro v id in g  a non-judgem enta l space fo r d iscuss ion  and e xp lo ra tio n  in  w h ich  stories are 
a llo w e d  to  w o rk  th e ir  m ag ic  (B . &  S. N o r fo lk , 1999, p. 23). C h ild ren  m ust be a llow ed  
to  hear, question and analyse others’ op in ions in  the safety zone o f  story. T h rough  that 
process th e y  w i l l  be em pow ered to make m ore  in fo rm e d  judgem en ts  and choices. In  th is  
e n v ironm en t a real sense o f  com m un ity  g row s, a group tha t cares and shares together in  
a suppo rtive  env ironm ent.
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Shou ld  c h ild re n  be free to te ll the ir ow n stories o r personal anecdotes in  a com m unity  
o f  e th ica l enqu iry?  There are contrary v iew s am ong theo ris ts  on  th is  issue. Some 
caution against the  over-use o f  anecdotes in  ph ilo so p h ica l e n q u iry  unless there is a 
co m p e llin g  reason to share them  because o f  the danger o f  d iss ip a tin g  the discussion and 
los ing the focus o f  the argum ent (Reed, 1992c, p. 24). I  con tend tha t there has to  be a 
p lace fo r  the  te ll in g  o f  anecdotes in  a com m un ity  o f  e th ica l e n q u iry . In  te llin g  the ir ow n  
stories the  c h ild re n  are connecting  the substance o f  the e n q u iry  to  th e ir  ow n  experience; 
anecdotes have em o tiona l attachments fo r the te lle rs  and they  are m o tiva tio n a l fo r them. 
Sprod contends tha t the sharing o f  anecdotes is a pa rt o f  the  process o f  creating an in te r- 
sub jective  w o rld . A s  w e  have already seen, e th ica l e n q u iry  has m uch to do w ith  
contexts, com m itm en ts  and em bodim ent, espec ia lly  in  in te rre la tio n sh ip s  w ith  others 
(Sprod, 2001, p. 197).
A  s to ry  is m ore  engag ing i f  i t  provokes p h ilosop h ica l re fle c tio n  ra ther than u n c ritica l 
acceptance o f  a v irtue . M iss in g  fro m  B ennet’ s (1993) c o lle c tio n , The Book of Virtues, 
are stories tha t in v ite  ch ild ren  to  re flec t on w h y  ta k in g  one course o f  ac tion  is preferable 
to another. B en n e t’ s stories and poems are intended to  present the tra d itio n a l v irtues  
w h ich  he deems centra l to  m ora l education. H is  con ten tio n  is th a t these stories speak o f  
m o ra lity  and v irtu e s  no t as som eth ing to be possessed, b u t as the centra l pa rt o f  hum an 
nature (Bennet, 1993, p. 14). They are intended to  be read b y  parents and ch ild ren  
together to  deepen th e ir ow n  and the ir ch ild re n ’ s m o ra l understand ing. M a n y  o f  the 
stories illu s tra te  a v irtu e  o r a v ice . Bennet’ s c ritic s  f in d  fa u lt  m ore  w ith  w ha t is le f t  ou t 
rather than w h a t is inc luded. P ritcha rd  notes tha t ju s tice , one o f  the centra l A ris to te lia n  
v irtues , is n o t one o f  the special chapter headings in  The Book o f Virtues. N e ith e r are 
respect o r to lerance, v irtues im portan t in  m u ltic u ltu ra l socie ties (P ritchard , 1996, p. 
103). N ussbaum  contends tha t the stories have serious sho rt-com ings  in  tha t they are 
s im p lis tic , re fle c t B ennet’ s p o lit ic a l conservatism , espec ia lly  in  the  early chapters, and 
do n o t advance to  m ore  re fle c tive  levels (Nussbaum , in  P ritcha rd , 1996, p. 99). S tories, 
w hen they  s tim u la te  re fle c tio n , can po in t to  new  pa thw ays and new  v is ions  o f  w ha t is 
im p o rta n t in  life . Used w is e ly  in  a com m un ity  o f  enqu iry , th e y  can enable ch ild re n  to 
engage in  c r it ic a l and im ag ina tive  d iscussion th a t u lt im a te ly  encourages the 
deve lopm ent o f  the m o ra l in te llec t.
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4.5 Gender and moral orientation
4.5.1 M id d le  to  late ch ildhood
The f in a l issue w h ic h  w i l l  be o f  considerable s ign ificance  in  m y  la te r analysis is the 
issue o f  gender and I  w i l l  conclude this chapter by  e xa m in in g  som e o f  the theory on 
gender and m o ra l o rien ta tion  fro m  m idd le  and late c h ild h o o d  to  ea rly  adolescence. 
Theoris ts do no t, as a ru le , g ive  precise ages fo r  w hen  ea rly  ch ild h o o d  ends and m idd le  
ch ildhoo d  begins. M id d le  ch ildhood is genera lly  taken to  be sch o o l-g o in g  age. S im ila r ly  
there are no c lear d iv id in g  lines according to age fo r  w hen  la te  ch ild h o o d  ends or early 
adolescence beg ins. The onset o f  puberty (a t ages n o w  lo w e r  in  the  west than in  
p rev ious generations) genera lly  indicates ea rly  adolescence.
In  m id d le  ch ild h o o d , be long ing to same-sex peer g roup  assumes considerable 
s ign ificance . In  same-sex groups p rim a ry  schoo l ch ild re n  de ve lo p  ideas about and 
p ractice soc ia l s k ills  associated w ith  the tw o  o rien ta tions  o f  care and ju s tic e  (Langdale, 
1993, p. 49). B oys  emphasise group so lid a rity ; the ru les o f  th e ir  games become m ore 
elaborate and th e y  p re fe r to  p lay fo rm a l co m pe titive  gam es in  teams. Langdale 
contends th a t w h ile  boys use the group in  th e ir  quest fo r  re co g n itio n , jo c k y in g  fo r 
p o s itio n  w ith in  the  g roup, g irls  in  contrast fo rm  clubs to exc lude  o the r g ir ls , tend ing to 
v ie w  th e ir  g roup  as a n e tw o rk  o f  in tim a te  re la tionsh ips  ra th e r than a h ierarchy. G ir ls  
seem to  be m ore  concerned w ith  m a in ta in ing  re la tionsh ips w h ile  boys are concerned 
w ith  m anag ing  h ierarch ies. Piaget (1932) contended tha t re la tionsh ip s  w ith  peers 
p ro v id e  an im p o rta n t con text fo r the deve lopm ent o f  c h ild re n ’ s concepts o f  ju s tice  and 
the soc ia l s k il ls  associated w ith  the jus tice  o rien ta tion . Langd a le  contends tha t same-sex 
re la tionsh ips  are the con text in  w h ich  g ir ls  deve lop  the care o r ie n ta tio n  and concern 
w ith  o thers ’ needs in  nurtu ran t behaviour. W h a t is n o te w o rth y , acco rd ing  to Langdale, 
is the absence am ong boys o f  preoccupation w ith  care o rie n ta tio n , and consequently the 
absence o f  o p p o rtu n itie s  to  develop the socia l know ledge  and  s k ills  acquired th rough 
th is  behav io u r in  th e ir  same-sex peer re la tionsh ips.
F o r bo th  sexes the m ove fro m  concrete to fo rm a l opera tions is one o f  the  central tasks 
o f  late ch ild h o o d . C o n flic tin g  attitudes and be lie fs  m a rk  the  n e w  in terpersona l w o rld  
(S ch a rf et al, 1979, p. 13). Scharf et al contend tha t in  la te ch ild h o o d  fro m  about age 
ten to  tw e lv e  there is fu rther developm ent in  bo th  m a le  and fem a le  capacity fo r  
em pathy. The re  is  a deve lop ing  se n s itiv ity  tha t m anifests i t s e l f  in  a ltru is tic  behaviour.
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The c h ild re n  beg in  to be able to  judge  friends, re la tives  and peers fro m  vantage po in ts 
o ther than  th e ir  ow n. A dded  to  th is is a w id e r understand ing o f  the  w o r ld  in  w h ich  they 
liv e  and a g ro w in g  p o lit ic a l awareness. C h ild re n  can expand the scope o f  the ir th in k in g  
and deve lop  a new  sens itiv ity  fo r  the outcast, the p o o r and the handicapped. I t  is in  th is  
pe riod  too  th a t g u ilt  fo r  ha rm ing  or o ve rlook ing  another is experienced; th e ir ow n  m ora l 
em otions are in te rpre ted  in  lig h t o f  the m ora l reactions o f  others (S c h a rf et al, 1979, p. 
29). B iases can be reduced to to lerab le leve ls b y  so c ia lisa tio n  and education tha t 
emphasises hum an com m onalities and im p a rtia lity . A c c o rd in g  to  H o ffm a n , increased 
understand ing  fosters em pathy, no t on ly  w ith  those w ith  w h o m  th e y  are fa m ilia r, bu t 
also w ith  strangers and others w hom  ou r actions a ffec t a lth o u g h  they  are absent 
(H o ffm a n , 1993, p. 178).
4.5.2 E a rly  adolescence
B y  early  adolescence no t on ly  is  the c h ild ’ s perspective  on the  w o r ld  chang ing but also 
h is o r her conception  o f  bo th  se lf and others changes. T h is  s h if t  o ften  m anifests in  
increased self-consciousness. Because o f  the u nce rta in ty  th a t the ea rly  adolescent 
experiences som e theorists re fer to th is  as a tim e  o f  cris is  in  search o f  id e n tity . E lk in d
(1980) te rm s i t  pre-adolescent egocentrism . The ea rly  ado lescent is between sources o f  
em o tiona l support, b reaking away fro m  the fa m ily  w h ile  h is  o r her o w n  m ore 
independen tly  generated sources o f  support are n o t ye t established. A ro u n d  th is  tim e  
peer re la tions  becom e ve ry  s ign ifican t. A c c o rd in g  to  D a m o n  and H art, same-sex 
friendsh ips  becom e im bued w ith  qua lities o f  lo y a lty  and in tim a c y . F riends understand 
one another as “ persons” . Friends share ab ilitie s , in terests and in n e r experiences and the 
fr ie n d  has a d is tin c t pe rsona lity  tha t d iffe rs  fro m  one’ s ow n . C h ild re n  m ake carefu l 
choices about w h o m  they w i l l  have as friends. T he  g roup  is rep laced b y  the dyad and 
chum -sh ips becom e the norm  (D am on &  H art, 1988, p. 301).
D a m o n  (1990, p. 83) contends tha t boys deve lop  the n o tio n  tha t they are essentia lly 
d iffe re n t fro m  s ig n ifica n t others in  th e ir lives , whereas g ir ls  deve lop a b e lie f in  
s im ila r ity  and connectedness between them selves and others. G ill ig a n  (1982) suggests 
tha t the reason tha t men stress rules and fa irness is  tha t m ales acqu ire  an o rien ta tion  o f  
separateness d u rin g  th e ir  developm ent. O n the other hand an o rie n ta tio n  towards 
connectedness and se n s itiv ity  towards the needs o f  others are the  m a rk  o f  a m o ra lity  o f  
care w h ic h  tends to be associated w ith  g irls . H e r con ten tion  is  tha t care-orien ted m ora l
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judgem ents tend  to  be classified  at low e r stages than  ju s tice -o r ie n te d  judgem ents ( in  
K o h lb e rg ’s scale o f  m easurement o f  m ora l judgem en t) and consequen tly  females are 
disadvantaged. K rebs and his colleagues d ispute  th is . T h e ir  f in d in g s  do n o t support the 
idea that the  ju s tic e  o rien ta tion  o f  K o h lb e rg ’ s test d isadvantages fem ales. T he  am ount o f  
care evidenced in  m o ra l judgem ents is p r im a rily  a fu n c tio n  o f  the  type  o f  d ilem m a. The 
results o f  the K rebs study suggest that s im ila rit ie s  betw een the sexes exceed th e ir  
d ifferences. The re fo re  m ethods designed to  enhance m o ra l deve lop m e n t shou ld  be m ore 
o r less app licab le  to  bo th  sexes. Care is not the exc lus ive  p ro v in ce  o f  fem ales and n o r is 
ju s tice  tha t o f  m ales and op tim a l m ora l deve lopm ent requ ires a tte n tio n  to  bo th  (K rebs, 
etal, 1994, p. 225).
G illig a n  also notes the  ina tten tion  to  g irls . W hat has been m issed o u t b y  n o t s tudy ing  
g ir ls  is an understand ing o f  the ir re la tionships, a d iffe re n t concep tio n  o f  s e lf  and 
m o ra lity  and d iffe re n t ways o f  kn o w in g  (G illig a n , 1993, p. 106). There is, accord ing  to  
G illig a n , a need fo r  new  concepts and new  categories o f  in te rp re ta tio n . T he  assessment 
o f  sex d iffe rences cannot be undertaken u n t i l  fem ale  d eve lop m e n t is be tte r understood. 
Care concerns need to  be the focus o f  a coherent m o ra l pe rspec tive  ra the r than a s ign o f  
de fic iency  in  w o m e n ’ s m ora l reasoning. The o v e r-r id in g  em phasis p laced b y  
psycho log is ts  on  se lf-su ffic ie n cy  is, G illig a n  argues, at odds w ith  the hum an cond ition . 
Separation, in d iv id u a tio n  and autonom y as m arks o f  m a tu r ity , are, she c la im s, at odds 
w ith  the interdependence o f  adu lt life  and are c o n tr ib u to ry  to  the  cu ltu re  o f  narcissism . 
She queries w he ther such an emphasis can susta in  the lo n g -te rm  com m itm en ts  
necessary fo r  ra is in g  and educating a c h ild  fo r  c itize n sh ip  in  a dem ocra tic  socie ty. 
M o ra l m a tu r ity  w o u ld  im p ly  be ing able to speak in  b o th  care and ju s tic e  term s.
Langda le  (1993 ) suggests tha t m ore im portance is  a ttached to  boys ’ pe rcep tions and 
behaviours in  the m o ra l developm ent lite ra tu re  and tha t there  is a tendency n o t to  attach 
deve lopm enta l s ign ificance  to  those o f  g irls . B o ys ’ experience  is  taken as m oda l fo r  
w ha t is  deve lop m e n ta lly  advantageous w h ile  th a t o f  g ir ls  is perce ived  as a 
deve lopm enta l handicap. P iaget (1932) saw the c o m p le x ity  o f  b o y s ’ p la y  as g round ­
w o rk  fo r  la te r m o ra l developm ent w h ile  the c o m p le x ity  o f  g ir ls ’ p la y  w e n t unno ticed  
and was seen as a d e fic it. The ove r-va lua tion  o f  the  m a le -ju s tice  pe rspective  in  boys 
risks lim it in g  them  in  the deve lopm ent o f  in te r-persona l s k ills . Langda le  contends tha t 
the shared in te res t and activ ity -based friendsh ips o f  m en  and the shared in tim a c ie s  o f  
w om en ’ s fr iendsh ips  have th e ir roots in  the pattern  o f  gender id e n tity  and m o ra l 
o rie n ta tio n  established in  same-sex peer re la tionsh ips  in  e a rly  and m id d le  ch ild h o o d
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(Langda le , 1993, p. 54). I  w o u ld  concur w ith  Langdale  tha t b o th  m o ra l vo ices need to  
be consc ious ly  in c luded  in  the m ateria ls and stories presented to  ch ild re n  fo r fos te ring  
th e ir  socia l and m o ra l developm ent and, acco rd ing ly , I  w i l l  be t ry in g  to  ensure that bo th  
m ora l vo ices w i l l  be represented (Part I I  o f  th is  study).
G arrod &  B ea l (1993 ) contend that i t  is no t ye t c lear w he the r the use o f  o rien ta tions is 
gende r-linked  and concede that as ye t there is no consistent m e thod  fo r  cod ing  m o ra l 
o rie n ta tio n  in  re a l- life  dilem m as. K o h lb e rg ’ s h yp o th e tica l d ilem m as are fram ed as 
prob lem s o f  com pe ting  righ ts  and therefore i t  is  d if f ic u lt  to  de tec t concerns about care 
w hen such concerns are expressed. Garrod &  Beal suggest th a t as c h ild re n  becom e m ore 
advanced in  c o g n it iv e  development, they are able to  cons ide r d iffe re n t v ie w p o in ts  in  a 
m ora l c o n flic t.  S ocia l class, e thn ic ity , and m a rg in a lisa tio n  m ay be as m uch a 
de te rm inan t o f  p redom inan t orien ta tion  as is  gender (G a rrod  &  B ea l, 1993, pp. 61-70). 
W a lke r (1987 ) fo u n d  that a lthough concerns w ith  rig h ts  and  ju s tic e  ra ther than care 
dom inated c h ild re n ’ s re a l- life  dilem m as, w ith  m a tu rity  the re  w as an increased use o f  
m ixed  o rien ta tion .
D am on contends that ch ild ren ’ s m o ra lity  is c o n te x tu a lly  de te rm ined  and th a t 
education m ay have a greater part to  p lay  than gender in  m o ra l judgem en t. The  care 
e th ic  seems to be m ore  dom inant in  societies w here g ir ls  have  a n u rtu r in g  ro le. D am on  
a ttribu tes the gender d iffe rence in  ch ild ren ’ s approach to  m o ra lity  to  the d iffe re n t w ays 
in  w h ich  boys and g ir ls  are treated w hen they  are young . S oc ia l experience seems to  be 
the c ruc ia l fac to r. A cco rd in g  to  Damon, there is good reason to  be lie ve  tha t gender 
d iffe rences in  m o ra l o rien ta tion  can disappear under new  so c ia l circum stances. M e n  can 
value ca ring  ju s t  as m uch as wom en can va lue  ju s tice . The  c h i ld ’ s m o ra l th in k in g  and 
behav iou r is m ed ia ted  by  the c h ild ’ s socia l experience a n d  n o t b y  gender d ire c tly  
(D am on, 1990, pp. 90-103). S charf argues tha t acce lera ted m o ra l deve lopm en t is 
encouraged in  env ironm ents w h ich  stim ula te  m o ra l c o n f lic t ,  encourage ro le -ta k in g , 
emphasise in te ra c tio n  and are seen by  ch ild ren  to  be fa ir  (S ch a rf, 1979, p. 26).
4.6 Conclusion
C rit ic a l d iscourse is  one w ay through w h ich  the schoo l can enhance m o ra l awareness 
and m ora l consciousness. H e lp ing  ch ild ren to  develop th e ir  capac ity  fo r  reasonableness 
ca lls  fo r  e m p o w e rin g  them  rather than in d o c tr in a tin g  them . C h ild re n ’ s th in k in g  cannot
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take a great leap fo rw a rd  w ith o u t th e ir deve lop ing  “ m e ta -th in k in g ”  (Q u inn , 1997, p. 8). 
A cco rd in g  to  Q u inn , they m ust become no t ju s t th inke rs , bu t th in ke rs  about th e ir ow n  
th in k in g , question ing  answers rather than answ ering questions. H are (1964) saw  
teach ing ch ild ren  to  th in k  as the best m eans o f  em pow ering  them . G ive n  the 
b e w ild e rin g  array o f  values, p rinc ip les and ideo log ies  tha t su rround the young  person, 
the o n ly  so lu tio n  is to  teach as m any people as poss ib le  to  th in k  as w e ll as possib le. M y  
experience w o u ld  ind ica te  tha t one o f  the m ost e ffec tive  w ays  o f  lead ing  ch ild re n  
towards autonom ous thought and action and tow ards se lf-d ire c tio n  is to  engage them  in  
enqu iry  (R usse ll, 2002). Setting up a c lassroom  co m m u n ity  o f  e th ica l e n qu iry  w here  
ch ild re n  s it in  a c irc le  and engage co lla b o ra tive ly  in  p h ilo so p h ica l and m ora l re fle c tio n , 
has an im p o rta n t part to  p lay in  the developm ent o f  e th ica l persons. In  d ia logue ch ild re n  
m ake sense o f  the w ho le  and th e ir in d iv id u a l pa rt in  i t  and learn  to appreciate the good, 
the b e a u tifu l, tru th  and rea lity . I t  provides the o p p o rtu n ity  no t ju s t  to  be c r it ic a l th inke rs , 
bu t to becom e creative  and caring th inkers w here self-transcendence takes precedence 
over se lf-expression .
In  p ro m o tin g  reasonableness we are encourag ing  ch ild re n  to  th in k  fo r  them selves. 
T h is  enta ils  m a k in g  m ora l judgem ents, choices and decis ions. The c o g n itiv e - 
deve lopm enta l theories o f  Piaget and K o h lb e rg  focused on m o ra l judgem en t reason ing 
rather than  m o ra l actions and behaviour. K o h lb e rg  la te r set about dea ling  w ith  th is  
question  o f  fo llo w -th ro u g h  to  dem ocratic l iv in g  w hen  he set up h is  Just C o m m u n ity  
schools. C h ild re n  need to  be encouraged to  act upon th e ir m o ra l judgem ents because 
ju d g e m e n t and ac tion  together are both  necessary com ponents o f  m o ra lity . In  the c h i ld ’ s 
de libe ra tions in  the com m un ity  o f  enqu iry , the ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r  reasons has a m o ra l 
aspect o f  itse lf. I f  w e  w an t to in fluence ac tion  w e need to  take  in to  cons ide ra tion  the 
a ffe c tive  d im ens ion , the part p layed by em otions as w e ll as p rinc ip les . In  ta k in g  the 
perspective  o f  the o ther in to  account we com e to  k n o w  ourse lves and acquire s e n s it iv ity  
to the needs and w e lfa re  o f  others.
E ncou rag ing  p h ilo sop h ica l re fle c tion  is w id e ly  recogn ised as c h ild re n ’ s best a lly  in  
nego tia ting  th e ir  w a y  in  an increasing ly unce rta in  w o r ld  w here  the param eters are no 
longe r c lear and pressures o f  a ll sorts con tribu te  to  co n fu s io n  and a b lu rr in g  o f  v is io n . 
As em bod ied  agents, liv in g  in  d ia log ica l cond ition s  w e  m ake sense o f  ou r live s  as s to ry  
tha t connects the past fro m  w h ich  we have com e to  o u r fu tu re  pro jects. B y  engag ing  in  
cons truc tive  debate such as in  a com m un ity  o f  e th ica l enqu iry  w e  are in  a better p o s it io n  
to overcom e the d r i f t  tow ards a tom ism  and ins trum en ta lism  and pursue a m ore  v ig o ro u s
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and dem ocra tic  life .  T h is , accord ing to  T a y lo r (1991, p. 120) is  our arm our in  
ove rcom ing  fragm enta tion  and powerlessness and s h a llo w  m odes o f  authen tic ity . The 
ro le  o f  educa tion  is cruc ia l here in  s tim u la ting  the m o ra l im a g in a tio n . W e  need to foster 
not ju s t  c r it ic a l b u t creative and caring th inkers  w ho  have concern  fo r  the w elfare o f  
others and are p o s itiv e ly  disposed towards personal re s p o n s ib ility  in  a dem ocratic 
society. I t  is to  a considera tion  o f  how  th is  m ig h t be trans la ted  in to  p ractice  that I  tu rn  
now  in  the second part o f  th is  study.
PART II CLASSROOM PRACTICE: A QUALITATIVE 
ANALYSIS
5 C O G N IT IV E  C H A N G E  A N D  D E V E L O P M E N T
5.1 In t r o d u c t io n
M y  goal in  undertak ing  fie ld w o rk  fo r th is  research was to  exam ine  m ora l th in k in g  in  a 
chosen sam ple o f  partic ipan ts in  a com m un ity  o f  enqu iry . I t  w as carried  out, as I 
exp la ined  in  chapter one, in  a m ixed  gender p rim a ry  school in  a m id d le  class urban area.
I  f ir s t  began to w o rk  w ith  th is  pa rticu la r g roup  o f  ch ild re n  w hen  th e y  w ere  in  2nd class at 
ages rang ing  betw een seven and e ight and continued to  w o rk  w ith  them  when they 
m oved  to  the Sen ior School (beg inn ing in  3rd class), re co rd in g  th e ir  d ialogues in  the 
succeeding years u n t il the end o f  the p rim a ry  school cyc le  in  6th class, age eleven to  
tw e lve . In  a ll, the data co llec tion  spanned th rough  fiv e  schoo l years w ith  a gap o f  one 
and a h a lf  years in  the m idd le . I  used the T h in k in g  T im e  -  P h ilosoph y  w ith  C h ild ren  
fo rm a t w here the ch ild ren  s it in  a c irc le  w ith  the teacher ta k in g  pa rt as fa c ilita to r  and 
partic ipan t-observe r.
In  th is  chapter, w h ile  m y  overa ll purpose is m o ra l awareness, I  w i l l  be lo o k in g  at the 
c h ild re n ’s th in k in g  processes in  m idd le  ch ild h o o d  when I f i r s t  m ade contact w ith  them , 
and fo llo w in g  them  th rough  to late ch ildhoo d  and early  adolescence. T h is  w i l l  in vo lve  
e xa m in in g  the changes tha t occurred over tim e  as w e ll as the s k ills  the ch ild re n  acquired 
th rough  p a rtic ip a tio n  in  the com m un ity  o f  enqu iry  such as the  a b il ity  to  deduce, in fe r, 
m ake connections, hypothesise, make good d is tin c tio n s , o rder and c lass ify , and 
generalise fro m  the particu la r. H o w  the ch ild ren  deve loped concepts, expressed the ir 
v iew s  -  ta k in g  the perspective o f  others in to  account, and the  language th e y  used w i l l  be 
the focus o f  m uch o f  m y  study. I  w i l l  no t be focus ing  on  m o ra l con ten t in  th is  chapter as 
th is  w i l l  be dea lt w ith  in  deta il in  the  next chapter. M a n y  o f  the  s k ills  I  w i l l  be lo o k in g  
at m ig h t be considered generic; m y in te rest here has s p e c ific  reference to  m ora l 
reason ing and the processes b rough t in to  p lay  in  d iscussing m o ra l issues. The gains and 
losses f fo m  ea rlie r to la te r modes o f  th in k in g  in  th is  p e rio d  w i l l  be explored. M y  ro le  
b o th  as fa c ilita to r  and partic ipan t-observer, s tim u la tin g  reason ing , sca ffo ld in g  o r 
suppo rting  the c h ild re n ’ s th in k in g  w h ile  at the same tim e  re lin q u ish in g , to a large 
extent, m y  ro le  o f  teacher in  charge, w i l l  m e rit a ttention . T he  g roup  dynam ic , gender 
s im ila r it ie s  and d iffe rences, levels o f  pa rtic ip a tio n  and s c a ffo ld in g  by  m ore able pup ils , 
w i l l  be probed. In  q uo ting  the ch ild ren  I  have used th e ir exact w ords  w ith o u t ed iting
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them  and have g ive n  them  pseudonyms instead o f  rea l names. The transcrip ts  range 
fro m  1 to  47 and consequently the transcrip t num ber w i l l  be an in d ic a tio n  o f  how  early 
in  the research the discussion to o k  place.
5.2 Cognitive style in middle childhood
5.2.1 T h in k in g  co llabo ra tive ly : m ov ing  tow ards a co m m u n ity  o f  e n qu iry  
M id d le  ch ild h o o d  is genera lly  understood as the school-age years fro m  age about f iv e  
up to  about ten ; thereafte r the period  lead ing up to  adolescence is  re fe rred  to as late 
ch ildhood , lead ing  in to  pre-adolescence at age about e leven (R u b in , B u ko w sk i and 
Parker, 1998). In  th is  research I  w i l l  deal f irs t w ith  the T h in k in g  T im e  process in  m id d le  
ch ild h o o d  at age seven to e igh t when I  f irs t encountered th is  group. C o llabo ra ting  in  
dia logue was a process tha t evo lved  over tim e. In it ia l ly  w e  had a lo n g  se ttling  in  pe riod  
w ith  each c h ild  g iv in g  h is or her op in ion , pay ing  scant a tten tion  to  w h a t others had said, 
m ore in  the nature  o f  se lf-serv ing  m onologue than d ia logue . In  the early  days the 
ground ru les and norm s had to  be spelled ou t at the  b e g in n in g  o f  the session. These 
emphasised the need to  lis ten  to  others, respect others, w a it  fo r  one ’ s tu rn  to speak, g ive  
reasons fo r  one ’ s o p in io n  and say w hat one be lieved  to  be true. Ju s tify in g  one’ s reasons 
som etim es p roved  d if f ic u lt  fo r  some ch ild ren whose best c o n tr ib u tio n  o ften  consisted o f  
agreeing v e rb a tim  w ith  w hat others had said e.g. “ /  agree with Barry” . F o r others the 
best co n tr ib u tio n  consisted in  be ing funny and e lic it in g  a laugh  and som etim es se lf- 
consciousness m an ifested  in  g igg ling . I  was sa tis fied  at f ir s t  w ith  any b r ie f  co n tr ib u tio n  
because hav ing  a vo ice  and speaking in  the group w hen  a ll eyes w ere  upon one cou ld  be 
daun ting  fo r  some. T o  a large extent I  had to  fo l lo w  m y  o w n  procedure b u t had some 
idea o f  w h a t an idea l d ia logue session consisted o f, h a v in g  p a rtic ip a te d  in  a coup le  o f  
sessions o f  m y  then  colleague, Philom ena D onne lly .
F o r about the  f ir s t  ten sessions I in tervened fre q u e n tly , u rg in g  w here  possib le  fo r  
ju s t if ic a t io n  o f  reasons, o r fo r  respect fo r others in  the group, a im in g  a ll the  tim e  to  raise 
the th in k in g  to  m ore  re flec tive  levels. G radua lly  the c h ild re n  began to  lis te n  to  each 
other m ore  and to  base th e ir com m ents on re fu ta tio n  o f  w h a t had been said. I  was aware 
o f  the need fo r  s e n s itiv ity  tow ards the fee lings o f  those w h o  d id  n o t speak and was 
conscious o f  the  need to  pu t them  at ease b y  stressing the va lue  o f  lis te n in g  and p o in tin g  
out th a t lis te n in g  to  w h a t others had said was a c o n tr ib u tio n  in  itse lf.
107
The fo u rth  session m arked a tu rn ing  p o in t w hen  some c h ild re n  used the term s ‘7  
agree 'with” and ‘7  disagree with” , g iv in g  reasons in  these instances. I t  meant the 
beg inn ing  o f  a rgum enta tion  and active lis te n in g  and also the  b e g inn ing  o f  a liv in g  
m utua l re la tio n  betw een participants. In  a ll the  d ia logues and p a rtic u la r ly  the earlie r 
ones, some c h ild re n ’ s irre levan t con tribu tions seemed to  d iss ipa te  the argum ent bu t 
there were some strong partic ipants who rem ained focused, p ic k in g  up on  po in ts  made 
ea rlie r and b rin g in g  the discussion back on  track . M y  focus  in  the ea rly  d ia logues was 
on s tim u la tin g  re fle c tiv e  th in k in g  and getting the  ch ild re n  accustom ed to  the form at.
A t  an ea rly  stage I  decided to focus e x p lic it ly  on  m o ra l th in k in g ; a lready o f  course I 
had am ple  o p p o rtu n ity  to  observe how  the ch ild re n  dea lt w ith  them es such as fairness, 
b ravery, ug liness and beauty. One could see deve lopm en t in  g rapp ling  w ith  com plex 
m o ra l issues. In  a good discussion con tribu tions re in fo rce d  and b u ilt  on one another and 
there w o u ld  be a sense o f  fo rw ard  m ovem ent. M a n y  tim e s  ch ild re n  needed to  te ll 
anecdotes and even though  th is  o ften dissipated the d iscuss ion , the  sto ry  be ing  lo n g  and 
som etim es no t re levan t, a certain degree o f  understand ing  w as necessary because some 
ch ild ren  needed to  connect the discussion w ith  th e ir  o w n  w o r ld s  and f in d  a pa thw ay 
th rough  th e ir  o w n  concrete experience. O ccas iona lly  som e ch ild re n  fe lt  underm ined 
when others cha llenged th e ir  op in ions and I  had to  e xp la in  th a t th is  was a pos itive  th in g  
as th e ir  co n tr ib u tio n s  had proved thought p ro vo k in g . One instance  o f  th is  was w hen  we 
discussed the r ig h ts  and w rongs o f  using an im als in  expe rim en ts  and one o f  the m ore 
con fiden t speakers in  the group counted the num ber o f  peop le , e leven in  a ll, w ho 
disagreed w ith  h im , and then thanked the peop le  w h o  agreed w ith  h im . T h is  was the 
tim e  fo r  m e to  p o in t ou t that people disagreed w ith  w h a t one said and n o t because o f  
w he the r they  lik e d  o r d is liked  one. I t  was necessary to  em phasise th a t w e  argued, no t 
fo r  the  sake o f  w in n in g  o r scoring po in ts ove r another b u t fo r  the  sake o f  tru th , w h ic h  is 
at the core o f  P h ilosoph y  w ith  C h ild ren. The g ive -and -ta ke  o f  the d ia logue process 
cou ld  n o t be taken  fo r  granted bu t con tinued p rac tice  m ade  w a y  fo r  openness and 
v u ln e ra b ility , as also attested to by  S p litte r &  Sharp (1995).
L e a rn ing  to  take the perspective o f  others and unde rs tan d ing  the v ie w p o in ts  o f  those 
w ith  w h o m  they  s tro n g ly  disagreed was one o f  the f ir s t  rem arkab le  tu rn in g  po in ts  in  the 
c h ild re n ’ s discussions. I t  cou ld on ly  be acqu ired th ro u g h  a c tive  d iscussion, lea rn ing  to  
ca lib ra te  the w o rk in g s  o f  the ir m inds w ith  o r som etim es against one another. 
E m p a th is in g  w ith  others and sharing the ir fe e lin g  states is , acco rd ing  to  Kagan (1987), 
one o f  the  im p o rta n t factors that m otiva te  us to  act. A s  t im e  w en t on the ch ild re n  were
108
able to  deal w ith  m ore abstract concepts. In  our d iscussions w e  exp lo red  concepts such 
as b ravery , w illp o w e r, freedom , respons ib ility  and fairness d u rin g  th is  f irs t year. A  
d iscussion about w hether F rog and Toad in  A rn o ld  L o b e l’ s w e ll kn o w n  story w ere 
brave led  to  e xp lo rin g  the concept o f  bravery and w he the r one needed to  do som eth ing 
dangerous to  be brave. One boy, aged eight, sum m ed i t  up thus: “ /  think being brave is 
facing up to your fears’' ( tr8). A nother, seeing fea r in  a m ore concrete fo rm , disagreed:
“You know when you said that thing about facing up to your fears. I  disagree with you 
because if  your fear is bigger than you he could kill you before you have a chance to 
face up to him” ( tr8). M any  in  these early discussions w ere  n on -com m itta l o r 
am biguous: “They were kind of brave and kind o f not" ( t r8). In  th is  they were perhaps 
c o n firm in g  M a tth e w s ’ contention  that i t  is e x trem e ly  d if f ic u lt  to  have a de fin ite  
concep tion  o f  the n o tio n  o f  b ravery (M atthew s, 1984, p. 23).
5.2.2 B eg inn in gs  o f  re fle c tive  th in k in g
In  a ll the  discussions I  was m in d fu l o f  the  need to  a va il o f  oppo rtun itie s  to raise the 
leve l o f  th in k in g  and to  note the ha llm arks o f  re fle c tiv e  th in k in g : in fe rr in g , deducing, 
d e fin in g , m a k in g  d is tinc tions , c lass ify ing  and genera lis ing . Som e top ics  p roved m ore  
f ru it fu l than  others in  s tim u la ting  re fle c tio n  as the  fo llo w in g  extracts o f  d ia logue w i l l  
dem onstrate. A n  early discussion w ith  the c h ild re n  on  “ W h a t is  th in k in g ? ”  led  to 
specu la tion  about w hether anim als cou ld  th in k  and m any th o u g h t they cou ld , o the rw ise  
“How can a lion kill a human if he doesn’t think i t ’s possible?” ( t r6). The ch ild re n  
m u lle d  o ve r w hether anim als are sentient beings. Som e th o u g h t an im als cou ld  th in k  
because “ spiders can think up how to make a web and birds, they can think up how to 
make a nesf’ ( tr7 ); “ hamsters are very clever because they have whiskers to use to f it  in 
a hole. They’d have to measure the whiskers and see if  they ’d  be able to fit in the hole” 
(tr7 ).
C on, one o f  the  m ore a rticu la te  in  the class, d re w  the c h ild re n ’ s a tten tion  to  the 
d is tin c tio n  betw een conscious de libera tion  and in s tin c tiv e  p ro m p tin g s  and po in ted  ou t 
tha t co p y in g  patterns o f  behaviour d id  no t constitu te  th in k in g : “ They don’t know much. 
See, they only know what their parents have done and they copy their parents. If 
elephants could think they’d be open to lots of other stuff. They’d be able to attack us to 
stop us from catching them”  (tr7 ). Some reckoned, fro m  the perspective  o f  th e ir  ow n
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w a y  o f  th in k in g , tha t awareness and fea r go together: “ 7 think animals can think because 
if they couldn't think they wouldn’t be scared of things”  (tr7 ).
G enera lis ing  fro m  the particu la r usua lly  came m id -w a y  o r la te r in  the discussion. 
A fte r  m uch d e libe ra tio n , somewhere beyond the m id -w a y  p o in t, someone concluded:
“Animals and humans are the same. I t’s just the brain that makes it different'’ (tr7). M y  
question as to  w he the r a b igger b ra in  means a c leverer m am m a l e lic ite d  the response 
“The bigger the brain it's the more they can hold in the brain. I t’s not the most they can 
know. If it's the most they can know, elephants would be able to invent the airplane 
before us" (tr7 ). H ere  was an e igh t-year-o ld  a ttem p ting  to  associate th in k in g  w ith  
kn o w in g  and to  m ake good d is tinc tions.
A t  age seven to  e igh t the ch ild ren  were fascinated b y  d inosaurs and m odem  day 
rep tiles . T h e ir  d iscussions saw attempts at c la ss ify in g  and co rrec ting  w hat they 
perce ived to  be fa llac ies : “ Crocodiles aren’t dinosaurs. They’re reptiles”  (tr  13). T h is  
was taken a stage fu rth e r w ith  the exp lana tion that som e th in g s  cou ld  be long to  m ore 
than one category: “I think you ’re sort of right. You see crocodiles were here at the time 
of the dinosaurs so they are sort o f reptiles. In a way they ’re sort o f reptiles and in a 
way they ’re sort o f  dinosaurs”  ( t r l3 ) .
D eductive  reason ing  was em erg ing; i f  apes are c lass ified  as an im a ls  then, because o f  
our com m on ancestry, we m ust be anim als too: “ Humans used to be once apes and 
when man was first developed he acted like the ape until he developed more and got a 
bigger brain and acted more like himself So I think animals and humans are the same 
because the monkey is an animal and the human is related to the monkey, so they have 
to be animal as well" (tr7 ).
These questions and the va lue  placed on ra tio n a lity  are engag ing  m any in  the f ie ld  o f  
b io -e th ics . Som e ph ilosophers such as S inger argue tha t the d iffe re n ce  between us and 
g o rilla s  and chim panzees are d ifferences in  degree ra the r than  o f  k in d . H e c la im s tha t 
there is  a so lid  body  o f  evidence tha t an im als are se lf-consc ious  and that apes can be 
tra ined to  use the sign language o f  dea f peop le  (S inger, 1993, p. 111).
There was a sense o f  fo rw a rd  m ovem ent w hen the c h ild re n  engaged an im ated ly  w ith  
the to p ic  under discussion. The exam ina tion  o f  abstract concepts such as goodness, 
tru th , honesty and beauty ca lled  fo r  good stories and poem s as tr igge rs  fo r  re fle c tio n . To 
exp lore  the concept o f  beauty, we discussed G ina  W ils o n ’ s poem  Prowlpuss w h ich  
charted the adventures o f  a sc ru ffy  one-eyed, one-eared a lle y  cat, hated b y  h is 
ne ighbours fo r  h is  no isy  n ig h tly  antics, bu t m uch loved  b y  h is  ow ner. The  ch ild ren
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grea tly  engaged w ith  the underdog (or undercat!) in  th is  poem  w h o , despite his ugliness, 
b rough t great jo y  to  h is owner. V arious d e fin itio n s  o f  beauty and ug liness were e lic ited : 
“ /  think there is such a thing as true beauty. True beauty is when you are beautiful on 
the inside and ugly on the outside. That’s still true beauty, but if  you ’re beautiful on the 
outside and beautiful in the inside, that’s double beauty’' (tr9 ). A n  advance in  th in k in g  
was m arked b y  go ing  beyond the actual te x t to  de fine  a concept. Beauty was 
synonym ous w ith  caring : ‘7  think that beauty is if  you love somebody and you really 
care about them” (tr9 ).
B y  the tim e  w e came to the 16th session I  was lo o k in g  fo r  an a b il ity  to  exam ine an 
issue and m ake a m o ra l judgem ent. W hat is goodness? C o u ld  an a c tio n  be good even i f  
i t  is no t legal? In  d iscussing these questions the adventures o f  R o b in  H ood were a 
su itab le  to p ic  fo r  p ro m p tin g  the ch ild ren  to  th in k  about the  reasons fo r  p o s iting  a 
d is tin c tio n  be tw een the good and the legal. O u r d iscussion centred ro u n d  w he ther R o b in  
H ood  was r ig h t in  robb ing  the r ich  to  help the poor. M a n y  ch ild re n  th o u g h t tha t in  the 
c ircum stances o f  the day he was righ t and ju s t if ie d  th e ir  reasons fo r  th in k in g  so bu t 
m ade the d is tin c tio n  tha t i t  w o u ld  not be r ig h t nowadays because w e  have other ways o f  
h e lp ing  the  poo r: ‘7  think Robin Hood was definitely right because if  he didn ‘t steal, 
nearly all the poor would be dead”  ( t r l2 ); “It was okay that day ....but I  don’t think it 
would be okay these days”  ( t r l2 ) .  Some w ere no t sure and the  a m b ig u ity  o f  the younger 
c h ild  w as ev iden t as he tr ie d  to  reconcile r ig h t and w rong :
‘7  think Robin Hood is kind of right and kind of wrong because stealing is bad but 
helping is good. So he’s kind of right and kind of wrong” ( t r l2 ) .  A t  th is  young  age they 
were con ten t w ith  a tw o -s ided  statement; one cou ld  be b o th  r ig h t  and w ro n g  at the same 
tim e ; there was a to lerance fo r am bigu ity . A s  they advanced in  co g n it iv e  m a tu rity  these 
k inds o f  statem ents tended to be challenged. Y e t, in  seeing tha t the  s itu a tio n  is  no t clear 
cut, and seeing i t  as bo th  r ig h t and w rong, the  c h ild  has grasped som eth ing  o f  the m ora l 
re a lity  w h ic h  is am biguous. L ipm an  (1988) contends th a t the  m ore  s k i l fu l ly  ch ild ren  
d raw  in ferences, id e n tify  re lationships, connect and evaluate , d e fin e  and question , the 
riche r the  to ta lit ie s  o f  m eaning they are able to  extract fro m  th e ir  experiences.
5.2.3 F ro m  M y th ic  to  R om antic  Understand ing
A t  age seven to  e igh t the ch ild re n ’ s th in k in g  oscilla tes be tw een m ag ic  and rea lism , or 
betw een the m y th ic  and the ra tiona l w h ich  constitu tes the cen tra l d e fin in g  feature o f
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R om antic  U nderstand ing  (Egan, 1997, p. 80). A c c o rd in g  to  E gan there is a connection 
between c h ild re n ’ s fantasy and m y th ic  th in k in g . The  c h ild re n  m ove  fro m  fantasy to the 
extrem es and lim its  o f  rea lity  at age seven and e igh t and the characters o f  the ir fantasy 
tend to  be e xo tic  and rem oved fro m  the ir everyday experience . T h is  was ve ry  obvious 
th rougho u t the  d ia logue sessions in  2nd class. B e lie f  in  re in ca rn a tio n  was com m on; these 
ch ild re n  w ere  m a k in g  th e ir F irs t H o ly  C om m un ion  la te r in  the  year and b e lie f that one 
cou ld  com e back after death in  another phys ica l fo rm  h a p p ily  coex is ted  w ith  R om an 
C a tho lic  teach ing  (w h ich  rejects re incarna tion) in  the  m in d s  o f  some ch ild ren. M any  
ch ild re n  in  d iscussing w ha t happened when liv in g  th in g s  d ied  ( t r l l )  though t that one 
cou ld  com e back again as hum an or anim al:
“I think i f  they wanted to they could come down as any animal or human”  ( t r l  1 ).
“ /  think if  humans die they could go up to Heaven and they could look down and they 
can just come back to life again as a baby and they can just be the same”  ( t r l  1 ).
‘7  think, when you go to Heaven God gives you a choice o f every single animal in the 
whole world and then when the people think up, he makes that animal and after a few 
years you get born as that animal”  ( t r l  1 ).
O thers d isagreed and w ere closer to the th in k in g  o f  adu lts  in  th e ir  env ironm en t. They 
reckoned th a t w hen  adults died they w ent to  H eaven w hereas c h ild re n  w h o  died became 
angels: “When people die I don’t think they turn into animals. I  think they go up to 
H e a v e n “  When young children die they turn into angels”  ( t r l  1).
The idea o f  a soul w ith  its  separate destiny, d is tin c t fro m  the b o d y  was raised:
‘7  think sometimes when you die you come back as a human .....  and sometimes you
come back the same....Your soul is what matters and I think your body will rot while 
your soul moves on”  ( t r l  1 ).
The  f in a l i ty  o f  death w o u ld  not genera lly  be pa rt o f  a y o u n g  c h ild ’ s rea lity . M o s t 
ch ild re n  w o u ld  n o t have had experience o f  the death  o f  a pe rson  at close quarters and i f  
they had any i t  w o u ld  o n ly  have been a pet o r a re la tiv e  w h o  w o u ld  no t have live d  w ith  
them . V e ry  yo u n g  ch ild ren  often see the dog as p a rt o f  the  fa m ily ,  the re fo re  a H eaven 
fo r  hum ans m ust also inc lude  a place o f  happiness fo r  dogs: ‘ 7  think that when you ’re a 
dog you die and go up to Doggie Heaven and then you ‘re allowed do all sorts o f stuff. 
You ’re-allowed have Pedigree Chum and things like that”  ( t r l  1).
For some ch ild re n  b e lie f in  m agic was e n tire ly  acceptab le  i f  i t  f it te d  in  w ith  the 
subject u nde r d iscussion. H av ing  listened to a lo t  o f  s c ie n tif ic  facts p u t fo rw a rd  by  
others in  the  g roup as to the orig ins o f  the un ive rse  one c h ild  had her o w n  theo ry  as to
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h o w  trees came in to  being: “ /  think trees, God chose to make ’em with his own magic”  
( t r l  3). There was an awareness in  the group o f  the rea l and the im a g in a ry  and tha t 
som etim es the im a g in a ry  is  m ore in teresting: “ True stories don’t give you much fun in 
your imagination''' (tr4 ).
Im a g ina tion  p layed  a large part in  how  the ch ild ren  v iew ed  fr ie n d sh ip . T hey  w ere no t 
l im ite d  to concrete rea lities  and the ch ild  o f  seven or e igh t had a w id e  d e fin it io n  o f  
fr iendsh ip . A  fr ie n d  d id  no t have to be a person. One cou ld  have an an im a l o r even an 
inan im ate  ob jec t as a fr ie n d  or one cou ld  con ju re  up an im a g in a ry  fr iend : “ The second 
best friend that you can ever get is your make-up friend if you have no-one to play with 
like Seán, the leprechaun”  ( t r l 6). The garden tree was used as a m etaphor fo r  
fr iendsh ip : “ The tree out my back is one o f my friends because every day when I ’m 
lonely I  go out to the tree out the back and I touch it and play with if ’ ( t r l  6).
In  the same d ia logue  the c h ild  came back again to  h is  im age o f  the tree as a fr ie n d  and 
the branches becam e its ha ir. I t  was h is fr ie n d  because “ He lets me cut his hair when it 
gets long”  ( t r l 6).
T h is  was the last instance o f  such s tr ik in g  use o f  m etaphor in  th is  group. M e tapho r is  
one o f  our c o g n itiv e  g rapp ling  tools. I t  enables us to  see the w o r ld  in  m u ltip le  
perspectives and to  engage w ith  i t  f le x ib ly . Y ou n g  ch ild re n ’ s p ro d u c tio n  and grasp o f  
m etaphor are co m m o n ly  superior to  that o f  o lde r ch ild ren  and adults. Egan contends 
tha t m e taphoric  capacity , in  some respects, declines as c h ild re n  becom e o ld e r (Egan, 
1997, pp. 56-57). In  the years tha t fo llo w e d  I  cou ld  f in d  no fu rth e r exam ples o f  
m etaphor bu t the  fasc ina tion  w ith  extremes and s c ie n tific  facts, the  features o f  R om an tic  
understanding, fea tured th rougho u t the study. B oys w ere in c lin e d  to  outdo  each o the r in  
know ledge o f  facts (tr2 3 ) and in  the te llin g  o f  anecdotes w ith  the s e lf  as hero  (tr2 7 ; 
tr31). Egan suggests tha t th is  obsession w ith  know ledge  and facts, a fea ture  o f  w h a t he 
term s R o m a n tic  U nderstand ing, means tha t “ b y  lea rn ing  abou t som eth ing e xhaus tive ly , 
one gains the secu rity  tha t the w o r ld  is in  p r in c ip le  kn o w a b le ”  (Egan, 1997, p. 87).
5.2.3 Puzzlem ent and conjecture in  the c h ild re n ’ s th in k in g
A ris to tle  contended tha t ph ilosop hy  begins in  w onder (Metaphysics 986b 12), a w onde r 
that seems a k in  to  puzz lem ent and is associated w ith  a k in d  o f  conceptual p la y . T h is  
idea also pervades M a tth e w s ’ (1984, 1994) th in k in g  and is one I  was ve ry  m u ch  aware
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o f  b y  the tim e  we go t to ou r 15th dialogue and w ere d iscussing the question “ I f  there 
were no G od” . The th in k in g  w en t from  w onder to rea lism :
“Who would have made the world? ”
"Mo-one could have made the world".
"It couldn’t have been builded by its own
"There must have been someone
"A big rock. There must have been a big rock”.
"Well who would make that big rock? ”
"Just the universe would make that big rock” ( t r l5 ) .
Dunne asks w he the r ch ild re n  can be schooled w ith o u t lo s in g  th e ir sense o f  w onder or 
hav ing  i t  s tifle d . C u lt iv a tin g  ch ild re n ’ s w onder, acco rd ing  to  D unne , is h o w  we should 
see o u r task in  education  -  especia lly in  the p r im a ry  schoo l years. W onder and 
know ledge  are no t m u tu a lly  exclusive bu t “ coex is t in  the m ost in tim a te  d ia le c tic ”  
(Dunne, 1998, p. 18). H ypothesis ing , re fle c tin g  on  the p e rp le x ity  o f  an issue o r com ing  
to term s w ith  a p rob lem , became part o f  ou r discussions. There  w ere m om ents o f  pure 
re fle c tio n  in  the c h ild re n ’ s th in k in g  that m ig h t appear p r im it iv e  to  the adult. M atthew s 
contends tha t “ w ha t w e  take to be p r im itiv e , how ever, m ay a c tu a lly  be m ore open ly  
re fle c tive  than the adu lt no rm  we set as the goal o f  educa tion ”  (M a tthew s, 1984, p. 52).
The c h ild re n  in  th is  study had the ir ow n ideas on  the o r ig in s  o f  the un iverse and ea rly  
m an’ s p lace  on  earth, a m ix tu re  o f  re lig io n  and f ic t io n  w ith  the b in a ry  opposites o f  
safety and danger represented by God on the one hand and the  d e v il and dinosaurs on 
the other. H ypo thes is in g  on the o rig ins o f  e v il, one c h ild  in  2nd class thought: "If there 
was no God there might be an earth because the devil would have made an earth. H e’d 
put dinosaurs and volcanoes on it. He’d make people and put them into misery and give 
them mean hearts" ( t r l 5). The d e v il is no longer m en tio n e d  in  any o f  the re lig io u s  
tex tbooks  in  the Jun io r School cu rricu lum , and has been gone fo r  a generation, ye t he is 
part o f  the  o ra l tra d it io n  handed dow n  by  o ld e r peop le  and grandparents and is seen as 
the em bod im en t o f  e v il. G od was seen as a p ro te c tive  fa the r f ig u re  w hose prepara tion  o f  
the w o r ld  fo r  us was described thus: "I think God made the dinosaurs. He didn 't like the 
way the dinosaurs destroyed the world and he wanted them extinct so that the world 
wouldn’t be too messy when we came along and that we wouldn’t be killed by them. I 
think that’s why he made them extinct”  ( t r l 5).
I  queried i f  there w ere no God whether one w o u ld  bo the r to  do the r ig h t th in g  and got 
the response: ‘‘You couldn’t do the right thing because you wouldn 7 exist. You wouldn 7
114
be in it because God made us” ( t r l5 ) .  I  w ondered i f  there w o u ld  be an a fte r- life  and got 
the response: “There wouldn't be an after-life because we'd never have life in the first 
place if  there was no God” (tr 15). I  w o u ld  have lik e d  to  steer the  discussion in  the 
d ire c tio n  o f  h o w  w e  w o u ld  liv e  our lives, tow ards the behav io u ra l aspect, bu t they d id  
not respond to  that. T hey were m ore concerned w ith  the a lte rna tives  to  hav ing  no God, 
our non-ex is tence  and the dev il hav ing  free re ign.
A t  th is  younge r age the ch ild ren  shaped and reshaped the concepts th rough w h ich  
they  understood th e ir  w o rld ; conjecture was a recu rring  fea tu re  o f  th e ir  th ink ing . The 
w o rd  “ 'm aybe”  was o ften  used in  speculation: "Maybe God was just a little seed and the 
sun's heat inflated and inflated ....and BANG! God was just made” ( t r l5 ) ,  I f  they d id  
no t k n o w  som eth ing  fo r certain they speculated: "I wonder how the stars are made. 
Maybe they’re just rocks that the aliens throw out every night off the planet" (tr5 ). They 
im ag ined  tha t in  p la n n in g  the earth, God w o u ld  act lik e  any to w n  p lanner: "Well I  think 
that God made a huge piece of paper and he planned what he was going to do " ( t r l  5). 
C om puters featured in  Heaven as w e ll and had a part to  p la y  in  h o w  w e  came in to  
being: "I think when you go to Heaven there's some plastic surgeon people and they 
make the code for you and whatever you pick on the computer. And they sew it up and 
then they push it out o f a slide into whoever is going to make you born ” ( t r l  1 ).
T o  m ake the c h ild re n  aware that w hat they said m attered I  show ed the transcripts to 
them  and exp la ine d  m y  use o f  the tape-recorder. The  tra n s c r ip t came to  be part o f  the 
process fo r  th e m ; m any o f  them w o u ld  read i t  w hen I  le f t  i t  h a n g in g  on the classroom  
no tice -boa rd  w ith  a p a rticu la rly  a lert eye fo r  th e ir ow n  c o n tr ib u tio n . T h is  was no t m y 
in te n tio n  at f ir s t  b u t w hen they m et m e on the c o rr id o r la te r in  the  w eek they w o u ld  ask 
i f  I  had done the  transcrip t. As tim e  w ent by  they pa id  no  a tte n tio n  to  the tape-recorder 
and came to  see i t  as part o f  the session. U rg in g  them  to  speak o u t c lea rly  was m y  
constant p ro m p t as deciphering m um bled  con tribu tion s  m ade the w r it in g  up process 
ve ry  ted ious. I  u su a lly  ended the session w ith  f iv e  m in u te s  o f  C loud  T im e , w h ich  
consisted in  ta k in g  them  on a guided v isua lisa tion  ( ly in g  on backs on  the f lo o r  w ith  eyes 
closed) to the accom panim ent o f  classical m usic. T h is  exerc ise  he lped  in  re lax ing  and 
b ond in g  the g roup  and brought f it t in g  c losure  to the session. Three years la te r in  5th 
class they  w o u ld  ask me to f in is h  w ith  C lo u d  T im e  b u t b y  then , tim e  and space were 
lim ite d . B ig g e r fu rn itu re  took up more space and they  had g ro w n  too  b ig  fo r  a ll to  f i t  
ly in g  side b y  side on the f lo o r  in  the circle.
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5.3 Cognitive style in late childhood/ early adolescence
5.3.1 D eve lopm en t in  reasoning sk ills  
A fte r  an absence o f  a year and a h a lf  (see 1.3.5) I  resum ed T h in k in g  T im e  w ith  this 
same class. S ince they were now  m ore m ature I  was a le rt fo r  ev idence  o f  greater a b ility  
to deduce, in fe r, de fine , d raw  analogies, m ake balanced judgem en ts  and generalise from  
the p a rticu la r. The th in k in g , in  the firs t three sessions a fter resu m p tio n , was generally 
unfocused b u t b y  the tim e  w e came to the fo u rth  session in  4 th class, egocentrism  had 
g ra d u a lly  g ive n  w a y  to  active  lis ten ing  and a w illin g n e ss  to m o d ify  one ’ s p o in t o f  v ie w  
in  the lig h t  o f  the re flec tions  o f  others. T h is  session was concerned w ith  w hether i t  was 
r ig h t to  use an im als fo r  experim ents and em pathy w ith  an im als p la ye d  a large part in  the 
c h ild re n ’ s engagem ent w ith  the top ic. T h is  d iscuss ion  appealed to  the ch ild re n ’ s sense 
o f  m o ra l outrage and I had a sense o f  the g roup bond in g  toge ther. T hey  w ere prepared 
to  take a stand and the w ords they used w ere h ig h ly  m o ra lly  charged, “It's not fair ”, 
"It’s disgraceful”, ‘‘I t’s hurting”, "should”, "should not”, "right to live”, "it’s cruel”. 
They had becom e sharper at spotting the incons is tency  betw een th in k in g  and behaviour, 
betw een w h a t people say and do: “How can people say they don’t like to kill animals 
and everyday they probably eat ham, turkey or beef or pork and then they come in here 
and say they disagree with killing animals? ” (tr23 ). The  a b il i ty  to  generalise fro m  the 
p a rticu la r and see the issue in  context go t m ore acute w ith  increasing cogn itive  
m a tu rity : "Animals eat other animals like deer in the wild and i t ’s not cruel for them to 
kill animals. I f  you were wild you would eat animals too ” (tr23 ).
O ve r tim e  one cou ld  see patterns in  the th in k in g  o f  in d iv id u a l ch ild re n  in  the group. 
S tew art w as in c lin e d  to stand back and take a lo n g  lens v ie w , ta k in g  account o f  the 
pa rticu la rs : "It kinds of depends when you think about i t”. B a rry  was a le rt to nam ing  
w ha t was happen ing  w hen people d iv ided  a long  sex is t lines: "People are getting sexist 
now. The girls are saying it’s the boys’ fault and the boys are saying i t ’s the girls’” 
(tr25 ). S po tting  any con trad ic tion  or a m b ig u ity , he w o u ld  te ll the  group: “ You can’t be 
right and wrong really ” (tr25). The a b ility  to  nam e a co n d itio n  and to  de fine  im proved
w ith  p rac tice : "Responsibility is taking care o f something if  you broke it i t ’s your
responsibility” (tr25 ). Freedom  im p lie d  re s p o n s ib ility  as S a lly  p o in te d  out: "Ifyou want 
freedom you have to be responsible" (tr38 ). T h is  emphasis on  re sp o n s ib ility  ind ica ted
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an advance in  m ora l th ink ing . The ch ild ren  adopted d iffe re n t stances and I  was urg ing  
them  to defend o r ju s t ify  th e ir  p o in t o f  v iew .
In  the early  d ia logues i t  seemed that the ch ild ren  saw th e ir  w o r ld  and tha t o f  the adult 
as separate w ith  the la tte r hav ing  a ll the pow er and co n tro l b u t b y  5th class th is  was 
changing w ith  a consciousness o f  themselves as active  agents. T he  concept o f  a fu ture 
s e lf began to  m an ifes t in  5th class (age ten to e leven). A  coup le  o f  ch ild ren  could 
empathise w ith  parents ’ p o in t o f  v ie w  and reasoned tha t they  w o u ld  act s im ila r ly  when 
they became adu lts  o r parents: “The adults don’t really think, hut they probably got all 
the rules from their mothers. When yous are older you '11 probably do the exact same as 
well'’ (tr24 ). They cou ld  now  understand the  reason ing  beh ind  the seeming 
protectiveness o f  parents: “Most of us are going to get married and am we wouldn’t like 
something to happen to our children. We’d be kind o f exactly the same. You wouldn't 
want something to happen to your children’’ (tr38 ). A  com m en t l ik e  th is  seems to 
co n firm  Secord and Peevers c la im  that young adolescents are lik e ly  to  describe 
them selves in  term s o f  past and fu ture  selves, whereas younge r ch ild re n  genera lly see 
them selves in  te rm s o f  the im m ediate present. The young  adolescent n o w  has a stronger 
sense o f  persona l c o n tin u ity  (D am on &  H art, 1988, p. 47).
In  lo o k in g  here at the tra n s itio n  from  m idd le  to la te c h ild h o o d  I  am  d raw ing  a ttention 
to w h a t m a y  be regarded as cogn itive  gains; such gains w ere  ev iden t in  verbal 
com petency and m o ra l reasoning bu t perhaps fro m  a ce rta in  p o in t o f  v ie w  some o f  the 
changes th a t take p lace in  th is  trans ition  cou ld  be regarded as losses. Is there no t some 
loss in v o lv e d  w hen  a c h ild ’ s sense o f  w onder gives w a y  to  re a lism  and fasc ina tion  w ith  
facts? The puzz lem en t and w onder o f  the early  years, up to  about age seven, where the 
b e lie f tha t the  m oon  cou ld  be made o f  “ mushy cheese”  and a liens occupy other planets 
and com e o u t on earth at n ig h t when everybody is  asleep w e n t uncha llenged i f  i t  
sounded p la u s ib le  (tr5 ), bu t i t  was eventua lly  rep laced b y  the  rea lism  o f  the eleven to 
tw e lve  year o ld . T h is  was p a rticu la rly  ev ident in  5 th class w h e n  w e  w ere  d iscussing John 
L e n n o n ’s poem  Imagine. M a n y  o f  the ch ild re n  saw  L e n n o n ’ s idea l w o r ld  as a utop ian 
dream, out o f  touch  w ith  rea lity . M o s t detached fro m  the rom ance and idea lism  o f  a 
heaven here on earth, w ith o u t wars or s trife , w here  e ve rybody  w o u ld  be happy in  a 
“ b ro therhood o f  m an” , and fe lt  a p u ll tow ards sta rk  re a lity : “I don’t think people will 
ever live in peace” (tr43). Resistance to  the class teacher’ s pleas tha t i t  m ig h t be s t il l 
w o rth  im a g in in g  an idea l w o r ld  brought the response: “There’s no such thing as an
ideal world. It would only happen in an idea”', “This world isn’t perfect either” (tr43).
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The existence o f  heaven was queried: “You don’t know if  there is one definitely until 
you die” (tr43 ).
T h is  class had a re lig io n  lesson on a d a ily  basis; th e ir  class teacher was present in  the 
g roup, and at the  tim e  o f  th is  session was p repa ring  them  fo r  th e ir  C o n firm a tio n . The 
fact tha t they  co u ld  speak so free ly , expressing doub t as to  the  existence o f  H eaven or 
an a fte r life , m arked the ease they m ust have fe lt  in  the group. A  fe w  p u p ils  observed 
tha t d iffe re n t re lig io n s  caused figh ts  and conc luded th a t the w o r ld  w o u ld  be a m ore 
peacefu l p lace w ith o u t re lig ion . There w ere d issen ting  vo ices ; the  so lu tion  fo r  B a rry  
was no t in  be ing  w ith o u t re lig ion . He id e n tif ie d  the  rea l issue as respecting other 
peop le ’ s re lig io n , beg inn ing  w ith  the here and now : “If you just respected other 
people’s religion and things like that then we could live in world peace... ” (tr43 ). Some 
others d id  concede tha t an ideal w o rld  was a w o rth y  asp ira tion : “My ideal world would 
be world peace and no hunger and people getting happy ” ( tr4 3 ). L e n n o n ’ s ideal w o rld , 
w ith  its  scant regard  fo r  m ateria l wealth, p rovoked  m uch  re fle c tio n . K a th leen  d id  not 
th in k  tha t be ing  w ith o u t possessions was a good idea. Possessions a llo w e d  one to 
p rac tice  g ra titude : “If there were no possessions nobody would be grateful for them ” 
(tr43 ). T he  expression o f  p e rp le x ity  as w e ll as ce rta in ty  m a rke d  a tu rn in g  p o in t in  
d iscussion, the awareness o f  no t know ing  and a ttem p ting  to  m ake sense o f  the 
unknow n : “I don’t really understand everyone living for today. It doesn't make any 
sense really ” (tr43 ).
W h ile  m etaphor had declined as the ch ild re n  got o lde r, th e y  ga ined in  th e ir  a b ility  
to  probe deeper, deve lop  concepts and d raw  analogies. A n a lo g y  en ta ils  id e n t ify in g  and 
p in p o in tin g  the resem blance to another con tex t and d o m a in  and d o in g  so w ith  some 
appropriateness and precis ion. In  a d iscussion on rac ism , an ana logy w ith  the Ir is h  
Fam ine o f  1845-50 was draw n, com paring  o u r experience  o f  mass e m ig ra tio n  to  
A m e rica  and subsequent experience o f  rac ism , w ith  the cu rre n t im m ig ra tio n  o f  asy lum  
seekers to  Ire land : “Racism was against us” (tr47 ). B lu m  (2 0 0 2 ) attests to  th is  a n ti- Ir is h  
p re jud ice  in  A m e ric a  in  the years 1820-60. T he  Ir is h  w e re  seen as an in fe r io r  k in d  o f  
hum an being, a lm os t as lo w  on the social scale as b lacks. T h e  c h ild re n  w ere  also aware 
o f  the  rac ism  tha t som e Ir ish  people experienced in  E ng land  in  the post-w a r years: “In 
England they used to have signs on shops 'no dogs, no blacks, no Irish ’ ” and aga in  on  
board ing  houses “Irish not welcome ” (tr35 ). T hey  im p lie d  th a t w e  shou ld  n o w  exerc ise  
to lerance and understand ing towards im m ig ran ts  because th is  happened to  us too  in  the 
not too d is tan t past. W h ile  d raw ing  analogies, lin k in g  present w ith  past is va lu a b le  in
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discussing m o ra l issues, i t  is w o rth  no ting  here tha t i t  has va lu e  beyond  the m ora l. 
H ence L ip m a n  advises early strengthening o f  the  s k il l  o f  ana log ica l reasoning fo r  bo th  
co g n itive  and creative  developm ent (L ipm an, 1988, p. 106).
5.3.2 F ro m  pre-conven tiona l to  post-conven tiona l th in k in g
N o w  I  w i l l  re fe r back b r ie f ly  to  earlier m odes o f  th in k in g  in  o rder to spell out 
deve lopm ent in  la te r th in k in g . In  th is  study, fo r  the ch ild ren  a t age seven to  e ight, God 
was p re d o m in a n tly  the leg is la to r ( t r l  5). Parents and soc ie ty  m ade the ru les  tha t d ictated 
ch ild re n ’ s behaviour. G e tting  caught and fear o f  pun ishm ent w e re  considered su ffic ie n t 
reasons fo r  be ing  obedient. One should take re sp o n s ib ility  fo r  w ro n g -d o in g  because i f  
one d id  no t: “You ’d  get found out and you ’d  get into a big lot o f trouble ” ( t r l  7). “I t’ll 
haunt you until you ’re found out” (ib id ). A s  w e  have seen in  the  second chapter o f  th is  
study, such fear o f  ge tting  caught and ensuing pun ishm en t w o u ld  fea ture  as K o h lb e rg ’ s
(1981) f ir s t  leve l o f  m ora l reasoning, w h ic h  was succeeded b y  tw o  other levels. 
K o h lb e rg  used the term s pre-conventiona l, conven tiona l and post-conven tiona l to  
describe the  deve lopm enta l leve ls o f  m ora l judgem en t. P re -conven tio na l th in k in g  o r 
L e ve l 1, acco rd ing  to  C o lb y  &  K oh lbe rg  (1987), is the  leve l o f  m os t c h ild re n  under age 
n ine:
L e ve l 1 is  a perspective fro m  w h ich  ru les and socia l expecta tions are som eth ing 
ex te rna l to  the  se lf; in  the Leve l 2 perspective  the s e lf  is  id e n tif ie d  w ith  o r has 
in te rn a lize d  the ru les and expectations o f  others, espec ia lly  those o f  authorities; 
and the L e v e l 3 (postconven tiona l) perspective  d iffe re n tia te s  the s e lf fro m  the 
ru les and expectations o f  others and defines m o ra l va lues in  te rm s o f  self-chosen 
p rin c ip le s  (C o lb y  &  K oh lbe rg , 1987, p. 16).
B y  the tim e  the ch ild ren  came to 3rd class at age e igh t to  n in e  and w e  w ere d iscussing 
the H e in z  d ilem m a, th is  conception o f  obedience, K o h lb e rg ’ s L e v e l 1, was los ing  ou t to 
considera tions o f  equ ity , tak ing  account o f  the  pa rticu la rs  o f  the  case. M o s t though t 
H e inz  shou ld  steal the  d rug to  save the l i fe  o f  h is  d y in g  son ( I  changed the con tex t 
s lig h tly  fro m  tha t o f  K oh lbe rg , because I  f ig u re d  the  c h ild re n  w o u ld  re la te  m ore to  a 
fa the r’ s lo ve  fo r  h is  c h ild  than a m an ’s lo ve  fo r h is  w ife )  even  though  th is  course o f  
action  w o u ld  p u t h im  in  c o n flic t w ith  the la w : “I think he should break in. Anyway I 
know i t ’s wrong but if  his son is dying he should. I t’s illegal but at least the son might 
not die then" (tr20 ). T h is  cou ld  be considered as a m ove tow ards pos t-conven tiona l
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th in k in g  w here  ru les, external to  the se lf are no longer accepted unquestion ing ly . Rules 
and expecta tions, f irs t  encountered as those o f  others are appropria ted  as one’ s own. 
The g ivens n o w  becom e questionable. H ow ever, K o h lb e rg  h im s e lf  considered the post- 
conven tiona l le ve l is reached o n ly  b y  a m in o r ity  o f  adults and u su a lly  o n ly  a fter the age 
o f  20-25 (C o lb y  &  K oh lbe rg , 1987, p. 16). C lea rly  he is s tip u la tin g  a ve ry  sophisticated 
leve l o f  in te lle c tu a l reasoning and the a b ility  to de fine  m o ra l ru les in  terms o f  se lf­
chosen p r in c ip le s ; fro m  th is  perspective he reckoned tha t “ fo llo w in g  conscience as 
against fo l lo w in g  the law , need not indicate the pos t-co n ve n tio n a l perspective o f  the 
ra tiona l m o ra l in d iv id u a l”  (C o lb y  &  K oh lbe rg , 1987, p. 20). H ow eve r, i t  seems to  me 
to be le g itim a te  to  regard i t  as at least a s ig n ifica n t m ove  in  th is  d irec tion .
P re -conven tiona l th in k in g  featured fo r some ch ild re n  som e o f  the tim e  th roughou t the 
study p e rio d  b u t m ost ch ild ren  fe ll in to  the category o f  co n ve n tio n a l th in k ing  and in  the 
H e inz  d ile m m a  m any w o u ld  break w ith  conven tiona l th in k in g . In  considering and 
d is tin g u ish in g  the  m ora l and legal po ints o f  v ie w  th e y  recogn ised the p o ss ib ility  o f  
c o n flic t be tw een them  and consequently a d if f ic u lty  in  in te g ra tin g  them . F o llo w in g  the 
dictates o f  conscience cou ld  mean bending the ru les fo r  the sake o f  r ig h t i f  necessary 
and th is  was m o s t obvious in  discussing again the H e in z  d ile m m a  in  6th class a fte r a 
three year in te rva l. M o s t though t that H e inz  had no re a lis tic  o p tio n  bu t to steal i f  he 
were to  save a l i fe  even i f  i t  m eant contraven ing the law . There  was an attem pt at 
m ak ing  d is tin c tio n s  between w ha t was considered to  be good and w ha t was ac tua lly  
r ig h t: "It wasn Y a good thing to do but it was the right thing to do. Anyone would have 
done it” (tr4 4 ). Som e had changed com p le te ly  fro m  the p o s it io n  they he ld  three years 
p rev ious ly . C lodagh , w ho  p rev ious ly  w o u ld  n o t countenance stea ling  under any 
circum stances, th o u g h t tha t now  “he should steal because the druggist person shouldn Y 
have charged that much for it". C learly  the d ru g g is t’ s greed fo rces H e in z ’ s action. T h is  
tim e  o n ly  one b o y  m entioned the p o ss ib ility  o f  ge tting  caught as a considera tion  b u t he 
was am biguous about the r ig h t course o f  action : “I think he should steal the drug but 
then I think he shouldn Y because what if he gets caught? He ‘d  have to go to ja il" (tr44 ).
The H e in z  d ile m m a  o ffe red  m any challenges in  ra is in g  the  question  o f  r ig h t versus 
legal, lead ing  m any to conclude that the la w  is no t a lw ays r ig h t. A cco rd in g  to  A r is to tle  
“ the la w  is d e fe c tive  on account o f  its  genera lity ”  and m ust take account o f  special cases 
(N E  1 1 3 7 b 2 4 -l 1 3 8 a ll) .  T h is  d ilem m a led the c h ild re n  in to  d e fin in g  w ha t “ lega l”  
m eant: "Legal means you don Y get punished for it. It doesn Y mean i t ’s right or wrong ” 
(tr3 2 ); “The law isn’t always right” (tr44). There  was a ce rta in  to lerance o f  a m b ig u ity
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by the c h ild  w ho  then tr ie d  to  reconcile H e in z ’ s p o s itio n  w ith  d o in g  w h a t was r ig h t (as 
a lready quoted above): “It wasn't a good thing to do but it was the right thing to do” 
(tr44 ).
K o h lb e rg  argued tha t ch ild ren  m ove fro m  one stage o f  deve lopm ent in  m oral 
reasoning to  another b u t cannot be at m ore than one stage s im u ltaneous ly . Th is is a 
con ten tious issue. James Rest disagrees w ith  th is  c la im  th a t deve lopm ent proceeds 
th rough  a stepw ise sequence o f  in te rna lly  consistent stages, a rgu ing  tha t ind iv idua ls  
s im u ltaneous ly  use reasoning o f  m any types (C o lb y  &  K o h lb e rg  1987, p. 15). The 
evidence garnered in  the present study seems to  support R est’ s p o s itio n . I  was aware o f  
th is  w hen  w e  w ere  d iscussing the issue o f  ly in g  and w he ther i t  was ju s tif ia b le  to lie  to 
save one ’ s o w n  sk in . F rom  a Koh lberg ian  perspective  m any c h ild re n  reasoned at a pre- 
conven tiona l le ve l, a vo id in g  troub le  o r ge tting  caught be ing  the m a in  reason fo r  action. 
The  ch ild re n  at th is  p o in t were at the end o f  5th class, ra n g in g  in  age fro m  10 to  11. 
T e llin g  the  tru th  to  avo id  troub le  rather than fo r  its  ow n  sake was ev iden t in  several 
ch ild re n ’ s co n tr ib u tio n s : “Sometimes you just admit it because if  you lie you just get in 
more trouble” ( tr4 0 ); bu t m any o f  these same ch ild re n  argued fro m  a conventiona l 
leve l, the n e x t stage above, in  previous and subsequent d ia logues. The b o y  w ho  argued 
fo r tru th - te llin g  above was more m otiva ted b y  the avo idance o f  troub le , w h ich  w o u ld  
pu t h im  in  K o h lb e rg ’ s pre-conventiona l category. In  an e a rlie r d ia logue  th is  same boy 
d isp layed  a strong consciousness o f  the in ju s tice  o f  ra c ism  and argued fo r  equal 
trea tm ent on  the p r in c ip le  tha t “ we 're all the same inside”  (tr3 5 ). Adherence  to  p rin c ip le  
in  h is  argum ent w o u ld  ind icate a h igher le ve l o f  m o ra l reason ing . In  a subsequent 
d ia logue he fe lt  so s tro n g ly  about the k i l l in g  o f  an im als tha t he was prepared to take a 
p r in c ip le d  stand and adopt vegetarianism : “You don't need to kill creatures to 
survive ....you can eat vegetarian food....I think killing an animal is murder ....I'm 
thinking of becoming a vegetarian” (tr40). T h is  same b o y  had a s trong  sense o f  h is  ow n 
re s p o n s ib ility  fo r  the p ro tec tion  o f  the e n v iro n m e n t and w as c r it ic a l o f  an attitude o f  
in d iffe re n ce  to  p o llu t io n : “I think we have a responsibility. We all should help bit by bit 
to save the environment and stop pollution " (tr42).
C h ild re n  can b e n e fit g reatly  fro m  the re fle x iv e  pe rspective  in  the g roup; they  can 
learn to decentre and thus come to analyse th e ir  o w n  th o u g h t processes. M o ra l 
reasoning, re la tin g  to  the righ ts  and w rongs o f  the im m e d ia te  case under consideration 
also in vo lve s  th in k in g  th ings through, ex trapo la tin g  fro m  s p e c ific  to  m ore general or 
un ive rsa l considera tions. Q uinn contends tha t c h ild re n ’ s th in k in g  can n o t take a great
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leap fo rw a rd  w ith o u t th e ir deve lop ing m e ta -th ink ing : “ They m us t com e to  be no t ju s t 
th inke rs , b u t th inke rs  about th e ir ow n th in k in g ”  (Q u inn , 1997, p. 8). Tha t was m y 
w o rk in g  assum ption  also th roughout th is  research and as m uch  as possib le  I  urged the 
ch ild re n  to  take re spons ib ility  fo r  the d ire c tio n  o f  the d iscussion and to  take on board 
w ha t o the r ch ild re n  had already said.
5.3.3 R e fle c tio n  on one’ s ow n  though t processes
Here I  w i l l  lo o k  at some m ateria l from  our d iscussions tha t is germ ane to  th is  issue o f  
m e ta -cogn ition . The com m un ity  o f  enqu iry  cou ld  be considered a m ora l p ractice  in  the 
A r is to te lia n  sense o f  a structured a c tiv ity , engagem ent w ith  w h ic h  th rough  a process o f  
hab itua tion , leads to  the acqu is ition  o f  certa in  s k ills  and v irtu e s , cognate w ith  that 
a c tiv ity . W e cannot re fle c t on tha t w h ich  w e do n o t a lready kn o w . In  ana lys ing the 
c h ild re n ’ s th in k in g , I  am asking w hether they can lo o k  se lf-co rre c tive ly  at th e ir ow n  
though t processes w ith in  the context o f  enqu iry . T h is  was m ore  in  evidence in  the later 
d iscussions. R e fle c tio n  on  one’ s ow n  though t processes and lea rn ing  to  th in k  se lf- 
c o rre c tiv e ly  about one’ s ow n  th in k in g  m arked a deve lopm ent in  the th in k in g  o f  the 
group a t about age tw e lve . L o o k in g  at them selves and h o w  th e y  de fined  them selves in  
re la tio n  to  others in  a m u lti-c u ltu ra l society in vo lve d  the ch ild re n  in  exam in ing  id e n tity  
and w h a t i t  is  to  be Ir ish . They arrived at d iffe re n t in te rp re ta tions , be ing  Ir is h  in  the 
w a y  one th in ks : “I don’t think it matters what colour they are. If you’re Irish, you’re 
Irish in the way you talk and the way you think” (tr47 ). In  con trast to  th is , another boy 
to o k  the  lega l in te rp re ta tio n  -  Ir is h  b y  v ir tu e  o f  b irth : “If a coloured person comes to 
Ireland they aren Y really proper Irish people unless they ’re horn here ” (tr47).
In  an e a rlie r d iscussion L ia m  raised the p o s s ib ility  o f  la te n t rac ism  in  a ll o f  us, 
resu lting  in  peop le  be ing  m ocked fo r  th e ir d iffe rence : “I think everybody is a bit racist 
because if  no one was at all racist they wouldn’t be able to go out and slag people that 
are black” (tr35 ). “ S lag”  is the ch i ldren ’ s slang te rm  fo r  teasing o r m ock ing . There were 
m any a ttem pts at d e fin in g  racism . For one b o y  i t  depended m ore  on actions than on 
fee lings: "If you don't like someone that has black skin you ’re not racist, but if you slag 
them yo u ’re racist” (tr35 ). Th is  co n flic ts  w ith  B lu m ’ s thesis tha t i t  is the content o f  
a ttitudes and be lie fs  that makes them  rac is t n o t w hether one has the  po ten tia l to  pu t 
one’ s be lie fs  in to  practice  (B lu m , 2002, p. 39).
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The ch ild re n  w ere  n o w  aware o f  con trad ic tion  o r h yp o c risy  in  h o w  they though t and 
acted: “It’s not right but we all do it” (tr35). R acism  co u ld  a p p ly  to  h o w  we treated 
T rave lle rs  ( Ire la n d ’ s d iscrim inated-aga inst m in o r ity , tra d it io n a lly  nom adic). W e 
condem n the T ra ve lle rs  fo r  lit te r  problem s and fo r desp o ilin g  th e ir  env ironm en t but we 
do the same: “There are some good Travellers that care whether the place is clean and 
some people that just throw rubbish but settled people are the same” (tr37 ); “ settled 
people”  is  the te rm  used by T rave lle rs  fo r those w ho  liv e  in  houses.
In  d iscussing d iffe rence  and inc lus ion , the  language used in  6th class was rem arkably 
s im ila r  to  tha t o f  three years p rev ious ly : “Treat them the same”, "You shouldn’t treat 
them different". T h e ir  language indicated a greater degree o f  em pa thy  as the dialogues 
progressed: “Racism is terrible because some people go too fa r ” (tr35 ). "There’s
nothing wrong with black people they're just like you” ( tr3 5 ). These ch ild ren  were
fro m  an a ll-w h ite  m a in ly  m idd le  class background bu t they w ere  aware o f  incidents o f  
racism  and gave instances o f  where they heard peop le  shout ra c is t rem arks at people 
whose sk in  c o lo u r was d iffe ren t. For some ch ild ren , acceptance m eant m in im is in g  
d iffe rences, ra the r than focusing on them : “I think to jeer black people isn’t right 
because i t ’s not really much in the difference. You're just from a different country and 
you have a different skin colour” (tr35). B lu m  c la im s that “ race th in k in g ”  encourages us 
to  inven t d iffe rences  and to  focus on  them  ra ther than on  s im ila r it ie s . I t  gets in  the w ay 
o f  em pathy and is the antithesis o f  the idea l o f  “ the m o ra l u n ity  o f  h u m ank ind ”  (B lu m , 
2002, pp. 102-103). These discussions he lped the ch ild re n  to  exam ine  the stereotypes 
they used, to  deconstruct fix e d  categories and spot fa llac ies . Som e w ere  u n w ill in g  to  le t 
go o f  p re jud ice  against T rave lle rs  and w ere  con fron ted  b y  th e ir  peers. Fo r exam ple, 
D o n a ld ’ s rem ark  “I said I hate Travellers ”, e lic ite d  the response "How can you hate 
Travellers if  you don’t even know them?” (tr36 ). The so lu tio n , the  ch ild re n  po in ted  out 
lay in  ge tting  to  kn o w  them  and then one w o u ld  becom e aware o f  our com m on 
hum anity .
In  the f in a l d ia logue  o f  th is  study one year la ter, conce rn ing  the depo rta tio n  o f  asylum  
seekers, I  becam e aware that ch ild ren  were n o t o n ly  e xa m in in g  and d e fin in g  rac ism  and 
Ir is h  a ttitudes to  d iffe rence  but m id -w ay  th rough  the d iscuss ion  they  began to  re fle c t on 
th e ir o w n  th in k in g  and the labels they used to  describe o r d is tance  them selves fro m  
people: "Everybody has a label. At the end we are all just people ” ( tr4 7 ).
"Ifyou call someone black it’s just as bad as calling them coloured” (tr47 ).
The p o lit ic a l correctness o f  no t c a llin g  peop le  “black” o r  “ coloured”  was queried:
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“I think by not calling them black or coloured is in a way, i t ’s kind of racist, being
afraid to say it  If I was calling someone black that means I ’m not afraid to call them
black, which means I don’t have some racism in my head" (tr47 ). W hen  L ia m  
contended tha t w e  are a ll a b it  racist, B a rry  agreed bu t asserted tha t i t  was because we 
cared tha t w e  discussed i t  in  the firs t place: ‘‘If we didn ’t care at all we wouldn 't be 
really talking about it today ” (tr47).
W h ile  some exam ined the ir ow n th in k in g  processes and the labels they used there 
were others w ho  echoed the v iew s o f  some adults in  the e n v iro n m e n t tow ards asylum  
seekers and refugees: “I think i t ’s a bad idea to just let them all in because then they 
wouldn't want to go to other countries like England. They’d just all come to Ireland... if 
you were letting all the refugees in " (tr47). T h is  b o y  m o d if ie d  h is  th in k in g  la te r in  the 
d ia logue and was prepared to  concede that i f  they w o rke d  and w ere  n o t dependent on 
w e lfa re  and pa id  taxes they could con tribu te  and w e  w o u ld  bene fit: "I think if  the 
government keeps paying for them it would be bad but if they got like a job and a house 
and they pay taxes, then we ’d  get a lot o f money" (tr4 7 ). T h is  k in d  o f  th in k in g  fits  in  
w ith  a w idespread  v ie w  o f  asylum  seekers as spongers and a d ra in  on resources, despite 
the fa c t th a t they are n o t le g a lly  entitled  to  w o rk  unless th e y  have re fugee status.
M o s t d isagreed w ith  the Ir is h  D is tr ic t C ou rt ju d g e  w ho , w h e n  tw o  refugees appeared 
before h im  on charges o f  the ft, advocated bann ing  co lou red  peop le  fro m  shopp ing 
centres i f  the spate o f  sh o p -lift in g  incidents d id  n o t stop (G am er, 2004 , p. 157). T h is  
sto ry  was w id e ly  reported  in  the m edia  and m any  c h ild re n  co u ld  perce ive  the 
in c o n g ru ity  in  the  ju d g e ’ s statements. B rendan was adam ant th a t g u ilt  shou ld  n o t be 
equated w ith  co lou r: ‘7  think it’s wrong just because they’re coloured to get banned 
from shops and shopping centres because...It’s not like in your colour that you shop­
lift National people from Ireland shop-lift as well. Just because they’re coloured
doesn ‘t mean they should be banned” (tr47).
5.3.4 L e tt in g  go o f  f ix e d  positions: changing stance
M y  goal fro m  the b e g inn ing  was to  m ove the d iscuss ion  to  w here  there was m a x im u m  
student-student in terchange. A s  a ru le, I  d id  no t in te rvene d u rin g  the d iscussion, w a it in g  
lik e  e ve rybody  else fo r  m y  turn. As a resu lt the c h ild re n  lo o ke d  at each o the r w h ile  
speaking and d id  n o t address th e ir com m ents to  m e except w hen  they  needed to  respond 
to o r som etim es re fu te  m y  contribu tions. T hey  w ere  w i l l in g  w ith o u t any p ro m p tin g
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fro m  me to  change stance and le t go o f  entrenched pos itions . The  research o f  B e rko w itz
(1982) and B e rk o w itz  &  G ibbs (1983) in to  e ffe c tive  m o ra l d iscuss ion  concluded that 
the best co n tr ib u tio n s  were from  those w ho  in tegra ted p re v io u s  speakers’ statements 
in to  th e ir o w n  fra m e w o rk  before m aking  a response and th a t teachers serve best by 
fa c ilita t in g  peer discussion rather than d irec ting  it. M a n y  tim es du ring  the discussions 
ch ild re n  changed th e ir stance on an issue in  l ig h t  o f  the  v ie w s  o f  peers as instanced in  
the d iscuss ion  on  stealing. Con considered one had to  steal w h e n  under pressure, but 
la ter back-tracked , hav ing  heard the con tra ry  v ie w s  o f  others: " You really should say 
!no ’ ” (tr2 8 ). In  a discussion on friendsh ip  B rendan changed fro m  h is  p revious pos ition  
on the issue and decided to p rio rit ise  fa m ily  over fr iends , h a v in g  lis tened to  o thers’ 
co n tribu tion s : “After hearing your point I kind o f disagree with myself because your 
family is more important... ” (tr31).
T h ro u g h o u t the  discussions the ch ild ren  made fre q u e n t references to  w ha t they had 
seen o n  te le v is io n  o r in  film s  as a source o f  au tho rity . T h is  in flu e n ce  was c lea rly  seen 
a fter v ie w in g  the  video  Young Pavee Voices (a  p rog ram m e m ade b y  R T E  te lev is ion ). 
C h ild re n  w h o  had earlie r expressed in to le ran t v iew s tow a rds  T ra ve lle rs  had a change o f  
heart, h a v in g  lis tened to  12-year-o ld  T rave lle r, M a r t in  C o llin s  w ho  to ld  us h is  side o f  
the story. M a n y  w ere in c lin e d  to re th ink : “I ’ve changed my opinion since last week".
“I think after seeing the video everyone's changed their opinion from last week. I really 
know this about Donald". D ona ld  was w il l in g  to  concede b u t s t i l l  had reservations: “I 
have kind o f changed my opinion from last week but I'd still like it better if there was no 
Travellers” (tr3 7 ). L is ten ing  to  the other side o f  the  s to ry , to  a boy  th e ir ow n  age, 
evoked s o lid a r ity  in  some. There was a sense o f  co m m o n  g ro u n d  and a fe e lin g  tha t they  
w ere pa rt o f  us: "After seeing the video you see how much we have in common. They 
play football and they support the things we do ” (tr37 ).
T h is  k in d  o f  co llabo ra tive  discussion led  to search ing and p rob ing , estab lish ing the 
tru th  abou t some m atter. I t  was a com m itm en t to  tru th  ra the r than  debate w h ic h  seeks to  
score ove r an opponent. Here one m ay be rem inded  o f  P la to  in  whose dia logues w e f in d  
Socrates o fte n  in s is tin g  against the Sophists on the c ru c ia l d is tin c tio n  between d ia lec tic  
as the a rt o f  a rgum enta tion , com m itted  to  the p u rs u it o f  tru th , and soph is try  (o r e ris tic ) 
as s k il l  in  g a in in g  v ic to ry  in  an argum ent, regardless o f  the tru th  o f  one’ s p o s itio n  o r the  
v a lid ity  o f  the  reasons adduced in  its favour. C ons ide r B rendan ’ s ea rly  statem ent 
regard ing  a sy lu m  seekers: "If they're allowed to stay, then too much people will be just 
coming over here ” (tr47 ) and later in  the same d ia logue , h a v in g  looked  m ore c lose ly  at
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the con tex t and lis tened to  the v iew s o f  others, he was prepared to  take account o f  the 
pa rticu la rs : “I think if  there’s a war on in their country they should be allowed stay. If 
their baby is born and there’s a war and i t ’s unsafe for them to go back, they should 
stay ” (tr47).
E v y  also sh ifted  fro m  her earlie r p o s itio n  and was prepared to  backtrack bu t w ith  
ce rta in  reservations. A lth o u g h  she em pathised w ith  the c h i ld ’ s pos ition , she was 
nevertheless against an instrum enta l a ttitude to  hav ing  a ch ild .: “I kind of disagree with
m yself I think people should be allowed stay but people that just get pregnant for no
reason, just to come over to Ireland to have an Irish-born child and just dump it 
somewhere so then they can stay in Ireland or something, there’s something wrong” 
(tr47 ). T h is  has echoes o f  the m is trust fe lt  b y  some Ir is h  peop le  tow ards those who 
chose to  com e here to  g ive  b irth , thereby p ro cu rin g  Ir is h  c itize n sh ip  fo r  the ir ch ild . 
(S ince th is  d iscuss ion  to o k  place the la w  has changed and Ir is h  b ir th  no longer 
au tom a tica lly  confers Ir is h  c itizensh ip )
5.3.5 S ca ffo ld in g  b y  m ore able pup ils
The supe rio r a b il ity  o f  some pup ils  to a rticu la te  and re fle c t w as a support o r sca ffo ld ing  
fo r  the  less able in  the  group. In  a ll the d ia logues the m ore  ab le ch ild re n  raised the leve l 
o f  d iscuss ion  and w ere  in c lin e d  to b ring  i t  back on tra ck  w h e n  i t  w e n t o f f  on  a tangent. 
The c o m m u n ity  o f  enqu iry  was in  one sense a lea rn ing  toge the r and an exam ple o f  the 
va lue  o f  shared experience. V yg o tsky  (1978) argued tha t c h ild re n  fu n c tio n  at a h igher 
in te lle c tu a l le ve l w ith in  co llabora tive  structures. I  fo u n d  evidence fo r th is  w ith  
increas ing  exposure to  ph ilosoph ica l enqu iry . There was a greater a b il ity  to  tease ou t an 
issue and a rrive  at some sort o f  conclusion . C onsider as an exam p le  o u r d iscussion o f  
the issue o f  cheating. B rendan adm itted  tha t he had cheated in  re la tion  to  an art 
co m p e titio n  because he had no t w on  his p rize  o f  tw o  p la y -s ta tio n  games honestly. H e 
had traced the p ic tu re  (where the task w as to d raw ) and fe lt  he had no t deserved the 
p rize : “I traced something and I won two play-station games. And I  felt guilty but then 
when I had fun playing it I  didn’t really care ” (tr30 ). The c h ild re n  reasoned w hether he 
d id  in  fac t do som eth ing  w rong  and po in ted  th is  ou t to  h im : “Brendan, those games you 
won, they 're not actually yours if you got it cheating. They ’re really someone else‘s ” 
(tr30 ). B rendan agreed and adm itted to g u ilt  fee lings at the t im e  b u t added that the dye 
was n o w  cast: “Ifelt bad about tracing that picture. I know they ’re not mine but you get
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over it and I can’t take them back now’’ (tr30 ). D o u b t was cast b y  another ch ild  on 
w hether trac ing  was ac tua lly  cheating; he though t i t  depended on  h o w  one defined 
cheating. H e c la r if ie d  the issue in  such a w a y  tha t he exonerated B rendan fro m  the 
accusation o f  w ro n g -d o in g : " Tracing is still drawing. They asked you to draw a picture 
so technically you didn’t cheat at all’’ (tr30). B rendan, w ho  ea rlie r fe lt  he had cheated, 
to o k  c o m fo rt fro m  the last argum ent and was happy to  change h is  m ind : "They are 
actually mine. They are my property. I did still have to colour it in and tracing is not too 
easy” ( ib id ) . C h ild re n  tend to empathise m ore w ith  a f r ie n d ’ s p o s it io n  and there is the 
p o s s ib ility  tha t the fr ie n d  in  th is  case wanted to  bend the tru th  and exonerate Brendan 
w ho  was the  o b je c t o f  m uch group condem nation in  th is  instance.
E m pa thy  w ith  those in  distress can guide m o ra l ju d g e m e n t and th is  was frequen tly  
observed in  the c h ild re n ’ s th in k in g  and th e ir appeal fo r  unders tand ing  o f  the o the r’s 
pos ition : "7  think i t ’s wrong to steal because think how the other person would feel if 
you stole something valuable from them ” (tr28 ). M a k in g  good  m o ra l judgem ents and 
a p p ly in g  the test o f  u n iv e rsa liza b ility  often m arked  the th in k in g  o f  the  m ore  able pup ils : 
"7  think he was wrong to steal because if everyone went around stealing things nothing 
would be good. You couldn’t trust anybody” (tr28 ). Som e c h ild re n  in fluenced  others’ 
th in k in g  in  the  g roup, n o t necessarily by th e ir  e loquence in  s ta ting  a case, bu t by  th e ir  
m ora l c o n v ic tio n  o f  the  rightness o f  certain a ttitudes o r actions. In  the T ra ve lle r debate 
(tr37 ) som e w ere con fron ted  w ith  the ir p re jud ices and the  fa lla c y  o f  c la ss ify in g  a ll as 
cu lpable because o f  the actions o f  a few. A ffe c tiv e  b o n d in g  (as w e  have seen in  4.2.2 
and 4 .2 .3 ) in  the group in fluenced  the w illin g n e ss  o f  som e ch ild re n  to  take note o f  the 
op in ions o f  others as they he ld  one accountable fo r  one ’ s v ie w s . Som etim es th is  
a cco u n ta b ility  fo rced  some to  sh ift stance and exam ine th e ir  o w n  th in k in g : "7 disagree 
with myself' (tr47 ). I t  a ffo rded them the o p p o rtu n ity  to  becom e c learer on m ora l 
concepts. T h is  was obv ious in  the discussion w ith  the g ir ls  on  th e ir  ow n , w ith o u t the 
boys (tr4 7 ). The candour and lack  o f  defensiveness o f  some g ir ls  he lped others to be 
honest and open and reveal the ir attitudes and inne rm ost th in k in g  w ith o u t fear o f  
r id icu le .
Q ues tion in g  answers rather than answ ering questions co u ld  be considered a 
characte ris tic  o f  p h ilo so p h ica l enquiry. M a n y  o f  the m ore  able c h ild re n ’ s con tribu tions  
in  the  la te r d ia logues to o k  the fo rm  o f  fo rm u la tin g  re le va n t questions and query ing  
assum ptions. L e n n o n ’ s Imagine, th rough its  con ten t le n t i ts e lf  to  m uch  re fle c tio n , as
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evidenced in  the questions posed b y  these ch ild ren : “You’d  want some religion, 
wouldn’t you? And why would you all want to be brothers? ” ( tr4 3 )
“In an ideal world you wouldn't have any war but how long would it last? How would it 
work? “ (tr43 ). T h is  resonates w ith  L ip m a n ’ s (1988, p. 102) c la im s  th a t as ch ild ren  grow  
they m ove to w a rd  increased co llabora tive  com petence, lo g ic a l astuteness and mastery 
o f  language and ideas. The superior a b ility  o f  some ch ild re n  in  the group to  lis ten 
a tte n tive ly  w ith  c r it ic a l awareness and to  sum m arise and a rticu la te  conc ise ly  w hat had 
been said m arked  a tu rn in g  p o in t in  m any o f  the discussions. C on , one o f  the m ost able 
pup ils  and w hose  con tribu tions  I  have adverted to  several tim es  a lready was one such 
exam ple. H e show ed a deeper understanding o f  the concept o f  freedom  and seemed to 
a rticu la te  the th in k in g  and apprehensions o f  h is peers in  the g roup . H e  articu la ted  fears 
o f  n o t b e ing  able to  become the s e lf o f  h is  choice, becom ing  m o u ld e d  and cramped by  
parents to becom e w ha t they wanted h im  to  be, unab le  to  rea lise  se lfhood: “We’re 
scared that our parents will mould our character because they want to make our 
decisions for us. So we won’t be able to make ourselves into the person we want to be 
and we ’11 be the person they want us to be ’’ (tr38 ). One m ay speculate tha t in  th is  long 
statem ent he gave e x p lic it  utterance to  the increased se lf-consciousness and increased 
sense o f  persona l agency o f  h is age-group so tha t ch ild re n  in  the class, though at that 
p o in t incapab le  o f  m ak ing  tha t utterance them selves, w o u ld  nonetheless recognise 
them selves in  it. One cou ld  perhaps fu rthe r speculate and see th is  as an exam ple o f  w ha t 
V y g o ts k y  m ean t by  h is fam ous phrase the Zone o f  P ro x im a l D eve lopm en t (see 4.2.3). 
E a rly  adolescence is o ften  m arked b y  a new  awareness b u t a lso  b y  uncerta in ty . In  the 
s e lf-re fle c tive  awareness, D am on &  H art rem inds us th a t the  e a rly  adolescent wants 
con tro l ove r h is  o r  her ow n  thoughts and fee lings  b u t recognises also tha t there are 
lim its  to  th is  awareness and con tro l (D am on &  H art, 1988, p. 44).
Those w h o  w ere  strong con tribu to rs  in  the group w ere  n o t a lw ays  the ones w ho  were 
h ig h  achievers in  o ther areas. C h ild ren  w ith  lea rn ing  d if f ic u lt ie s  in  other areas cou ld  be 
equal in  th is  group. Everyone had an equal r ig h t to  be an enqu ire r and express an 
op in io n . T h e y  had a vo ice  and others lis tened, a boost to  th e ir sense o f  self-esteem. T w o  
o f  the boys and one g ir l w ho were rece iv ing  le a rn ing  suppo rt in  E n g lish  read ing were 
am ong the  m ost voca l and articu la te in  the group. A n o th e r w ho  found  concentra tion  
d if f ic u lt  in  o the r areas and found  h im s e lf “ in  tro u b le ”  a lo t o f  the  tim e , looked fo rw a rd  
eagerly  to T h in k in g  T im e  and never m issed an o p p o rtu n ity  to  speak, som etim es ve ry  
s trong ly . O n  the  o the r hand, tw o  boys w ho made c o n tr ib u tio n s  up to  the end o f  5th class
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were reLuctant to con tribu te  anyth ing  in  the group in  6th class. One o f  them  sometimes 
fe lt  uncom fo rtab le  in  the group. In  2nd class w hen I  v ideo-recorded the  f in a l session fo r  
the year and we fin ished  w ith  a v isua lisa tion  exercise I  noted in  m y  jo u rn a l tha t th is  boy 
w o u ld  n o t close h is eyes and d r if t  away o n  h is  c loud  lik e  the others. H e kept h is eyes 
w id e  open th rougho u t as though  he d id  not trus t the  process. The o the r o n ly  spoke i f  he 
sat beside me in  the c irc le  and reacted p o s itive ly  to  m y  encouragem ent. I  was aware that 
p rob lem s at hom e such as illness, depression and fa m ily  b reak-up , con tribu ted  fro m  
tim e  to  tim e  to some ch ild ren  be ing silent and less open in  expressing them selves.
O n the  o ther hand early  encouragement fro m  hom e cou ld  im pac t on how  con fiden t 
one was in  the group. One boy w ho  was re m a rka b ly  con fiden t and a rticu la te  th roughou t 
the  w h o le  process had a parent w ho regu la rly  d id  v isu a lisa tio n  exercises w ith  h im  to  
aw aken c re a tiv ity  fro m  the tim e  he was ve ry  young . S ig n ifica n t adu lts  in  the c h ild ’ s l ife  
im p a c t grea tly  on h is  o r her sense o f  se lf esteem and s e lf e ffica cy . Parents, as w e  have 
seen in  the  p rev ious chapter (4 .2 .3) depending on  h o w  they in flu e n ce  in te rac tion  and 
reasoning , g rea tly  a ffec t ch ild re n ’ s subsequent m o ra l deve lopm ent (W a lk e r &  H enn ig ,
1999). All o f  th is  strengthens m y  conv ic tion  tha t a lthough a co m m u n ity  o f  enqu iry  such 
as T h in k in g  T im e  can indeed be a p o w e rfu l m ed ium  fo r  p ro m o tin g  m ore  adequate 
m o ra l reasoning on  the ch ild re n ’ s part, nonetheless its  im p a c t a lw ays rem ains 
con d itio n e d  by  o r dependent on the in v is ib le  parenta l in flu e n ce  in  the hom e.
5.4 The role of the teacher in the community of enquiry
In  the w illin g n e s s  to  acknow ledge c h ild re n ’ s voices, one takes a step tow ards 
e m pow ering  them  (B e lenky , 1996; G illig a n , 1982). M y  a im  fro m  the beg inn ing  was to 
encourage every  c h ild  to develop and a rticu la te  h is  o r her o w n  w a y  o f  lo o k in g  at th ings. 
M y  in p u t becam e less as the ch ild ren  them selves to o k  charge. I w as m in d fu l o f  sharing 
re s p o n s ib ility  w ith  the group, m ode lling  d ia logue  and s tim u la tin g  though tfu lness. A s  
fa r  as possib le  I  a lw ays tr ie d  to  pu t m y question  in  the fo rm  o f  “ I  w onde r i f . . . ”  because 
in  th is  session I  d id  n o t w an t i t  to  resemble a question  and answer fo rm a t as is o ften  the 
case in  the  c lassroom . Q uestion ing  answers becam e as im p o rta n t as answ ering questions 
and qu ite  o ften  the ch ild re n  themselves posed the questions. T o  g ive  an exam ple  here: 
in  one session w e  w ere discussing w hether i t  was r ig h t to  l ie  to save one’ s o w n  sk in
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when L ia m  broadened the d im ension: “Can I ask a question? Is it right to lie to save 
their friend’s skin? ” (tr40).
I w e lcom ed  be ing  re lieved  fro m  the ro le  o f  be ing a ll-k n o w in g  and to ta lly  in  charge 
and a llo w e d  the ch ild ren  a sense o f  co -respons ib ility . I  saw  m y ro le  as one o f  
cha lleng ing  the c h ild re n  to come to term s w ith  com p lex  m ora l questions in  an 
atmosphere o f  openness and responsiveness. B onnet re fers to i t  as “ em pathetic 
cha lleng ing ”  w h ic h  invo lves  sharing w ith  them  a sense o f  w onder and puzzlem ent 
(Bonnet, 1994, p. 139). The ch ild ren , w ith  a certa in  candour and innocence, w o u ld  say 
p rec ise ly  w h a t th e y  meant. I t  was im portan t fo r  c h ild re n  to  fe e l they had freedom  o f  
speech. T h is  freedom  o f  expression bonded the group and tow ards the end o f  our 
sessions in  6th class one boy expressed i t  concise ly: “We should be taken seriously 
because like, if  you think about it, this is the only place where people would listen to our 
views. That right should really occur to most people ” (tr4 5 ). T h is  b o y ’ s statem ent was 
also an appeal to  thoughtfu lness, to  re flec t and consider the  vo ices  o f  ch ild ren . T h is  is a 
central message in  the N a tio n a l C h ild ren ’ s S trategy (G o ve rn m e n t o f  Ire land , 2000), (as 
we have a lready seen in  1.2) and educators are becom ing  m o re  aware o f  its  im portance. 
In  Perspectives on Equality Shine Thom pson draws a tte n tio n  to  the fa c t that ch ildhoo d  
has been igno red  o r m arg ina lised  in  pub lic  discourses in  the R e p u b lic  o f  Ire land  and she 
adm onishes educators to  be m in d fu l o f  creating  co n d itio n s  in  w h ich  c h ild re n ’ s vo ices 
can be heard and no t to  assume tha t ch ild ren  are incapab le  o f  independent though t 
(Sh ine T hom pson , 2005, p. 182).
B e in g  m in d fu l o f  c h ild re n ’ s capab ilities and po te n tia l as re fle c tive  th inke rs , I  saw 
m y s e lf as “ g a d -f ly ” , to  use Socrates’ te rm , goad ing  them  tow ards re fle c tio n  and 
though tfu lness. A s  fa c ilita to r in  the group, I  p layed a g u id in g  ro le , aware o f  the need to  
nudge the d iscuss ion  away fro m  the particu la r and the s p e c ific  in  the d ire c tio n  o f  the 
general -  and som etim es, depending on the con text, back to  the  spec ific  again. N e ith e r 
the class-teacher n o r I  had a ll the answers and d id  n o t p re tend  to  kn o w  i t  a ll. The search 
fo r  know ledg e , th ro u g h  th in k in g  things th rough  c o lla b o ra tive ly , was the object. 
M o d e llin g  d ia logue  was o ften rew ard ing  because the c h ild re n  w o u ld  em ulate term s and 
phrases in  th e ir  o w n  con tribu tions . I  sometimes used phrases, unsure o f  w hether they 
m ig h t be understood b u t o ften  got them  back d ire c tly  in  response and in  the  r ig h t 
context. L ip m a n  contends tha t ch ild ren  need m odels o f  leadersh ip  i f  they them selves are 
go ing  to  be good fu tu re  leaders. They need m odels o f  good a d u lt-c h ild  conversa tion  i f  
they are to engage e ffe c tiv e ly  in  d ia logue (L ip m a n , 1988, p. 93). A ga in , le t m e g ive  an
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exam ple. C ons ide ring  the essence o f  beauty and h o w  sub jective  its  in te rp re ta tion  can be,
I  posed the question : “There’s an old saying ‘Beauty is in the eye of the beholder’ Is
it really a matter o f personal opinion? ” T h is  e lic ited  the response: “I agree with Ms 
Russell...Beauty is actually in the eye of the beholder. You’d think they’re beautiful if 
they 're your friend. You wouldn’t think they ’re ugly ” (tr27 ).
A s  fa r as poss ib le  I queried o r reflected ra ther than g iv in g  m y  o p in io n  but sometimes 
i t  was easy to  get ca rried  away by the discussion. I f  ch ild re n  asked d ire c tly  I w ou ld  g ive  
m y o p in io n . A s  no ted  in  the previous chapter, no d iscuss ion  is  va lue-free and a ll 
teachers revea l va lues, bu t I  was m in d fu l o f  n o t im p o s in g  m y  ow n  v iew s on the 
ch ild ren . T h is  w as a fo ru m  where one queried va lues ra ther th a n  accepting  them  at face 
value. A n  im p o rta n t threshold was crossed w hen  the p u p ils  trus ted  th e ir  class teacher or 
me s u ff ic ie n tly  to  r is k  query ing  our v iew s. One exam ple  o f  th is  was w hen we w ere 
d iscussing the question  o f  how  m uch freedom  e leven-year-o lds should have. The class 
teacher, a c tin g  as d e v il ’ s advocate, suggested tha t e leven-yea r-o lds  shou ld  have o n ly  
lim ite d  freedom  because they were no t capable o f  ta k in g  fu l l  re sp o n s ib ility  and got the
responses: “I disagree with Ms Lawless Most o f the time eleven-year-olds are
responsible “ ( tr3 8 ); “I kind of disagree with Ms Lawless because you can’t really have 
supervised fun if  you ’re out with your friends....So I think freedom should be when 
you’re on your own not with someone else... ” (tr38).
In  T h in k in g  T im e  the ch ild ren  became fa m ilia r  ove r t im e  w ith  d iffe re n t fo rm s o f  
argum ent. I  w o u ld  pose a question “ W hat is i t  tha t makes s tea ling  w rong? ”  rather than 
“ W h y  is s tea ling  w rong? ”  The la tter could e lic it  the response “ Because our parents say 
i t ’ s w ro n g ”  w hereas the fo rm er question a im s at ge tting  at w h a t essentia lly  is  w ro n g  
about the  action . I t  is  re levant here to re ca ll H aberm as’ s stress (see 4.2.2) on the 
im portance  o f  the in te r-sub jec tive  process o f  a rgum enta tion  in  lead ing  to  freedom  fro m  
undue in flu e n ce  and autonom y in  w ill- fo rm a tio n  (Haberm as, 1990, p. 71). Som etim es 
the c h ild re n  w o u ld  a d m it that some action was w ro n g  a d d ing  “but everybody does it”; 
“Everyone today is going to say ... it's not right but everyone does it’’ (tr40). M y  query 
“Does that make it right?’’ e lic ited  the response “it depends on the situation" and I  had 
to probe fu rthe r: “Stewart says sometimes it is okay to lie to save your own skin. It
depends on the situation. What I want to know Stewart is what situation would make it 
right? ’’ (tr4 0 ). M y  hope was tha t they w o u ld  see the incons is tency in  not fo llo w in g  
th rough. C a rr &  S teuta l (1999, p. 245) c la im  tha t one has n o t fu l ly  grasped the re levant
131
moral virtue if one is not committed to pursuing it. Socrates thought likewise. If one’s 
beliefs were authentic one would act accordingly.
To have fruitful discussions I was mindful of eliciting children’s interest. It was 
important to choose trigger material, stories, poems or a controversial news item, that 
engaged them. Stories can have a moral dimension (as noted in 4.4.2). In our 
discussions certain stories and sometimes poems elicited more reflective contributions 
than others. Those that were most successful with this group were the stories of Philip 
Cam, Thinking Stories 3. The children could identify with Joshua and Neal, the two 
urban protagonists aged around twelve or thirteen in the stories. The heroes or heroines 
in the stories wrestled with the same concepts o f trust, truth, honesty, lying, cheating, 
retaliation, anger and getting even, as themselves. Good stories where ideas were 
suitably embedded in terms and examples which children recognised, enabled them to 
gain insights into their own thinking, to empathise, to examine the rights implicit in a 
situation and to examine a person’s motives and intentions. However, some of my 
choices were not altogether successful. Gabriel’s Story by Ann Margaret Sharp did not 
greatly engage the children and some of the language in it was difficult for them; one 
boy’s boredom with the story prompted him to come up his own suggestion for next 
session about "doing something going on in the world, like Afghanistan ” (tr30). The 
conflict in Afghanistan was making news headlines at the time.
I was aided to a large extent by the class teacher who was committed to the process, 
preparing the way by reading the story or other relevant material for discussion with the 
class beforehand. No comment was allowed during the reading as this had to wait until 
the Thinking Time session. We discussed the choice o f topic (preferably in the form of 
a question) when we were all in the circle and as time went on the children became 
adept at choosing or suggesting one that would give good scope for deliberation.
5.5 Gender orientation
The debate about whether boys and girls reason from different perspectives has been 
controversial especially since Kohlberg introduced his stages o f justice reasoning. In 
Kohlberg’s test, the Moral Judgement Interview, (which attempts to measure the most 
advanced level of reasoning of which an individual is capable) girls generally scored 
lower. Many contend that this is so because the nuances of children’s reflections -  and
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of girls in particular -  are not taken account of in Kohlberg’s stages (Matthews, 1984; 
Pritchard, 1996).
In adverting to this debate earlier (see 2.4.1) we have seen that Gilligan (1982) has 
argued that boys’ reasoning tends towards impartialism and girls tend to reason from a 
predominantly empathic perspective. These terms have come to be seen as characteristic 
o f the two different schools of thought, one being where universal principles 
predominate and the other where account is taken of the particulars o f a situation. Boys, 
according to Gilligan, focus from a justice perspective and girls from one of care, and 
there is little consideration for overlap. Gilligan’s claim is that girls are more likely to 
seek an inclusive solution to a moral dilemma.
My overall findings with my study group indicate that even though the girls were 
generally less assertive and there were fewer of them, they matched the boys in overall 
moral reasoning. This was more obvious when I took the girls on their own without the 
boys, towards the end of the study period, and they had less reservations about speaking 
freely (ti46). Throughout all of my study I found instances o f  boys as well as girls 
arguing from impartialist and empathic perspectives and using both interchangeably. 
This was the case in discussing the Heinz dilemma when the children were in 3 rd class 
at age eight to nine and again in 6th class at age eleven to twelve. Both boys and girls 
sought inclusive solutions and were equally motivated by considerations o f care. While 
there were a few dissenters in 3rd class about whether Heinz should steal arguing that 
stealing is wrong, by the time they got to 6th class all were o f one mind that human life 
takes precedence over all other considerations: "Stealing is wrong but so is letting 
someone die ” (tr44). Heinz was in a double bind and did not have a realistic option: 
"The law isn ’t always right but i f  you let someone die th a t’s ju s t not right” (tr44). Most 
wanted a  satisfactory resolution for all concerned parties. On this issue my data concur 
with the findings o f Flanagan (1991) and Walker (1987). According to them, context is 
the crucial issue and most people use a mixture o f orientations, depending on the 
context.
The way the children dealt with the deportation issue was a case in point (tr47). In 
the early stages o f the dialogues which dealt with issues o f inclusiveness and racism 
examples of girls arguing from an impartialist perspective abounded. Evy contended 
that “I f  everybody from  all the countries...came to Ireland the population would be 
really large; there’d  be no places to build houses ...This country would be crowded” 
(tr47). Grace agreed, adding “I  think they should be deported because I  think soon most
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o f the population o f  Ireland will be like Nigeria or the Czech Rebublic” (tr47). Those 
who started out with impartial considerations, concerned with the influx o f asylum 
seekers and arguing for deportation of the two non-national families (one Nigerian and 
the other Romany from the Czech Republic) in our story, very soon changed their 
stance when the discussion focused on the baby in his m other’s arms (we had an 
enlarged photograph from The Irish Times) and argumentation veered towards empathic 
considerations: “I  disagree with myself... I  think they should be allowed stay” (tr47). 
This was true for both boys and girls. A willingness to modify one’s point of view in the 
light of the contributions and reflections o f others characterised the thinking of both 
boys and girls. It was listening with an openness to having one’s cherished beliefs 
challenged and possibly changed.
The girls initially were as critical of Travellers as boys were and did not consider the 
dire circumstances o f their living conditions. They were critical o f them for despoiling 
the environment: "Travellers should be told to tidy u p ” (tr36);
"You w ouldn’t mind i f  the Travellers kept it clean...but they d o n ’t ” (tr36).
This latter speaker changed her stance mid-way and argued that because o f the 
misdemeanours o f  some, all should not be tarred with the same brush: "You shouldn't 
judge Travellers by one Traveller” (tr36).
There were always children in the group who took account o f the particulars and 
challenged the thinking of the group. Stewart was wont to take a view at odds with the 
kind of universalism often attributed to Kant: "You have to consider the case. I t ’s not 
ju s t everybody has the same reason for staying" (tr47). One difference between the 
sexes was that boys frequently sought to back up their statements with scientific facts, 
often going off track in long details. Brendan regularly quoted statistics or hard facts to 
back up his statements. He was the realist in the group and had his own ideas on the 
race issue and its impact on the gene pool:
"Look at England. A while ago they were all white. Now you get a lot o f  them black or 
from  Pakistan or somewhere like that. It doesn’t really matter what you do. Eventually 
Ireland will be like that” (tr47). A year earlier in 5th class when Cian stated that black 
people who come in now would not be noticeable in a hundred years from now because 
“their son or daughter will have white skin because they will have got used to us" 
(tr35), Brendan again retorted with what he took to be the facts: “Black people d o n ’t 
turn into white people. For example, England, they started o f f  as black people. The 
black gene is a lot stronger than the white gene " (tr35).
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This preoccupation with a factual basis was a feature o f boys’ discussion from the 
beginning. In another typical example, back in the early days o f the study in 2nd class, 
discussing the times of Robin Hood, and outlaws being hanged if  they were caught, 
some boys were fascinated by the gruesome details: " I f somebody didn7 know you 
weren 7 allowed kill deers or anything then you ’d  get hanged up and that would be 
worse than ja il because i f  you get hanged by your head, your head could easily fa ll o ff  
by doing that. Or you could slip out o f  the rope and then you could easily bang on the 
floor"  (trl2). This was further elaborated upon: “People’s heads d on ’t fa ll o ff when 
they’re hanged. They just strangle... I f  you want heads to fa ll o f f  you have to..” (trl2). 
If there are gender differences, I’m inclined to think that this is one example. The girls 
in the class, and I too, hardly had the stomach for the gory details entertained by the 
boys.
Boys also tended to outdo each other in the telling o f anecdotes and I frequently had 
to intervene. Generally I encouraged them to keep anecdotes short and only tell one if it 
were directly relevant to the point in question. What was relevant however, was not 
always clear to them. In one instance in 4th class we were discussing the death penalty 
and I attempted to intervene when I felt that the dialogue was going in all directions and 
I did not see any point in all the details of the boys’ fantasies. I was stalled by Cian who 
reminded me: "We didn 7 get o ff  the point. I  mean we ’re getting into details o f  how his 
mind works " (tr26). This was a reprimand for me and a reminder that he knew where 
the discussion was heading whereas I did not. The boys were generally more assertive 
in stating their opinion and not afraid of a challenge. Later in the same dialogue, another 
boy backed up my point, aware o f the process of argumentation:
“We ‘ve got so much o ff the point like. We started with should he die or not. And it came 
to pouring a bucket o f  water on the computer and dress him as a plumber. What do they 
have in common? So, like, th a t’s completely o ff  the point. Who started that anyway”? 
(tr26). This is evidence o f someone taking charge of the discussion and not leaving it 
solely to the teacher to point out what was happening. The boys were generally more 
assertive in such instances. Allowing the children to take responsibility is in keeping 
with Lipman’s (1988) contention that the more skilfully children distinguish, connect 
and evaluate and question, the richer the totalities o f meaning they are able to extract 
from their experience.
From the age of about ten onwards as the girls got more self-conscious they got 
noticeably quieter and allowed the boys to dominate (I will deal with this in greater
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detail in Chapter Seven). Some were shy at different times. One girl’s best effort was to 
get as far as saying “I  agree with.. " and not give any reasons. She assured me when I 
spoke to her privately that she was happy in the group but could not speak when her 
turn came. When the others sometimes singled her out, urging her to contribute, she 
would get embarrassed and I had to intervene and stress the right to silence. Speakers 
needed listeners also. Looking at video footage of the group at age eight, and re-reading 
my journal, 1 noted that this same little girl could not slide off her chair and wriggle in 
amongst the others for a place on the floor during Cloud Time but waited on her chair 
until I would find a space for her. In spite of her reticence, I noticed towards the end of 
the study period that she was very popular with both male and female classmates.
5,6 Conclusion
This study o f the development in children’s thinking involved being close to them as a 
participant and facilitator, observing them move from egocentric thinking to real 
dialogue in a setting that over time seemed to move them towards openness and 
responsiveness. The interaction of the group helped all o f us to move out of our 
entrenched positions and take a risk, a step into the unknown. From egocentric 
beginnings with limited use of the language of reflection in 2nd class the children moved 
to more complex conceptions, formulating questions and discussing the broader issues 
of life. Thinking situations through, defining and classifying, following the argument 
where it led while still keeping the thread was an art learned in the practice. The 
scaffolding o f the more able pupils could be relied on most o f  the time as they sought to 
ground the argument. Somewhere beyond the mid-way point in a discussion, having 
Listened and reflected, someone would move beyond the personal and the specific to the 
general. N ot everyone learned the skills of argumentation but most contributed, often in 
the form of a personal anecdote that connected with personal experience. Frequently 
those anecdotes needed to be tamed as they dissipated the argument. A noticeable 
difference in interaction after about the age of ten was the girls’ seeming to take a lesser 
role and allowing the boys to dominate. A discussion with the girls on their own in the 
later stages o f the study revealed a competence to assert themselves and an ability to air 
their views with confidence. The explanation, as noted earlier (see 4.5.2) seems to lie in
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the problems girls encounter in a mixed group in early adolescence (Elkind & Weiner, 
1978) rather than any lack of ability to articulate their views,
Gains were evident over the course of this study but perhaps -  also some losses. The 
move from Mythic to Romantic understanding (Egan, 1988) entailed an increase of 
realism — but at the cost of a diminution of fantasy and the sense of wonder. The gains 
were reflected in the way the children dealt with an issue with increasing cognitive 
maturity, mastering the skills of competent interaction, spotting inconsistencies and 
contradictions, becoming clearer on what the core issue was and what the right course 
of action should be. My aim was that they would acquire a questioning disposition and 
take all considerations into account, seeing the comprehensive picture rather than 
jumping to conclusions.
Interacting on a personal level, agreeing and disagreeing and being challenged to 
defend one’s stance constituted a learning experience in itself, and helped one to reflect 
critically on one’s own views in light of the opinions o f others. It was a learning 
experience for me also in abandoning my role o f appearing to be all-knowing and 
instead sharing responsibility with the participants in the group, allowing them the 
freedom to challenge me or their class teacher. “If we want children to be responsible 
when they are adults, we should give them the proportionate responsibilities while they 
are children” (Lipman, 1988, p. 70). I hope that in this study I provide sufficient 
evidence to justify the claim that the community o f enquiry engendered such 
responsibility and a spirit of self-correction.
6  NOTIONS OF MORAL RECTITUDE
6.1 Introduction
In the last chapter I examined children’s thinking processes, how they form their views 
and the influence o f the interactive process on shaping those views. In this chapter I will 
extend the discussion, focusing more explicitly on a range o f substantive moral issues 
and moral reflection. I will examine notions of justice or fairness, moral obligation and 
responsibility, truth telling, theft and friendship, moral judgement, attitudes and values.
I shall look at how the children negotiate complex moral issues, coping with ambiguity 
and disagreement, clarifying their thoughts in the discussion process. This will entail 
examining how viewpoints on and ways o f dealing with different issues evolved with 
increasing competence with the discussion format and developing cognitive maturity. 
We shall see how the children were able to mobilise for themselves a moral vocabulary 
that helped them judge what the best course of action might be in various situations and 
how they bore out in their discussions Coles’ (1997, p. 121) contention that even from 
the age of eight children are capable of struggling with ethical questions. It is generally 
agreed in the literature review in the first part of this study that young children’s 
understanding o f justice is determined largely by those who occupy positions of 
authority in their lives such as parents and teachers and sometimes God. In this second 
part my aim is to show that as the children mature they internalise values and are 
capable o f deciding for themselves what is right and wrong, just and unjust. They go 
beyond the egocentric approach of the early years, as Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg 
(1981) maintain, and only around the age of ten does a real understanding and respect 
for authority generally manifest itself.
In this chapter I will look at children’s apprehensions and judgements in relation to 
core moral concepts, mainly those of rights and duties, freedom and responsibility, and 
virtue and vice. The discussions range over a broad spectrum of rights from human 
rights and children’s rights to animal rights. Rights imply responsibilities to each other, 
to the environment and all who share the planet with us. Duty and moral obligation 
figure largely, judging right and wrong and figuring out what is right when the solution 
is not obvious. Racism, capital punishment, bullying and peer pressure come up for 
discussion and concern the children whether by virtue o f being controversial at the time 
or because they impacted on their lives at some stage.
138
6.2 Notions of fairness
6.2.1 Fairness as equal distribution and fairness as equity
Our first discussion of fairness was in deciding whether the father in the Biblical story 
of The Prodigal Son was fair in his treatment o f his two sons, and the general consensus 
was that he was not because he had favoured one son over the other: ‘Tow have to treat 
people equally fo r  fairness” (tr 14). At age seven and eight the children commonly 
defined fairness as equal distribution, understanding it as the sharing of equal quantities, 
or the giving o f equal amounts. Some were unsure and shifted position as they discussed 
it further, bearing in mind the father’s compassion for his son in distress. They 
concluded that fairness implied doing the right thing for both his sons: "I think fairness 
is doing the right thing for both o f  them " (trl4). In the latter part o f this discussion, 
doing the right thing equated more with fair treatment than with the giving of equal 
amounts. This was fairness as equity, making allowances for particular situations, which 
became more evident in the children’s viewpoints as they matured and their thinking 
became more reflective and differentiated.
As we shall see in the following sub-sections, the children offered several meanings 
for fairness over the course of the study. They ranged from equal treatment of persons 
without discrimination, equal opportunities for all regardless o f colour or race, fair 
treatment o f animals, sharing responsibilities and duties equally and being fair and 
balanced in one’s judgement of others.
6.2.2 Fairness as equal treatment
Themes dealing with diversity and exclusion were chosen to examine the moral 
meaning o f different kinds of treatment o f others. How can we include those who are 
different? W hat does inclusion mean? Does skin colour make a difference? Should 
Travellers be treated differently to other people? Is it fair to deport the family o f an Irish 
citizen? In 2nd class we first discussed inclusiveness o f all those who are different or on 
the margins for whatever reason, and came back to the same themes in 5th class and 
again in 6th class. The language used in 2nd class was similar in some respects to that 
used in 6th class. The children argued for equal treatment on the basis o f common 
humanity using empathic reasoning: “You should treat everyone the same. No one is
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different; ju s t because they act different doesn’t mean you should treat them like that ” 
(tr 19); "Even i f  you've dark skin, y o u ’re still the same as everyone else” (tr 19);
‘‘You should treat everyone the same because everyone’s a human and everyone has 
feelings” (trl9). The emphasis on sameness could imply homogeneity and show 
insufficient sensitivity of and acknowledgement o f difference.
Such sensitivity was evident three years later when the children showed more 
awareness o f  difference (at this time there was a big influx o f  refugees and asylum 
seekers into Ireland and controversy about the issue in the media). One boy reasoned 
that if  immigration continued at its present rate, in the next ten years “most o f  the 
population o f  Ireland will be coloured" (tr47). My follow-up question to this “Could 
we live with several different colours in Ireland and still be Irish?” elicited the 
immediate response: "I think we could probably....even i f  we become coloured it 
wouldn’t be that big a deal" (tr47). These children would not have much direct 
experience o f contact with non-nationals and their views often reflected the attitudes of 
adults in their environment. One boy thought the solution lay in getting to know people, 
thus breaking down barriers: “I f  you d o n ’t like black people and they irritate you 
because they seem more foreign, then you should get to know them and make them have 
a good experience.... so they seem more Irish to you i f  your problem was they seem 
more foreign to y o u ”. This was the first time that a child implied that one’s prejudices, 
though acquired from outside may really be one’s own problem. Friendship transcends 
colour if  one gets to know people: “You have friends that might be black and you  
wouldn’t notice a thing i f  you really get to know them ” (tr35). It is interesting to note 
that the child who said this was echoing M acIntyre’s (2002) view that in coming to 
terms with prejudice and overcoming intolerance students should be encouraged to 
share together and engage in common tasks:
Where there are schools informed by the values o f some distinctive tradition, 
Catholic or Protestant or Orthodox, Jewish or Islamic or Hindu, it is of crucial 
importance that their students participate in activities shared with all those with 
whom they are least likely to be in sympathy (MacIntyre, 2002, pp. 18-19).
A similar view is put forward by Holmes who, on a study of race relations among 
young children, found that racial prejudice is a learned concept: young children accept 
others at face value and only adopt the attitudes and prejudices of others in their 
environment as they get older. She contends that by teaching children about the
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commonalities human beings share, they can learn to appreciate the differences among 
us (Holmes, 1997, pp. 108-109).
In the final dialogue in the study (tr47) the children examined their own thinking and 
proneness to stereotyping. It was noticeable that their thinking oscillated between 
empathy with Travellers and outright condemnation. One boy reminded the group that 
all human beings shared common anatomical features, regardless of race: "There’s 
really only one difference between a white person and a black person, their skin colour. 
Everyone has two feet, ten fingers, a brain, two eyes” (tr47). Yet this same boy would 
not show similar consideration towards the Travellers whom he emphatically 
condemned throughout, partly because of the constant theft o f his father’s tools, a theft 
which he attributed to Travellers. Matthews contends that a very young child will not be 
able to empathise with a victim of racial discrimination because o f limited experience 
and understanding but “in general we may hope to advance along the scale of moral 
imagination as we grow older and our experience of life becomes broader and deeper” 
(Matthews, 1994, p. 65). The children in this study were by now, at age twelve, aware 
of racism in the form of name-calling, avoidance o f contact, and a conception in some 
quarters that people of colour were somehow inferior. While they could be more 
sympathetic to the plight of refugees with whom they had little direct experience, they 
were less so towards the Travellers whom they associated with “rubbish”, “trash”, 
“litter”, “robbing”, “stealing”, and many seemed to have personal anecdotes to back 
up their prejudices: “Some Travellers are bad....most o f  them are bad....nearly four  
times a year my dad gets robbed o f  tools fo r  his business ” (tr36).
On the other hand, others were alert to stereotyping o f the Travellers, imputing to 
their whole community the misdemeanours o f some: "I t ’s like racism because some 
black people might be good and some black people might be bad, and some white 
people can be good. And i t ’s like Travellers. Some Travellers can be good” (tr36). 
Despite this alertness however, it was still apparent that no child listed a good quality or 
gave an example o f one. Afterwards on reading the transcript I wondered if any of them 
had ever spoken to a Traveller; no Traveller children had ever attended their school. 
Barry had a warning for the group on how they make judgements: “Judging Travellers 
is still like racism because racism is judging people that are different to you ” (tr36). 
There was criticism of the implication that Travellers are not normal people: “You can 7 
say Travellers are different to normal people because they are normal” and this 
provoked the response “ I f  Travellers were normal people we w ouldn’t be talking about
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them because it wouldn’t be such a big issue” (tr36). A degree o f  sensitivity in the 
group as to how we referred to people on the margins was apparent. One boy, in 
referring to the Travellers as “it”, provoked immediate indignation because o f the 
dehumanisation that it entailed: "You called the Traveller ‘i t ’. I ’m ju s t saying Travellers 
are people ” (tr36).
Since many children’s views of the Travellers seemed to be negative and based on 
prejudice I decided to show them a taped version o f a television programme Young 
Pavee Voices. In this programme they would be exposed to another point of view, that 
of Martin Collins, a twelve-year-old Traveller child who guided us round his halting 
site, explaining the customs and way of life of his people and pointing out the 
deprivations and lack of basic facilities. Having listened to the Traveller child’s point of 
view, some children realised that equal treatment meant the provision of proper 
facilities for all. They were clearly moved and empathised with the boy and what he had 
to endure -  the first time that I had seen evidence of such empathy with a Traveller. 
They began to think that there was no point in condemning people for a dirty 
environment if  they were devoid of proper facilities: "I think i f  people put like bins 
around the halting site and toilets with taps with fresh water, the halting site wouldn't 
be in a m ess"  (tr37). (Halting sites are built by the state with provision for parking of 
Travellers’ caravans.)
With an emergence of political consciousness the children were now becoming 
critical o f the existing social order and questioned its moral underpinnings. The 
government came in for criticism on the matter "It is kind o f  the governm ent’s fau lt for  
not like providing them with a toilet’’ (tr37) and "The government would think that 
roads are more important than people’s lives" (tr37). Some were aware o f hypocrisy in 
this regard since what we condemned in the Travellers could be equally attributed to 
ourselves: "Some o f  us do litter as well" (tr36). The question o f where responsibility 
might lie became a concern and some children saw the unfairness o f  the treatment 
meted out to Travellers. Yet, no one commented on how Travellers might fee l -  
although the young Traveller women themselves (in the video) commented on how 
hurtful it was to be turned away from a pub. However, one girl in the class drew 
attention both to stereotyping and inconsistency in the social attitudes to them, saying 
that if  some Travellers caused a fight in a pub all Travellers weren’t allowed in the next 
week whereas settled people have fights all the time and they are allowed in. At the core
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of stereotyping, expressed in the unwarranted use of all, the fact that there are some 
whom this generalisation does not fit is enough to expose it as a stereotype.
In this discussion six of the girls declined to make any comment and passed on every 
round, not feeling in any way disposed to make a contribution. Boys were more taken 
with the practicalities -  how the government could put in portable toilets, the cost o f 
building a sewage system -  than with reflection on their plight. John noted in the video 
that the young Traveller girls, wearing large ear hoops, could afford expensive jewellery 
when they should be saving for an education and he did not seem to be sympathetic 
towards them. (In fact, on my reviewing the video footage, they seemed be wearing 
only cheap earrings and bangles.)
Some children claimed that if  fairness meant equal treatment, the media were biased: 
“I f  black people beat up a white person, it'll be all in the newspaper, but say a white 
person fought, it wouldn't be on the news because they’re in their own country” (tr35). 
The clas s teacher introduced a new element into the discussion -  round the question as 
to whether racism might be motivated by feelings o f fear and of being threatened by 
those who were made the objects of prejudice: "Should we be afraid o f  them? Are they 
a threat to us?"  (tr35). This line of enquiry however was one that the children did not 
pursue. Perhaps such psychological analysis o f motives was not yet within their 
compass. Despite this disinclination for a psychological examination the children did 
show evidence o f the kind of moral sentiments stressed, for example, by Pritchard. At 
the core o f  such sentiments is the conviction that others are entitled to fair treatment, 
having due regard for their dignity and worthiness o f respect. With increasing 
understanding a child can extend considerations of fairness to victims o f injustice and 
unknown others. Reason alone, Pritchard claims, will not achieve this because without 
moral sentiment reason will not come down decisively in favour o f morality (Pritchard, 
1991, p, 246).
6.2.3 Fairness as retributive justice
An advance in thinking in our dialogues was marked when someone not only took note 
of others’ opinions but shifted position on reflection. Such was the case when we 
discussed retributive justice which entails making retribution for wrong doing or paying 
in some way for crimes committed. The children, now in 4th class aged nine to ten, 
believed in the justice of punishment for evildoing, but not many would go so far as to
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support the death penalty. According to Piaget, to study the notion o f justice one must 
analyse children’s ideas about punishments. In his view very young children are unable 
simultaneously to take into account their own view of things and the perspective of 
someone else. The sense of justice is developed in the child through mutual respect and 
co-operation among children themselves (Piaget, 1932, p. 196). We discussed the death 
penalty and whether it was right or wrong in considering the case o f the Oklahoma 
bomber, Timothy McVeigh, who was sentenced to death around this time. There was 
much coverage of the story in the media and the children were aware o f the stark reality 
of his execution: “He was staring up at the ceiling executed" (tr2 6); “They’ve put him 
down like a puppy” (tr26). Initially many children thought he should have died because 
of the enormity o f his crime: "He probably should have died because he shouldn’t have 
killed all those people”-, “He probably should have died. A t least he had a nice death. 
Those people d idn’t ” (tr26). Piaget’s findings are that young children judge moral 
situations according to the damage done whereas when they are older they take the 
intention of the person into account. Moral realism dominated some children’s thinking 
initially, the belief in immanent justice and that punishment should fit the crime (Piaget, 
1932, p. 36). In the course of discussion this kind of thinking gave way to other 
considerations. Life-sentence in jail was considered a more appropriate punishment; the 
possibility was entertained by several children that the killer might feel shame and 
remorse.
The group dissected and examined various ideas, looking at ourselves as we hold 
someone’s life in our hands. In spite of a lot of interruptions from outside during the 
discussion, the boys engaged greatly with the topic but few o f the girls contributed 
much (a more detailed discussion of gender will be given in the next chapter). Some of 
the children disagreed with the death penalty because that would only add to the death 
toll. Donald thought McVeigh only meant to blow up the building and he didn’t mean to 
kill all those people: “It was in a mental moment o f  his life” (tr26). He later added that 
it was “only 168 people and i t ’s not that m uch” (tr26). Some thought McVeigh was 
ruthless in the manner in which he chose to attack the government. In attacking a 
government building he showed scant regard for the lives therein: “Their lives aren’t 
worthless or anything” (tr26). Others thought he escaped too lightly and that life in 
prison would have been more painful. It would also have given him the chance to reflect 
and repent: “They shouldn’t have killed him because....he’d  have more time to think 
about what he ’d  done in prison. They shouldn't have killed him because that makes
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them murderers’’ (tr26). Barry changed from his original stance on reflection: "They’re 
doing the same to him as he done to everyone else ” (tr26). Brendan who earlier thought 
he deserved to die was now ambiguous: “It's ju s t like killing another person. He kinda 
should've died but he kinda shouldn’t have died. I  can’t say really" (tr26). Who among 
us can judge? Can one ever be sure who deserves to die? Bill considered that they are 
“all wrong” and asked: "How do you know h e ’s responsible?" (tr26). The words 
"pain" and “guilt"  came up frequently. Kathleen thought "he deserved to die but it 
wasn t really fa ir  to kill him ” (tr26).
The dilemma for the children was in deciding whether anyone forfeited the right to 
life because o f their crimes. The age-old question came up in regard to the death 
penalty. What if  you have got the wrong man? What if  McVeigh is innocent? One 
cannot redress the balance after death and there is the voice o f  conscience to contend 
with. This was going through Stewart’s mind as he reflected: "I  don Y know how a
person who actually killed him with a needle could kinda live with it  I  couldn't live
by killing somebody and then I  found out that he shouldn Y have died. I  couldn Y live like 
that" (tr26). For anyone who entertains doubts about children’s moral sense surely these 
sentiments from a ten-year old boy display an integrated moral personality and a strong 
moral conscience and are proof of the commitment and bindingness of morality.
This discussion paved the way for examining further the issue of rights. The children 
had done some class work on human rights and had some poster displays advocating 
human rights in the school corridors.
6.3 Rights, duties and responsibilities
6.3.1 Children’s rights
I first discussed children’s rights with my study group when they were in 5th class (age 
10-11). The children were conscious of the discrepancy between adult rights and 
children’s rights. What they saw to be the case was that adults had more rights and some 
reasoned that this is so because adults are in a position to know what is best: "You don Y 
have the same rights really because they know w hat’s best fo r  you ” (tr24). Others were 
critical of the power enjoyed by adults because they sometimes got it wrong; it was the 
adult’s opinion that counted "even i f  they’re wrong" (tr24). They used words such as
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“unfair” and “control". There were dissenters who understood the parents’ point of 
view and implied that children would not be able to handle certain rights: "I don’t think 
we should have the same rights as adults because i f  we 're let do certain things w e’d  just 
grow up bad” (tr24). Barry thought that having an opinion mattered: “We need an 
opinion on everything" (tr24). Would equal rights with adults mean an end to 
childhood and more responsibility? Caoimhe and Jane thought so: “I f  we did have the 
same rights as adults we wouldn 7 be children. We wouldn 7 be able to do skipping and 
stu ff like that” (tr24); “We wouldn’t be able to play; it would be hard work" (tr24). This 
resonates with the views of Purdy (in Matthews, 1994, p. 73) who suggests that equal 
rights would consign many children to the workplace at an early age where without 
education they would be condemned to the most menial tasks.
thOne year later in 6 class we took a more critical view o f children’s rights and 
discussed the articles in the UN Convention on The Rights of the Child. Whilst 
recognising their need for guidance, care and protection, the Convention stresses the 
importance o f nurturing children’s evolving capacities to take responsibility and so 
develop into active, participating citizens. Matthews suggests that society is moving 
slowly in the direction of assigning more rights to children at a younger age. He 
contends that children should have rights that they do not now enjoy and have them at 
an earlier age (Matthews, 1994, pp. 79-80). Before the discussion on the issue of rights 
began I asked the class teacher to get the children to read all articles o f the UN 
Convention in turn and they each had a copy to take home and decide which were most 
important to them at their present age. In their early contributions the children cited the 
right to life, to protection in times of war, freedom from sexual abuse, and the right to 
be protected from dangerous drugs as being important to them. Several children alluded 
to the right to freedom from sexual abuse: “I f  y o u ’re sexually abused you don’t even 
have a life...the people that have child pornography.... th e y ’re sick, evil" (tr45). I 
wondered how much they actually knew about child pornography. In a world where 
children needed to be protected by being aware of the dangers, they understood their 
parents’ concerns -  concerns which they nonetheless saw as exerting a price -  the price 
of trust and openness: “Your parents worry about you and anything happening. 
Nowadays when someone asks fo r  directions you can barely even trust them without 
wondering about being abducted” (tr45).
As the discussion progressed, Article Twelve, the right to an opinion and to be taken 
seriously, seemed to have a more immediate impact on their lives at this time. Barry
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homed in on the content of the article and was quick to see that this article was a formal 
statement o f his own words a year previously: “We need an opinion on everything" 
(tr24). Many other children concurred adding that adults often do not listen to children.
“Not many adults listen to children and i f  they have a good idea or an opinion they just 
think they got it from  somewhere else " (tr45). Here they might be seen as confirming 
Cohen’s claim in his Equal Rights for Children that children are assumed to be “weak, 
passive, mindless and unthinking” while adults are assumed to be “rational, highly 
motivated and efficient” (Cohen, 1980, p. 45).
Some children pointed out that having rights enshrined in a convention did not mean 
that everybody would either know about them or respect them. Sally contended that 
“even though there 's all these rights, a lot o f  people don Y care. A lot o f  people break 
them because they’re not really concerned" (tr45). It was important to children at this 
age, most now twelve, to have a voice and they were beginning to have a greater 
understanding of the machinery o f government and politics and the part that they 
themselves could play in the scheme of things. Fred argued for the right to vote but 
Stewart who always weighed the pros and cons disagreed: “People are saying that they
want to be able to vote with some children it would be a popularity thing. They’d  ask
who's the most popular person in the school... and then they’d  all vote fo r  that person” 
(tr45). Some children noticed that in this, children would not differ greatly from adults 
who often vote on the basis of the candidate’s personality rather than on his or her 
views. Ai sling agreed because “i f  children could vote most o f  them wouldn’t really 
understand anything to do with politics" (tr45). While agreeing with Aisling on this 
matter, Brendan nevertheless asserted the right to freedom o f speech: “We should have 
the freedom to say what we think” (tr45).
At the end of the discussion some children were aware of the importance o f children 
knowing their rights. Cian, asserting the right to information, suggested that rights 
should be explained to children so that they then could have an opinion: “Children in 
school have a right to know about these rights” (tr45). Barry concluded that the 
children in this class would be the only ones in the school who would know about 
children’s rights: “Children don’t know the basic ones ...hardly anyone knows about 
them" (tr45). This enthusiasm was tempered by a realisation that this might be mere 
tokenism; after the session when they were putting back the chairs and reorganising the 
classroom I overheard Stewart’s wry comment: "Fat lot o f  good., us going home with
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‘rights ’ under our arms " (a reference to his rolled up copy o f the UN Convention on 
Children’s Rights which he carried under his arm to this session).
If  knowledge is empowerment many children were conscious o f  the need to make all 
children aware o f their basic human rights. The National Children’s Strategy 
(Government o f Ireland, 2000, p. 30) has the stated aim of giving children “a voice in 
matters which affect them and to ensure that their views are given due weight in 
accordance with their age and maturity” . It recognises that giving children a voice is 
society’s way of showing that it values and appreciates them; giving children a voice 
has also a part to play in helping to protect them from abuse. It is also saying that this is 
important for civic education and for active participation in a healthy democracy.
6.3.2 Animal rights
Moral sensitivity, it might be agreed, includes an awareness o f the need to respect the 
lives of all who share the planet with us, including animals. Accordingly, we discussed 
when the children were in 4th class the morality o f  doing experiments on animals, 
whether for cosmetic or medicinal purposes, and took up the issue o f animal rights 
again at the end o f 5th class. It was note-worthy that many o f the children in this study 
echoed exactly what Lipman had to say about American children: that they share a 
sense of kinship with animals and are horrified at our hunting and slaughtering, our 
needless experimentation, and other reckless ways in which we have caused damage 
through carelessness, in some instances causing species to become extinct that could 
have been preserved (Lipman, 1988, p. 74). The language the children used: “notfair", 
“disgraceful’’, “ashamed”, “shouldn’t”, reflected their moral outrage: “I  wouldn't buy 
medicine i f  it was tested on animals ” (tr23); " it’s not fa ir  because animals could get 
extinct" (tr23). In the children’s reckoning, animals did not have a voice: “They don't 
get a right to say that they don’t want it done to them ” (tr23).
Distinctions were made in deciding whether insects or animals that are “stupid" 
counted. Our culture values rational capability but the children did not approve of using 
“stupid’’ animals for experimentation, according them the same right to life as others. 
The children empathised in their own way: “I  wish there were other kinds o f  creatures 
in this land they could use ” (tr23). They exonerated rats also even if they were vermin 
because it was in their nature to act as they did: “That’s the way they were m ade" 
(tr23). What categories of beings counted as having rights? In the children’s moral
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thinking about animals, the fact that they were living was enough: ‘‘They're still living 
and they're still creatures" (tr23). Kenneth put himself in the animal’s position and 
spoke for it: ‘‘I ’m too smart to d ie” (tr23). The language they used was morally 
charged; the word “cruel" was used frequently. Conducting experiments on apes 
touched them closely because they were our near cousins: “We 're h a lf ape and human. 
It's not fa ir  to kill apes because we 're half apes " (tr23).
A defence o f killing animals in awareness of our need for meat was refuted: " We 
could survive without eating meat. When you go to MacDonalds you 're getting to kill 
animals fo r  your own enjoyment ” (tr23). A boy who earlier declared that he would give 
his life to save an animal: “I  would give my life to save an anim al’’ (tr23) had qualms of 
conscience towards the end of the discussion: “I  hate eating meat but at least I ’m not 
cruel. I'm  addicted to it"  (tr23). Perhaps what he intended to communicate here was 
that he hated the killing o f the animal but he loved eating the meat.
Some children put animal and human rights on an equal footing: “I  think animals 
should get treated the exact same as humans" (tr23). One year later when we were 
discussing the issue of blood sports, the general thinking was the same, with a pervasive 
feeling that there was a general lack of empathy with animals: “A lot o f  people d on ’t 
know how animals fe e l"  (tr41). Some made a distinction between killing for fun and 
killing for food. Fishing combined both and presented a challenge, which prompted 
Kenneth to condemn it: “I t ’s not right to kill fish  fo r  fun, killing creatures or anything 
else" (tr41). A few children equated killing an animal w ith murder. Brendan was 
prepared to go further and to consider making a commitment to refrain from eating 
animal meat: “I  think killing an animal is murder. It's  ju s t the same as killing a human 
and I ’m thinking o f  becoming a vegetarian" (tr41). Fiachra argued that we live much 
longer than lots of other animals and saw no case for shortening further the relatively 
short life they have.
When it came to killing animals in blood sports such as fox-hunting and greyhound 
racing, Con raised an important question a couple of times in the discussion. He asked 
whether our right to have fun was greater than the animal’s right to life and whether we 
were more important (tr41). This point was taken up by Cian who asserted that being 
smarter did not automatically make us superior. He came back to this point in a later 
discussion on the environment: “I ’d like to pose a question. Is it really worth killing 
tons and tons o f  animals with toxic waste ju s t so we can do something better? Is it really 
worth it? " (tr42).
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In the community o f enquiry the children were struggling to evaluate morally, testing 
out the boundaries and juggling with issues that border on the moral. It is interesting to 
note that points raised by the children in this discussion chime with positions taken by 
the Animal Liberation Movement. In recent years these positions have been strongly 
articulated in philosophical ethics. Mankind’s superiority or ‘speciesism’ in its 
privileging o f rational consciousness is challenged. Singer argues that there is no 
unbridgeable gulf between humans and animals but rather an overlap. He decries the 
notion that autonomous, self-conscious beings are in some way more valuable and more 
morally significant than other animals that live from moment to moment. Non-human 
animals endure suffering and pain in our treatment o f them for our own ends and our 
concern for their suffering should not depend on how rational or self-aware they might 
be (Singer, 1995, p. 182).
Some philosophers, in other respects at odds with Singer, argue that the same 
exclusive focus on the human capacity for reason also adversely affects how we view 
people with profound disabilities. On this question of privileging rationality, Kittay, for 
example, contends that dignity should be accorded on the basis that we are all “some 
mother’s child” and worthy of being loved and cared for. Indeed, it is because of and 
not in spite o f  this very fragility and vulnerability that one is deserving of consideration 
and priority (Kittay, 1999, p. 166).
6.3.3 Freedom and responsibility
In discussing freedom, the children sought to find their own pathway amid the 
centrifugal forces that pulled them in various directions. As they got older their 
definitions got more refined and they could digest Ideas and reflect on an issue more 
fully, being challenged to think and re-evaluate. In one of our earlier discussions in 2nd 
class at age seven and eight one might argue that freedom had not quite crystallised as a 
concept. The predominant belief was that freedom was about making the right choices, 
more in line with freedom to do as one ought rather than as one wished: "We're only 
free to go where w e ’re allowed. 1 think we sort o f  have freed o m ” (tr3). Their sense of 
obedience dictated clear limits. Freedom to do as one wished might not be in one’s own 
best interests: ‘‘Sometimes you get carried away by freedom and once you do that you  
forget about rules and do whatever you like ” (tr3). Three and a half years later in 5th 
class, similar sentiments were echoed. Many felt that they had "enough” freedom.
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One’s freedom was not unlimited and was curtailed by one’s obligations, as Sally 
succinctly expressed it: “I f  you want freedom you have to be responsible” (tr38). 
Children live in a world o f competing values and morals, with family, school and 
church on the one hand, and peers and the wider environment on the other. With 
different sets o f values and constant pull away from a consistent centre, Taylor (1991, 
p. 27) asks how an individual can have freedom and not be fragmented. He suggests that 
salvation lies in recovering “authentic moral contact with ourselves” . Lipman (1991) 
echoes these sentiments and he sees the solution in helping as many people as possible 
to think as well as possible.
In 5th class some children argued for more freedom from restriction and supervision, 
being able to do what one wanted without constant adult supervision, freedom to play 
more and watch television and do less homework: “Eleven-year-olds should be allowed 
to watch TV, up late and everything”; “You really ca n ’t have supervised fun  i f  you're
out with your friends  You can’t have your mum follow ing you around to see what
y o u ’re doing” (tr38). Then there was a deepening understanding o f freedom, moving 
from preoccupation with play at first to freedom to make decisions. Saoirse, one of the 
more articulate girls, concluded: “I  think freedom is making your own decisions. Our 
parents have to make our decisions fo r  us.... adults do have a lot more freedom because 
they get to make their own decisions and our decisions as w ell” (tr38). The view here 
seemed to be that self-determination is at the core o f autonomy and children’s 
dependence curtails this. There was recognition that adults have power over children but 
that children do not have much of it. One boy pointed out that parents could take away 
some o f one’s freedom if  one abused it yet no one could take their freedom away from 
them. There was the implication o f naked power and that freedom and the capacity to be 
responsible were not necessarily synonymous: ".Adults get themselves drunk and do all 
stu ff like this but there’s no one to take their freedom away from  them ” (tr38). Liam 
thought the idea o f parents having unlimited freedom was unfounded because their 
responsibilities bind them. They were not free to do as they pleased: “I  think I  get more 
freedom than my mom would. She can’t just sail all over the place going out...she irons 
clothes and does m eals” (tr38). Cian later refuted this in his assertion that parents had a 
choice. They could decide to be irresponsible if they so wished: “Parents have a 
choice....you d o n ’t really have to...you could ju st be irresponsible and do no work 
whatsoever, not care what children d id” (tr38).
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This discussion allowed for reflection on several key moral issues -  freedom, 
responsibility and obligation. Collaborative reflection led some children to speculate on 
the psychological motivations of parents and for evaluating their reasons for acting as 
they do. Aisling had her own ideas on what motivates parents. She reckoned that 
parents could be strict because their parents were not and they wanted to act differently 
with their children. Conversely, she held that if  parents wanted their children to enjoy 
more freedom it was because their parents were too strict with them when they were 
children: “I f  your parents are really strict i t ’s probably because their parents weren Y 
I f  they didn Y have to go to school or anything to learn they’d  make their children go to 
school so that they wouldn't be like them. I f  their parents were really strict they’d  let 
their children have more freedom because they w ouldn’t want them to have a childhood 
like they d id ” (tr38).
Brendan made a qualification: “It really depends on how responsible the person 
y o u ’re talking about is” (tr38). The restrictions o f parents were understood but with 
reservations. It was understood that many of the rules parents imposed were in the 
interests o f safety. Many agreed that parents could be too protective: “My Da, h e ’s too 
protective. I  like him sticking up for us and all but he sticks up fo r  us too much ” (tr38). 
On the other hand there was a strong sense in the group that too much freedom was not 
desirable, and that certain parameters were necessary. The tensions here were between 
protection and empowerment. A few children mentioned not wanting freedom to “go 
w ild” or having so much freedom that “we wouldn’t go to school"  (tr38). There was the 
very real fear o f not being able to handle freedom: “ifyou  get too much freedom y o u ’re 
going to get bad” (tr38). Jane was aware of and inclined to reject limitations to one’s 
own initiative when one is not allowed to face the negative consequences even if  one 
reckoned one could handle them. She wanted the freedom to watch a movie and risk 
having nightmares: “I f  I ’m scared, I ’m scared but it doesn’t matter. I ’ll have 
nightmares. I  don Y care and they just say 'no, no, n o ”’ (tr38).
Half-way through the discussion Evy changed stance, having earlier asserted that 
children had “enough” freedom and now qualified her statement: “I  take back what I  
said last time. We do need a little bit more freedom but we need our parents to protect
us as well i f  people were bullying you and hitting you, do you wish you were with
Mum and D ad?” (tr38). There was a high degree o f reflection in this discussion: some 
children showed an ability to interpret their parents motives, and the effect o f parents’ 
own childhood on them, bringing a kind of psychological explanation to the motives of
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their parents and then went on to decide whether this was good for them as children. 
This same kind of discussion takes place among adults -  balancing paternalism and 
autonomy; protecting children has to be balanced by respecting their need for 
autonomy. Morgan contends that an overriding concern about safety can limit the 
possibility o f children to experience feelings like failure, sadness and disappointment. 
His claim is that the growth of feelings o f self-efficacy means learning to cope with 
failure rather than trying to avoid it (Morgan, 2002, p. 117).
The emerging autonomy of the 11-12 year old is threatened by the insistence of 
parents, in their child’s best interests, that he or she think in a certain way and follow a 
particular course of action. Can children handle freedom? The findings of Ruck, 
Ambramovitch and Keating (1998, p. 414) suggest that by 12 years of age there are 
some things such as privacy, to which they are entitled. They make the case that young 
children are more likely to view their entitlement to certain nurturance and self- 
determination rights as related to their age whereas older children seem to be aware of 
the universal nature of various rights. Brendan thought that "you ca n ’t really have 
supervised fu n  when you 're out with your friends. You don't want your parents to follow  
you round to see what y o u ’re doing“ (tr38). Another boy expressed the fears and need 
for autonomy that confronted the emerging adolescent, seeking assertion of a new sense 
of self: "7 think that we want to make more choices than our parents make for us 
because we ’re scared that our parents will mould our character because they make our 
decisions fo r  us. So we won ’( be able to make ourselves into the person we want to be 
and w e ’ll be the person they want us to b e” (tr38). This struggle for self-preservation 
has echoes in Nietzsche: “The snake that cannot cast his skin perishes. So it is too with 
those minds which are prevented from changing their views: they cease to be minds” 
(Nietzsche in Lavrin, 1971, p. 35).
This kind o f reasoning marks a new level o f consciousness in the early adolescent. 
Damon & Hart refer to this phase of early adolescence as the “differentiation phase”, 
characterised by the child trying for psychological independence from parents and a 
push towards the peer group (Damon & Hart, 1988, p. 311). According to Elkind & 
Weiner, this phase o f formal operational thinking means they are now able to reflect 
upon and conceptualise their thoughts and thought processes. They can reflect on their 
own thinking. While very young children live in the here and now, the early adolescent 
is able not only to understand things as they are now but he or she can reflect on what is 
happening and see the bigger picture, the narrative unity. My study shows that there is
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not just cognitive development but there is heightened moral awareness and a strong 
moral thrust.
Children, as we can see in this study show a sophisticated understanding of what 
parents and policy makers are talking about and this great level o f reflective awareness 
calls for recognition. The National Children’s Strategy (Government of Ireland, 2000, 
p.30) recommends that children be given greater freedom and responsibility in relation 
to decisions about their daily lives as they grow older. In this way they will feel valued 
and appreciated. This does not mean passing responsibility for decisions and their 
consequences on to children, but it does imply children having an active part and their 
views being respected.
6.3.4 Responsibility for the environment
Much work had been done with the children’s class teacher regarding care o f the 
environment and the children felt strongly about environmental issues. I chose two 
poems by Brian Patten, The R iver’s Story and The Newcomer as the triggers for a 
discussion on responsibility for the environment. There was a general feeling in the 
group that people were indifferent and took everything in nature for granted: People 
don’t care about the environment until something happens. When something does 
happen i t ’s going to be too late " (tr42). They were aware that they have a part to play in 
causing pollution and in making a collective effort to be responsible: "We should try to 
stop pollution because it is kind o f  our responsibility. People are cutting down trees and 
th a t’s fu s t wrong. We need good air. We can't live in bad air, breathing it in ” (tr42). 
The part played by factories in causing emissions that pollute the atmosphere and cause 
acid rain was discussed. One child’s solution was that the factories that caused air 
pollution should be paid less money as a disincentive: “They should try and give the 
plants and factories that do all the pollution less m oney” (tr42). Liam suggested that if 
there were no factories, hospitals would not have vital life-saving machinery. Fred 
agreed but added that factories did not have to pollute: "With factories you can fix  the 
air where i t ’s not like harmful” (tr42).
The responsibility did not lie solely with factories; we played a big part polluting the 
environment. Several pupils suggested that throwing litter on the ground and dumping 
waste in rivers was something that could be controlled if people had the will to do so: 
“People should stop putting all that litter on the ground, dumping waste and all in
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rivers because we're ju s t making the environment really bad” (tr42). Brendan thought 
people dump for immediate selfish gain without due concern for the welfare of future 
generations: "Some people just dump in s tu ff because they think i t ’s not going to do
anything in their life  I f  you dump it i t ’s  fa r  away It w on’t bother them but it will
bother someone that they're related to a few  hundred years la ter” (tr42). Barry 
contended that "They should have stopped those plastic bags fo r  years” (tr42). Jane 
agreed and suggested that getting rid of plastic bags was only the first step (the 
reference here is to the government tax on plastic bags); we now had to go further and 
get rid o f  waste. The children’s views resonated with those o f Singer who suggests that 
we should see our responsibility as looking after all living things and not regard it as a 
God-given right that humans should have dominion over nature, doing what they will 
with other living things (Singer, 1993, p. 266).
The hypocrisy o f politicians was alluded to insofar as election promises were 
concerned. This discussion took place after an election and posters were to be seen 
everywhere long after polling day. One child was critical of the aspiring candidates who 
"are saying th ey’re going to make the world cleaner ....all the posters and leaflets and  
everything that they used fo r  the election, they ‘d  be using loads more paper than they 
should. Are they going to recycle them?” (tr42). Aisling alluded to the fact that concern 
about jobs was very short sighted because ultimately the future o f the whole 
environment was threatened: " I f they keep polluting no one will be able to live on it 
anymore” (tr42). Towards the end of 5th class they had enough political consciousness 
to realise the value of people power and pressure. Sellafield nuclear plant in Cumbria 
was seen as the biggest environmental threat to Ireland. One child suggested exerting 
pressure to have it closed down: "I think we have to pu t pressure on them. People 
should never stop and they’ll get so annoyed that they’ll ju s t do i t” (tr42). Our trust in 
the future has lost its innocence when a terrorist attack on the Sellafield plant or even 
the direction o f the wind in the case of release o f radiation could end all our lives: 
"When that thing explodes w e’ll all die, everyone in Ireland”; " I f  the wind blows the 
wrong way Ireland will never be habitable again because o f  Sellafield. So like, we will 
all die ” (tr42).
The thrust o f this discussion seems to confirm Damon’s contention that the awakening 
political awareness of the early adolescent makes possible political and civic 
participation. They have a clearer understanding of linkage and how imperfections in 
the system can impact on one’s life and environment and vice versa. They now know
155
that one can make choices about whom and what issues to support and become more 
concerned with contributing to the welfare of others (Damon, 1983, pp. 293-296).
6.3.5 Duty and moral obligation
Children’s sense o f responsibility in relation to the environment was only one facet of a 
broader issue that was of interest to me in this study. I also wanted to investigate their 
more generic understanding of obligation and duty. In discussing this key moral issue 
many of Cam’s (1997) stories proved very helpful. One o f these was Robert’s Story, it 
concerned a handicapped boy named Robert who attended a special school for the 
disabled and who was continually bullied on the station platform as he went to and from 
school. While running away from the bullies he fell and broke his leg. During all this 
time the station guard, whose duty it was to issue and check tickets, did nothing to 
intervene. The children questioned whether he had failed in his duty to Robert and 
whether we all had a duty to help one another. The feeling in the group was that the 
ticket collector was doing his duty as defined by his employers but he was failing in his 
duty as a human being. Being a moral agent involved one in complex choices and 
morality came into view when these choices had to be made. The discussion centred 
round what the ticket collector actually did, his capacity for action -  what he could have 
done, and what he should have done -  his moral obligation. One child put it succinctly: 
“He was doing his duty as his job  but not his duty as a person ” (tr34). Some thought he 
had a duty to intervene to stop the bullying: “He should have helped him whether he 
gets pa id  or n o t” (tr34). Another thought he could have helped but adding that this was 
not his duty: “He should've helped him but it wasn 't his du ty” (tr34).
It was suggested that he was not a bodyguard and was just a person who sold tickets 
and could not risk his position by leaving the ticket desk to run down the platform and 
stop the bullying. That, according to some, was unacceptable: “I  would risk losing my 
job  i f  it would help someone ” (tr34). There was a reminder from one child to remember 
the purpose o f life in the first place: “God gave us life to work together and help one 
another, so you should work on that” (tr34). Barry concluded that "it is kind o f  the 
principle” (tr34). In Robert’s case his handicap made him vulnerable and deserving of 
protection. One was motivated by the rightness o f an action. One helped others on 
principle; one went beyond the call of duty, considering the good of others. This was 
what helped avoid bystander behaviour. One child asserted that someone had to take a
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stand: “It might never stop i f  no-one sticks up fo r  h im ” (tr34). Hoffman (1976) 
maintains that there is a link between empathy and altruism and research would suggest 
that the greater a student’s capacity for empathy, the less chance there is o f that student 
becoming a bystander.
How we treat others or mistreat them in the case o f bullying was something the 
children felt strongly about. In the two discussions (tr33 and tr34) which concerned 
bullying they were able to get into the mind of the bully and could see many forms of 
bullying, picking on those who were in some way different. Many were aware o f the 
bully’s reasons: to assert power, to gain status with friends, jealousy o f others, wanting 
to appear “coo/”, feeling insecure and weak and needing to assert superiority. 
Examining the bully’s motivations in Adrian Mitchell’s poem Back in the Playground 
Blues (Poems fo r  Thinking, Fisher, 1997) the children concluded that bullies were not 
very smart and that they bullied to assert their power: “They use their size and strength 
over other people “They bully the person w ho’s smarter and smaller and weaker than 
them ” (tr33). They picked on the weakest where they would have little resistance: 
“They always do be real quiet when they’re on their own and then they act real tough 
when they’re with their friends” (tr33). Getting attention was considered one o f their 
motivations: “Bullies show off; they bully to get attention”; “Sometimes they do get fun  
out o f  i t”; “Bullies often bully just to be real cool, but what is coolness?” (tr33). 
Bullying on the sports field was no different: “It kind o f  puts a dark thing into you ” 
(tr33). Bullies showed little regard for the feelings of others and thus did not weigh the 
consequences o f  their actions. If they could empathise with their victim they might act 
differently: “The other person might not know how much it really hurts and i f  they knew 
how much it was they might not do i t” (tr33).
The children’s insights into the mind o f the bully has echoes in MacIntyre’s (2002) 
contention that contempt for the weak and the disabled reflects an inability to face up to 
the weakness that is in oneself and this inability leads one to bully or act in a way that 
proves one’s superiority. In these discussions, as the children began to weigh up all 
considerations there seemed to be a deepening awareness o f the core o f morality -  what 
we ought to do morally, going beyond the call of duty in the conventional sense -  and 
that we live better lives when we are motivated by concern for the welfare of others as 
well as our own.
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6.4 Virtue versus vice
6.4.1 Cheating and lying versus truth-telling
How important is it for me to do what I believe to be right in a particular situation? 
Many recognise and agree on a particular course o f action as being right without feeling 
strongly obligated to act accordingly. While understanding can guide action it does not 
necessarily mean there will be a follow through. The children, now in 5th class, were 
mostly in agreement that cheating was wrong and that one should not judge oneself too 
harshly if  one “could not do it right” (tr30); in other words one should make allowances 
for one’s shortcomings and not expect perfection if that were not within one’s 
capabilities. All those who spoke were prepared to admit that they had cheated at some 
time and were unconcerned about it -  though some qualified their statements by saying 
that they did not mind cheating in something that was not considered important. 
Cheating in exams on the other hand was condemned, and there was a feeling that one 
would not feel good about oneself: “I  wouldn’t cheat on anything important because i f  I  
got into the highest in class in 1st year and I  cheated I  w ouldn’t fe e l too good" (tr30); 
“I f  you  cheated and got a good grade you wouldn't fe e l well inside y o u ” (tr30). Con 
adverted to the sharp divide between moral demands and accepted behaviour: “/  think 
that cheating ju s t isn ’t right. It w on’t be right in the world ever but everybody does it so 
we don’t really care that much about it" (tr30). This was refuted by Brendan who was 
adamant that on the contrary a lot of people were concerned about cheating. He 
instanced the case of cheating in sport through drug-taking: “Everybody's saying that
nobody cares about cheating. Well a lot o f  people do care  Whenever humans take
drugs a lot o f  people care ” (tr30).
Many thought that if  you tried hard you would achieve and would not have to cheat. 
The woid "try” was used frequently by Caoimhe: “You keep trying....you can always 
fin d  a way to achieve what you want” (tr30). Brendan thought that by cheating you 
would not have learned anything and used the words “no moral sense whatsoever” 
(tr30). This was the first time ever that any one in the group referred to a moral sense.
In their remarks here the children seemed to reflect on the crucial distinction between 
what is socially acceptable and what is morally right and on the difficulty of adhering to 
the latter particularly when it conflicts with the former. In terms o f one’s own behaviour 
it is often easy to waive the moral requirement in favour o f the socially accepted. This
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of course entails a failure to achieve consistency between what one knows to be right 
and what one actually does. Consistency and inconsistency have been of great concern 
to writers on moral education. Kohlberg (1984) contended that people are more likely to 
be consistent in their moral behaviour by the time they reach stage 5 which is the post- 
conventional or principled stage or the perspective o f the rational individual, aware of 
values and rights prior to social attachments and contracts; at the stages prior to this 
people find excuses for not doing what they believe to be right. Perhaps in this, 
Kohlberg’s preoccupation with stages may occlude a more adequate explanation. His 
theory does not adequately explain why many people at lower stages act consistently. 
Blasi (1983), for example, maintains that the impetus to act one way or another is 
dependent to some degree on the kind of person one thinks one is and wishes to 
become. One is more likely to feel compelled to act morally if  moral concerns are 
crucial in one’s self-definition.
Towards the end of 5th class the children debated the issue o f  lying, whether it was 
ever right to lie and if it were alright to lie in order to save one’s own skin. Several 
children thought that lying was wrong but that everyone lies at some stage: "I d o n ’t 
think i t ’s right to lie but everyone has their moments and they lie sometimes” (tr40). 
Many thought it better not to lie and thus avoid getting into trouble: " I f  you lie you ju s t 
get in more trouble’’ (tr40). Others mentioned trust as a factor, losing one’s parents’ 
trust and the trust o f friends. Some were ambiguous about whether it was right or 
wrong. It could be right and wrong sometimes: "It's okay to lie so you don’t hurt 
someone's feelings but it's not i f  yo u ’re going to lie so someone else might get in 
trouble ” (tr40). It could depend on the particulars o f the situation: "I think it might be 
okay to lie to save your own skin and sometimes it's not. It varies with the situation ” 
(tr40). There was ambiguity in the statement: " I t’s always wrong to lie but everybody 
does it. Sometimes i t ’s okay” (tr40). It was widely accepted in the group that everybody 
lies: " I t’s not right but everybody does i t” (tr40). I posed the question: " I f everybody 
does it, does that make it right? ” and this elicited the response "It doesn’t make it right 
or w rong”.
In response to the class teacher’s query as to whether one had something to lose by 
lying, one boy thought "we lose something every time we lie to save our own skin. We 
could lose a tiny bit o f  pride ” (tr40). Kathleen however dissented and thought that 
“some lies are good lies” and that telling someone that their picture was nice when one 
did not really think so could be justified in consideration of that person’s feelings. Here
159
the children were grappling with an issue that has vexed and divided moral 
philosophers. Much of what they said went against Kant’s famous rigour in regard to 
truth telling: that to lie even for a good reason is never justified because to universalise 
lying for good causes is to negate the meaning o f truth telling (in Kohlberg 1981, p. 
165). On the other hand it is in tune with Habermas’ (1990, p. 53) contention that 
“under given conditions, it is right or good in the moral sense to lie” and with 
Matthews’ argument that even though it is prima facie  wrong to tell a lie, other moral 
claims may override the demand to tell the truth. We develop morally as we get better at 
thinking our way though such conflicts or apparent conflicts (Matthews, 1994, p. 64). In 
their view it is part of moral development to begin to face and think one’s way through 
conflicts and apparent conflicts in moral experience.
6.4.2 Stealing versus honesty
For this theme, early in 5 class, we discussed Cam’s story The Knife. The hero in this 
story, a boy named Karl, had stolen a boy’s knife from the shop. The children discussed 
whether Karl had done wrong in stealing the knife. My follow-up question was: What 
makes stealing wrong? All were agreed that stealing was wrong but for various reasons. 
One child’s thinking on the matter was on Kantian lines, the test o f universalizability: 
" I f everyone went around stealing things, nothing would be good. You couldn’t trust 
anybody ” (tr28). Others considered stealing to be wrong because it was a form of 
cheating; one would not have earned it and one was stealing the fruits of someone else’s 
labour: "The idea o f  stealing is that you d o n ’t have to work fo r  it"  (tr28). There was a 
sense that those who contributed more deserved more and in stealing from somebody 
"you ’re taking away their pride ” (tr28). Here, although not explicitly in these terms, 
what is being argued for is the notion of just deserts; there was a sense that those who 
contributed more deserved more. A further move was made in the discussion when 
another child retorted: "You're not really taking away their pride. You’re taking away 
your own pride ” (tr28). A few other children concurred with this view and pointed out 
how satisfying it was to save up for what one wanted, and one would not derive the 
same satisfaction from stealing: "It wouldn ’t mean as much to me as it would i f  I  had all 
the money fo r  it" (tr28). Jane saved for a year to buy her bunk bed and for her holiday 
and she thought Karl would have been prouder and happier if  he had done the same 
rather than stealing what he coveted: "In saving fo r  my bunk bed when I  got it I  was
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happy I f  you stole it, it wouldn’t be yours. It would still be theirs" (tr28).
Expanding the discussion, I asked if it would still be wrong to steal someone’s idea. 
Someone alluded to pirating computer programmes. They considered it was wrong to 
steal an idea on the same principle as stealing goods. Someone had worked for a long 
time on this idea and had worked out how to use it and it was not for you to steal it, not 
having contributed to it. Here again you have the understanding o f  justice as desert.
There are psychological consequences of an act and many children alluded to the 
effects on one’s mind when one falls short o f one’s ego ideal: "Your conscience would 
probably eat your mind. Then you'd get a bit disturbed’’ (tr28); “I f  you steal all you get 
is a guilty conscience about the thing which you sto le” (tr28). Many saw stealing as 
taking the lazy way out: "You 're taking yourself away from  the real world” (tr28). One 
gets the sense here that one’s sense of self, one’s integrity, is found through doing the 
right thing.
One child thought it could not be wrong to steal something as small as a jelly sweet 
which Led us to discuss whether it was the size or the amount o f goods taken that made 
stealing wrong. Some children objected to stealing on principle, describing it as 
"wrong” and "not r ig h f\  no matter how small the object stolen and regardless of its 
value to its owner. It would still matter if  you stole it even though the owner did not 
mind. If your friends found out that you stole something they would mind and think less 
of you.
Peer pressure became an issue. If friends were stealing it would put one under 
pressure and make resistance difficult. A few o f the boys thought one would risk 
isolation and there was a price to pay for resisting peer pressure: “I t ’s hard not to 
because the pressure comes on and they’d  call you chicken” (tr28). You would have no 
friends and you would be a "loner". The girls seemed more resistant to peer pressure: 
"You shouldn’t be their friend i f  you have to steal against your w ishes” (tr28); “Even i f  
my friends did steal I  wouldn’t ” (tr28). Jacinta thought that "you c a n ’t buy friendship 
but you  can buy a knife” (tr28). Con on reflection reckoned you could “get over” your 
friends calling you "chicken” but if you stole something you wouldn’t be able to get 
over it. Stewart came to the conclusion that if  your friends were putting pressure on you 
to steal with a threat of isolation for non-compliance, then they were "putting a price on 
friendship” (tr28). Donald, who first raised the issue o f being called “chicken”, 
changed his mind mid-way, now deciding that one should not give in to pressure: “I  
think i t ’s bad to steal....you wouldn’t have a good reputation” (tr28). Here one can see
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the peer group as the crucible in which character is formed. The children reflected on 
friendships and the influence o f peer pressure. They seemed to be aware of this 
relationship as being potentially positive or negative -  the presence o f others could 
influence one either way -  but in any case inevitable. One was thrown into relationship 
and they were aware of the inter-subjective nature of moral experience.
6.4.3 Weighing right and wrong
With regard to the morality of stealing, Kohlberg's classic story, the Heinz dilemma, set 
complex choices before the children: should Heinz steal the drug to save the life of his 
dying wife if  that is the only course of action open to him? In 3 rd class at age eight to 
nine most thought he should steal because life took precedence over property. There 
were some dissenters who would not agree with stealing under any circumstances: “I f  
he did steal i t ’s wrong to steal" (tr20) and “I  d o n ’t think the man should break in 
because i t ’s illegal" (tr20). There was a degree o f ambivalence on the part of the child 
who was trying to come to terms with the dilemma: “The man is sort o f  doing 
something wrong and something right" (tr20). The seriousness of a life-threatening 
illness could be lost on a young child who might not have experienced the death of a 
near one and consequently might not have had much of a concept o f the finality of 
death: “I  don't think he should break in. I t ’s (dying) ju s t the cycle o f  life"  (tr20). Some 
believed in the triumph of goodness on the part o f the judge and that “i f  the judge has a 
heart he probably wouldn’t send him to ja i l” (tr20). Only at this young age-level did 
anyone mention an appeal to God for guidance or help: "I think he should say a prayer 
to God and see i f  God will help him " (tr20).
In 6 th class, three and a half years later, all were in agreement that Heinz should steal 
the drug. Most o f the children saw stealing as wrong but in Heinz’s circumstances it 
was a necessary evil: “I t ’s kinda wrong to steal but in these circumstances your man 
has to stea l....he’s got no other option” (tr44); “stealing is wrong but so is letting 
someone die ” (tr44). They did not consider that these circumstances could make it right 
to steal. In 6th class they were aware that the law was not always right and one had a 
moral obligation to act even if  it meant contravening the law. The legal duty not to steal 
was outweighed by the moral duty to save life. Now the children could reflect on an 
issue and name what was really happening: “Putting a very large price on that drug is 
like putting a price on life ” (tr44). Others agreed that one could not put a price on life.
1 6 2
If  Heinz loved his wife he must try all means to save her life. If he did not love her was 
he equally obligated? Several children thought that he was: "7 don’t think it matters i f  
you love her or not because someone else might love her and i t ’s still a life....that could 
happen to anyone’s wife" (tr44). Moral relationships between intimates could differ 
significantly from those between strangers. Did one have an equal responsibility 
towards a stranger? Should one steal to save the life o f a stranger? The children 
considered that one should because "no life is more important than another and life is 
more important than money" (tr44).
They were now able to make finer distinctions. If Heinz decided not to steal and his 
wife died, the guilt did not lie solely with Heinz. The druggist shared culpability: "If he 
didn 'i steal and she dies, the druggist would probably be murdering her as well. I t ’s his 
fau lt that she couldn’t get the drug” (tr44). Sally empathised with Heinz’s dilemma by 
relating it to her own experience and reflecting on what her father would do in similar 
circumstances: " I f my mum was dying I  don’t think my dad would sit there and let her 
die and not take every opportunity to save her. I  think he would save her" (tr44). Both 
boys and girls in the group used the language of relationship and care, the language of 
concern: "I really couldn’t sit there and let someone d ie” (tr44). Stewart summed up 
the debate by observing that the world was obsessed with money now and many were 
more interested in it than they were in other people. Unlike my previous research group 
(Russell, 2000) none of them focused on the wife’s wishes and what she might want 
done, Her right to life was not in dispute but nobody in the present study group 
mentioned her right to die if that might have been her wish in her present condition.
Knowing what is right when there are conflicting forces pulling one in various 
directions, is a difficult one for children. Ensuring that they become reasonable persons 
is something that many educational thinkers have for good reason endorsed. Pritchard 
(1996, p. 72), for example, contends that this is the most effective way o f fighting 
“mindless absolutism and mindless relativism”. The following discussion (tr32) took 
place in 5th class between the above two Heinz dilemmas (tr20 and tr44). How does one 
know what is right? Does it depend on who thinks it is right? Should one discuss it with 
adults? In Cam’s story The Fight Joshua says it doesn’t matter what other people think. 
In intervening in a fight to help his friend he knows that what he did was right. We 
discussed the question: suppose that everybody disagreed with Joshua, could he still be 
right? This story exercised the children’s moral imagination, helping them to understand 
what needs to be taken into consideration, Joshua’s own perspective and that o f others.
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Initially the general consensus was that he could be right because he was there and he 
knew exactly what happened: "You should stick by what you think but not what 
everyone else thinks" (tr32): “It doesn't matter what other people think It should be 
what you think and you should stick with i t ’’ (tr32). Some thought that children should 
have the right to disagree with adults and follow their own dictates on the matter: “You 
have to have belief in y o u rse lf  (tr32). It seems clear that the children here were, at least 
implicitly if not by name, invoking a concept of autonomy and what comes out in their 
discussion is the value of autonomy and the tensions and ambiguities associated with it. 
They concluded that what was lawful did not necessarily correspond with what was 
right and that it depended on “what kind o f  law it is “ because the law was not always 
right: “Ages ago when people thought the world was flat, it was against the law to say it 
w asn’t ” (tr32).
Does one then discount the opinions o f others and conclude that we have all the 
answers inside ourselves? Several children thought one could decide for oneself but “it 
kind o f  depends on the question. I f  it's in this kind o f  situation you just have to depend 
on yourself There could be some questions that you want to settle by y o u rse lf  (tr32); 
“I f  there were loads o f  people there and they saw it, you would start to wonder i f  you 
were right or not but you could still be right” (tr32). Taylor (1991), even as he 
emphasised the importance of dialogue, stressed the importance o f having contact with 
one’s own inner nature. One must have the capacity to listen to this inner voice, contact 
with which is often lost through the pressures o f outward conformity (p.29). The class 
teacher queried whether Joshua had exhausted all possibilities and asked: “Even i f  I  
think I ’m judging fo r  m yself what's right and wrong, that judgem ent doesn't come from
me in isolation  have I  the right to make that decision without looking at every
aspect? ” (tr32). Singer (1993) suggests that following one’s conscience may not always 
be the best way o f judging the rights and wrongs o f a situation. It could indicate an 
abdication o f one’s responsibility as a rational agent if  one fails to take all relevant 
factors into account. He suggests that the “internal voice” is more likely to be the 
product of one’s upbringing than a source o f genuine ethical insight (p. 295).
While the children showed an awareness o f the importance o f autonomy and the 
unavoidable tensions and conflicts associated with it, they were also aware of the need 
for consultation. On the one hand there was the need to think for oneself and assert 
independence; at the same time one cannot be so aloof that one does not question 
oneself. There has to be openness to persuasion, which points to the need for good
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dialogue or communicative autonomy as Habermas (1990) conceives it. Discussing it 
with peers was considered: "To know w hat’s right you should really discuss it with your 
peers and people that are the same age” (tr32). Another expanded on this by making a 
distinction: " I f  you're having a serious argument with your parents, y o u ’d want to 
discuss it with your own age-group, but i f  you ’re in a figh t with your friends yo u ’d want 
to discuss it with your parents” (tr32). Another child reflected on how difficult it was to 
decide if  he thought it was right and other people thought it was wrong, I posed the 
question “Could a society work i f  everybody were to think fo r  h im self about what is 
right and wrong? ” This elicited the responses from two o f the more vocal boys in the 
group: " I f  everybody thought what they wanted to think....most people would end up
right. You w ouldn’t be able to trust people  everyone would go m ad” (tr32). Is this a
rejection o f subjectivism? The response from the next boy seemed like an appeal for 
order in the midst o f chaos: "There’s got to be someone tha t’s right and someone that’s 
w rong” (tr32). The children’s concerns here are very close to that o f several 
philosophers, for example, Baier and again Pritchard. Baier (1958), reflecting on why 
people should be moral, concluded that social chaos would ensue from everyone’s 
following a principle o f enlightened self-interest (in Pritchard, 1991, p, 230). Children, 
according to Pritchard, need to be able to evaluate critically. They are bombarded by 
and have to cope with conflicting messages and voices, not only those of parents, 
religious leaders and teachers, but also peers and the world o f entertainment (p. 164).
6.5 Conclusion
In the community o f enquiry the children were concerned with ethical issues, wondering 
about the rights and wrongs of a situation, questioning what was fair and right, duty and 
responsibility, and where the boundaries, if  any, were between moral obligation and 
social convention. They explored the boundaries o f acceptable behaviour and the 
implications o f freedom. Throughout the discussions they confronted issues and 
challenges that face their peers everywhere -  acceptance, rejection, pressure, exposure 
to bullying. The interaction in the community gave them an opportunity to become 
clearer in understanding moral concepts. Many were forthcoming in expressing moral 
sentiments -  feelings of guilt, indignation at injustice, remorse, and concern for the 
welfare o f others. Pupils who did not seem to show sensitivity towards the plight of 
others less fortunate such as Travellers or non-nationals experiencing racism or facing
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deportation, had their thinking challenged in the group. This sometimes led to better 
understanding because they were held accountable for their views and had to justify 
them. Because of what they shared collaboratively the children who readily expressed 
their views seemed to emerge with a better understanding of the issues involved, of 
themselves and o f others. They seemed, one might say, to develop what Habermas 
(1990) refers to as communicative autonomy, knowing oneself through interaction with 
others. This was particularly striking in the frequency with which children openly 
changed stance in light of reflection with others. What was significant was not only the 
fact o f change but also the reasons for it; it was in the light o f persuasive arguments 
rather than pressure to conform.
My role as facilitator enabled more explicit reflection on motives and actions. 
Reflection alone is not a sufficient condition for moral action, but it is necessary in 
arriving at the sort o f understanding that motivates moral action. Starting with a story or 
poem helped to ground the discussion and make its contents recognisable to the 
participants. Sometimes when the choice of story was poor the pupils did not engage 
greatly with it. At other times good triggers seemed to strengthen children’s capacity 
and readiness to engage imaginatively in dialogue and to reflect on their own lives as 
well as those o f others. Fictional characters can express dissident views and introduce 
diversity into the community (Sprod, 2001, p. 200). This was the case with many of 
Philip Cam ’s stories in Thinking Stories 3 (see 4.4.2).
Levels of participation in the group varied greatly. Some children never passed an 
opportunity to speak while a few scarcely contributed at all. However the latter listened 
carefully and followed the discussions while resisting all encouragement to speak or 
justify their point of view; at most they occasionally ventured to agree with another’s 
opinion. Sprod (2001, p. 203) contends that the listener may be participating more fully 
than the student who speaks more frequently but seldom connects to what others have 
said.
By the end o f the study period the pupils seemed to have a strong moral sense as 
evidenced by their assertions regarding the dignity of the human being and his or her 
entitlement to freedom and justice. The group on the whole displayed a strong 
competence in exploring all sides of an issue -  issues of the good life and of justice, and 
most justified their reasons for holding a particular stance. Matthews (1994, p. 54) 
conceives moral development as “exchanging a less adequate concept of honesty, 
courage, justice or obligation for a better one”. From an initial concept of obligation as
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an external one, with responsibility lying in the hands of authority figures, mainly 
parents, I think the children advanced to a concept of obligation that could be 
considered more o f an internal one, being able to decide independently about the 
rightness or the wrongness of an action. While reward and punishment figured for some 
children some o f the time, there seemed to be recognition among most of the moral 
appropriateness of some situations and a sense of personal obligation to follow through 
on the right course of action.
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7 INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I have been concerned with central issues in morality and in 
particular with the children’s developing understandings o f right and wrong. In this 
chapter I will focus on another topic that has been significant in moral theory and has 
also occupied a central place in children’s lives -  that of friendships and interpersonal 
relationships. As is well known, friendship is a major theme in Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics where it is considered a kind of virtue, most necessary for living, and to be the 
bond that holds communities together (NE 1155a3-24). Since friendship is a salient 
topic for children also I will explore their views about it at different age levels. I will 
look at what friendship means to children, how they value friends and what criteria they 
hold o f a good friendship. Among the factors explored in this regard will be reciprocity, 
similarity of interests, trust, empathy and loyalty. As we shall see these factors seem to 
intensify as children mature, particularly in late childhood and early adolescence. We 
shall see also that while boys and girls share some common aspirations with regard to 
friendship they differ in other significant aspects. Their perceptions of friendship and 
perceptions o f  each other, and their awareness o f these differences, will become clear in 
the analysis o f the dialogues recorded during the course of this study.
Early adolescent friendship is influenced by many factors, including physical 
development and its psychological consequences on how boys and girls relate to each 
other. We shall see that a growing awareness of differences and an associated self- 
consciousness had some impact on the children’s participation in the community of 
enquiry. From age ten onwards the girls became noticeably more reticent and seemed 
prepared to allow the boys to dominate in the discussions. This finding on reticence in 
girls corroborates the research findings o f Gilligan (1982), Brown & Gilligan (1992), 
Belinky (1996), and Elkind & Weiner (1978),
7.2 F r ie n d s h ip  re la tio n s h ip s
7.2.1 Friendship in middle childhood
Friendships are crucial in children’s lives, in their developing awareness and in their 
learning o f fundamental moral standards. The most striking setting in which younger
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children form and sustain friendships is in their play which often involves observing the 
rules of the game. Unsurprisingly in this study children, at a younger age, initially 
defined a friend as someone to play with. In 2nd class, at age seven to eight, being able 
to play together was important: "You have to p lay with them and be with them for a 
while before you can know what they’re like and that's nearly how you can make 
fr iends” (tr9). Confirming research by Corsaro and Holmes, it seemed that any 
individual who played with one was potentially a friend (Corsaro, 1985; Holmes, 1997). 
Compliance with the rules of the game in playing together and showing concern for one 
another was expected. At this younger age too the children seemed to entertain a broad 
concept o f friendship which included not only peers but also pets and characters from 
their world o f fantasy and inanimate objects to which they relate (or at least what adults 
consider inanimate). A friend could extend from a person to a pet or to an imaginary 
character or a cartoon from television: "I d o n ’t think a friend  has to be a person. It 
could be a pet or an animal. It can be a person out o f  a cartoon as well. And it could be
an imaginary fr ien d  it depends to your view how to be your fr ien d " (trl6). A couple
of boys listed the 1football post”, and the “coal sh ed 7 as friends (tr 16). Some o f the 
children spoke convincingly of imaginary friends being among their best friends: “I ’ve
got my imaginary friend who is one o f  my best fr iends  he was a really good
friend....he always looked up to me and h e ’d  never hurt anybody" (tr 16). An imaginary 
friend could compensate for lack of a real one: ‘‘The second best friend  that you can 
ever gel is your make-up friend i f  you have no one to p lay with, like Sedn the 
Leprechaun" (trl6).
Animals counted as friends for some o f the children: “My best fr iend  is my hamsters. 
They’re my favourite fr iends’’ (trió); "A friend could be anybody. It could be a hamster. 
It could be a dog. It could be a cat. It could be a parrot or whatever animal... a friend  is 
something you can play with and that helps you"  (trió). It need hardly be said that this 
wider view o f friendship is in sharp contrast to that o f Aristotle who would not 
countenance the friendship o f animals, particularly those he considered to be tools in the 
service of man and from whom no return of affection was possible. Perhaps Aristotle 
would not allow that children are capable o f friendship at all for he does after all say 
that they (children) are incapable of choosing and thus o f being moral agents in any real 
sense. Aristotle saw friendship as a sharing of the good between the good and regarded 
children as incapable of choosing and thus in the strict sense of being good: “Only the
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friendship of those who axe good and similar in their goodness is perfect” (NE 1161a26- 
bl 5). There has to be mutual affection and caring for each other’s good.
Corsaro (1985) is one of several contemporary theorists whose views are very 
different to Aristotle. According to him, friendship is a meaningful part of children’s 
lives, being an expression of their social identity outside familial connections. Even at a 
young age, while they differ from older children in their imagery o f friendship, they are 
capable o f  spelling out the conditions of a good friendship. To the child of seven to 
eight in this study a friend was also someone whom one could trust and who would 
defend one in times o f trouble, particularly if  one were threatened by a bully: "A friend  
is someone who would help you i f  you were in trouble with loads o f  bullies” (trl6). 
Another saw the value of a team who would defend one if  a group of bullies were 
“ganging up on y o u ” (trió). In response to my query as to what it was about the person, 
or the pet or the thing, that made them a good friend, Con aged eight, who was the most 
articulate in the group summed it up thus: ‘‘I f  I  was to describe a friend  I ’d describe it 
like this -  a friend  that would never break a promise, a friend  that I  could trust, a friend  
that would help me and never desert me, a friend  that I  could share my problems with, 
a friend  that would figh t fo r  me ”, Then came the realism as Con realised that no one 
person could embody all o f one’s desires: " I’d  ju s t like to say that no one can be exactly 
like the friend  I  describe. So what I  normally do is ju s t try and be like a friend and help 
everybody” (trió). There was a striking degree of maturity in being aware at this young 
age that one needed to possess the qualities of a good friend if one desired them in 
others. Others reflected the self back to one. There was resonance for Con’s ideas: “It 
would be a good friend  i f  there was: anyone like tha t”', "You have to be like that to be a 
friend"  (trió). Despite Aristotle’s own disinclination to credit children morally, perhaps 
what these children are saying chimes with his emphasis on the demands of friendship, 
and his contention that loving is more important than being loved and that true 
friendship seems to consist more in giving than in receiving affection (NE 1159a-32).
The children thought that friendship relationships implied a set o f obligations and 
expectations such as loyalty and trust: "I think a good fr iend  would be someone who 
would help you and come to you when you ’re lonely and hurt and would never be rude 
to you and fig h t with y o u ” (trió). This is also borne out in research findings (Selman, 
1990; Holmes, 1997). There were elements of realism in the eight-year-old’s awareness 
that friendship was not perfect and that sometimes even a friend could be annoying. 
Even at this age they were aware that not all who professed to be friends had one’s
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welfare at heart: “a good friend is when they do nice things fo r  you and they help you, 
and a bad friend  is when they use you... ” (trió). Here there is a distinct echo of 
Aristotle’s censure o f friendship based on utility rather than a shared commitment to 
goodness. One is reminded also of Youniss’s contention that younger children tend to 
deal with more concrete problems in their friendships like playing and sharing while 
older children after the age of about nine put more stress on the qualities of friendship 
such as co-operative reciprocity, equality and mutual understanding (Youniss, 1980, p. 
179).
7.2.2 Friendship with increasing cognitive maturity
The change in friendship perception as children got older was a qualitative one. Having 
a friend who shared similar interests and who thought in a similar manner, sharing 
similar attitudes, became more important. This became evident in the children’s 
dialogues from 5th class (age ten to eleven) onwards: “He would care what you think" 
(tr39). Some used well-worn clichés to convey the value o f friendship: “friendship has 
no price"  and “friends are priceless” (tr28). One would take note o f a friend’s opinion 
and be more hurt by their disapproval than that o f someone who was only an 
acquaintance: “Y ou’d be hurt more by your friends than other people because other 
people, you d o n ’t know them. You wouldn’t care what their opinion o f  you is; but your 
friends, you 're really with them so you would be interested in what their opinion is ” 
(tr29). One expected friendship to be reciprocated and when it was not one experienced 
hurt: " W e’ve known our friends fo r  a long time and we like them. You think they like 
you. Then when they offend you, it hurts" (tr29). One could feel left out when friends 
did not include one, particularly if  one were originally part o f the group. Boys were as 
eager to express this kind of hurt as girls: “Last year Liam and someone else had some 
fun  around the common and they would always hang out with each other and talk to 
each other and I  fe lt  really let down ” (tr29). When a friend abandoned one it hurt more 
because one identified so closely with a friend: “You ’d  fe e l a bit o f  you is gone ” (tr29). 
This notion that a friend is part of the extended self has echoes in Aristotle’s notion of 
the friend as the alterego and the wider claim o f MacIntyre (1999, p. 116) that our 
social relations are indispensable to our flourishing and that we need the give and take 
of affective relationship.
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In this study children were aware that certain standards o f behaviour were expected 
o f one by one’s friends and they frequently cited the consequences for friendship of a 
violation o f these standards: “You wouldn't have any real friends i f  you said a racist 
remark. All your friends, they wouldn’t really like you any more ” (tr33). If one’s friend 
were a bully it would be reason enough to abandon the friendship. Likewise one would 
forfeit some friends if one stole something: “I f  your friends found  out you stole 
something, they’d m ind” (tr28). Girls were more adamant that stealing would justify 
severance o f friendship: “I f  my friend stole from  the shop I  wouldn Y be their friend  any 
more " (tr21). Keller & Edelstein contend that being mindful o f facing the consequences 
o f one’s actions is an important motivational source; when one feels the need to justify 
one’s actions to others one has internalised the evaluations o f significant others (Keller 
& Edelstein, 1993, pp. 314-315). This also accords with M acIntyre’s (1999) contention 
that through friendship one is held accountable and this accountability to others is a 
major part in becoming a moral self.
Peers could influence one also in a negative way, putting pressure on one to 
conform against one’s better judgement. One boy in the group thought that “i f  
everybody’s doing it and not being friends with you i f  you don Y do it, you really sort o f  
have to " (tr28). The same boy later changed his mind, having listened to the opinions of 
others in the discussion and now affirmed: “Yea, I  think stealing is wrong. You really 
should say 'no ’. You have to try and build character to do this ” (tr28). Here was an 
example of resisting negative peer influence.
In 5th class the children introduced the term “real fr ie n d ” and this was defined as 
",someone who respects and cares about y o u ’’ (tr39). A real friend as defined by John 
“would not tell on y o u ” (tr39). Caoimhe took this notion further in stressing the keeping 
of secrets as vital to friendship: “A real fr iend  is a person who doesn Y annoy you or 
doesn Y hate you, knows your secrets and won Y tell anyone ” (tr39). Both boys and girls 
used the words "trust”, “rely o n ”, “listen”, and "care”, Likeability was a  deciding 
factor: “A real fr iend  is someone you like because tha t’s good enough fo r  me i f  I  like 
someone” (tr39).
The reciprocal nature of friendship became more obvious in late childhood. Defending 
a friend, and being defended in turn, took on new significance. One would defend a 
friend in a fight because “h e ’d  probably do it fo r  y o u ” (tr31). Reciprocity implied that 
one returned a complement: "If he helps you in a figh t you should help h im ” (tr31). 
Loyalty demanded that one would take action in defence o f a friend: "It would be really
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hard to let your friend  get hurt" (tr31). Boys, on the whole, saw loyalty to a friend as a 
compulsion to intervene on his behalf if the friend was involved in a fight and they used 
strong language to convey this:
"He w asn’t going to stand there and watch him get bashed” (tr31).
‘‘I f  my friend  was getting bashed I ’d  hop in fo r  him ” (ibid).
“A friend  sticks up fo r  y o u ” (tr39).
“You should stick up fo r  your friends because they’re your real fr ien d s’’ (tr33).
“I wouldn Y ju s t stand there laughing at him. I ’d  give the other fellow  a d ig” (tr31). 
“Nobody's going to stand there and watch their friends being thumped to H ell” (tr31).
It is interesting to note that loyalty was not unqualified but was subordinate to the 
observations of certain rules of good behaviour. Some o f the children would consider 
the particulars o f the situation and make finer distinctions in deciding whether it was 
right to help a friend in a fight: “I  think he was right to help his fr ien d  but his friend was 
wrong to start the f ig h t” (tr31). Being friends was not enough to justify one’s support. 
They qualified their statements by saying that they would not defend a friend who was 
in the wrong: “I  think people that slag black people, like, they get themselves into fights 
and then want their friends to jump in fo r  them. I  wouldn Y really jum p  in i f  they were 
calling nam es” (tr31).
“It's probably not right to defend your friend i f  he did the wrong th ing” (tr31);
“I think i t ’s right to help your friend but I  don’t think i t ’s right to get in a fig h t” (tr31); 
“Ifyour fr ien d  is a bully I  don Y think you should be their fr ie n d ” (tr33).
Barry thought a real friend could not be a bully: “I f  he was your real friend  he would 
stop bullying and i f  he wouldn Y you know he's not your real fr ie n d ” (tr33).
The difference between a girl’s approach to defending a friend and a boy’s one was 
obvious when Sally suggested that one could talk someone out o f a fight. She was 
adamant in her belief in the force of persuasion. Kathleen supported this view which 
prompted two boys to respond: “Kathleen, you said y o u ’d  defend your friend  but you 'd  
not get in the fight. How could you defend your friend  and not get in a fig h t? ” (tr31), 
Brendan contended that when one was fighting one was too angry to talk: “Most o f  the 
time i f  y o u ’re angry at somebody you wouldn't really talk to them and they w ouldn’t 
really get a chance to actually say ‘sorry’” (tr31). The realism o f the situation is that 
people would not listen when they were angry: “I f  they ’re in a fig h t and angry with 
each other they’ll ju s t figh t away” (tr31). Sally stuck to her point o f view and appealed 
to thoughtfulness and reflection. She believed that this kind of talk could impact on
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behaviour and insisted that “you can actually talk somebody out o f  a fig h t i f  you ju s t ask 
them why are they really fighting and then they 'II ju s t think about it and then agree with 
y o u ” (tr31). Jane’s intervention would be measured. Whether she would intervene or 
not would depend on the circumstances: “I f  he started the figh t I  w ouldn't” (tr31). 
Aisling would not side with a friend who was fighting; neither would she take sides in a 
dispute so that her relationship with them would stay intact. She reiterates what she said 
in an earlier dialogue: “I  probably would ju s t stay out o f  it because I  wouldn’t want to 
hurt their fee lin g s” (tr22). Talking one’s way out of a fight marked the different 
approach o f  the girls. This is in keeping with Krappman’s contention that children in 
late childhood, while they are concerned with establishing and protecting the self, they 
also want to be part of the peer network and are concerned with finding good solutions 
to their differences and difficulties and thus enhancing the friendship (Krappman, 1993, 
pp. 375-378).
7.2.3 Friends and similarity of interests
Many thought that having something in common was not the major determinant of 
friendship. Likeability and willingness to reciprocate mattered more. “You don’t have to 
like the same s tu ff to be friends. You ju s t have to agree with someone to be friends 
because you ju s t like different things” (tr39). This idea was echoed by several who 
asserted that one did not have to have the same interests. As they matured in 5th class 
the children were more willing to take account of and make allowance for difference in 
taste and opinion. They suggested that conflict could be healthy and if  it were worked 
through it could strengthen relations. Fighting was considered part o f friendship and 
might even enhance it: “Every friendship has fighting because at the end y o u ’re going 
to make up and you can be better friends after tha t” (tr39); “All friends get on each 
other's nerves sometimes” (tr39). Good communication between friends could entail 
confronting what was coming between the parties in the friendship. Jane suggested that 
“i f  you fig h t with someone and then that’s out o f  the way, then y o u ’re better friends 
than you are before you started the fig h t” (tr39). Perhaps there is an awareness here o f 
the view argued, for example, by Gordon that a relationship gains strength when two 
people work through their differences and end up with a solution that meets both their 
needs (Gordon, 1974, p. 241).
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Barry insisted that one could have friendship without having to fight: " We’re good 
friends and we don’t need to fig h t" (tr39). Brendan asserted that some friends have 
absolutely nothing in common, that they just fight. Then, rising as it were to a meta 
level in this reflection, he detected a kind of contradiction in his statement, and added: 
"Well that's something in common. No friendship has nothing in common because you 
fight. Tha t’s something in common” (tr39). The concept of forgiveness as important in 
friendship was introduced by the girls: “A real friend would fo rg ive” (tr39). Indeed a 
real friend would not only forgive but would be reliably on one’s side: "A real friend  
would forgive but then again a real friend wouldn ’t say something behind your back in 
the firs t p lace"  (tr39). For another child, humour was important; Donald was adamant a 
friend needed to share laughter as well: “A friend isn’t a fr iend  i f  they don’t laugh at 
y o u ” (tr39).
Con disagreed with many of his peers in making the Aristotelian point (NE 115a24- 
b28) that it is similarity that draws people together: "We do have to have something in 
common to be friends ” (tr39). Mick supported this view, adding that “boys go walking 
together and they kind o f  have something in common that w ay” (tr39). Maccoby (1990) 
stresses that the importance of attitudinal and moral similarities, as a determinant of 
friendship, emerges with increasing cognitive maturity. There is more intimacy and 
mutual dependability as one gets older. Close friends share personal experiences and 
inner feelings and they must be able to trust one another and rely on each other in times 
o f need. In 5th class there seemed to be an increased realisation of the obligations and 
expectations o f friendship and a greater intériorisation of what the desired reciprocity 
consists in: “someone that you could trust and rely on, someone that would listen to 
y o u ” (tr39); they were also aware that to have a good friend one must be a worthy 
friend oneself. Donald condemned bullies for having nothing to offer beyond a show of 
physical strength and suggested that friendship implied something more: “Bullies are 
kind o f  weak....using their physical appearance to get friends. That’s real inside. I f  you 
want to get friends y o u ’ll have to get strong inside” (tr33). This notion of “strong 
inside ", implying an inner strength, showed a greater awareness on the children’s part 
o f the psychological dimension of friendship and of the fact that what defines the moral 
agent is a disposition to pursue the good of others as well one’s own (See Carr & 
Steutal, 1999, p. 246).
At this stage both boys and girls despised utilitarian friendships seeing them as false 
with someone pretending to be a friend but in reality using one for their own selfish
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reasons. When someone accused others in the group of being friendly with Bill because 
of his big house this was sharply refuted by Cian who insisted “I'm  not seeing him 
because he has stu ff” (tr39). Another made the interesting distinction that “i f  you have a 
big house it is enough to attract friends but it w on’t keep friends ” (tr39). A false friend 
could be attracted to one’s possessions such as play stations and not be really interested 
in friendship: “My friend was just using me fo r  my play station. When he came over to 
my house he robbed my football'’ (tr29). Another asserted that they “do n ’t really talk. 
They'd be ju s t there playing” (tr39). Both boys and girls expressed feelings of being 
hurt at being used by a friend: “I  think when your friends use you, they ’re not really 
your friends and you ’d  be hurt that they ’re using you fo r  something which you have ” 
(tr29). The genuineness of the friendship between the male protagonists, Joshua and 
Neil, in Cam’s story Winged was queried, the implication being that one could be 
deluding oneself about one’s friend: “I ’m going to question. Were they best friends? 
They might have been fooling themselves to think they were best friends. They m ightn’t 
actually be best fr iends” (tr39). In analysing the children’s views one is again reminded 
of Aristotle’s contention that it is between good men that both love and friendship are 
found in the highest form. Only the friendship of those who are good and similar in their 
goodness is perfect (NE 1162M0-35). Utilitarian friendships lack this goodness and are 
therefore doomed.
Both boys and girls accorded family precedence over friends: “Blood is thicker than 
water. Your fam ily means a lot more than your friends. You love your fam ily” (tr31). 
Cousins formed part of the family circle and for some children the family bond could 
trump friendship: "Your cousin is part o f  your fam ily and you might know him fo r  the 
rest o f  your life ” (tr31). Towards the end of a discussion on friendship Brendan had a 
change o f heart and agreed with the others on the importance of family: “After hearing 
your point I  kind o f  disagree with myself because your fam ily is more important.... Your 
friend  is ju s t like a person but your cousin is your fa m ily ” (tr 31). Interestingly, the word 
"love ” was not used in the context of friendship, being reserved for family members.
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7.3 Boys’ and girls’ friendships
7.3.1 Boys’ perception of friendship
While boys and girls shared common aspirations of friendship in the form of mutuality 
and dependability as they got older, in late childhood and early adolescence they were 
aware of similarities and differences in how they expressed their friendship. At a 
younger age the children did not advert to secrets or rather, the relevance of secrets did 
not emerge in their discussions. However, in 5th class at age ten to eleven, it was clear 
that girls shared secrets but boys asserted that they did not: "Sometimes boys have 
different kinds o f  friendship because Caoimhe said a best fr ien d  is someone that you 
can tell secrets to. Well like we don’t really tell secrets to each other. We just jump on 
each other and mess with each other” (tr39). This sharing of secrets and keeping of 
promises was more important for girls than for boys in this study. John claimed that his 
circle o f  friends did not disclose secrets: "Girls tell secrets to each other. Like me, 
Barry and Liam, we d idn’t tell secrets mostly to each o ther” (tr39). Cian added that 
"boys talk about what stu ff they have ” (tr39). I find it noteworthy that while VanManen 
and Levering (1996, p. 8), in their important study Childhood Secrets: Intimacy, 
Privacy, and the S e lf reconsidered, contend that secrets have pedagogical significance 
in so far as they contribute to the formation of personal identity, they make no 
reference to the different ways in which boys and girls view secrets. Evidence gathered 
in my study however points to significant gender differences on this matter and seems 
to indicate, at the very least, a need for further, more focused research on the topic.
Liam saw the contrast between the ways in which fighting is conducted: boys 
physically wading in with fists flailing while the girls were more concerned with 
appearances and with talking their way through it: " When a boy gets into a figh t it gets 
all serious. Then we get into a big scrap and bash each other, but when a girl gets into 
a fig h t it gets all mouth and looking better” (tr39). What the children say resonates 
with the research findings of Ruble & Martin (1998), indicating that in early 
adolescence, girls’ groups are more cooperative while boys’ groups are more combative 
and rough with more attempts at attaining dominance and with more constrictive 
interaction styles. Girls’ groups on the other hand are marked by cooperative attitudes 
and enabling interaction styles (Ruble & Martin, 1998, p. 961).
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The boys in this study were not inclined to be quite as positive in their estimation of 
girls’ behaviour as Ruble & Martin. Liam, for example, suggested that girls bully and 
"not say they d o ” (tr33). Brendan reckoned that bullying was more emotional for girls 
but boys could get over it because theirs was a physical hurt: “I  think g irls ' bullying can 
be more emotional fo r  girls. The boys, they might get hurt but they ’11 get over that ” 
(tr33).
One should conclude, however, that predilection on the part of boys for more 
physical expression precludes real emotional experience on their part. Stewart, for 
example, claimed: "You can get over it i f  y o u ’re strong like boys, but like girls are 
saying s tu ff to you that maybe hurt your feelings” (tr33). Barry went further and in a 
quite open and candid way remarked on the unfairness o f not being offered sympathy 
when one’s feelings were hurt. One was not allowed to cry. I f  one were physically hurt 
people would look after one: " When you get hurt by someone physically and you cry, 
people would really look after you and come over to you. But then, mentally, i f  they hurt 
your feelings and you cry, most people will ju st laugh at you, but I  don’t get it why they 
do that” (tr33). This same boy thought that girls could be more hurt by painful 
comments: "You can get really hurt when you ’re a girl. Comments can hurt you more " 
(tr33). These comments showed that boys could decentre too and see what was going on 
for girls.
Research findings, for example, Elkind & Weiner (1978) point to a lowering of self 
esteem in girls from age 10 onwards while boys’ self-esteem does not seem to suffer in 
the same way. That did not stop the boys from appreciating the greater vulnerability of 
girls. In the present study the evidence on this matter is somewhat ambiguous. On the 
one hand, at a time when his peers were gaining rapidly in height in 5th class, Stewart 
could say that he did not find his low stature a disadvantage and was comfortable with 
himself: “I ’m the smallest in this class but I  don’t care. I  w ouldn't mind i f  I  was big or 
small. I ’m okay” (tr29). On the other hand, Fiachra’s experience was not quite so 
positive as his low stature caused him grief: ",People slag me fo r  my height. My little 
brother, h e ‘s only eight and h e ’s not much smaller than me. H e's big fo r  his age and 
he's strong and no one slags him ” (tr29). This candidness and honesty emerged in the 
later discussions; boys were prepared to express vulnerability, a trait attributed generally 
to girls.
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7.3.2 Girls’ perception of boys’ and girls’ interaction
In 2nd class at age seven and eight there was no noticeable difference in the participation 
of boys and girls in the group but from 4th class onwards, at about age ten, it became 
noticeable that girls became less comfortable about expressing an opinion in a mixed 
group. Boys were more at ease and less hesitant in articulating their views, whereas 
many o f the girls, whom I knew to be more articulate than many of the outspoken boys, 
were becoming more reticent and content to let the boys dominate the discussions. They 
seemed to be more aware of being constricted by both boys and other girls and seemed 
to become more cautious in their approach. In the light o f accumulating evidence I 
decided to probe this issue of relative withdrawal by the older girls. To do so I decided 
to hold a session with the girls on their own towards the end of the study period when 
most o f them were now twelve, providing them with an opportunity to speak freely in a 
single-sex group. This decision provoked loud protestations and accusations of 
discrimination from the boys who saw themselves being excluded from the discussion. 
Of the fourteen girls in the class only ten were present and there was an air of intimacy 
in this smaller group. These girls were now at the end o f primary school and about to 
enter secondary school.
The topic for discussion was whether girls were better o ff in single-sex schools for 
their secondary education. Rather than confront them with their reticence in discussion I 
decided to approach the matter obliquely and opened the discussion with “Are girls 
better o f f  in single sex schools for their secondary education. An American 
psychologist, Carol Gilligan, says that girls lose their voices and become fearful o f
expressing an opinion in case they appear foo lish  not only in fron t o f  boys but also
in the presence o f  girls. What do you think?” Many o f them agreed that since boys 
would distract them from their studies they would concentrate more on their studies and 
have a better education in single sex schools: “Ifyou  fancy  a boy y o u ’d  try to look good 
in front o f  h im ....you’d  concentrate on them more than anything. Your education would 
go down a bit because you wouldn’t be listening to what the teacher would be saying. 
You’d be listening to that boy ” (tr46). My contributions took a questioning form in this 
discussion. I asked whether boys inhibited them in the group. Some agreed that this was 
the case: “In our class it is kind o f  embarrassing to talk. You'd probably talk more in an 
all-girls school” (tr46). There was a feeling in the group that boys’ mocking was 
intimidating: " When y o u ’re expressing your opinion in our class they think y o u ’re 
stupid and you get laughed at by boys and you get all embarrassed and it stops you
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from  talking at a ll” (tr46). Confidence was an issue but Caoimhe saw the value of 
having discussions in a group like this and suggested that one might have more 
confidence in expressing one’s opinion in a mixed school afterwards: "I think that after 
you finish a conversation with someone like this when speaking out, you might have a 
bit more confidence to express your opinion in a mixed school afterwards" (tr46). I 
think the girls appreciated and valued this kind of forum where they could express 
themselves and evaluate what was happening in their friendship relationships.
Some o f the girls thought that boys were mean to girls and bullied them but they 
interpreted this as boys’ attempt to enhance their standing vis-à-vis their peers: ‘‘H alf 
the reason why boys bully girls is because some other boys might think that they ’re 
brave.,.they fe e l they'd have to bully to stay in their group” (tr46). Saoirse thought that 
boys had a reputation to keep up: ‘‘Most likely you're going to get bullied by boys
because i t ’s like in their nature they'd have to keep up their reputation with the other
boys” (tr46). A t this age they were very self-conscious about their appearance 
especially in the eyes o f boys. One would “be slagged by boys ...over your fatness or 
your skinniness ” (tr46). It is noteworthy however, that the girls did not simply comment 
on boys and close ranks. They were critical of themselves and how they related to each 
other. Caoimhe, who had already opted for a single sex secondary school so that she 
would not be teased, attributed this mocking and teasing to age and lack o f maturity and 
suggested that it was not just boys who were the culprits but that girls did it as well: "I 
don't think it's a real difference" (tr46). She thought boys were not afraid of saying 
what they thought but “girls, they ’re more quiet. They ju s t say it to their friends ” (tr46). 
Some girls thought that bullying goes on between girls but in a different way: “In a 
g irls’ school th ere ’s more bitchiness and fighting"  (tr46); “the boys wouldn’t bully you 
as much as the girls ” (tr46).
Emotional hurt could be more painful and many girls were aware of this, in some 
respects echoing comments by boys (encountered in the previous section): “Girls don't 
physically beat you ....but y o u ’re hurt because your feelings hurt m ore" (tr46); “girls 
are more cruel mentally than physically because I  think they prefer to hurt people’s 
feelings than actually hurt them" (tr46). A lot of self-criticism was expressed in a very 
undefended way. There was a sense that girls held on to grievances and took longer to 
repair the relationship in contrast to boys who restored friendship easily: "If girls did 
figh t they w ouldn’t talk for a few  weeks...but boys, they'd have a figh t one day and 
they'd probably be friends the next" (tr46)
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There was general agreement that boys interacted differently to girls. They had a
different way of expressing themselves: "Boys do n ’t talk in their group  they express
what they feel in a fight but girls are ju s t talking among themselves. They'd call
names behind your back and that’s the difference between boys and girls" (tr46). Girls 
would "slag” you but "boys push you around". Girls were fearful o f starting a fight for 
fear o f  getting into trouble but “boys couldn ’t care less. They ju s t kill each other ” 
(tr46). The word “k ill" was often used by them to denote very rough play. They alluded 
to the bravado of the boys in boasting o f being the anti-hero, the one who got into 
trouble and was not afraid, but Saoirse was not impressed: “I  heard a few  boys 
talking...and they were saying 7 think I ’m the boldest because I ’ve got into trouble this 
many times and I  got sent to Mr. X ’s (the Principal) office ...They’re ju s t stupid" (tr46).
Some girls thought that in a mixed school there was pressure on the girls to wear 
make-up to impress the boys but this was refuted by others. One did this for oneself, not 
for others: “I  p u t on make-up. It isn 't to impress the boys. I t ’s ju s t to look nice... You re 
not going to be liked because you have make-up on. I  think tha t’s stupid judging people 
by what they look like ” (tr46). Others thought that when one enhanced one’s appearance 
one felt more confident: “Girls put on make-up to give themselves more confidence as 
w ell” (tr46). Jacinta thought that some girls wore make-up and drank and smoked to 
look “cool” and attract boys: “Some girls start drinking and smoking and looking
gorgeous all around boys I f  they do homework they’ll slag them and they wouldn’t
go out with them. But i f  you look gorgeous and drink and smoke they w ould” (tr46). 
Evy agreed that girls behaved in a certain way to attract boys: “I  saw these girls and 
they had make-up on and they saw these boys and they were pulling up their
skirts and the boys started walking over to them.... I f  they had been normal people the
boys wouldn ’t have come over to them " (tr46). She put herself in a vulnerable position 
in asserting that boys in this class liked girls with physical attributes which she was 
conscious of lacking: “They like boobies and I'm  straight. Everyone slags me because 
o f  that” (tr46). Cultural conditioning has made for close relationship between girls’ 
appearance and their self-concepts. Elkind 8c Weiner (1978, p. 633) claim that in a 
society where a woman is valued by her looks, appearance plays a large part in a 
woman’s self-conception.
I asked them if  they would be afraid of saying what they really thought and felt with 
other girls. Sally would not say what she really thought if  there were boys in the 
company "in case they’d  call m.e ‘stupid’” implying that she would if there were girls
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present (tr46). She thought a lot of people around here wanted to impress the boys by 
smoking and she thought that was horrible and asked: " Would you start smoking and 
drinking ju s t fo r  one boy?" (tr46). Caoimhe’s response to this question reflected a 
growing self-assuredness and an ease and candour that was obvious towards the end of 
the discussion: “No, I  wouldn’t. I f  I  wanted to I  would, I  w ouldn’t ju s t do it fo r  a boy. I f  
they didn 't like me the way I  am, I  just wouldn’t be with them ” (tr46). These girls did 
not want to resort to duplicity and there was a sense that it was harder for girls to be 
authentic. This strong conception of self and sense of self-respect was also reflected by 
Saoirse who reinforced Caoimhe’s view: "Girls who do all that stu ff fo r  boys.... they 
do n ’t care about themselves. They care more about other people than they do about 
themselves” (tr46). These girls were aware o f the different ways o f being, aware o f the 
tensions inherent in the situations in which they found themselves. There was pressure 
to conform and yet there were lone voices among them that were resistant to following 
the herd. There was a sense that boys use girls and have little interest in authentic girls: 
"I don Y think you should smoke or drink fo r  a fella  because i f  h e ‘s ju s t going after your 
looks and all...he ’11 ju s t dump you and go with someone else w ho’s nicer looking 
because h e ’s not going fo r  your intelligence” (tr46).
7.3.3 The risk o f being authentic
Evy would go along with the herd sometimes and say that she liked something that was 
popular with the rest of the group rather than risk being different: "they’d think I ’m 
weird because I  didn't like i t” (tr46). Then being aware o f what she was saying she 
back-tracked and heard the parental voice o f warning: "Yea, my mom told me to say 
what I  think instead o f  other people leading you. Just do your own thing’’ (tr46). Jane’s 
mother had given her similar advice which she seemed glad to echo here in this group. 
If everybody else said one thing it did not mean that she had to agree: "I have to say 
what I  think" (tr46). The risk of losing relationship and appearing foolish was echoed 
by Jacinta: "Sometimes I ’m afraid to express my opinion....doing a picture in class or 
drawing, they start slagging you, 'you 're stupid, can Y draw ’ and you ’re afraid to ask 
them how to make a different picture because they might actually slag you over it" 
(tr46). This period of early adolescence, the crossroads between girlhood and 
womanhood is, according to Brown and Gilligan, a crisis in young girls’ lives, often 
marked by disconnection and a loss of voice (Brown & Gilligan, 1992, p. 6). Once they
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remove themselves from relationship they can have difficulty in articulating their 
feelings, but they yearn for authenticity in a relationship and want real friends, ones 
who will understand and accept them as they are.
Brown & Gilligan contend that for girls in early adolescence to risk saying what they 
are really feeling and thinking could mean losing their relationships and finding 
themselves isolated (p. 217). 1 asked if it were a big risk in our group to say what one 
really thought because o f what could happen to one. Caoimhe did not think it was a big 
risk but admitted that she felt more comfortable among girls. For Jane it depended on 
the girls and how close she was to them: “I f  you ’re really good friends, -well i t ’s not a 
risk to take, but i f  they’re not they’ll go o ff  and say things about y o u ” (tr46). Saoirse 
expressed a certain wariness; girls even those one trusted behaved differently towards 
each other when there were boys present: “I ’m not afraid to express my opinion here 
because there’s no girls w ho’d go o ff and slag you, but like, in fron t o f  boys they would, 
and I ’d  say that most girls, depending on the girls that they’re with, they'll slag y o u ” 
(tr46). Then seeking reassurance of being understood by me, she asked: “Does that 
make sense to yo u ? ” She had not previously asked this but this time it must have 
mattered to her. Brown & Gilligan in their study of pre-adolescent girls concluded that 
it was essential that there was opportunity to think and feel with other women. They 
suggest that we need to be able to appreciate the relational impasse that these young 
girls experience, and call for a new understanding o f women’s psychological 
development (Brown & Gilligan, 1993, p. 225).
I queried how they could know whether their friends really valued them for 
themselves, and how they differentiated between true and false friendship. There was a 
general feeling that real friends did not put pressure on one to be other than oneself: " I f  
they didn’t hang around with you because you didn ’t smoke or drink or didn 7 wear 
make up, well that really says they’re not really your friends"  (tr46). Jane concluded 
that one must be accepted for who one essentially is if  the friendship is authentic: “I f  
they d idn’t take me fo r  who I  am, well then they’re not really your friends. You ju s t be 
yo u rse lf’ (tr46). Saoirse suggested that not all girls smoked and drank because o f boys; 
they did it because their parents set the example and “they think tha t’s the right thing to 
do, so they should do i t” (tr46). A long discussion on the dangers of smoking ensued, 
listing the dangers to health. Some of these girls showed real anxiety about the fact that 
their parents smoked and they were fearful o f the consequences for them: "My dad 
smokes. I ’m afraid that h e ’s gonna die” (tr46); "My dad smokes. I  don’t like him
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smoking.... I  do be afraid that he'll get cancer’1 (tr46). There was a feeling that smokers 
died younger and would not see old age. Fear for mother was also expressed; Jacinta 
understood that stress drove her mother back on the cigarettes but she was aware of the 
consequences: “My mam's best fr iend’s husband died o f  smoking and drinking” (tr46).
It was as if  these girls had reversed roles and were now protective o f their parents.
7.4 Conclusion
In this chapter my focus has been on friendship and interpersonal relationships, looking 
at the children’s ideas on what makes someone a friend. I studied the development of 
the concept o f friendship from middle childhood to late childhood and early 
adolescence. At age seven to eight a friend could be someone to play with, an imaginary 
friend, a pet or an inanimate object, or a cartoon character. With increasing cognitive 
maturity a “real fr ien d ” was defined in more complex terms. In late childhood and 
early adolescence there were moral implications in close friendship; a friend had to be 
trustworthy and loyal and come to one’s aid in time o f need. Reciprocity involving trust 
and trustworthiness was expected. Both boys and girls considered the friendship at risk 
if  the friend hurt one’s feelings or used one for selfish purposes. There was a sense in 
the group that friendship implied obligations and responsibilities and a mutual concern 
for each other’s welfare. Friends could reject one if  there was a violation of what peers 
considered good behaviour; such transgressions would be bullying, stealing, cheating or 
being racist. Similarity of interests was not considered a pre-requisite for friendship for 
many in my research group but most as they grew older wanted someone to care about 
them and respect difference.
How boys relate to each other and how girls relate to each other were different in 
ways which became more marked in late childhood and early adolescence (5th and 6th 
classes). In this group they were able to articulate and explain these differences in 
behaviour. Boys were aware of relating to each other in a more physical way, in rough 
and tumble play without the need for intimate emotional sharing. Girls were deemed to 
talk their way out of difficult situations, share secrets and isolate others by talking about 
them "behind their backs”. This latter behaviour was decried by the girls themselves; a 
"real fr ien d ” would not engage in such behaviour. Keller & Edelstein (1993, p. 332) 
contend that this intimate sharing of each other’s concerns plays a significant part in 
establishing a moral self, characterised by loyalty, trust and dependability.
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The themes that emerged at this critical transition confirms the views of Youniss 
(1980) that in early adolescence exposure carried risks such as being ridiculed for being 
different, and the one way of ensuring against the negative consequences o f this was by 
having close friendships. Many of the girls in this study group became cautious and 
fearful of expressing an opinion for fear of being laughed at, not only by boys but by 
other girls. They yearned for real friendship and their strong voices in the girls-only 
discussion showed that they had a robust resistance to false relationships. They were 
aware of the pressures to follow the herd and to drink and smoke to impress the boys. In 
this group o f girls there was an intimate atmosphere; I could feel a strong connection 
with the girls and had a sense that they trusted me. They took risks in exposing 
themselves and I could sense that they were aware o f their feelings and o f what they 
wanted. Daring to be oneself and to be authentic in a world where false relations 
beckoned, seemed to be the predominant feeling among the girls at the end of their 
disclosures in the group. Their self-consciousness in the presence of boys, allowing the 
latter to dominate in other discussions, may have been a factor in showing a low 
estimate of what boys expected from them in a relationship. Some attributed the boys’ 
more active participation in the group throughout the year to their need to preserve their 
“reputation ” and to appear "brave " to their friends -  a face-saving exercise to preserve 
dominance.
In these last discussions very crucial issues related to children’s moral development 
were raised and I shall advert to them again in my concluding chapter. There is the 
tension between the need to be independent and the need for affirmation from others. I 
come to know who I really am by virtue o f  my relationship with others; I only grow in 
relationship but I have to resist the pull of particular relationships. If I have to hold back 
who I truly am and appear to be what others want me to be, then I have lost touch with 
my authentic self. Becoming a moral self involves me in listening to the voice of 
conscience, in making responsible informed choices, in being mindful of the welfare of 
others as well as my own, and ultimately in being oriented towards a love of the Good.
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CONCLUSION
8 CONCLUSION: RESEARCH OUTCOMES AND IMPLICATIONS
8.1 Introduction
In Part II I have analysed and interpreted the thinking of the children in my study group 
both in content and process and explored the influence o f the community o f enquiry 
forum, in this case Thinking Time -  Philosophy with Children, on shaping their 
interactions. In this concluding chapter I will discuss the research outcomes, reflecting 
back on the two main parts of the study. My aim is to review what has been learned 
from the study, to consider the extent to which it has answered the main questions posed 
at the outset, and to discuss the significance and implications of the main findings for 
practice, policy and research.
The development of a capacity for critical moral reflection and commitment is 
perhaps more urgent now than ever. In the present climate in Ireland utilitarian 
considerations seem to take precedence, eroding our higher moral aspirations. The 
idealism o f children could get lost in an Irish society and economy that has changed 
considerably in a short period of time. Children are under a whole range of social, 
psychological and emotional pressures to compete and succeed in a society where the 
values of consumerism predominate. In this climate it may be a matter of great 
consequence to keep a moral vision alive. An article in The Irish Times o f March 30th 
2005 entitled “Embattled teachers try to lessen impact of ‘consumer culture”’ bears 
witness to the concern felt in educational circles. The National Children’s Strategy 
(Government o f Ireland, 2000, p. 27) confirms the need of all children for 
acknowledgement, validation and promotion of the moral and spiritual dimension of 
their lives by their peers, parents, and other significant adults.
It is in this context that the present study aims to offer insight into how children form 
their views as they struggle to come to terms with complex moral issues such as duty 
and moral obligation, freedom and responsibility, friendship and relationships, peer 
pressure and bullying, racism and exclusion, justice and fairness. It is in this context 
also that it draws attention to the importance of a forum such as the community of 
enquiry in which these issues are mediated, allowing children to develop and deepen 
their understandings. The potential of this forum to promote an expansive notion o f  the
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good, to develop the moral dispositions of students, and to promote an enriched notion 
o f citizenship will be examined in relation to the outcomes of the earlier analysis.
8.2 Discussion of outcomes
In analysing the outcomes o f this research in the three chapters o f Part II the insights 
from the research into the literature in Part I guided my understandings throughout. I 
have dealt with this analysis in three main categories. Chapter five is concerned with 
children’s cognitive processes, chapter six with notions o f  moral rectitude, and chapter 
seven with friendships and interpersonal relationships. In this discussion o f outcomes I 
am looking at the significance of these findings and in extrapolating from them I am 
examining their wider salience. What is the significance o f children’s notions of right 
and wrong and their competence to reflect on moral issues? Were our discussions in the 
community o f enquiry just a talking shop or did they lead to a heightening o f moral 
consciousness and a development of moral sensibilities, and ultimately to a disposition 
to moral action? I will deal with these questions in the following sections as well as 
examining the group dynamic and the significance o f boys’ and girls’ different styles o f 
interaction and participation.
8.2.1 Competence to reflect on moral issues
One o f the main findings to emerge from this study was the increasing competence of 
the children in a community of enquiry to reflect on moral issues, to engage each other, 
make reasoned judgements, justify their reasons, and change stance in light of opinions 
of others. This social and cognitive competence, the entry into argumentation, which 
Habermas (1990) conceives of as communicative autonomy, developed from slow 
uncertain beginnings and gained momentum and a sense of direction over time. Trust 
was something that could not be taken for granted but emerged with acceptance within 
the group and with increasing ease with the format of enquiry. This sense of belonging, 
having a voice and being heard and the assurance that what they had to say mattered led 
to a stronger sense o f community, and speaking in terms of we as well as I, for most of 
the children in the group. Being challenged to defend their views and be held 
accountable helped many to reflect, rethink and change stance. The ability to backtrack
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from an entrenched position and to modify one’s views in light o f the opinions and 
arguments of others was a measure of the trust and ease a child could feel with peers. It 
was also a tribute to their open-mindedness as this change sometimes arose from 
personal reflection and at other times was precipitated by pressure of argument from 
peers, enabling the child to emerge with a greater sense of autonomy and belonging in 
the community.
The significance of the peer experience in mediating the development o f competence 
was evident throughout the study. The scaffolding of more able pupils manifested itself 
in advancing the argument, questioning and stretching the imagination of others and 
bringing the focus back to the issue in question when it had gone off on a tangent. 
Daring to challenge or disagree with the teacher’s opinion marked a turning point in 
competence and confidence. This happened relatively infrequently but particular 
children were more drawn into the whole process than others. The community of 
enquiry could be deemed to have a formative quality. In the articulation of their views 
in a forum of trust and reciprocity, it had a part to play in shaping identity and in 
developing a secure sense o f self.
The community of enquiry forum enabled the children to move from self-involved 
monologue or egocentric thinking to real dialogue, openness and responsiveness. From 
unfocused circular thinking with a lot of intervention from me, they gradually moved to 
a position where eventually they were able to grapple independently with complex 
Issues, formulate questions, think situations through and arrive at new understandings of 
moral concepts. Using Egan’s (1997) categories it could be said that the Mythic 
thinking characterised by fantasy and conjecture in middle childhood gave way to 
Romantic understanding in late childhood with its attendant gains and losses. The losses 
were reflected in the abandonment of puzzlement in favour o f  realism and a new 
fascination with scientific facts, and the telling of anecdotes with the self as hero. This 
was a feature o f boys’ rather than girls’ thinking. Loss o f metaphor after the age of eight 
was noticeable. How to retain some of this sense o f wonderment and puzzlement as one 
grows older is a challenge facing educators. Verbal competency and an ability to draw 
analogies, being able to see the relevance of history to current situations marked the 
gains. As well as a growing ability to make competent moral judgements and to change 
stance, taking cognisance of the perspective o f the other, development was also 
reflected (as we shall see later in this chapter) in heightened moral sensibilities and in 
enhanced dispositions to moral action.
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The classroom community of enquiry served as a real life model fostering good 
thinking and interpersonal growth in the practice of community and has significance for 
future participation in the wider community. With increasing habituation in the enquiry 
forum the dialogue became more pupil-driven; it allowed the children responsibility for 
direction and leadership. Children, with increasing confidence developed a sense of who 
they were and that what they had to say mattered. Self-understanding, according to 
Dunne (1995, p. 151), is always an understanding of one’s relatedness to others and to 
the good. The Thinking Time practice gave the children an opportunity to reflect on 
their own experience and to connect with the larger whole. MacIntyre (1999) claims that 
it is in standing back from one’s own desires and evaluating them that one makes 
oneself accountable. In the interchange in Thinking Time self-esteem was visibly 
enhanced in many of the participants as they gained confidence in self-expression and 
profited horn the interaction of others. Research findings confirm that children need 
others to become themselves and to understand the selves they become (Splitter & 
Sharp, 1995; Mead 1934; Vygotsky 1981).
There were a few children in the group who did not seem to advance as much as 
others and whose best contribution rarely progressed beyond agreeing with another’s 
opinion in a few brief words. This could be partly attributed to lack of ability in self- 
expression and shyness or fear of having the attention o f the group focused on them. For 
some, being able to make any utterance at all called for effort and courage. When 
questioned about it privately they insisted they were happy in the group. One boy who 
voiced an opinion which differed from the others in the final session told me afterwards 
that he could do it if  he did not look at the camera or the others but instead cast his eyes 
to the ground while speaking. He was very pleased that he had managed to make a 
contribution and I would like to think that his desire to participate and contribute is 
representative of shy children.
Trust, which developed gradually, enabled the children to take a risk, to question, to 
back-track from an entrenched position and take on board the views of others. This 
atmosphere o f trust enabled a decentring from one’s own position and to self-correct 
and become active thinkers. Empathy and reciprocity, central in dialogue, helped build 
relationships and deal in a caring way with other participants in the group. The aim was 
not to defeat an opponent as in debating but to get at the truth of things in a 
collaborative fashion. In this search for truth one is provided with a larger frame of 
reference from which to reflect on self. Experiencing oneself in relationships, according
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to Mustakova-Possardt (2004, p. 254), fosters empathic concerns with others and these 
concerns can gradually move beyond interpersonal relationships into larger social 
concerns with justice and equity.
Conceptions of obedience in the younger years were modified to considerations of 
equity as the children matured, and this was evidenced particularly in the Heinz 
dilemma discussion. The ability of some children to take account of the particulars 
when making moral judgements became more evident in the final two years of the 
study, These children saw that blanket condemnation and generalisations could not do 
justice to particular cases. Consideration o f the intention o f the agent and the particulars 
o f the case were essential in making an adequate moral judgement. In the discussion on 
capital punishment empathic considerations held sway over retribution for wrong-doing. 
One boy’s sympathy for the Oklahoma bomber led him to minimise the enormity o f the 
crime and the number of lives lost. An exploration o f what execution entailed, the 
killing of the perpetrator of a crime without allowing him  the time or years to 
experience sorrow or remorse influenced many children to ponder deeply on the value 
of every human life and to oppose this form o f punishment.
The children’s ability to take the perspective of the other developed as they got older. 
While they could reflect on the unfairness o f the child’s world with all power vested in 
the adult, they could also understand matters from their parents’ perspective and reflect 
on the fact that they were likely to act in a similar fashion w hen their turn came to be 
parents; they would similarly place restrictions on children out o f a spirit of 
protectiveness. Being able to articulate fears in regard to compliance with the well- 
intentioned wishes o f their parents was a measure o f the trust and ease they felt in the 
community of enquiry. The fear that parents will make decisions for him and make him 
into something of their choice rather than his, was aptly articulated by one boy and 
echoed the fears o f others, aged twelve, when they increasingly need to assert their 
autonomy.
The children showed the capacity to move beyond a rule bound morality to explore a 
more expansive notion of the Good. This was evident in rigid views giving way to 
increasing sensitivity to the weak, whether human or animal, in several of their 
dialogues. Their awareness of the interdependence of all forms o f life and advocacy of 
responsible use of the earth’s resources was notable.
The collaborative search for truth has significance in resisting a slide towards 
subjectivism and relativism. In the discussions involving the contrast between moral
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and legal sense o f “right” such as the Heinz dilemma and Robin Hood, the children 
were evaluating and making fine distinctions, trying to arbitrate between conflicting 
claims. At the younger ages o f eight and nine avoiding trouble was uppermost. One 
obeyed to avoid getting caught, pre-conventional thinking in Kohlberg’s (1981) terms. 
As the children matured considerations of equity began to take precedence. These 
discussions engaged not only their critical capacities in examining core values such as 
the value o f life taking precedence over the law but also their moral sensibilities. 
Ultimately, as we shall see presently, it is dispositions as much as beliefs that define the 
moral person.
The more able children could spot inconsistencies and contradictions in the way they 
themselves talk and behave. This has value for later participation in civil society. There 
was recognition that although they profess to love the truth and there was a general 
consensus that cheating on matters of importance was not excusable, they still lie and 
cheat and bend the truth when it suits them. Stealing was considered wrong on principle 
because one stole the fruits of someone else’s labour and did not earn it oneself. The 
moral vocabulary o f the children tended to reflect a strong feeling component; empathic 
considerations were underlying the principle when children considered the feelings of 
the victims and how they themselves would feel when something valuable was stolen 
from them. They frequently expressed moral disapproval and concern for the welfare of 
others. Hoffman (1993, p. 169) contends that while Kohlberg’s developmental theory 
assumes the primacy o f cognition, empathy plays a significant role in determining 
whether one becomes committed to a moral principle by giving the principle an 
affective base.
A feature o f the children’s thinking towards the end o f the study period was an 
increasing ability to reflect on their own thought processes, and to explore identity and 
examine our treatment o f others who are different. There was a tendency to challenge 
racist attitudes and stereotypes and an awareness o f our hypocrisy in regard to the 
marginalized. The children noted that we condemn others for what we do ourselves; for 
example, we condemn Travellers for throwing litter when we are guilty o f similar 
misdeeds. They noted that people point the finger at foreign nationals for shoplifting 
and associate it with colour, forgetting the fact that people of their own ilk perpetrate 
more theft. The labels we use to exclude people, all determined to separate us from one 
another, were examined. The fact that many o f them changed their initial rigid and 
negative view o f Travellers -  whom they grouped together under labels of "rubbish”,
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“robbing" -  to an understanding of the young Traveller’s position in the Young Pavee 
Voices (first screened by RTE Television) was a reminder that children rarely get to 
hear the story o f the marginalized and consequently have little if  any comprehension o f 
their values or way of life. Their impressions and judgements tend to be made on the 
basis of media coverage and the negative views of assertive adults. Contact with ethnic 
minorities and Traveller children was minimal and opportunities to get to know them 
were few because this study group was a homogenous ethnic group in a Roman 
Catholic school and to date each of them had lived in Ireland and most in the area where 
they still lived. (A small number of non-national children were already in the school and 
the trend was predicted to increase.)
There was no noticeable difference in the contributions and levels of participation o f 
those who had joined the group in the Senior School for the final two years of the study 
compared with those who had been present from the beginning. In fact, all of those who 
joined in the latter two years were vocal contributors, and some o f those who 
contributed the least were present from the beginning. The new-comers had a degree of 
confidence and verbal competence and were easily assimilated and supported by the 
others already au fa it  with the practice. The group proved to be a hospitable space for 
new children and, although often challenged, they seemed to blossom within it.
8.2.2 Heightening o f moral consciousness
The children in the study seemed to have a well-developed moral sense and this was 
evident throughout the dialogues in their assertions regarding the dignity o f the human 
being and his or her entitlement to freedom and justice. M ost were sensitive to the 
moral salience o f a situation and displayed a sense o f personal obligation to follow 
through on the right course of action. A more expansive notion o f the good is evident in 
the many instances of children’s generosity of spirit, a sense o f the importance of 
relationship and that the self is not an atom -  the realisation that some things are 
important beyond the self. This is in keeping with Taylor’s (1996, p. 25) contention that 
“human beings have an eradicable bent to respond to something beyond life” and that 
“denying this stifles”.
In examining issues of justice, moral obligation, freedom, responsibility and 
inclusiveness, the children tried to make sense of the situations that confronted them as 
moral agents and sought to arrive at an understanding, and if  possible a reconciliation of
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opposing values. At age seven and eight their notion o f justice was very much governed 
by those who occupied positions o f power and the locus o f  control was largely external. 
From age ten to twelve they were increasingly able to decide for themselves, in the light 
o f a developing notion of the good, what was right and wrong, just and unjust. Values 
seemed to become internalised. Kohlberg (1981) contends that real understanding and 
respect for authority emerges around the age o f  ten. In dealing with the race issue, 
which is a core issue in moral formation, there was a reminder from several in the group 
that one has an obligation to see the oneness o f  the human family. Children are capable 
o f generosity o f  spirit and embracing the whole human race but they are also influenced 
by the thinking in their immediate environment. Some saw asylum seekers as 
threatening in many ways and expressed fears o f  overpopulation, pressure on housing 
and competition for scarce resources; they regarded them as takers rather than people 
capable o f  making a worthwhile contribution, enriching the society which hosts them. 
On the other hand, some expressed sympathy for foreign nationals and this sympathy 
influenced others in the group, leading them to change stance, on looking at the bigger 
picture and examining the fallacies o f prejudiced thinking. The same was true o f  
attitudes to Travellers. The suggestion that the solution lay in getting to know them 
reflected a generous spirit and a belief in the significance o f relationship.
Most children seemed to have an understanding o f  the concept o f  rights as evidenced 
in discussing the UN Charter on The Rights o f  The Child. They singled out some rights 
as being more important to them than others -  for example, the rights to freedom from 
sexual abuse and to protection from dangerous drugs -  but the article most frequently 
referred to was Article Twelve, the right to an opinion and be listened to and taken 
seriously. There is a growing recognition o f the need to listen to children and take note 
o f their views. The National Children’s Strategy (Government o f Ireland, 2000) has 
placed great emphasis on giving children a voice on matters that concern them. In this 
study the children conceded that, in general, parents knew what was best for them but 
still contended that they did not always listen to them. At the same time there was 
recognition among some that there were aspects to childhood that they valued and that 
equal rights (as children understand them) could mean an end to the freedoms o f  
childhood.
The children’s notions o f rights extended beyond the defence o f  basic rights for all 
humanity to embracing other forms o f  life. They questioned the privileging o f  
rationality and were adamant that being smarter did not necessarily make us superior.
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Animals did not have a voice and the children were horrified at their use for medicinal 
and cosmetic purposes when they endured suffering and pain in the process. The 
questions raised by the children in this study pose challenges to the way we see 
ourselves as dominators rather than custodians o f the earth and all forms o f life that 
inhabit it. Does nature exist solely for our benefit? Do people have a right to pollute 
rivers and oceans for their own benefit? The children saw a preoccupation with jobs as 
short-sighted. They considered the Sellafield plant in Cumbria a real threat to our 
existence and saw individual and collective greed as leading to the destruction o f the 
environment. This might encourage us as educators to see the significance o f a spirit o f  
interconnectedness rather than exploitation. A bio-centric approach advocates the 
protection o f non-human beings or natural environments for their own sakes rather than 
just for ours. Splitter & Sharp (1995, p. 233) see the community o f enquiry as playing a 
role in defining and honouring the relationship between humanity and the rest o f nature 
and working out the implications o f  what it means to be a responsible person in the 
world.
There was recognition that with freedom comes responsibility. Freedom was a 
concept understood by the children, not as wanton freedom but freedom to make 
choices. At all stages in the discussions, freedom to do as one pleased was attractive but 
was not seen as realistic. They recognised that children need protection and that adults 
were in a better position to know what is best for them. Nevertheless by age eleven and 
twelve some strongly advocated freedom to makes choices for themselves, freedom 
from being moulded into what parents wanted o f them, and the freedom to have some 
part o f one’s life secret and free of restrictions and supervision. VanManen & Levering 
(1996, p. 100) suggest that adults need to respect this establishment o f  the boundaries o f  
privacy insofar as this is possible and allow children to develop a separate identity.
Sensitivity to the needs o f others has implications for harmonious relations in the 
wider community. These discussions helped to awaken and heighten children’s social 
consciousness which must surely have significant implication for political participation 
in later years, though as Walsh has noted, concern for a child’s future should not and 
need not trump attention to their present reality as children (Walsh, 1993, p. 91).
8.2.3 Development o f  moral sensibilities
The cultivation o f moral sensibilities includes fostering a belief in the ultimate 
meaningfulness o f life. In Robert's Story (Cam, 1997) the children recognised that one 
could be fulfilling one’s job description without responding fully as a human being, 
making a distinction between duty as defined by an employer and proper moral 
response. If it came to a choice some children said they would risk losing the job rather 
than ignore the cries for help o f a person in distress. This resonates with Taylor’s (1996, 
p. 14) contention that ethics involves more than what we are obliged to do; it also 
involves what it is good to be. In this study the children seemed to understand that 
commitment to the well-being o f another implied that bystander behaviour was not 
acceptable. Many children had a clear understanding o f bullying and the motives that 
underlie it. Some saw the bully as poor in empathy, basically a weak character who 
plays on the fears o f  others: "It kind o f puts a dark thing into you ’’ (tr33).
In teasing out the rights and wrongs o f a particular situation the children were building 
on and shaping one another’s ideas, making connections and distinctions. Should one lie 
to save one’s own skin? Many thought in minor matters it did not matter much if  one 
lied or cheated but there was an acknowledgement that something is lost when one 
bends the truth and lies with the intention o f  deceiving. They saw this loss as a loss o f  
pride in oneself. They agreed that the fact that everybody does it does not make an 
action right. One boy reminded us that the taking o f drugs in sport hurts a lot o f people. 
This reference to having pride in oneself arose again in The Knife (Cam, 1997) 
discussion, dealing with minor incidents o f  stealing. In stealing the fruits o f someone 
else’s labour one is taking away one’s own pride and losing something precious. The 
community o f  enquiry could thus be considered a form o f  ethical practice, heightening 
the moral sensibilities o f  those engaged in the discussion. Murdoch contends that it is 
the quality o f  consciousness that matters. True morality, according to Murdoch, is 
ultimately a love o f the Good: “Anything which alters consciousness in the direction o f  
unselfishness, and inspires love in the highest part o f  the soul is to be connected with 
virtue” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 377).
Noddings (1984, 1992) argues that moral principles themselves do not provide 
sufficient motivation for moral action. Care theorists place more emphasis on moral 
sentiments, cultivating better people rather than better principles or reasoning. 
Communicative autonomy, knowing oneself through the interaction o f others 
(Habermas, 1990) plays a large part in raising the consciousness o f  children. For
1 9 5
Socrates the examined life was a life in conversation. Through conversation one 
deliberated and acquired knowledge, and knowledge that for him equated with virtue. 
By enhancing the children’s judgement and reasoning capacities we are equipping them 
for challenging situations. How does one know what is right? Can one decide for 
oneself without considering the views o f others? In deliberating on these questions the 
children veered from asserting that one did not have to consult others if  one was 
absolutely sure o f the rightness o f one’s opinion and had belief in oneself, to seeing the 
value o f  consulting peers if  a conflict with parents was involved or parents if  there was a 
conflict with peers.
The children pondered over following the dictates o f  conscience, taking on board the 
opinions o f  others and the particulars of the situation. Teasing out these issues led one 
boy to conclude that chaos would ensue if  everybody were to decide for him self or 
herself what was right because each would believe in the rightness o f  his or her own 
position. This points in the direction of the need for a reasonably based consensus on 
core values. Since these children were in a Roman Catholic school and had religious 
instruction daily, it was surprising that none o f them referred to the guidelines o f  
religion in the discussions o f right and wrong. Perhaps they had internalised these 
values. In discussing Lennon’s Imagine a view  was expressed that we would be better 
off without religion since it was the cause o f  so many wars. This view  was rejected in 
favour o f  respect and tolerance by one of the stronger group members. It is interesting 
to note that the questions posed by Murdoch are central to most established religions. 
She suggests that what should be aimed at is goodness, and that w e should not be overly 
concerned with right action but rather with questions such as: “How can we make 
ourselves better?” “What sort o f life is worth living?” (Murdoch, 1998, p. 366).
8.2.4 Friendship, interaction and gender
This study highlights the importance o f  friendship at all ages. Aristotle termed 
friendship the bond that holds communities together. Some o f  the qualities o f  a good 
friendship cited by the children remained the same from middle childhood to early 
adolescence. Trust, empathy and loyalty were the cornerstones o f  true friendship for the 
children from age eight through to age twelve. Awareness that one needed to posses the 
qualities o f  a good friend if  one required them in others was expressed at both ends of 
the continuum. Playing together and observing the rules o f the game were more
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important in middle childhood. The broad concept o f  friendship, embracing imaginary 
friends, imaginary objects and pets became narrowed with increasing cognitive 
maturity. The change in perception o f friendship was a qualitative one. One expected 
the friendship and caring to be reciprocated, and hurt was deep if  a friend betrayed one. 
Certain standards o f  behaviour were expected and the evaluations o f  peers were 
significant.
Peer pressure was a factor in friendship. Friends could put pressure on one to 
conform to the values o f the herd as in stealing from shops. Non-compliance could 
mean isolation but there was consensus that one had to resist this kind o f pressure.
"Real friends ” would not put one under this kind o f pressure nor could they be bullies -  
though they might put positive pressure on one to refrain from anti-social behaviour and 
discourage racist remarks. Having something in common was not a major determinant 
o f friendship for the children at ages eleven to twelve; likeability and willingness to 
reciprocate mattered more. They could make allowance for difference and some saw 
conflict as healthy because the negotiation involved in reconciliation could strengthen 
friendship. The willingness to accept faults in another and to cope with conflict and 
emerge stronger showed belief in the constancy o f friendship.
The importance o f  friendship and sense o f belonging for children emerged strongly in 
the study, with the qualities o f trust and loyalty being much emphasised. While both 
boys and girls had some common aspirations for friendship such as constancy, 
mutuality and dependability, there were notable differences in their approach to 
engagement and conflict. Girls tended to believe in the power o f  persuasion and that one 
could talk someone out o f  a fight. Boys tended to disagree seeing little room for 
conversation when one was angry and physically involved. Boys raised the issue o f  
utilitarian friendships and expressed scom for people who pretended friendship in order 
to gain access to one’s possessions. Such people used one and both boys and girls 
expressed feelings o f being hurt at being used by a friend. It was the girls who raised the 
issue o f  forgiveness as important in friendship.
Another observable gender difference was that girls acknowledged that they shared 
secrets w hile boys asserted that they did not. VanManen & Levering (1996, p. 112) 
maintain that by about twelve years old, the bounds o f  friendship and o f  secrecy 
coincide and that sharing secrets is significant in forming a separate identity. While the 
boys in this study saw the sharing o f secrets as something pertaining to girls -  a fact not 
highlighted by VanManen & Levering -  they were adamant that they wanted privacy
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and resented the constant supervision o f  an adult, particularly when they were with 
friends. There is a reminder here for parents and teachers o f the importance o f  allowing 
children space and privacy.
Both genders could decentre and see matters from the perspective o f the other 
reinforcing the idea that the sense o f self is socially constructed. Boys saw girls as more 
vulnerable emotionally, more easily hurt and saw themselves as less likely to be hurt 
since they communicate in a different way: their contact is more physical involving 
rough play and they tend not to hold on to grievances. Girls saw boys as having more 
physical contact and being more competitive. They also thought that in this seeming 
directness and simplicity o f boys’ relationships there was an absence o f  intimate 
sharing, boys not being allowed to cry, not sharing secrets, having to make an 
impression, be dominant and save face. The girls attempted to persuade the boys that 
one could talk one’s way out o f a fight, confronting them with an alternative to settling 
matters with flailing fists. The boys insisted that talk is useless when one is physically 
active, pummelling an opponent.
On their own and out o f earshot o f the boys the girls were quite critical o f boys for 
their competitiveness, and need for dominance and preservation o f  reputation within the 
group, often at the cost o f negative behaviour. Some found boys’ mocking inhibiting 
and argued that girls perform better in single sex schools but some girls were aware o f  
their own shortcomings and quite critical o f  themselves in how they gossiped about 
each other and held on to grievances. They saw conflict among girls as being verbal and 
often prolonged. The girls allowed the boys to dominate discussions but some argued 
that boys needed to be assertive to save face in the group. A study by Lodge (1998, p. 
179) o f children in middle childhood in an Irish classroom found that in a mixed-gender 
class, males tended to dominate verbal proceedings with girls participating to a lesser 
extent than boys in classroom interaction. Her study showed that, overall, boys 
demanded and received more teacher attention in the classroom. Much o f this attention 
tended to be negative but rewarding for them since increased visibility boosted their 
self-esteem. Lodge asserts that research findings bear out the greater tendency o f boys 
to communicate with one another physically and verbally in a rough manner and, by 
comparison to girls, to pay less heed to adult opinions o f  them (Lodge, 1998, p. 264). 
An exception to this in my study was one boy’s assertion o f the unfairness meted out to 
boys by peers: one is given sympathy when physically hurt but not when one’s feelings
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are hurt. This could be a reminder that boys also need a sympathetic ear and freedom to 
express feelings.
Another factor highlighted in the study was the pressure that assails early adolescents. 
The girls’ discussion on their own centred on the concept o f  authenticity (though the 
term was not used) and they drew attention to the pressures on them to conform, follow  
the herd, and the risk o f isolation if  they dared to be different and to say what they really 
thought. They were candid about what they really felt, and about how they would risk 
following their inner dictates, and not compromise for the sake o f popularity. Some 
thought that one must be accepted for who one essentially is. As one straddles girlhood 
and womanhood life is difficult and fraught with risk. Brown & Gilligan (1992) point to 
the importance o f  supporting them at this age in their need to think and feel with other 
women, and acknowledge that they are capable o f  caring deeply. This was also borne 
out in my study; many o f the girls’ fears extended to worry about their parents and their 
habit o f endangering their health by smoking. The roles now seemed to be reversing; 
they were being the protective ones and their parents the ones in need o f protection.
The findings indicate that the boys were sympathetic towards the girls and were not 
inhibited by them. On the other hand the girls were very critical o f  the boys and o f  
themselves. This discussion with the girls on their own points to the need for a forum 
for girls to be able to express themselves freely away from the competitive atmosphere 
of the mixed gender classroom. The reticence o f girls after age ten to partake fully in 
discussion and their willingness to allow the boys to dominate raises a question about 
the value o f  mixed-gender classrooms as they exist in Ireland where class teaching is 
largely the norm and the competitiveness o f  boys in such a system has an inhibiting 
effect on girls. At the end o f the study period I wondered if  boys in a mixed gender class 
would also benefit from a discussion on their own away from the need to prove 
themselves in the presence o f  girls. Perhaps for both genders, in different ways, 
significant issues arise towards the end o f primary schooling that need to be better 
understood and dealt with more insightfully.
Although the study revealed differences in the way boys and girls viewed  
communication and friendship, significant gender differences were not discernible in 
the moral reasoning o f  boys and girls as they dealt with moral dilemmas involving 
issues o f fairness, justice, obligation and responsibility. Thus, Gilligan’s thesis that girls 
reason from a predominantly empathic perspective and boys from a predominantly 
impartial one was not confirmed. Male and female participants reasoned from empathic
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and impartial perspectives and used a mix o f moral orientations, depending on the 
context. This corroborates the findings o f  Walker et al (1987) that it is context rather 
than gender that determines moral orientation.
8.3 Implications of the study
Having outlined the main findings o f  the study, I shall conclude with some remarks on 
their wider import. Some caution here is enforced by the fact that this investigation was 
an in-depth case study o f  a single class group in an Irish primary school. It might be 
contended that such concentrated focus on just one class provides too slender a base for 
any confidant or reliable extrapolation to the wider community o f  Irish primary school 
classrooms. There is some justification for this reserve but, without reopening major 
methodological issues here, I claim that, as between wide-gauge research with large 
samples and the statistical techniques they entail, and the kind o f micro-ethnography 
undertaken in this study, some advantage in depth and penetration lies with the latter. 
This is particularly the case when the object o f investigation is an innovative non­
mainstream practice such as Thinking Time -  and when the aim is not to establish 
information about what is already being done on a wide front but rather to test the 
potential o f  this new practice. For this purpose, it is perhaps enough that the class 
selected was not in any way exceptional -  for example, by containing unusually gifted 
children or being in an especially favoured area socio-economically or otherwise that 
might make it manifestly unrepresentative.
8.3.1 Implications for practice
The study demonstrates the importance o f being aware o f  children’s moral thinking, that 
they have their own opinions and need to be given a forum where they can articulate 
their views and be respected for them. The curricular emphasis on literacy and 
numeracy means that some children are deemed less able than others. In Thinking 
Time-Philosophy with Children all can have a voice and be considered competent. This 
was borne out in this study by the fact that a few o f the most vocal and confident in the 
group had the lowest attainment in literacy. In the safe setting o f  the community o f  
enquiry they could feel that what they had to say mattered and they could feel affirmed 
and valued.
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Focus on content is not enough. Teachers need to help children to reflect on the ways 
in which they are thinking. Searching for truth and meaning is more relevant to children 
now than ever because o f  the confusion and uncertainty o f living in a pluralist society. 
How might we further advance and develop children’s moral thinking? Is there a way o f  
protecting and enhancing the transcendent self -  the self that seeks for truth, goodness 
and beauty -  or perhaps some postmodern equivalent o f  what these transcendental 
values have meant for human beings, at least since Socrates and other great figures o f  
what Karl Jaspers called the Axial age? Pedagogy needs to concern itself with personal 
ethical flourishing, have some conception o f excellence and foster a sense o f virtue in 
the children. It is not clear where moral education finds a home in the Irish school 
curriculum. Apart from religion class, where the core values o f  a particular religion are 
taught, there is some scope in the recently introduced subject Social Personal and 
Health Education (SPHE). There is a danger however that this subject might be 
confined to purely psychological concerns and in avoiding this it might very profitably 
be informed by insights gained in the study.
The evidence accumulated here suggests that the experience o f a community o f  
enquiry helps children to deliberate wisely, and encourages them to make informed and 
responsible judgements. The inclusion o f Thinking Time -  Philosophy with Children as 
part o f  a whole school policy would prove valuable in challenging children to question 
and think through their assumptions, appreciate diversity and respect the feelings and 
emotions o f others. It would have a part to play in fostering consistency between one’s 
beliefs and real-life choices. Incorporating the spirit o f  Thinking Time into the whole 
way that the school is organised would have wider significance in giving due 
recognition to children’s views and implicating them in matters that concern them. This 
is in keeping with the vision o f the National Children’s Strategy (Government of 
Ireland, 2000, p. 8) that children are citizens whose rights need to be strengthened in 
legislation, policies and practices -  not least their right to express their views.
Participating in a study such as this one impacts on the researcher as much as on the 
participating children. Although I considered m yself impartial and equally committed to 
the well-being o f boys and girls in the group, long immersion in the group endeared the 
participants to me. It was not possible to be completely impartial nor was it desirable in 
the face o f  the children’s openness and candour. They expressed their thoughts and 
feelings and I sometimes felt humbled in their presence. Their generous sharing o f their 
own deeper thoughts and feelings helped me to understand what it was like to stand in
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their shoes and I had a sense of regret when the time came to part with them. On their 
final day in primary school one month after our final Thinking-Time session the 
children took their leave o f all their teachers and many were tearful. Some of the girls, 
to my surprise since I had already bade farewell to the whole group, sought me out in 
the Junior School, laden with presents and “Thank You” cards. None o f the boys did. 
Perhaps they would have been embarrassed at this age to present a lady with a present!
The study also impacted on the class teacher who took part in the final two years of 
the study. She noted that participation in a community o f ethical enquiry led to an 
improved ability to formulate challenging questions in other areas. She was unsurprised 
when on a visit to The National Gallery the guide remarked on the number o f searching 
questions posed by these children. This was just one o f many instances o f transfer 
benefits that she recounted. She also asserted that listening skills in the classroom were 
enhanced and responses to opposing views became more focused on the issue being 
debated and less on the personalities of the protagonists. It led her to be more aware o f  
the children as co-decision-makers. Their judgements and decisions on what course o f  
action to take were influenced by standards and yardsticks they had discussed as a 
community.
8.3.2 Implications for citizenship
MacIntyre (1981) suggests that the self has to find its identity in and through 
communities and on the basis o f the evidence adduced in this study, I feel confident in 
claiming that the community o f enquiry has a part to play in the social construction of 
the self. According to Splitter & Sharp, this community is potentially a model of 
democracy in the classroom, a model o f how to prepare young people for citizenship. 
As participants they have an opportunity to widen their horizons, taking into account the 
concerns and perspectives o f others as they reflect on the consequences o f  their own 
actions on the world (Splitter & Sharp, 1995, p. 246). The community o f  enquiry has the 
potential to influence children’s life-long learning. Critical self-reflection and 
commitment to discourse are what is needed for participation in the democratic system. 
In this study some discussions for example, on the environment and animal rights, 
engaged the moral sentiments and dispositions o f the children. They had a strong sense 
of ecological responsibility and were critical o f  adults for their instrumental outlook. 
Having a forum where their voices could be heard could promote an awareness of
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collective responsibility and an enriched notion o f citizenship. Being mindful o f  
responsibility for our fellow human beings and sensitivity to the needs o f the 
handicapped as in Robert’s Story (Cam, 1997) helped the children towards a strong 
collective conscience and the fostering of moral sentiment.
Without the right kind o f nurture in social contexts, moral sentiment can atrophy. 
What is needed, according to Bauman (1995), is more autonomy for individual selves 
and more vigorous sharing o f  collective responsibilities. Otherwise one remains focused 
on individual comfort and instrumental purpose. Moral issues must be constantly 
discussed and debated if  they are to be understood. While the children in this study were 
beginning to acquire political consciousness and to understand the role o f  government 
in the provision o f services, they needed reminding o f the part they themselves could 
play in safeguarding the environment, and in their treatment o f  others particularly with 
regard to stereotyping and prejudice. This kind o f  discussion can further the belief that 
life has meaning and that each individual has a part to play in the social fabric.
Dunne argues that the kind o f knowledge being promoted by the State is the kind that 
would create a skilled work force, utilitarian considerations being uppermost. This 
narrow conception o f knowledge is not the kind that can deliver the kind o f solidarity 
that a healthy conception o f citizenship requires. This notion o f solidarity, how one 
understands who one is, one’s sense o f identity, is at the core o f  community. This sense 
o f  collective participation, speaking o f we as well as o f  I, marks the disposition o f mind 
required for active citizenship. The crucial modem challenge, according to Dunne, is 
finding ways o f  reconciling the roles o f the modem subject as economic agent, as bearer 
o f  rights and as citizen (Dunne, 2002, p, 78).
If we are to foster personal and civic morality there is need for a strong moral 
education. Children are the hope o f  the new society and their idealism needs to be 
nurtured. In postmodern Ireland, with the credibility o f religion in decline, children may 
seem to have more freedom, but this freedom can become vacuous, becoming little 
more than the freedom o f the market, the freedom of rampant individualism. The values 
o f  a consumer society, creating wants rather than satisfying genuine needs, point to a 
moral vacuum. “Soft relativism” (Taylor, 1989, 1991), a growing amoralism and 
indifference to the plight o f  the marginalised and less well-off, gravely threaten our 
active participation as citizens in a civil society. The problems that beset Irish society 
are reflected in western societies worldwide where the pursuit o f individual self-interest 
takes precedence over concern for the common good and the welfare o f  all. This
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preoccupation with self-fulfilment cannot, according to Taylor, sustain a strong 
identification and commitment with the political community. He sees the need for a 
recovery o f  a language o f commitment to a greater whole if  society is to survive 
(Taylor, 1989, p. 508).
It is as part o f a counter thrust to all this that a critically dialogical practice such as 
Thinking Time has, it can be argued, an important role. Moral education needs to find a 
place in some form in the Irish curriculum, where moral and civic values are reflected in 
how we respect and care for one another. While we have an awareness o f  the rights o f  
others -  and a somewhat attenuated moral vocabulary to articulate it -  this awareness 
needs to translate into a capacity for genuine moral reflection and honest caring. Change 
in the cultural make-up o f our society has confronted us with issues o f  racism and 
discrimination. A new awareness of Irishness that includes all colours and creeds 
together with respect and tolerance for cultural difference is called for. The present 
challenge to cherish all o f the children o f the nation equally could hardly have been 
envisaged a decade ago. A recent government publication Intercultural Education in 
the Primary School (NCCA, 2005) which was circulated to all primary school teachers, 
goes some way towards raising awareness among teachers o f  the importance o f  respect 
for other cultures and lifestyles. I suggest that a community o f  ethical enquiry such as 
the one described in this study would go a long way towards the creation of thinking, 
caring and sensitive children, aware of and respectful o f difference, and towards 
furthering a healthy conception o f citizenship in tomorrow’s adults.
8.3.3 Implications for future research
This research provides rich detailed insights into the thinking o f one group of 
children in prolonged engagement over a period o f  almost five years. It furthers our 
understanding o f  the thinking o f that group’s development in moral responsiveness and 
thinking from middle childhood into early adolescence but clearly, as a study, it has 
limits, an appreciation o f which may suggest lines along which further research might 
profitably be conducted. One fruitful line o f enquiry concerns the implementation o f the 
SPHE programme in Irish primary schools. Given that the implementation o f this 
programme is at an early stage, and given the moral-civic nature o f  much o f its content, 
a research project investigating possible ways in which the norms and procedures o f
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Thinking Time could be incorporated into its methodology, has much to recommend it 
to policy makers and practitioners alike.
Two gender related studies also suggest themselves on the basis o f the interpretations 
offered in the second part of this study. The first concerns girls in the senior classes of 
primary schools. Is the pattern o f reticence on their parts, discerned in this study, 
evidence o f  a widespread but insufficiently recognised phenomenon and would it be 
replicated in other studies of larger relevant populations? If the answer here is in the 
affirmative, how might steps be taken -  including through the conduct o f further 
research -  to ensure that the related issues are not only better recognised and understood 
but are also acted on with greater pedagogical skill in the period o f difficult transition 
from childhood to adolescence and from primary to post-primary schooling?
The second gender related issue that seems to call out for further investigation 
concerns children’s secrets. The most authoritative study on this topic, Children’s 
Secrets: Intimacy, Privacy, and the Self reconsidered (Van Manen & Levering, 1996) 
does not advert to girls’ penchant for sharing secrets among themselves or to boys’ view  
of this as a characteristic trait of girls. Are the findings on this issue in my study 
unusual? Do boys generally see secret sharing as pertaining to girls only? Is their own 
relative disinclination to share secrets related to a sense on their part that this involves 
divulgence o f  confidence and an opening up o f  themselves and their emotions -  
something that so far is generally not part o f  their culture and upbringing? These 
questions, raised pointedly by the present study and, so far as I can tell, not addressed in 
existing scholarship, suggest fruitful lines for further enquiry.
Another very valuable type o f follow-up study might investigate the vexing interface 
between moral knowledge and moral action, and the complex factors, imaginative and 
emotional, that mediate between the two. By its nature, this study was confined mainly, 
though not I hope exclusively, to investigating children’s “knowledge” -  though their 
participation in the community o f enquiry was itself o f  course engagement in a practice 
and thus a form o f action. What would be more interesting to explore -  and what would 
call for a more observational study anchored in diverse locations in the children’s life- 
worlds -  is the effects o f  development in their thinking on their actual behaviour in a 
range of morally salient situations. A really ambitious and very complex enquiry along 
these lines might also include a control group not exposed to Thinking Time -  another 
element that could not be accommodated within the limits o f  this study.
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Another more limited form o f “transfer” might also be further researched -  again 
perhaps by including a control group. How do changes effected in the children’s modes 
of thinking, pattern o f responsiveness and interactive styles through participation in 
Thinking Time affect their approach to learning in other subjects, especially subjects 
such as social and environmental studies and history, that are laden with moral 
concerns? Or again, what is the impact o f  the experience o f  such sustained discussion 
on learning -  and teaching -  in religion as a school subject? Are some o f the classic 
issues o f the thorny relationship between faith and reason animated in a new way? 
These and other similar, related questions suggest themselves, not only pointing to 
fruitful lines o f possible enquiry but also, by doing so, confirming, I hope, the very 
considerable significance o f what has been undertaken in this study.
In conclusion, while one cannot generalise from the findings o f  a single case study, 
one can learn a lot from a study such as this one. It shows what is possible when 
children in a particular setting engage in ethical enquiry. Thus it enhances our 
understanding o f  the moral sense o f children at a particular age and in a particular 
setting and can provide fertile ground for further research. The inclusion of Thinking 
Time — Philosophy with Children in whole school policy would have a key part to play 
in fostering the moral development o f children and make a valuable contribution to the 
formation o f  future citizens o f  our democratic polity.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX
The following is a list o f all the transcripts o f recorded dialogues that make up the raw data 
for this qualitative research study:
Tr 1: What happens when we dream?
Tr2: If there were no television....
Tr 3: What does Freedom mean to you?
Tr 4: The Whales’ Song....Was the uncle right?
Tr5: The Universe
Tr6: What is Thinking
Tr 7: Animals and humans are nearly the same, or are they?
Tr 8: What does it mean to be Brave?
Tr9: What is Beauty?
Tr 10: What is Will-Power?
Tr 11: What happens when living things die?
Tr 12: Was Robin Hood right to rob the rich to help the poor?
Tr 13: Where did the first trees come from?
Tr 14: What is Fairness?
T rl5: If there were no God....
Tr 16: What is a good Friend?
Tr 17: Responsibility (Should Tom tell?)
Tr 18: Which is more serious: breaking one glass in a temper or 15 by accident?
Tr 19: Inclusiveness: How can we include those who are different?
Tr 20: Should Michael O’Connor steal the drug to save his son’s life?
Tr 2 1: Theft (The Stolen Bike)
Tr 22: Taking sides in a dispute
Tr 23: Animal rights: Experiments with animals
Tr 24: Children’s Rights
Tr 25: What does taking Responsibility mean?
Tr 26: Do you agree with the Death Penalty?
Tr 27: Beauty versus Ugliness (The Velveteen Rabbit by Marjorie Williams)
Tr 28: Stealing (The Knife, by Philip Cam)
Tr 29: Friendship (Linda and Clara, by Ron Reed)
Tr 30: Cheating (Gabriel’s Story, by Ann Margaret Sharp)
Tr 31: Friendship (The Fight, by Philip Cam)
Tr 32: If everybody disagreed with Joshua could he still be right? (The Fight)
Tr 33: Why do Bullies bully? (Back in the Playground Blues, by Adrian Mitchell)
Tr 34: Duty to Others (Robert's Story, by Philip Cam)
Tr 35: Does skin colour make a difference?
Tr 36: Travellers
Tr 37: Travellers (response to video ofR TE’s Young Pavee Voices)
Tr 38: How much Freedom should eleven-year-olds have?
Tr 39: What is a real Friend? (Winged, by Philip Cam)
Tr 40: Is it alright to lie to save your own skin? (Winged)
Tr 41: Is it ever right to kill animals for fun, e.g. sport?
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Tr 42: The Environment (The River’s Story and The Newcomer, by Brian Patten)
Tr43: Imagine by John Lennon
Tr 44: The Heinz dilemma (Lawrence Kohlberg)
Tr45: Children’s Rights
Tr 46: Are girls better off in single-sex schools for their secondary education?
Tr 47: Is it fair to deport the family o f an Irish citizen?
On the following pages is a sample (unabridged) of four o f the above dialogues:
Tr 15: If there was no God (page 3)
Tr 23: Experiments with animals (page 10)
Tr28: Stealing (page 17)
Tr 46: Are girls better off in single-sex schools for their secondary education? (page 26)
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Transcript 15 (2nd class): If there were no God
- Evy begins the dialogue:
- If there was no God there would be no earth.
- I disagree with Evy because if there was just one planet and that was Mars  no one
would be alive,
- I agree with Evy.
- If you’re disagreeing with [inaudible] w e’re saying no-one would be alive, the
world would still be there, right?
- Who would have made the world?
No-one could have made the world.
- It couldn’t have been builded by its own.
- There must have been someone.
- A big rock. There must have been a big rock.
Well, who would make that big rock?
- Just the Universe would make that big rock.
- I agree with Liam because once all the galaxies were just this huge rock that came from
oxygen and gas and then one day it exploded and it caught a load o f  rocks in it, so God
didn’t really make it.
If there was no God there would be no us.
- T: I agree with Bill. “If there was no God there’d be no us”. I wonder would we live
the same way, would we behave the same way if we didn’t believe there was a God 
there.
If there was no god we wouldn’t be saying this because we wouldn’t be there.
- Well, I think that God made a big huge piece o f paper and He planned what He was
going to do and then if we were bad because, am, ah- God just made the planet out o f a
rock.
I agree with Fred because we wouldn’t be talking right now if  there was no God.
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I think if  there was no god there’d be no life. I disagree with Caoimhe and Liam and 
well whoever said “somebody is after making the world” but he probably wouldn’t 
have. God was the first one to step on the earth before any other people stepped on it.
- I think there might be an Earth because I think the devil would have made an earth.
He’d make it and make it Hell. He’d put dinosaurs and volcanoes on it. He’d make
people and put them into misery and give them mean hearts.
- Ms Russell, if  there was no God, there would be no people so the world would be just, 
like, empty.
- I agree with Liam and Barry because scientists think the world was made because gas 
exploded and that made the world come.
- I agree with Evy and Bill.
Some scientists say that the world will end at the stroke o f  midnight of the millennium 
but I don’t think that will happen. God might just have put that in their minds for a 
joke.
I’ve got a question. How was God bom?
- Con, if the devil made the earth, who made the devil?
- I think that God made all that, if there’s no God all the other gods could have made the 
earth.
- If there was no God there wouldn’t be any school right now, we wouldn’t be in it.
- I agree with Caoimhe Madden. A few years ago they said that the world would end as
well.
- A gas explosion is real big. It must have been loads o f  rocks and I agree with Liam and 
Barry.
- I agree with Liam because the gas would have exploded. It probably would make those 
things. And whoever said God was the first person to step on earth, what about Adam 
and Eve? They were told to be the first people to step on earth.
- God’s not really a person, is He? He’s a God. I disagree with anybody who said God 
made the earth because, like, He’d have to be -ah -  If the sun just got blocked off, like, 
the earth would just turn into ice.
I agree with Liam. What did he say? Oh yea, because if  God made the earth first it 
would be just spinning around, floating into space. And Con, where are you coming to
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now? Like, how could the devil just start the earth? Then he would just be floating 
round like God. And if there was no God, I’d just be sitting around playing marbles all 
day.
I disagree with Mick because God didn’t step on earth. Adam and Eve did.
I disagree with Evy and I agree with Kenneth and Liam.
If there was no God there wouldn’t be much religions.
I disagree with anybody who said God stepped on earth first. He never stepped on 
earth.
T: If there was no God yes, I agree there’d be no religion. Well, would you bother 
doing the right thing then?
You couldn’t do the right thing because you wouldn’t exist. You wouldn’t be in it 
because God made us.
Well, if  god made us and no one believed in God at all and they didn’t know God was 
there at all, you wouldn’t be very holy at all and they wouldn’t know about Jesus or 
anything.
If God didn’t make us and there was no God I think we wouldn’t be here at all.
I disagree with Liam because we wouldn’t be here.
If there was no God and no school we wouldn’t be here.
If there was no God and there was an earth but there was no school on the 
earth.. ..[inaudible]
Yea. We wouldn’t be here.
I disagree with Bill and Saoirse because Jesus is God’s son. God’s son stepped on the 
earth instead o f God.
I can answer Stewart’s question, ah, “Who made the devil”? The same, ah, the same 
way God was made. The devil was made that way. And I’m saying that the devil 
might, that if there was no God, there’d be more ways that the devil could be making 
misery around the whole Universe. So he’d be able to make the earth with dinosaurs 
and make people and give them misery for amusement.
I agree with Barry. I think there was an explosion but I think that God made everything 
on the earth but I don’t think He made the actual earth.
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- I disagree with Mick because Jesus wasn’t the first one that stepped on the earth.
- Anyway, I can answer Stewart’s question about how God was born. You see God just
probably just appeared one day up in Heaven.
I agree with Saoirse and I disagree with Mick because they didn’t say that God’s son
Jesus didn’t step on earth. They just said that God didn’t.
- Brendan didn’t because he asked me what I said. Some scientists say the world will
end at the stroke o f the millennium.
I think if there was no God there wouldn’t even be a devil.
- Adam and Eve couldn’t be the first man and woman to step on the earth because they
were quite like us and men evolved and women evolved from monkeys. So they’d just
act like monkeys, the first men if they walked.
- God was the first person to touch, oh Brendan, when you said “one day God appeared”, 
well there wasn’t any days in those days. God was the first man to touch the earth 
because He made it and I think that the earth will end on the stroke o f the millennium 
because that’s what happened with the dinosaurs. A big rock came in and then all the 
dinosaurs, they died.
A rock couldn’t come in and kill the dinosaurs.
- An asteroid!
My mum said that ice killed all of them.
- It was the Ice Age.
Con, how could the devil be there to make all the dinosaurs?
- I agree with Donald because the world didn’t end when the dinosaurs died. If there was 
no God and there was still a world and everything I don’t know what the world would 
be like because loads o f  people don’t believe in God.
- I disagree with Evy because the dinosaurs, they didn’t die because they got a thirst. The 
scientists think that there was a big asteroid and there was a big volcano.
- Donald, how do you know that it was an asteroid? No one knows if it was an asteroid. 
They only found it was an asteroid when it actually hit the earth. And whoever says it’s 
going to end at the stroke o f the millennium, the earth has had loads o f millenniums. 
It’s very old. So why would it just blow up on this millennium? It might be next 
millennium or the millennium after that. There’s going to be loads o f millenniums. 
The earth itself is around five million years. The sun will probably blow up. When that
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will blow up it will blow Venus and all the planets. Everything will blow up. The earth 
has only a few billion light years away. The sun is only about 58,000 light years long. 
It would blow up the earth in ten seconds with the explosion.
If people don’t stop talking about the earth is going to cone to and end I’m going to 
freak!
Okay Brendan, the chances of the earth ending are a million to one. A zillion to one! 
And the earth won’t end at the millennium but it may be very hot with the soaring sun. 
It happened two millenniums.
I agree with Evy and I disagree with Donald and I disagree with Mick.
I don’t think the world will end at the stroke o f the millennium.
I disagree with Liam because it wasn’t ice. It was fire. That’s why because Ireland was 
attached to Europe when the fire came to kill the dinosaurs. A part o f the earth sinked 
to the water and then there was only a bit o f Ireland left. That’s why we have only a 
very little Ireland.
T: I don’t think the world will end at the stroke o f the millennium. Some people have 
said before that the world is going to end on a certain day because they wanted to sell 
more candles and make people go out and buy them. People often have a reason for
saying those things because they make money if you believe them. If there was no
God, I hope there is because if there was no God there’d be no after-life and we’d end 
when we die.
I disagree with Barry because the chances o f the world ending is zero.
I don’t think the world will end at all because, like, if because they said that before and 
it never did.
I don’t think the world will ever end because it’s loads o f years so I don’t think it will 
ever end.
But Donald is only guessing. I think when Jesus died, He’s after, well He’s after being 
God and they’ll have to make a new one.
Well when they say it will end on the millennium they don’t say the earth will blow up. 
I think they might be saying our world will end, that we ’11 be extinct and something else 
will go on living on earth, exactly like the dinosaurs.
I agree with Con.
Ms Russell, there wouldn’t be and after-life because we’d never have had life in the 
first place if there was no God.
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I agree with Barry because there’s been like, nineteen millenniums and why would it 
just be this one?
I don’t think the world will end because why did they catch on to this one? Why didn’t 
it blow up in all the other ones?
Brendan, I didn’t say that the world would actually end. I said that sometimes i t’s said 
but it won’t. I don’t even believe that it would end anyway because they just want to 
sell more candles. They say that there will be a black-out before the millennium and 
people are trying to get more candles like Ms Russell said but I didn’t actually say that 
the world will end.
I don’t think that the world will end because I think God made the dinosaurs. He didn’t 
like the way the dinosaurs destroyed the world. And He wanted to make them extinct 
so that the world wouldn’t be so messy when we came along and that we wouldn’t be 
killed by them. I think that’s why He made them extinct.
- T: Keep to the point now “If there was no God”.
I hope that the scientists that said the world will end on the stroke o f the millennium, I 
hope they’re not real scientists because then they’re probably right. Back to the point. 
Am. 1 think there’s nineteen millenniums or something. The dinosaurs -  there was an 
asteroid or a rock because I heard it on the radio.
T: We’ll have to stop you there Donald because Christy is singing a song outside. 
Maybe he’s finished is he? He’s finished, thank God, go on.
I heard it on the radio that it’s possible that the world might end this millennium
because all the dinosaurs were astray and they’re sending up this rocket thing to
see if  there’s any asteroids or anything......
T: Donald, it’s a bit too long. You’ve said that already. Evy you are last now. We’ve 
finished our three rounds. Put up hands anyone who really wants to say something. 
Evy picks, preferably one who hasn’t spoken already. She can speak herself as well, 
[most hands go up!]
I agree with Brendan because the world will never end.
I disagree with Liam Lister because [inaudible]
I disagree with anybody who says that the dinosaurs destroyed the earth because 
dinosaurs only destroyed the earth to kill their prey.
- Hands up who thinks the world won’t end. Then would you please stop talking about 
it!
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Maybe God was a little seed and the sun’s heat inflated and inflated and inflated it and 
BANG God was just made. And maybe humans were made in the ice age and 
monkeys made snowmen and the ice age melted and it turned into humans.
Why do we have to stop talking about the millennium?
Not the millennium. Because it’s not the point.
People might be scared.
What happens if  the sun blows up? It will hit the earth and every planet.......
: We are going back to the same area again so I think it’s time to finish here.
CLOUD TIME.
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Transcript 23 (4th class): Experiments with Animals
T: Animals are used in experiments to discover a cure for human diseases. If it were not for 
these experiments many people alive today would not have survived. Animals are also used 
to test cosmetics -  skin-care and make-up. (I then show pictures o f  animals most commonly 
used in experiments: rats and mice for cancer, apes for heart transplants, cats and dogs for 
various drugs etc.) Our question for discussion today is: Could it be right in some 
circumstances to experiment on animals?
Fiachra begins the dialogue.
Fiachra: I kinda don’t think they should test animals because it’s not fair on them. And for 
make-up and skin, that’s basically a disgrace and all that and it’s not so fair on the animals.
Brendan Barron: I think it’s mean to test drugs and operations on animals and the same way 
eye-shadow. I wouldn’t buy medicine if  it had been tested on animals.
Con: Well, I’m just thinking about it’s not fair to use them for make-up and eye-shadow 
because like w e’re killing animals just to make us look a tiny bit prettier. It’s sort of like 
stupid because w e’ve extinct a lot o f animals and now w e’re paining them just to save us 
because it’s a bit stupid. We kill them and now they’re sacrificing lives to help make us 
live, like. It’s disgraceful.
Stewart: I think it’s disgraceful as well. Just think o f it from the animals’ point of view. If 
you were one o f the animals you wouldn’t want a person doing an experiment on you.
Cian: I agree with Stewart but I think in some cases it’s okay to kill animals like ants. I 
think they’re stupid. Why don’t they just do transplants on something like ants.
Bill: I agree with Stewart. They have a right to live to live.
Donald: I agree with Fiachra. It’s a disgrace to use animals to be pretty and they could get 
extinct.
Evy: I agree with Stewart because animals are just like humans and I wish that there were 
other kinds o f creatures in this land that they could use.
Donald: Like you!
T: That’s mean. N ow don’t embarrass anyone please.
Grace: I don’t really think it’s a good idea to inject animals with all these diseases because 
it’s not fair to the animals.
Clodagh: Yea. They don’t even get to say if they want it or not. They don’t get a right to 
say that they don’t want it done on them.
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Caoimhe Orde: They shouldn’t be tested because like they have rights the same.
Liam: I agree with Con because it’s not very good to be doing that to animals.
Barry: 1 don’t think it’s fair. They were here long before us. We’re hurting them.
Mick: I think animals should get treated the exact same as humans should because they 
shouldn’t get killed. If you were that animal you wouldn’t want an experiment, would you?
Aisling: Animals don’t know what’s going on to them in testing. They might die and they 
don’t know what happened to them.
Saoirse: Yea. I think that if humans want to make make-up out of tests on animals they 
should test it on a human. If it’s hurting it should be tested on humans.
Caoimhe Madden: 1 think it’s not fair because animals could get extinct and it’s just not 
fair.
T: As far as I know they don’t use animals that are threatened with extinction. That’s why 
they use cats and dogs and mice and rats. They’re easy to breed. They can have lots more of 
them and they’re not threatened. I think we are agreed that using them for make-up isn’t 
right because we could do without that. But I wonder if I had a little brother who was dying 
o f some disease would I sacrifice an animal just to make him better. I wonder would I?
Kenneth: Maybe now in the middle of an operation this animal you’re operating on just sits 
up and says “Hey you! Go away! Go test it on some human! I don’t want to die. I’m too 
young to die. Maybe I’m too smart to die.
Brendan B: I disagree with Cian because ants aren’t animals. They’re insects.
Con: I agree with everyone who said that animals, who sided with animals, okay?
Stewart: If somebody like my friend or part of my family was sick and they’re finding a 
cure I wouldn’t think it right to use it on animals because they wouldn’t even find a cure for 
it and they just kill an animal and not find a cure.
Cian: I disagree with Brendan on ‘ants are just insects’. Insects are animals. They’re tiny 
little animals that have six legs and they’re part o f the animal family.
Donald: I disagree with Stewart because ah if  somebody in your family really was sick you 
would actually do anything to save them. And apes are very smart and I agree with Evy 
because if  there were more Evys on the planet we should test them on her.
Jacinta: I agree with Aisling.
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T: Donald, I draw the line here. That’s against the ground rules: respect others. We look 
after everybody in this group. Isn’t that fair, children? I wouldn’t like anyone to be 
embarrassed. Would you apologise to Evy, Donald.
Donald: Sorry!
Jacinta: I agree with Aisling because the animals could die anyway with shock.
Jane: If someone in my family was dying I wouldn’t do it on animals.
Caoimhe Orde: It’s bad enough to test it on animals.
Liam: I disagree with Jane because if your little sister was dying you would agree with 
testing on animals because the family is more important than a few animals.
Barry: Evy, the first time you were talking, am it’s not even fair to use animals that are 
stupid.
Mick: If your brother or your father was dying you’d have to do something.
Aisling: If it was somebody in my family, it’s not fair to let a person die and the animal 
live.
Saoirse: I agree with Aisling. I wouldn’t either if it was a person in my family. I’d probably 
know the person in my family longer than the animal.
Caoimhe Madden: I think animals have the exact same rights as humans.
T: If I’d agree with the killing of animals to save a person in my family what about saving 
somebody I don’t know at all? People say ‘ah well, it’s alright to use mice and rats and 
w e’re killing these anyway’.
Are their lives less important than cats and dogs?
Kenneth: I’d like to continue what I was saying last time. I’ve lots to live for like. If some 
human is going to die in five minutes, say he’s going to die anyway. Give him the injection. 
He’s going to die anyway.
T: Kenneth, who dies in five minutes?
Kenneth: You don’t test it on the animal. You test it on the human who’s going to die in 
five minutes.
Fiachra: I wouldn’t help anybody I don’t really know because they could be a murderer or 
something. I don’t think they should test it on rats. My friend has 16 o f them in a cage.
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Brendan B: I’ve got two parts to my answer. I think rats have the same rights as other 
animals as well. They’re still basically animals, like. I probably wouldn’t test animals for 
someone I don’t know because ah the same as Fiachra like.
Con: Well, I sort o f agree with Brendan and Kenneth because if I was testing it on a 
hamster I’d test it on him when he was three years old because hamsters only live for about 
two or three years. So I’d test it on really really old animals who are going to die very soon. 
It’s better than testing on animals really young.
Stewart: I agree with Brendan because I wouldn’t like....when you think about it, if your 
sister or your brother was dying you probably would want to do it if you think about it.
Cian: I disagree with Con because say if the animal was dying anyway and you wouldn’t 
know if  it was because o f the disease or say it naturally had some disease, right, like BSE 
and it died anyway. You wouldn’t know if that cure didn’t work or if it was dying of age. 
And am I kind o f agree with Ms Russell because I think it’s unfair that rats really don’t do 
anything bad. You know the way we heard about Foot-and-Mouth. The rats are just 
carrying diseases. They’re just going around getting food. That’s their natural thing. That’s 
the way they were made.
Bill: I agree with Barry. Animals have a right to live. A dodo should be alive right now. 
And humans don’t have rights to take cats and rats to kill.
Donald: Stewart, am, I told you so and I agree with Barry and Bill. The dodo was kind of 
stupid but when there was not much o f them left they still should have lived because they 
had as much rights as any other animal.
Jacinta: If someone in my family was dying I’d like to save them but I wouldn’t like to kill 
an animal because I think it’s cruel.
Jane: I agree with Jacinta.
Grace: I agree with Caoimhe because animals do have rights and I disagree with Con. 
They’re more likely to test the disease on animals that are young.
Clodagh: I disagree with Con too because if  they try to cure whatever animal, they 
wouldn’t know if  they could save them or not because they’d just die.
Caoimhe Orde: People say like you can just do it on animals but they’re still living and 
they’re still creatures.
Liam: In this lab somewhere they had these monkeys to drill into their skull to get a certain 
thing out and in about five months they die and they do this to every monkey............
Barry: 1 think if somebody was about to die and if  they knew they were about to 
die...............
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Mick: I agree with Liam and Barry.................................
Aisling: I disagree with Con because if the animal was about to die, it would want to be just 
let die. Then you do an operation on it, it’ll probably just die.
Tracy: I agree with Con.
T: Tell us why Tracy. (Tracy stays silent).
Anna: I disagree with Con because they shouldn’t do it on animals.
T: 1 wonder when scientists get animals into the laboratory are they interested in the 
animals or are they mainly interested in testing out their drugs or diseases. Is the same 
animal tested again and again and the creature is only kept there for experiment. When we 
get to Fiachra he can pick a speaker because w e’ve done three rounds with the tip. Then we 
go back to the first person with the hand up.
Kenneth: Con, you said they (should) test on animals that are about to die. They (should) 
test on humans that are about to die. And Cian, ants are too small to operate on.
Cian: I know. I’m aware o f that.
Kenneth: You could easily bum it (an ant) with a magnifying glass.
Jane: I think it’s done for the experiment. It’s like a child bom that doesn’t know what a
monkey is. They see pictures but they don’t know what it really looks like.
Sally Tully: I disagree with Con because if you operate on an older animal it’s going to die 
quicker.
Grace: Whoever does that in the lab is cruel to the animal.
Barry: We’re always eating animals in meat and also for their skin and that’s not right 
either. I disagree with Con because if you only kill an animal when they’re old, ah I could 
never kill an animal but I eat meat.
Con: That was the eleventh person who disagreed with me. I’ve been counting.
T: You’ve made a lot o f people think, Con.
Con: There’s a few people I want to say thank you because they said the same thing. They
didn’t say they disagreed with me so Thank You!
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T: Children, if everybody agreed with you there wouldn’t be much o f a discussion. It’s by 
agreeing and disagreeing that we have a good argument, isn’t it? So don’t be offended if 
someone disagrees with you. That’s good,
Fiachra: Con, you made me worry because my hamster is getting quite old and I’m worried 
that it might die.
Mick: I disagree with Con because I had a goldfish that was six years old. I had a hamster 
that was four years old.
Barry: I would give my life to save an animal.
T: Do you eat meat then?
Barry: Yea.
Liam: How can people say that they don’t like to kill animals and everyday they probably 
eat ham, turkey or beef or pork and then they come in here and they say that they disagree 
with killing animals?
Cian: I agree with Liam. It does kind of make sense like. W e’re just killing them either way 
for our own enjoyment. We could survive without eating much meat. When you go to 
MacDonalds you’re getting to kill animals for your own enjoyment like.
Bill: I agree with Liam about the monkey thing because like w e’re half ape and human. It’s 
not fair to kill apes because we’re half apes.
Stewart: If you were really old and someone wanted to experiment on you then you 
wouldn’t like them to do it.
Donald: Con, I’ve a surprise. I disagree with you and I agree with Aisling because they’d 
rather be left to die on their own than go through pain and suffering. Because if you die on 
your own o f age, they’d be happy to die on their own.
T: Who are you talking about? Who’ll be happy, animals or people?
Donald: Animals. They’d be happy to die on their own than in suffering and pain.
T: Pick the girls now. There are a lot of boys talking.
Donald: Barry.
Barry: I should have agreed with you Liam. I hate eating meat but at least I’m not cruel. 
I’m addicted to it (meat).
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Aisling: Animals eat other animals like deer in the wild and it’s not cruel for them to kill 
animals. If you were wild you would eat animals too.
T: So that animals eat each other, is that the point?
Evy: the only meat I eat is chicken and turkey because I don’t like any other. We go to 
MacDonalds and I love vegetables. It isn’t very nice to kill vegetables!
END
16
Transcript 28 (5th class): Stealing (The Knife, by Philip Cam)
Did Carl do wrong in stealing the knife? What makes stealing wrong?
Evy begins the dialogue.
Evy: I think he did wrong because people have to work to get money for their family. When 
you steal something then they don’t get the money.
Kenneth: If he didn’t steal the knife he’d still feel okay but if he kept the knife he’d have a 
guilty conscience.
Con: I think he was wrong to steal because if everyone went around stealing things nothing 
would be good. You couldn’t trust anybody and you’d be like when somebody into your 
house you’d be watching them all the time.
Cian: I agree with Con and I agree with Kenneth because stealing is wrong.
Stewart: I think stealing is wrong because if  you steal somebody else’s possessions, if you 
steal it you can get in big trouble and it’s wrong.
Ms Lawless: Yes, I would agree with people so far that stealing is wrong for many reasons. 
People steal things but why is it wrong to steal just nothing? ‘Twas only an old knife really. 
Why was it wrong to steal something that had no real value in itself? And yet I think he did 
wrong. It wasn’t belonging to him. It was belonging to somebody else.
Brendan McArthur: I disagree with Con because you said that stealing is wrong but yet if 
everybody was stealing and you didn’t want somebody to steal and you had a gun, you 
probably had to steal that gun as well.
Brendan Barron: I think it’s wrong to steal because think how the other person would feel if 
you stole something valuable from them.
T: If everybody else was doing it and all your friends said it was okay to steal 1 wonder 
would that make it okay?
Caoimhe Orde: I think stealing is wrong. I think if you really want something you should 
work for it and you’d feel better about it as well.
Sally: If all my friends were stealing I still wouldn’t because it’s wrong to steal.
Barry: I totally disagree with Con because if you couldn’t trust anyone and everyone was 
stealing that that would mean you’d be stealing and it would be wrong like to do like them.
Liam: Some people said if all their friends were stealing that they wouldn’t do it but it’s 
kind o f  hard not to because the pressure comes on and they’d call you a chicken.
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Eamon Murran: I think it’s wrong to steal because if it becomes a habit then you could get 
caught.
Fiachra: if Carl didn’t have any friends he’d probably go up to someone and say “Give me 
money or I’ll stab you”.
Donald: I agree with Liam because like if everybody else was doing it it’d be hard like not 
to join in. Stealing, if everybody else was doing it and you didn’t they wouldn’t like you 
any more because you’re “chicken” and all that.
Jane: I agree with Liam because if your friends did say that you’re chicken and all I don’t 
think it’s very fair. They’re the ones that are stealing. It would put pressure on you because 
they’ll say “I won’t be your friend if you don’t”. You shouldn’t be their friend if  you have 
to steal against your wishes.
Clodagh Mulhearn: I don’t think you should steal because it doesn’t belong to you and if it 
doesn’t belong to you, you shouldn’t take it.
Kathleen: I agree with Evy because if everyone steals.........
Mick: I disagree with Ms Lawless because.............
Kenneth: What’s the point in stealing when you can get cash and get it?
Con: I agree with Liam and Donald because if everybody’s doing it and not being friends 
with you if you don’t do it so you really sort o f have to like. And Ms Lawless, you were 
saying that we know it’s wrong but it’s worth so little, I want to point out to you, in the 
story it says: “Look”, Pete cautioned, “You could still be caught. Like you said, you were 
the only one in the store, and that knife is worth a lot o f  money”.
Stewart: if  you steal everybody would be asking you “Where did you get that and you’d 
have to lie to everybody and then ‘twould get to you eventually.
Ms Lawless: Even if things are worth a lot o f money they’re still only things. I suppose it’s 
a question o f I would say: Are there some things in life more important than things like 
knives you can get money for, cars you can get money for. To me it seems in the story here 
what was more important to Carl in the end. He didn’t choose to give back the knife that 
was worth a lot o f money because he found something else more important. The question 
we have to ask in relation to Liam and Donald’s comment is: Can you get over that stage 
when you have to be part o f the gang to do something wrong? Is there something more 
important that can make us value something more than a knife worth a lot o f money?
Brendan McArthur: I disagree with Con because if you took a knife and it’s worth a lot o f  
money not many people would buy a knife singly. Most people wouldn’t buy a knife for 
say £ 2 9 .1 kind o f  agree with Donald and Liam but disagree with them as well because like
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you could get over them calling you “chicken”. But you couldn’t get over your conscience 
for stealing something valuable.
T: Yes, 1 think that’s an interesting point. You could get over it. You’re under pressure. 
They’re calling you “chicken”. If you don’t want to be isolated, does it make it okay or is it 
still wrong?
Barry: i kind o f agree with Brendan because if you steal something it is worth a bit but like 
your conscience would probably eat your mind. Then you’d get a bit disturbed and that’s 
worth a lot more than the knife.
Caoimhe: I agree with Brendan.
Donald: ] disagree with Brendan because if  they called you “chicken” you would kind o f  
get upset and then they’d keep calling you stuff and then like you’d have no friends. Yea. 
You’d be a loner. You wouldn’t like that at all.
Jacinta: What if your friends are stealing and they ask you to do it and you said it was 
wrong they called you “chicken”. If you said “No” they’d probably tell you to pick between 
them. If you said you didn’t want to steal, they’d say you’re not being our friend any more.
Jane: In the story I have a point where the boy’s really saying that friendship is better. It’s 
more valuable than a knife, so if the knife is worth much friendship has no price.
Clodagh M.: I don’t think he should steal it because it is not right.
Kathleen: I agree with Jane because if you lose a knife you can just buy another one but if  
you lose your friend you can’t.
Evy: I agree with Kathleen and I think stealing is wrong.
Saoirse: I think stealing is wrong because if you steal something all you get is a guilty 
conscience about the thing which you stole. But if you earned the money to buy that thing 
you know that you earned the money to get it.
Mick: I agree with Brendan Barron because I think you would get on without them [the 
gang].
Kenneth: If your friend does it and you’re the one that quit on him [inaudible].
Con: Well I agree with Brendan Barron because if your friends do call you “chicken” well 
you would be able to get over it. you’d get used to them doing it and you won’t care any 
more. But if you stole something you wouldn’t be able to get over it. you wouldn’t.
Cian: I agree with Brendan and I disagree with Liam.
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Stewart: I think that if you steal something you could live a hard life. The chances are that 
you, you don’t still live a happy life.
Ms Lawless: Yea. I think friendship is more important and it’s risked when you steal even 
if you’re in a crowd and you join in. You do risk losing real friends. I wouldn’t expect 
someone to trust me if  I was stealing. Trust would be gone.
Brendan McArthur: I kind of agree and disagree with Stewart because the idea of stealing is 
that you don’t have to work for it. You just said they could live a happy life if they did not 
steal. Most people, they wouldn’t if they were getting a big thing like a tv or a bike. It 
would take them a while to work up to it and they wouldn’t want to. And I agree with 
Kathleen.
Brendan Barron: Stealing is just a way, I think stealing is just lazy because you could work 
for the money and earn it just by taking a little bit longer but am like you wouldn’t really 
get over it. Your friends are like, you couldn’t buy friends or anything by being “cool”. 
Friends are priceless but if they want to steal and then they start calling you a chicken well 
then you shouldn’t like them any more.
T: Yea, I agree that stealing seems to be the easy way out. So what does it take sometimes 
not to? I wonder does it take something like having the courage to stand up to the gang, 
stand up to your friends, to do the right thing.
Anna: Even if my friends did steal I wouldn’t.
Barry: 1 think like if you don’t steal and other people are working to get that stuff it kind of 
screws up everything. You’re just taking yourself away from the real world.
Eamon: I agree with Brendan because if they tell you to steal you shouldn’t be their friend.
Fiachra: I agree with Eamon and Brendan.
Donald: I think first o f all, I kind of now agree with Brendan and then but I wouldn’t steal 
because when you steal something, your mind when you don’t steal something it’s kind of 
calm. But if you steal something it’s all nervous and when somebody asks you if somebody 
said “Did you hear the knife in the shop is gone missing” you’d be there “Oh, I didn’t know 
that”. You’d be really nervous.
Sally: I agree with Jane because friendship is more valuable than stealing a knife.
Jacinta: 1 agree with Jane. You can’t buy friendship but you can but a knife.
Jane: I disagree with Brendan McArthur. I saved for my bunk bed for a year and for my 
holiday. I still wanted the bunk bed after a year. If he saved up for the knife he’d be more 
proud and happier than he would be stealing it.
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Kathleen: I disagree with Brendan McArthur because if you save up for something because 
you really want it, it would take a good while.....
Evy: If people work for it and someone steals it then they probably get blamed for it. 
Aisling: I agree with Saoirse.
Mick: 1 agree with Kenneth because it’s just like saying that if you’re not going to get a job, 
say your friend got a job and the other guy stole it.
Kenneth: Just say you were with your friends and they say to you “I’m just gonna go to the 
shop to steal something”, and you said “no” they could call you “chicken” or they could 
beat you.
Con: Yea, I think stealing is wrong. If your friends go down and they’re going to steal and 
they’re asking you if you want to come with them you really should say “no”. It’s really 
difficult now when you’re doing this but you really should say “no”. You have to try and 
build character to do this.
Cian: I agree with Con and Kenneth because stealing’s wrong.
Stewart: If your friends tell you to steal something or else they won’t be your friend, then 
your friends are putting a price on friendship.
Brendan McArthur: Everybody said that you could save up for it if you still want it but I 
really meant that like say, you’re really impatient and like if it’s something that might be
sold out by the end o f the week you wouldn’t have time to save up for it if  you had
maybe a hundred you’d just go over and take it.
Brendan Barron: It’s kind of hard to, stealing is the lazy way out and if  you get caught 
you’re in big trouble. And people work. People work to make those things. So you’re 
taking away their pride.
T: Yes, I agree people work to make those things so you’re taking away the fruits of 
someone’s labour. I’m just wondering here if you stole something that wasn’t any good to 
the owner and that owner didn’t care about it anyway, would that make it okay to steal or 
less serious to steal.
Barry: I don’t think it would matter what it was or how much it was worth. It’s just what 
you’ve done so it doesn’t matter like. You’ve stolen it.
Liam: I kind o f disagree with Brendan because you’re not really taking away their pride. 
You’re taking away your own pride.
Eamon: I disagree with Jane because you have to save up for the thing you need because 
you’re not going to steal a bunk bed.
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Fiachra: I agree with Eamon. You couldn’t just go out of the shop with a bunk bed in your 
pocket.
Donald: 1 agree with Barry because like it doesn’t matter. You could be stealing a little 
bush that’s dead. You’d still have a guilty conscience.
Jacinta: I agree with Eamon because you can’t actually steal a bunk bed without getting 
caught.
Jane: I disagree with Eamon and Jacinta. I didn’t actually say that I did steal a bunk bed. I 
said that stealing wouldn’t be worth it. In saving for my bunk bed when I got it I was 
happy. I said when you steal a knife it wouldn’t be very valuable to you. If you stole it, it 
wouldn’t be yours. It would still be theirs.
Clodagh M: I think it would still matter if you stole something and the owner didn’t want it 
because the owner might not mind. But if your friends found out that you stole something 
they’d mind.
Kathleen: I think it does matter if  you stole something and the owner didn’t mind. It would 
still be stealing.
Mick: I agree with Fiachra because how could you fit a bunk bed in your pocket and how 
could you walk out o f the shop without the alarm going off.
Con: Well, I think if you steal something that’s really small and it’s not really worth 
anything that’s just being mean and the person’s not going to need it at all. That’s just 
being very lazy because if they’re not going to need it at all and you just ask them for it 
they’ll probably give it to you if they’re not going to need it at all. Stealing it, now that’s 
just real lazy.
Cian: I agree with Con. I know one thing that’s not dear without anybody caring. If you 
stole like a penny sweet, it’s only one sweet. They probably wouldn’t ask you to pay for it.
Ms Lawless: I was thinking there about getting away with it. If you’re going to be asked 
did you take something, whether it’s valuable or not valuable you’re asked a straight 
question. Did you take it? Did you see it? To get away with it I think you have to lie and I 
ask myself: How would I feel about myself after lying? And before I lied? And I think that 
would affect how I would feel about myself.
Brendan McArthur: I disagree with Cian because even if it’s small like and you took it, it 
wouldn’t be lazy. It would actually be stupid because if you stole food or something or 
loads o f sweets they’d be gone in a few days. But then if they catch you they might make 
you work there for maybe a week or so.
2 2
Brendan* Barron: That’s good because you’re taking away their pride as well as your own 
because Chink o f the people who really worked hard to make that and think how you’d feel 
with your guilty conscience like forever.
T: Yea, I agree you’d probably have a guilty conscience if  you took something that 
belonged to another person. I wonder then if you stole it from a thief. It doesn’t belong to 
him. He’s not going to come saying “That was mine”. If you stole it from a thief would it 
be okay?
Barry: I think it’s kind of boring to steal because if  I wanted something like a bike and 
instead o f  getting a job and saving up for it, I stole it. It wouldn’t mean as much to me as it 
would if I had all the money for it.
Liam: Well, I kind o f disagree with Brendan Barron. The people in the factory just press a 
button on a machine and it’s done. It’s in the packet and all done. So it doesn’t really take 
them hours and hours to do it.
Caoimhe: I agree with Liam.
Fiachra: ] agree with Liam because it’s just a factory and they [inaudible]
Donald: I think it’s bad to steal it because like if you stole something like that was valuable, 
a bike or something, if the guards caught you like and they let you off, you’d have no 
friends. You wouldn’t have a good reputation.
Sally: I agree with Liam.
Grace: I f l wanted something I’d better go out and or something but I wouldn’t steal it.
Clodagh M: I don’t think you should steal. No matter how small a thing it is, it’s wrong.
Kathleen: I agree with Grace because if you steal it’s not really yours but if you wait and 
get it yourself then it’s yours.
T: W e’ve done several rounds now. This time for the last ten minutes now you can put up 
your hand. Evy will start and she’ll pick a speaker, maybe someone who didn’t speak so 
much.
Evy: I know that they press a button but how long does it take by the time you see it?
Saoirse: I think stealing is wrong because if your friends are doing it and they say you 
should do it too, well I don’t think you should even if they’re not your friends any more. It 
shows that they’re not real friends.
Kenneth: I disagree with Evy and I agree with Liam because the machine would go a lot 
faster than a person making it by hand.
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Cian: I agree with Clodagh because even if your friends tell you you’re “chicken” and stuff 
you shouldn’t do it.
Brendan Barron: It’s different because think how long it took Bill Gates to make his first 
computer.
A voice: Who’s Bill Gates?
Liam: Oh my God! Microsoft!
Brendan Barron: He’s the guy who made Microsoft and say if you stole his idea and you 
stole all his microchips and stuff how would you feel?
Fiachra: Some shops are stealers because they rip you o ff . When you buy them [toys]
for a really expensive price they break in two seconds.
Liam: Evy, we weren’t talking about robbing machines. We’re talking about a packet of 
sweets and Bill Gates had machines to make computers.
Boy: He didn’t invent the computer though.
T: Can I come in here. Before we leave Bill Gates you might think about this: Is it alright to 
steal an idea? Is that stealing?
Barry: Your friends can call you “chicken” or beat you up, they’re not really your friends. It 
is wrong to steal an idea. They’ve worked a long time on this idea or else they thought o f it 
straight away and have worked out how to use it.
Eamon: I agree with Fiachra because when I went into a shop I went to buy this racing car 
and it said £20 on it. Then they charged me £25 and said there was something wrong with 
it.
Donald: 1 disagree with Evy because you’d only have to make something by hand if you’re 
in the 1980s or 1970s or before 1990. We’re in the modem age. W e’ve got TVs, radios and 
play-stations, computers. We’ve got all these rocket scientists, gadgets and all.
T: And what? What’s the point you’re making Donald?
Donald: 1 disagree with Evy. [Laughter]
Kenneth: If you robbed something you’d have to think o f the alarm..........
T: We’re rambling off the point now. Is is right to steal?
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Brendan Barron: When you steal something from a shop it might have cost a lot of money 
to make that thing. It would be just like stealing tots o f  money even if it was a piece o f junk 
that you wouldn’t use. You could sell it. It’s just taking the easy way out.
Fred: I disagree with Evy because they’re not On my road a young fellow stole a
packet o f  sweets and the shop-keeper saw him.
Cian: I disagree with Clodagh because who would care if you stole a penny sweet?
All: She never said that.
Cian: She said if  you stole anything big or small. What’s wrong with stealing a penny 
sweet?
Liam: It still cost a penny.
Cian: How long would it take you to save up for that?
Stewart: They’re [those who steal] going to be upset. They’re going to be feeling the guilt 
when they think about it.
T: I’m going to turn off the tape now. Would anyone take up Cian’s point. The fact that the 
sweet is small, does that make it okay to steal? Is the amount or the size that makes it 
wrong? The last word is from Con then.
Con: Well, if  you’re stealing it from the shop or something then it’s not going to be easy 
because you’re stealing it from someone who owns it. But if  you found it like on the street 
or something now and you stole it, it wouldn’t really be any point either because you’re not 
going to eat it if it’s on the street. And it’s just lazy stealing a penny sweet because how 
long is it going to take you to save up for that? It won’t take you any time to save up.
END
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T ra n s c r ip t  46 (6 th class): A re  girls b e tte r  o f f  in  single-sex schools fo r  th e ir  
secondary education?
To begin the discussion I read the following:
Are girls better off in single-sex schools for their secondary education?
A lot o f experts tell us that around the age o f 11 or 12, girls begin to feel self-conscious 
about how they look and how they appear to others. An American expert, Carol Gilligan, 
says that girls “lose their voices” at this age. They become fearful of expressing an opinion 
in case they appear foolish or not “cool”, not only in front of boys but also in the presence 
of other girls. What do you think?
Ms Russell: Are girls better off in a single-sex school where they are able to and are not 
afraid to express an opinion? Do boys inhibit you or is it your peers?
Evy: I think they do because boys are like mean to girls. They slag them sometimes. If you 
fancy a boy you must look nice in front of him but if you were in another school [an all-
girls’ school] you wouldn’t have to look, ah well, you’d concentrate on your study.
Grace: I agree with Evy because that would actually happen in some schools.
Ms Russell: I wonder does it happen in this class. I know when I had you in 2nd class some 
of you were very talkative and said a lot but by the time you’ve come to 6th class you’ve 
gone very quiet and I’m wondering why.
Sally Sm.: When I was in 2nd class, everyone was just, there was no messing and it was 
very strict. In an all-girls school it’s better for their education.
Caoimhe O: Yea, in our class it is kind of embarrassing to talk. You’d probably talk more 
in an all-girls school.
Jacinta: I think when you’re expressing your opinion in our class they think you’re stupid 
and you get laughed at by boys and you get all embarrassed and it stops you from talking at 
all.
Jane: It really depends on who the girls are because if you say something stupid the girls 
tell you it’s no good. If you say something to your best friend they’re going to say nothing. 
They’re just going to say “Oh that’s alright” or something like that. I half agree with Evy 
sometimes. In girls schools you do want to look your best. Girls do like to put make-up on.
Clodagh; I agree with Evy.
Grace: I agree with Jane.
Ms Russell: Why do you agree with her? What do you think?
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Grace: Because if you’re in a girls school you might want to like being better looking than 
other girls.
Caoimhe M: I agree with whoever said that they’re afraid to talk in our class because they’d 
feel self-conscious about what they said. If they made a mistake most o f the people in the 
class would laugh at you and you would get all embarrassed.
Ms Russell: I wonder who would you be afraid most o f laughing at you, the boys or is it the 
girls? If you had girls only would you be afraid o f being laughed at? I’m just wondering.
Sally Sm: No. I think if you’re in a, if it’s just girls you don’t mind saying something stupid 
because they’re not going to laugh at you but if  it’s boys they will.
Caoimhe O: Yea, but girls do sometimes. If you’re going to Secondary, they’ll all be still 
laughing at you. I don’t think it’s a real difference.
Jane: I think if, the only reason I’m not going to a girls’ school is girls not only laugh at you 
in front o f your face, they talk about you behind your back and that’s worse than laughing 
at you. If you’re in a girls’ school and if you had a best friend you can stick with your 
friends. The other girls would get in a group and go against you.
Ms Russell: Clodagh, are you happy in the group? Say something now. We’re not laughing 
at you. We’re laughing with you.
Evy: I would prefer to go to an all-girls school and I am. I don’t like male teachers because 
if I had a girl’s problem, if  you had a boy teacher you wouldn’t be able to tell him.
Caoimhe M: Evy, there is men teachers in Sxxxxx [Laughter]
Ms Russell: So, is that what stops girls from expressing their opinion, a fear of looking 
foolish is it? Is it your physical appearance, how you look, if you’re fat or thin or is it that 
you’re afraid that what you say is going to be foolish?
Jacinta: I think when you’re in a mixed school you’d still be slagged by boys and all over 
your fatness or your skinniness. Some people in an all-girls school would still be the same. 
So like, some people don’t care what they look like but others want to be all pretty and all. 
You don’t make up going to an all-girls school. Girls don’t mind but when you go in there 
is some p eop le and they go against you.
Evy; When you go into an all-girls school and when you like start off you feel like you’ve 
been in, but after a while sometimes people bully you and things like that.
Saoirse: Wherever you are you’re going to get bullied and most likely you’re going to get 
bullied by boys because it’s like their nature. But like, when you’re in an all-girls school, if 
you have a best friend they’d stick by you and they’d stand up for you. After a while they 
will slag you and they’ll go behind your back and talk but they won’t say it to your face - -
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- If you’re in a mixed school you’re more likely to get slagged by the boys because they 
have to live up to, they’d have to keep up their
Evy: reputation
Saoirse: Yea, their reputation going with the other boys. If they don’t slag you you’ll be a 
goody-goody and stuff. But girls, it depends on the girls.
Caoimhe O: I wanted to go to a girls’ school because I didn’t want the boys to slag me.
Ms Russell: You’d be afraid of being slagged by the boys and it would stop you from 
giving an opinion, would it?
Caoimhe O: Yea.
Ms Russell: And is that why you don’t give an opinion usually [in Thinking Time]? 
Caoimhe O.: Yea, most of the time I can’t think of anything to say.
Ms Russell: Well now you’ve said it, so well done!
Ms Russell: Well I’ve noticed in your class that the boys aren’t afraid at all of how they 
look. Maybe they are, maybe that’s why they talk. As Saoirse said they want to keep up 
their reputation in front of each other. But the boys are always confident in their opinion. 
Whether it’s a good opinion or not they give it and the girls always stay quiet. The girls 
seem to be worried about what the boys think but the boys don’t seem to worry about what 
the girls think.
Sally Sm: I think in a girls’ school there’s more bitchiness and fighting.
Caoimhe O: I think in a mixed school, I think they’re both the same. In a mixed school, just 
because the boys are just younger, but when they get a bit older, they just mature and stop 
it. But in a girls’ school people mature as well. It’s just their age.
Jane: I agree with Saoirse because ....... You don’t pay attention to boys. It’s just their
nature, as Saoirse says. Boys won’t go off and talk about “that girl”, what she did because 
they don’t bother. But girls, they do. They go behind your back and they talk about “that 
girl”.
Clodagh: I agree with Sally.
Caoimhe M: I think half the reason why boys bully girls is because some other boys might 
think that they’re brave. And when someone new would come into the school they’d take 
on them but they wouldn’t be so into bullying. But then they’d kind o f feel that they’d have 
to bully to stay in their group.
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Ms Russell: So are boys and girls basically different when it comes to friendship? Do boys 
not back-stab each other at all? Is it only girls who do that?
Sally Sm: In Sxxxxx, every month there’s a girl, if  anyone is bully you, you can go to a
teacher and sort out the bullying. I think you should have that in every school.
Caoimhe O: Yea, boys aren’t afraid to like, they just speak about what they think to others. 
But like girls, they’re more quiet. They just say it to their friends.
Jacinta: Girls would probably, they’d slag others more than getting in a fight with them.
Boys don’t really slag. They just have to have fights.
Jane: You should have a friend in every school. Boys don’t talk in their group because 
they’re all friends. They express what they feel in a fight. But like girls are just talking 
among themselves. They’d call names behind your back and that’s the difference between 
boys and girls.
Evy: I agree with Jane because like the girls in this school, they wouldn’t like kill you or 
beat you up, just slagging. But the boys push you around and stuff. In mixed schools, the 
boys just kill each other. The girls just, they would slag each other. They wouldn’t start a 
fight because they’re afraid they might get in trouble but the boys wouldn’t care. The boys 
couldn’t care less. They just kill each other.
Caoimhe M: Like Evy was saying, if you fancy a boy you’d try to look good in front o f  
him. That would take you away from, you’d concentrate on them more than anything and 
you kind of, your education would go down a bit because you wouldn’t be listening to what 
the teacher would be saying. You’d just be listening to that boy.
Saoirse: I think that boys only like to kill each other because they want to be, yea, they 
want to live up to their reputation because I heard a few boys talking here and they were 
saying: “Oh I think I’m the boldest in the class because I’ve got in trouble this many times 
and I got sent to Mr X ’s office this many times. And I slag this many girls and I like to do 
this. They’re just stupid.
Anna: I agree with Saoirse.
Ms Russell: Yea, that’s interesting what you said there Saoirse. They’ve a different way of, 
they’re proud o f getting into trouble. What you were saying there is what the experts say, 
that some girls don’t do well in mixed schools because they’re more concerned about how 
they look in front o f the boys rather than concentrating on their studies. So I wonder how 
many o f you are going to go to mixed schools [for secondary school education].
Sally Sm: I’m going to Sxxxxx. I want to go there. I think in a mixed school there’s more 
bullying and in Sxxxxx you’re not allowed to bully. You’d get detention.
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Caoimhe O: Yea, in Sxxxxx even though there’s no bullying, they still do it after school. 
And if you say anything they just get you again and no one really tells on you.
Jacinta: I’m going to Gxxxxx which is a mixed school. I probably prefer to go to that 
because there’s bitching between girls and all. If you’re going to a mixed school the boys 
wouldn’t bully you as much as the girls. They probably wouldn’t start it that much at all, 
just say names. You’d probably get a better education in an all-girls school.
Jane: I’m going to Gxxxxx, If you were putting on make-up sometimes the boys won’t pay 
any attention to you even if you do that. If I put on make-up to impress a boy and he didn’t 
pay any attention, I wouldn’t care. I’d get on with my study.
Evy: I agree with Jane because in an all-girls school like, they don’t care which way they 
go in. I saw a girl going and her hair was out like this. They don’t brush their hair or 
anything because there’s no boys in the school to impress. But in a mixed school you see 
these girls going in with big hoops and make-up on their faces and their hair nicely done. 
It’s crazy. They just want to impress the boys.
Grace: I ’m glad I ’m going to Nxxxxx because my mam wants me to go to Mxxxxx. It’s 
very big and I prefer Mxxxxx.
Caoimhe M: I prefer to go to another mixed school like Nxxxxx, which I am. But I think 
that after you finish a conversation with someone like this when speaking out, you might 
have a bit more confidence to express your opinion in a mixed school afterwards.
Saoirse: I disagree with Evy because in Sxxxxx you see them going in with loads of make­
up on and the big hoops and everything. You see them at the bus stop waiting.
Evy: Boys can see them then you see.
Saoirse: But they still put on make-up and stuff and in Nxxxxx they do as well. I think that 
girls, they prefer to look nice. In Santa Sabina you’re still going to get slagged because girls
don’t physically beat you. But th ey  you’re hurt because your feelings are hurt more.
You get over being bullied in a mixed school. I’d say that mixed schools are better.
Anna: I agree with Saoirse.
Ms Russell: Is it only for the boys that people put on make-up or do girls want to look nice 
for their own sake, look beautiful for yourself? And are girls more cruel to each other than 
boys would be to them?
Sally Sm: I put on make-up and stuff. It isn’t to impress the boys. It’s just to look nice. I 
don’t think there’s any point because no matter what you look like, you’re not going to be
liked because you have make-up o n  . I think that’s stupid judging people by what they
look like.
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Jacinta: I think girls would bully each other more than boys would bully because girls are 
more vicious and slagging and all. They just keep slagging you and all. If girls did fight 
they wouldn’t talk for a few weeks or something. But boys they’d have a fight one day and 
they’d probably be friends the next.
Jane: I agree with Jacinta and Saoirse. I had a fight with this boy on my road and the next 
day he came up to my house and told me he was sorry. And I thought that was really nice. 
But if I had a fight with a girl it would go on for weeks and weeks. I’d want to go up and 
say “sorry”, but if I went they’d probably walk away or run away - and girls do want to 
look nice even if it’s an all-girls school.
Clodagh: I agree with Sally.
Evy: Boys in our class only like girls with am, am, I can’t say it.
Ms Russell: You can say it if you like.
All: [Laughter]
Evy: Boobies!
Ms Russell [laughing]: That’s natural!
Evy: I know because they don’t like me. They like boobies and I’m straight. Everyone 
always slags me because of that. If you were in an all-girls school they will kind of still slag 
you. I agree with Jacinta because in a mixed school they would put more make-up on to 
impress the boys. Some girls might put it on just for fun like if they want to look nice. But 
why do they want to look nice? Boys! [laughter]. In an all-girls school there’s loads of 
bitching going on and they’re all fighting. I agree with Jane. The fights, they go on for ages 
and ages until somebody says “sorry”. If the boys have a fight, next day they’re friends.
Caoimhe M: I think girls are more cruel mentally than physically because I think they 
prefer to hurt people’s feelings than actually hurt them [physically],
Saoirse: I think girls put on make-up to give themselves more confidence as well.
Ms Russell: Would you really say what you think all the time even with other girls or 
would you be afraid of saying what you really think and feel with other girls?
Sally Sm: I would. Say if there were boys around I wouldn’t in case they’d call me 
“stupid”. I agree with Evy and Jane as well because loads of people around here are 
smoking I think it’s horrible. Most of them do it to impress boys and the boys might think 
they’re nice because they smoke and wear make-up.
Jacinta: I agree with Sally Smith because some girls, not all girls, some girls go away and 
start drinking and smoking and looking gorgeous all around boys. They do all that and then
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think it’s cool to do that and then they’ll [the boys] like them. If they do homework they’ll 
slag them and they wouldn’t go out with them then. But if they look gorgeous and smoke 
and drink they would.
Jane: My mam told me to say what I think and if everybody else says one thing it doesn’t 
mean I have to. I have to say what I think.
Clodagh: I agree with Jacinta and Sally.
Evy: Yea, I agree with Jacinta because if somebody says “Oh I love that thing” and I don’t 
really like it, I would just say it because they’d think I’m weird because I didn’t like it or 
something. Yea, my mam told me to say what I think instead of other people lead you, say 
what they say, do what they do. Just do your own thing.
Grace: 1 know a girl down in Wexford and she’s fifteen and she’s smoking and drinking 
since she was like ten and she goes out with all her sister’s friends. They don’t go out with 
her because of her looks. They go out with her because she has a helicopter, a boat and all. 
They don’t like her for her looks. They like her for her money.
Caoimhe M: Well, I’d be afraid to express my opinion normally in front of girls and boys, 
if I was only with girls and boys. You’d just think that you’d feel stupid if you said the 
wrong thing. They’d all laugh at you and be mean to you for a while until they went over to 
you and said “Sorry, we didn’t mean to laugh at you. We thought it was a joke or 
something”.
Saoirse: T think that am, it depends on the type of girls, like here. I’m not really scared to 
express my opinion here because there’s no girls here who’d go off and slag you. But like 
in front of boys they would. And I’d say that most girls, depending on the girls that they’re 
with, they’ll slag you. Does that make sense to you?
Ms Russell: Yes, that does make sense. Is it a big risk then to say what you think because of 
what could happen to you? You’d be excluded and laughed at. Is it a big risk to say what 
you think even with girls your own age?
Sally Sm: I have this friend since when I was four. She moved in from Stillorgan and she 
moved to England and she came back two years ago. She’s thirteen and she asked me did I 
want to go to town with her and her friends and I said “Yea” because they’re a lot older. 
She was smoking and I never thought she’d do anything like that. She was always smoking 
because she liked boys and they liked her and she smoked and drank with them and that’s 
why they like her. And she told me not to tell anyone so I can’t. Then her mam came down 
and she was grounded for a few months. Her mam might be sending her to a boarding 
school because her mam has five other kids and she can’t mind her because she’s done it a 
few times, came in drunk.
Caoimhe O: I don’t think it’s a big risk to say what I think but I feel more comfortable 
among girls.
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Jacinta: Sometimes I’m afraid to express my opinion because like if you’re doing a picture 
in class or drawing they start slagging you: “You’re stupid, can’t draw” and you’re afraid to 
ask them how to make a different picture because they might actually slag you over it.
Jane: It depends how close you are to them people. If you’re really good friends, well then 
it’s not a risk to take, but if they’re not they’ll go off and say things about you.
Clodagh: I agree with Caoimhe.
Ms Russell: How do you know then whether your friends really value you for yourself or 
whether they’re after you because you have something they want. You drink with them. 
You smoke with them. How do you know they really value you for what you are in 
yourself?
Sally Sm: Well, I would never smoke and drink but some of my friends do. If I found that 
they were I’d let them. If they - for something that I had I wouldn’t really. That’s what 
some friends do with other people because they have money. One of my friends got a new 
go-cart and then everyone wanted to play with him and then the next week no one wanted 
to even play with him.
Jacinta: There’s a girl I know on my road, covers herself in make-up and she smokes and 
drinks and all, all short skirts and all and stopped doing all work. She did that because of 
the boys and she thinks they all like her and all. But like some of them don’t. She has 
asthma and she smokes. She comes home and she’s always coughing and she’s sick 
sometimes.
Jane: If you want to know if people liked you for what you are, if you wouldn’t smoke or 
you wouldn’t drink and if they didn’t hang around with you because you didn’t smoke or 
drink or didn’t wear make-up. Well that really says they’re not really your friends----
Clodagh: I agree with Jane.
Evy: Yea. A girl who used to be a nice girl called Robin, she smokes. It’s crazy because 
they only do it for boys. Like Jane said, they only do it for boys. If there’s no boys in the 
world, I know you wouldn’t be able to have babies, but girls would get a lot better and stuff 
[giggling],
Caoimhe M: I agree with Jane, to put them to the te s t If you didn’t drink or smoke or
wear make-up and wear short skirts for them you should just, it would stop to see if they 
were your true friends.
Saoirse: I don’t think all girls smoke and drink because of boys. Some because like, their 
parents smoke and drink and do all that sort of stuff. I think sometimes they think that 
that’s right so they should do it.
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Ms Russell: If you only do things like that just to impress others, does it make you feel 
false?
Sally Sm: Some people, well they’ve been taught not to smoke and drink. Their mother and 
father sm oke they’re always coughing.
Caoimhe 0 : A lot o f girls don’t just put make-up on to impress the boys all the time or 
drink and all. Sometimes they just want to look good or feel better.
Jacinta: I agree with Saoirse and Caoimhe because some girls are raised in families like that 
and some try to impress boys.
Jane: I agree with Jacinta. It’s the area you grow up in. Like I’d see myself and if they 
didn’t take me for who I was, well then they’re not really your friends. You just be 
yourself.
Evy: Well some girls, I know they probably put make-up on but they don’t smoke and 
drink for boys. They just do it to feel confident in themselves, like Caoimhe said. I saw 
these girls and they had make-up on and they saw these boys and they were pulling up their 
skirts and getting their hair [starts to run fingers through hair] and the boys started walking
over to them. So like, if they had been normal peop le  the boys wouldn’t have come
over to them.
Grace: 1 don’t see the point in smoking to impress boys. While you’re smoking you’re 
affecting your health. If you want to spend time [smoking] you won’t be enjoying yourself 
because your health will be affected.
Caoimhe M: I think people want the boys to pay attention to them, or they don’t smoke or 
they don’t drink. If they don’t really want the boys to pay attention to them, well they’ll put 
make-up on anyway. They probably want to feel confident in themselves.
Sally Sm: If I was a boy I think I’d prefer to hang around with girls who don’t smoke. I 
don’t know why girls smoke and drink just because they want the boys like.
Caoimhe 0: There’s some boys who just don’t like girls for who they are. Even if my 
brother sees someone they don’t have to be all dressed up. He still likes them even with 
make-up.
Jacinta: 1 agree with Grace and Jane because like if you start smoking and drinking for a 
boy, you’re risking your health and your future because in the future if you’re having a 
baby, drugs, drink and smokes could affect your child and all.
Jane: I agree with Jacinta. If you’re smoking to impress a boy, well then that’s not going to 
really help you in the future because you’re damaging yourself and that boy is not going to
Anna: I agree w ith  Saoirse.
34
be with you. You could probably marry him or something and like Jacinta said if you y/ant 
to have a baby that mightn’t ............. [inaudible]
Sally Sm: How many of you would smoke just like to impress a boy? Or drink? If the boy 
you like and he smokes and drinks, would you just start smoking and drinking like, just for 
one boy?
Caoimhe O: No, I wouldn’t. If I wanted to do it I would. I wouldn’t just do it for a boy. If 
they didn’t like me the way I am, I just wouldn’t be with them.
Jacinta: I don’t think you should smoke or drink for a fella’ because if he’s just going after 
your looks and all. And then you’re going out with each other, he’ll just dump you and go 
with someone else who’s nicer looking because he’s not going for like your intelligence.
Grace: None of my friends smoke. There’s no need to because if they had the pressure of 
boys and stuff and the boys put a pressure [inaudible]
[I am beginning to feel that the topic is exhausted but since many o f  these girls have been 
reluctant to speak in other sessions I  allow the topic to drift on and let the girls have their 
say]
Caoimhe M: I don’t like wearing make-up or smoking or drinking or anything. If a boy 
asks you out you should just be yourselves and let them know to make sure of your 
decision.
Saoirse: Girls who do all that stuff for boys, I think they have no, they don’t care about 
themselves. They care more about other people than they do about themselves.
Evy: I think girls who do that are stupid in a way. Like who’d want to do that to 
themselves? I want to be alive when I’m seventy-five [laughter in the group]
Ms Russell: Is that it then? Is there anyone?
Evy: People who smoke and drink. They die about seventy. They die really young. If they 
had children, the children would want the mammies and daddies to grow older and older, to 
live longer.
Sally Sm: My dad smokes. I don’t like him smoking. Sometimes I’m afraid in case he 
might, my best friend -  his dad smokes and he died two years ago of cancer. My dad 
smokes and I do be afraid that he’ll get cancer,
Jacinta: My mam smokes. She used to and then she went off them for two years. Then
when stress came along she went back on them and all and like as Sally sa id  My
mam’s best friend’s husband died of drinking and smoking.
Ms Russell (about to round up but Evy insists): Very short and to the point.
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Evy: My dad smokes. I’m still afraid that he’s gonna die.
Grace: My dad used to smoke 60 -  80 cigarettes a day and he made himself give up four 
years ago. And he’s disgusted when people smoke. My neighbour died two years ago. He 
was only fifty-one. He never smoked and he never drank in his life.
Saoirse: My mam and Larry smoke and they’d smoke a packet and a half a day. Larry, he’s 
been trying to stop and my mam won’t stop. The living room gets really smoky. We’re 
moving to Spain, so when we’ve got all the pictures over in Spain there’s this big patch on 
the wall. All the wall is grey from all the smoke. We always have to go upstairs because I 
don’t want to be there.
Ms Russell (rounding up while others insist on speaking): Is it a story about smoking? I 
think we have enough stories about smoking now. [The tape is running out]
END
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